Showing posts with label mechanism design. Show all posts
Showing posts with label mechanism design. Show all posts

Friday, February 9, 2024

Celebrate Vince Crawford in Budapest at the CONFERENCE ON MECHANISM AND INSTITUTION DESIGN in July. (Call for papers...)

 Here's the announcement:

CONFERENCE ON MECHANISM AND INSTITUTION DESIGN

The 2024 Conference on Mechanism and Institution Design will take place in Budapest, Hungary, July 8-12, 2024, and be hosted by Corvinus University of Budapest. It will be an in-person meeting. This biannual conference is under the umbrella of the Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design (SPMiD)The conference will also celebrate Vincent Crawford’s 75th birthday and his fundamental contributions to economic theory, game theory, and the Society.


The confirmed keynote speakers include:

Call for papers

The theme of the conference is on mechanism and institution design, interpreted in a general sense. The conference welcomes papers in all areas of economics, finance, computer science, law, and politics, etc., which are related to mechanisms and institutions. The topics include but are not limited to game theory and foundations, auction design, mechanism design, market design, information design, market and equilibrium, assignments, contests, bargaining, matching, college admission, election schemes, political institutions, public good provision, algorithmic mechanism design, algorithmic game theory, computational social choice, engineering economics, nonlinear pricing, law and litigation, voting, sports, economic reform, regulation, taxation schemes, school choice, governance, corporate finance, cryptocurrency, financial institutions, capital structure, incentives in labor market, social choice, information and learning, decision theory, platform, network, etc. Papers can be theoretical, empirical, experimental, or historical. Young economists including senior PhD students are encouraged to submit their papers.

Saturday, January 20, 2024

AEA's lockbox: recording allegations while reserving the right to report them

The American Economic Association has announced that they have initiated a Reporting Lockbox – Now Available to Members, meant to allow members to record transgressions such as sexual harassment while reserving and preserving the right to report them later, if the same individual is named as an offender by someone else. The idea is to allow repeat offenders to be identified, even if each offense might be too ambiguous to justify an immediate complaint.

"The Reporting Lockbox enables AEA members who are not yet ready to file a formal complaint to log circumstances or conduct by other members that may violate the AEA’s policy against harassment, discrimination, and retaliation. If two or more AEA members log alleged incidents of harassment, discrimination, or retaliation perpetrated by the same person by making entries in this digital archive and indicating a willingness to communicate with other alleged victims, each member who logged an incident will be contacted separately to determine if each would consider communicating with the other members, or to otherwise keep the submission active or withdraw it. A mutual decision to contact the other members who logged an incident about the same alleged perpetrator could lead to their filing a formal complaint with the AEA Ethics Committee or pursuing other options outside of the AEA.

"The AEA will not have access to the Reporting Lockbox, and therefore will not know the identities of members or persons of interest unless action is taken by the members through the filing of a formal complaint to the AEA. Users of the Lockbox can edit or remove entries at any time."
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Earlier related post:

Wednesday, November 1, 2017

Tuesday, November 8, 2022

Mathematics and Computer Science of Market and Mechanism Design, at Berkeley MSRI, August 21-December 20, 2023 (applications open)

 Apply now to join a semester of interdisciplinary workshops on market and mechanism design, from the point of view of mathematicians, computer scientists, and economists.

Mathematicsand Computer Science of Market and Mechanism Design at the Mathematical Sciences Research Institute in Berkeley, California, August 21, 2023 to December 20, 2023

 Seeking applications for Research Members and Postdoctoral Fellows:

  • Research Members are scholars in economics, computer science, operations research, mathematics, or related fields who have a PhD at the time of application and will be in residence for at least 30 consecutive days of the program.
  • Postdoctoral Fellows are scholars in those fields who received their PhD on or after August 31, 2018, and will be in residence for the entire program.

Apply here by December 1, 2022https://www.msri.org/web/msri/scientific/member-application

 Program Summary:

In recent years, economists and computer scientists have collaborated with mathematicians, operations research experts, and practitioners to improve the design and operations of real-world marketplaces. Such work relies on robust feedback between theory and practice, inspiring new mathematics closely linked – and directly applicable – to market and mechanism design questions. This cross-disciplinary program seeks to expand the domains in which existing market design solutions can be applied; address foundational questions regarding our ways of developing and evaluating mechanisms; and build useful analytic frameworks for applying theory to practical marketplace design.

 https://www.msri.org/programs/333

 Program Organizers:

Michal Feldman (Tel-Aviv University); Nicole Immorlica (Microsoft Research); Scott Kominers (Harvard Business School); Shengwu Li (Harvard University); Paul Milgrom (Stanford University); Alvin Roth (Stanford University); Tim Roughgarden (Columbia University); Eva Tardos (Cornell University)

 About MSRI:

Acknowledged as the premier center for collaborative mathematical research, MSRI  organizes and hosts semester-length programs that become the leading edge in that field of study. Mathematicians worldwide come to the Institute to engage in the research of classical fundamental mathematics, modern applied mathematics, statistics, computer science and other mathematical sciences.

