Medical conference code of conduct

  Different fields have different conference cultures, and these change over time.  I've agreed to give a talk at a conference that physicians may attend for Continuing Medical Education (CME) credit, and it came with the following list of things for me to attest. Most of them seem to be assurances that my discussion will not be influenced by companies that have paid me in some way.

Attestations

• The content and/or presentation of the information with which I am involved will promote quality or improvements in health care and will not promote a specific proprietary business interest of an ineligible company.
• Content for this activity, including any presentation of therapeutic options, will be well-balanced, unbiased, and evidence-based. Opinions that are not supported by evidence or are supported by limited or preliminary evidence will be so identified. Recommendations involving clinical medicine will be based on evidence that is accepted within the profession of medicine as adequate justification for their indications and contraindications in the care of patients. All scientific research referred to will conform to the generally accepted standard of experimental design, data collection, and analysis.
• I have not and will not accept any honoraria, additional payments, or reimbursements directly for this CE activity from an ineligible company.
• I understand that my presentation and/or content may need to be peer-reviewed prior to the activity, and will provide educational content and resources in advance as requested.
• If I am discussing specific healthcare products or services, I will use generic names to the extent possible. If I need to use trade names, I will use trade names from several companies when available, and not just trade names from any single company.
• If I am discussing any product use that is off-label, I will disclose that the use or indication in question is not currently approved by the FDA.
• If I have been trained or utilized by a commercial interest or its agent as a speaker (e.g., speaker's bureau) for any ineligible company, the promotional aspects of that presentation will not be included in any way with this activity.
• If I am presenting research funded by a commercial interest, the information presented will be based on generally accepted scientific principles and methods and will not promote the ineligible company or the funding company

 

Stanford Economics Site Conferences 2022

Here's the full set of sessions for this summer: 

Program Overview

• How Should We Fund Science? (June 30-June 30, 2022)
• The Economics of Animal Welfare (July 12-July 12, 2022)
• Empirical Implementation of Theoretical Models of Strategic Interaction and Dynamic Behavior (July 13-July 15, 2022)
• New Frontiers in Asset Pricing (July 18-July 20, 2022)
• Dynamic Games, Contracts, and Markets (August 8-August 10, 2022)
• Gender (August 11-August 12, 2022)
• Political Economic Theory (August 11-August 12, 2022)
• Macroeconomics and Inequality (August 15-August 17, 2022)
• Experimental Economics (August 15-August 16, 2022)
• Psychology and Economics (August 17-August 19, 2022)
• The Micro and Macro of Labor Markets (August 22-August 23, 2022)
• Migration (August 25-August 26, 2022)
• Labor Markets and Policies (August 29-August 31, 2022)
• Financial Regulation (August 29-August 31, 2022)
• IO of Healthcare and Consumer Finance Markets (August 31-September 1, 2022)
• Housing & Urban Economics (September 7-September 9, 2022)
• Climate Finance, Innovation and Challenges for Policy (September 12-September 13, 2022)
• The Macroeconomics of Uncertainty and Volatility (September 14-September 16, 2022)

Academic (computer science) conferences as marketplaces

Eppstein and Vazirani propose a centralized marketplace for computer science conferences:

A Market for TCS Papers??
November 19, 2019 by Kevin Leyton-Brown

By David Eppstein & Vijay Vazirani

"No, not to make theoreticians rich! Besides, who will buy your papers anyway? (Quite the opposite, you will be lucky if you can convince someone to take them for free, just for sake of publicity!) What we are proposing is a market in which no money changes hands – a matching market – for matching papers to conferences.

"At present we are faced with massive inefficiencies in the conference process – numerous researchers are trapped in unending cycles of submit … get reject … incorporate comments … resubmit — often to the next deadline which has been conveniently arranged a couple of days down the road so the unwitting participants are conditioned into mindlessly keep coming back for more, much like Pavlov’s dog.

"We are proposing a matching market approach to finally obliterate this madness. We believe such a market is feasible using the following ideas. No doubt our scheme will have some drawbacks; however, as should be obvious, the advantages far outweigh them.

"First, for co-located symposia within a larger umbrella conference, such as the
conferences within ALGO or FCRC, the following process should be a no-brainer:

1). Ensure a common deadline for all symposia; denote the latter by S.

2). Let R denote the set of researchers who wish to submit one paper to a symposium in this umbrella conference – assume that researchers submitting more than one paper will have multiple names, one for each submission. Each researcher will provide a strict preference order over the subset of symposia to which they wish to submit their paper. Let G denote the bipartite graph with vertex sets (R, S) and an edge (r, s) only if researcher r chose symposium s.

3). The umbrella conference will have a large common PC with experts representing all of its symposia. The process of assigning papers to PC members will of course use G in a critical way.

