Monday, October 12, 2015

He has new papers on school choice

Yingua He that is, and coauthors Gabrielle Fack and Julien Grenet, and Antonio Miralles, Marek Pycia and Jianye Yan.

You can find them at the links below.

Abstract: We propose novel approaches and tests for estimating student preferences with data from school choice mechanisms, e.g., the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance. Without requiring truth-telling to be the unique equilibrium, we show the matching is (asymptotically) stable, or justified-envy-free, implying that everyone is assigned to her favorite school among those she is qualified for ex post. Having validated the approaches and tests in simulations, we apply them to Parisian data and reject truth-telling but not stability. The estimates are then used to evaluate the sorting and welfare effects of the admission criteria that determine how schools rank students in centralized mechanisms.

Abstract: We propose a pseudo-market mechanism for no-transfer allocation of indivisible objects that honors priorities such as those in school choice. Agents are given token money, face priority-specific prices, and buy utility-maximizing assignments. The mechanism is asymptotically incentive compatible, and the resulting assignments are fair and constrained Pareto efficient. Hylland and Zeckhauser's (1979) position-allocation problem is a special case of our framework, and our results on incentives and fairness are also new in their classical setting.

1 comment:

Yinghua He said...

He thanks you very much, Al :-)