 Questions? See attached flyer, or reach out to mcsorgs@msri.org

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This could be a nice way to spend a semester--apply now (MSRI loves company:)


Wednesday, July 6, 2022

Mark Braverman wins Abacus Medal (formerly Nevanlinna Prize)

 Mark Braverman, a computer scientist whose work touches on mechanism design, has won the Abacus Medal of the International Mathematical Union.

Here are some links: citationvideowrite-upCV/publicationsproceedingsinterviewPlus magazine! article

Readers of this blog may be interested in these papers:

Optimization-friendly generic mechanisms without money

"The goal of this paper is to develop a generic framework for converting modern optimization algorithms into mechanisms where inputs come from self-interested agents. We focus on aggregating preferences from n players in a context without money. Special cases of this setting include voting, allocation of items by lottery, and matching. Our key technical contribution is a new meta-algorithm we call \apex (Adaptive Pricing Equalizing Externalities). The framework is sufficiently general to be combined with any optimization algorithm that is based on local search. We outline an agenda for studying the algorithm's properties and its applications. As a special case of applying the framework to the problem of one-sided assignment with lotteries, we obtain a strengthening of the 1979 result by Hylland and Zeckhauser on allocation via a competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI). The [HZ79] result posits that there is a (fractional) allocation and a set of item prices such that the allocation is a competitive equilibrium given prices. We further show that there is always a reweighing of the players' utility values such that running unit-demand VCG with reweighed utilities leads to a HZ-equilibrium prices. Interestingly, not all HZ competitive equilibria come from VCG prices. As part of our proof, we re-prove the [HZ79] result using only Brouwer's fixed point theorem (and not the more general Kakutani's theorem). This may be of independent interest."

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Clearing Matching Markets Efficiently: Informative Signals and Match Recommendations by Itai Ashlagi , Mark Braverman, Yash Kanoria , Peng Shi , Management Science, 2020, 66(5), pp.2163-2193.  https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3265

Abstract: "We study how to reduce congestion in two-sided matching markets with private preferences. We measure congestion by the number of bits of information that agents must (i) learn about their own preferences, and (ii) communicate with others before obtaining their final match. Previous results suggest that a high level of congestion is inevitable under arbitrary preferences before the market can clear with a stable matching. We show that when the unobservable component of agent preferences satisfies certain natural assumptions, it is possible to recommend potential matches and encourage informative signals such that the market reaches a stable matching with a low level of congestion. Moreover, under our proposed approach, agents have negligible incentive to leave the marketplace or to look beyond the set of recommended partners. The intuitive idea is to only recommend partners with whom there is a nonnegligible chance that the agent will both like them and be liked by them. The recommendations are based on both the observable component of preferences and signals sent by agents on the other side that indicate interest."

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Update: from Quanta.

The Scientist Who Developed a New Way to Understand Communication. Mark Braverman has spent his career translating thorny problems into the language of information complexity.  by Stephen Ornes

"While Braverman continues to guide the theory as his former students and postdocs push it forward, the bulk of his work is done. Now his interests are more focused on a new field called mechanism design, which uses the mathematical approaches of economics and game theory. "

Monday, January 24, 2022

23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC’22)--call for papers (by Feb 10)

 The deadline is 11:59pm EDT on Feb 10, but I'm guessing that papers have a good chance of being received as late as midnight.

23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC’22): Call for Contributions

"TL;DR for Seasoned Authors:

Papers submitted to EC’22 must select one of four methodological tracks and up to two content areas. The list of tracks and content areas can be found below.

EC’22 is continuing the forward-to-journal option as in previous years.

EC’22 is currently planned as a primarily in-person event, with some components (e.g., poster sessions and tutorials) to be held either virtually or in a hybrid format. Presenters of accepted papers who cannot (or do not feel comfortable to) travel to EC’22 will have the option to present their paper virtually.

...