"Once papers are reviewed by PC members and external reviewers, each symposium will rank its submissions using its own criteria of acceptance. We believe the overhead of ranking each paper multiple times is minimal since that is just an issue of deciding how “on-topic” a paper is – an easy task once the reviews of the paper are available.

4). Finally, using all these preference lists, a researcher-proposing stable matching is computed using the Gale-Shapley algorithm. As is well-known, this mechanism will be dominant strategy incentive compatible for researchers." 

"With a little extra effort, a similar scheme can also be used for a group of conferences at diverse locations but similar times, such as some of the annual summer theory conferences, STOC, ICALP, ESA, STAC, WADS/SWAT, etc.

Upcoming market design conferences in May and July, in Switzerland and Russia

Here are announcements to two conferences:

MATCH-UP 2019
5th International Workshop on Matching Under Preferences
Congressi Stefano Franscini, Monte Verità, Ascona, Switzerland
26-29 May 2019

MATCH-UP 2019, the 5th International Workshop on Matching Under Preferences, will be held in the Congressi Stefano Franscini, Monte Verità, Ascona, Switzerland from Sunday 26 May – Wednesday 29 May 2019. It is the fifth in the series of interdisciplinary and international workshops on matching under preferences.

Matching problems with preferences occur in widespread applications such as the assignment of school-leavers to universities, junior doctors to hospitals, students to campus housing, children to schools, kidney transplant patients to donors and so on. The common thread is that individuals have preference lists over the possible outcomes and the task is to find a matching of the participants that is in some sense optimal with respect to these preferences.

The remit of this workshop is to explore matching problems with preferences from the perspective of algorithms and complexity, discrete mathematics, combinatorial optimization, game theory, mechanism design and economics, and thus a key objective is to bring together the research communities of the related areas."

**********

Economic Design and Algorithms in St. Petersburg (July 8-10, 2019)

"We are pleased to announce the international conference Economic Design and Algorithms in St. Petersburgorganized by the International Laboratory of Game Theory and Decision Making of Higher School of Economics, Russia.

OVERVIEW
The conference will bring together economists and computer scientists. It will focus on design problems where the methodologies of these two communities interact successfully, including but not limited to:
●    Market design
●    Matching and assignment
●    Voting rules
●    Fair division
●    Information design
●    Auctions
●    Networks
The conference will be preceded by a 2-days Summer School(July 5-6, 2019) which will be announced soon."

Auctions and Market Design Section of INFORMS

Martin Bichler writes:

We are excited about the successful formation of the Auctions and Market Design Section of INFORMS! Please visit and bookmark the INFORMS Auctions and Market Design homepage.

Events organized by the new INFORMS Section in 2018 include:

Cluster on Auctions and Market Design at the INFORMS Annual Meeting Nov. 4-7, 2018 in Phoenix, Arizona

As in the last few years, the cluster (previously the Auctions Cluster) will be chaired by Bob Day. Please email Bob at robert.day@uconn.edu if you are interested in being a session chair or want to have him find a spot for you in a session.  Please try to respond in the next two weeks (by March 4) to assure your session. Later requests by individual authors will be considered, but the sooner the better to lock in a slot.

Workshop on Mathematical Optimization in Market Design
June 18-19, 2018, Gates Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY (co-located with ACM EC 2018)

We are pleased to announce a new focused workshop co-located with and immediately preceding ACM EC 2018. The workshop will have invited speakers from academia and industry including Itai Ashlagi (Stanford), Peter Cramton (Cologne), Scott Kominers (Harvard), Sébastien Lahaie (Google), Sasa Pekec (Duke), Tuomas Sandholm (CMU), and many more.

The final program and registration will be online end of March at the event website. Please direct questions to Martin Bichler (bichler@in.tum.de).

Section Officers:

• President: Robert Day, School of Business, University of Connecticut
• Vice-President: Martin Bichler, Department of Computer Science, Technical University of Munich
• Secretary: Ben Lubin, School of Business, Boston University
• Treasurer: Thayer Morill, Department of Economics, NC State University

Advisory Board

• Itai Ashlagi, Management Science and Engineering, Stanford University
• Karla Hoffman, School of Engineering, George Mason University
• Paul Milgrom, Department of Economics, Stanford University
• Sasha Pekec, School of Business, Duke University
• Al Roth, Department of Economics, Stanford University
• Tuomas Sandholm, Department of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon University

Experimental macroeconomics

The annual experimental macro workshop and summer school that have in the past been in Barcelona will this year be at Stony Brook (the email address seems to be stonybrook in barcelona:):