Timetable for Authors

February 10, 2022 (11:59 pm EST): Paper submission deadline

April 11, 2022 (11:59pm EDT): Reviews sent to authors for feedback

April 14, 2022 (11:59pm EDT): Author responses due

May 8, 2022: Paper accept/reject notifications

May 18, 2022 (11:59pm EDT): Camera-ready versions of accepted papers due

July 11-15, 2022: Conference technical program"

...

Program Chairs:

Sven Seuken (University of Zurich and ETH AI Center)

Ilya Segal (Stanford University)

Contact the PC chairs at ec22chairs@gmail.com 

Track Chairs:

Theory: Robert Kleinberg (Cornell University) and Aaron Roth (University of Pennsylvania)

Applied Modeling: Gabriel Weintraub (Stanford University)

Empirics: Georgios Zervas (Boston University)

AI: Kevin Leyton-Brown (University of British Columbia)


EC’22 will use the following areas:

Mechanism design

Auctions and pricing

Market design and matching markets

Contract design

Online platforms and applications

Econometrics, ML, and data science

Equilibria, learning, and dynamics in games

Social choice and voting theory

Social networks and social learning

Fair division

Market equilibria

Crowdsourcing and information elicitation

Privacy, algorithmic fairness, social good, and ethics

Blockchain and cryptocurrencies

Behavioral economics and bounded rationality


Area Chairs: Nick Arnosti (University of Minnesota)  Haris Aziz (University of New South Wales)  Moshe Babaioff (Microsoft Research)  Yakov Babichenko (Technion)  Bruno Biais (Toulouse School of Economics)  Martin Bichler (Technical University of Munich)  Larry Blume (Cornell University)  Liad Blumrosen (Hebrew University)  Benjamin Brooks (University of Chicago) Yang Cai (Yale University)  Agostino Capponi (Columbia University)  Yeon-Koo Che (Columbia University)  Rachel Cummings (Columbia University)  Nikhil Devanur (Amazon)  John Dickerson (University of Maryland)  Laura Doval (Columbia University)  Paul Duetting (Google Research)  Michal Feldman (Tel Aviv University)  Ashish Goel (Stanford University)  Hanna Halaburda (New York University Stern School of Business)  Hoda Heidari (Carnegie Mellon University)  Martin Hoefer (Goethe University Frankfurt)  Ian Kash (University of Illinois at Chicago)  Fuhito Kojima (University of Tokyo)  Nicolas Lambert (MIT)  Jacob Leshno (The University of Chicago Booth School of Business)  Shengwu Li (Harvard University)  Annie Liang (University of Pennsylvania)  Brendan Lucier (Microsoft Research)  Mohammad Mahdian (Google Research)  Azarakhsh Malekian (University of Toronto)  R. Preston McAfee  Reshef Meir (Technion)  Jamie Morgenstern (University of Washington)  Thayer Morril (North Carolina State University)  Denis Nekipelov (University of Virginia)  Sigal Oren (Ben-Gurion University)  Michael Ostrovsky (Stanford University)  Rafael Pass (Cornell University)  Ariel Procaccia (Harvard University)  Marek Pycia (University of Zurich)  Marzena Rostek (University of Wisconsin-Madison)  Jay Sethuraman (Columbia University)  Nisarg Shah (University of Toronto)  Peng Shi (University of Southern California)  Alex Slivkins (Microsoft Research)  Eric Sodomka  Nicolas Stier-Moses (Facebook)  Siddharth Suri (Microsoft Research)  Steve Tadelis (Berkeley–Haas)  Inbal Talgam-Cohen (Technion)  Alexander Teytelboym (University of Oxford)  Utku Unver (Boston College)  Vijay Vazirani (University of California, Irvine)  Jens Witkowski (Frankfurt School of Finance & Management)  James Wright (University of Alberta)  Lirong Xia (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute)  Bumin Yenmez (Boston College)  Yair Zick (University of Massachusetts, Amherst)  Aviv Zohar (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

Wednesday, August 18, 2021

1st ACM Conference on Equity and Access in Algorithms, Mechanisms, and Optimization (EAAMO'21)

 Irene Lo writes:

As many of you may know, I've been part of launching a new ACM conference series and publication venue: the 1st ACM Conference on Equity and Access in Algorithms, Mechanisms, and Optimization (EAAMO'21). Registration is now live, and I'd be delighted to see many of you there! See below for more details.

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We are thrilled to announce that the registration for EAAMO ‘21 is now live! Please register for regular admission on Eventbrite by September 10, 2021.

Conference registration is $20 for ACM members, $15 for students, and $35 for non-ACM members. We also provide financial assistance and data grants in order to waive registration fees and provide data plans to facilitate virtual attendance. Please apply here before September 10, 2021.

A main goal of the conference is to bridge research and practice. Please nominate practitioners working with underserved and disadvantaged communities to join us at the conference (you can also nominate yourself if you are a practitioner). Invited practitioners will be included in facilitated discussions with researchers. 

For more information, please see below or visit our website and contact us at gc@eaamo.org with any questions.

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 The inaugural Conference on Equity and Access in Algorithms, Mechanisms, and Optimization (EAAMO ‘21) will take place on October 5-9, 2021, virtually, on Zoom and Gather.town. EAAMO ‘21 will be sponsored by ACM SIGAI and SIGecom

 

The goal of this event is to highlight work where techniques from algorithms, optimization, and mechanism design, along with insights from the social sciences and humanistic studies, can improve access to opportunity for historically underserved and disadvantaged communities. 

 

The conference aims to foster a multi-disciplinary community, facilitating interactions between academia, industry, and the public and voluntary sectors. The program will feature keynote presentations from researchers and practitioners as well as contributed presentations in the research and policy & practice tracks. 

We are excited to host a series of keynote speakers from a variety of fields: Solomon Assefa (IBM Research), Dirk Bergemann (Yale University), Ellora Derenoncourt (University of California, Berkeley), Ashish Goel (Stanford University), Mary Gray (Microsoft Research), Krishna Gummadi (Max Planck Institute for Software Systems), Avinatan Hassidim (Bar Ilan University), Radhika Khosla (University of Oxford), Sylvia Ortega Salazar (National College of Vocational and Professional Training), and Trooper Sanders (Benefits Data Trust).

 

ACM EAAMO is part of the Mechanism Design for Social Good (MD4SG) initiative, and builds on the MD4SG technical workshop series and tutorials at conferences including ACM EC, ACM COMPASS, ACM FAccT, and WINE.


Wednesday, August 1, 2018

How to split the check using social skills or mechanism design

The Washington Post ran a column yesterday that offers advice on
How to split the check without the accusations and awkwardness.

The article points out that restaurants' point of sale software can help if you alert the waiter before you order.

For other fair-division problems, here's a website, Spliddit , that offers tools (and the underlying references to the literature) to help:


If your problem meets the assumptions of the underlying model, you can take it from there.

This seems to be a project of Ariel Procaccia and various colleagues, with Hervé Moulin   as an advisor.

He has another site, RoboVote, which seems more like a general social choice tool for aggregating information or preferences.

Saturday, April 29, 2017

The 28th Jerusalem School in Economic Theory: Mechanism Design, June 27 - July 6, 2017

The 28th Jerusalem School in Economic Theory

Mechanism Design

Event date: June 27 - July 6, 2017 

Organizers:
    Eric Maskin, General Director (Harvard University)
    Elchanan Ben-Porath, Codirector (The Hebrew University)
    Stephen Morris (Princeton University)



    Mechanism design is the “reverse engineering” part of economic theory. Normally, economists study existing economic institutions and try to predict or explain what outcomes the institutions generate. But in mechanism design we reverse direction: we start by identifying the outcomes we want and then ask what institutions could be designed to achieve those outcomes. The theory has found wide application in auction design, pollution control, public good provision, and elsewhere.

    List of speakers:
    NAMEAFFILIATIONEMAIL
    Elchanan Ben- Porath                             
    The Hebrew University of Jerusalem              
    benporat@math.huji.ac.il
    Ben Brooks
    The University of Chicago
    babrooks@uchicago.edu
    Sylvain Chassang
    New York University
    chassang@nyu.edu
    Eddie Dekel
    Northwestern University and Tel-Aviv University
    eddiedekel@gmail.com
    Sergiu Hart
    The Hebrew University
    hart@huji.ac.il
    Jason Hartline
    Northwestern University
    hartline@northwestern.edu
    Emir Kamenica
    The University of Chicago
    emir.kamenica@chicagobooth.edu
    George Mailath
    University of Pennsylvania
    gmailath@econ.upenn.edu
    Jakub Kastl
    Princeton University
    jkastl@princeton.edu
    Eric Maskin
    Harvard University
    emaskin@fas.harvard.edu
    Stephen Morris
    Princeton University
    smorris@princeton.edu
    Tim Roughgarden
    Stanford University
    tim@cs.stanford.edu
    Ariel Rubinstein
    Tel-Aviv University and New-York University
    rariel@post.tau.ac.il
    Vasiliki Skerta
    University College London
    v.skerta@ucl.ac.uk
    Balazs Szentes
    London School of Economics
    b.szentes@lse.ac.uk