Call for Papers: WORKSHOP ON THEORETICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL MACROECONOMICS
The Eighth International Workshop on Theoretical and Experimental Macroeconomics will be held July 18-19, 2017 in Stony Brook, NY as part of the Stony Brook Summer Game Theory Festival.
The keynote speakers for the 2017 workshop are Xavier Gabaix (NYU) and Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé (Columbia University)
Researchers working on behavioral, experimental and theoretical approaches to addressing macroeconomic questions are invited to submit a paper for this two-day conference. The deadline for submissions is March 31, 2017. To submit a paper, please send your paper to stonybrook@upf.edu. 
For several decades, macroeconomic models have been built on explicit micro-foundations about the behavior of firms, consumers and government agencies, leading to closer ties between micro/game theorists and macro theorists.  On the applied side, the assumptions and predictions of macroeconomic models have historically been tested using non-experimental field data, collected mostly by government agencies. An alternative empirical approach attracting increased attention is to evaluate these models using controlled laboratory settings with human subjects, minimizing noisy, unknown, and confounding factors present in field data. Experimental findings can be informative about questions like equilibrium selection or the efficacy of various government policies as well as for the validation of various behavioral theories.
Further information about the Workshop is available at: http://gtcenter.org/Downloads/call_for_papers.pdf

SUMMER SCHOOL IN EXPERIMENTAL MACROECONOMICS: Call for applicants
The 10th Experimental Economics Summer School in Macroeconomics will be held in Stony Brook, NY, USA, from July 17-23, 2017.
The location of the 2017 summer school (and the related workshop) has been changed from Barcelona to Stony Brook, NY, USA.  This year’s summer school will be a part of the Stony Brook Summer Game Theory Festival.
For more details about the summer school including how to apply, visit the summer school webpage:
https://www.upf.edu/leex/events/bleess_2017/index.html
The deadline for applications is Friday, April 7, 2017.
We will provide (shared) accommodation for all invited summer school students in the dorms of the State University of New York (SUNY) at Stony Brook. Depending on our funding we will additionally provide some scholarships to a few students.
Summer school students are also invited to attend the 2-day, 8th International Workshop on Theoretical and Experimental Macroeconomics from July 18-19, 2017 that will also take place in Stony Brook, USA.
Please forward this announcement to all interested parties.
Workshop and summer school organizers:
John Duffy (University of California, Irvine)
Frank Heinemann (Technische Universität Berlin)
Rosemarie Nagel (ICREA, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, and Barcelona GSE)
Shyam Sunder (Yale University)

U.S. academic conferences and the travel ban. What would be the effect of a boycott? Can conferences usefully be moved?

Part of the international reaction to the recent U.S. travel ban on people from seven countries has been a call to boycott U.S. academic conferences.
Here, e.g. is one such call: In Solidarity with People Affected by the ‘Muslim Ban’: Call for an Academic Boycott of International Conferences held in the US
"Among those affected by the Order are academics and students who are unable to participate in conferences and the free communication of ideas. We the undersigned take action in solidarity with those affected by Trump’s Executive Order by pledging not to attend international conferences in the US while the ban persists. We question the intellectual integrity of these spaces and the dialogues they are designed to encourage while Muslim colleagues are explicitly excluded from them."

I have had an opportunity to think about this regarding the ASSA conference run in January by the American Economic Association, and it seems to me that such a boycott won't help the majority of academics (students and professors) from the banned countries who come to our conference, or to many American academic conferences.

In our (the AEA's) particular situation, my sense is that we have had few if any Yemeni and Sudanese economists participating in the AEA meetings, and the people potentially affected by the current U.S. entry bans are mostly Iranian.*  And the majority of Iranians who have participated seem to be working or studying in the U.S.

So…if a travel ban is in place next January, and we moved the conference to some civilized city like Toronto, we would be depriving most of the potential Iranian participants of the ability to attend, since they couldn’t leave and then reliably re-enter the U.S..

My current sense is that the AEA will decide to take care of the Iranians as best we can (which for the minority who aren’t in the U.S. may involve some electronic communication efforts), rather than cater to any economists whose scruples would require us to abandon the Iranians living and working in the U.S.  by moving the conference elsewhere.

To be clear, I think moving the AEA meetings outside of the U.S. would harm the majority of Iranians who participated in past years.

Of course I’m hopeful that we’ll have come to our senses long before then.


*see this article in the Chronicle for a wider view of who studies in the U.S.:
Why the Travel Ban Probably Hits Iranian Professors and Students the Hardest

see also the data compiled by the Institute of International Education:
 International Students: All Places of Origin 2014/15 - 2015/16, and for previous years:  2016 | 2015 | 2014 | 2013 | 2012 | 2011 | 2010 | 2009 | 2008 | 2007 | 2006 | 2005 | 2004 | 2003 | 2002
Selected Years 1950-2000
and see
Universities Spoke Up in Case That Led to Ruling Halting Trump’s Travel Ban

LI Reunión Anual de la Asociación Argentina de Economía Política: Nov 16-18

I'll be speaking today at the Conference of the Argentine Association of Political Economy:
http://www.tucumanturismo.gob.ar/evento/1490/li-reunion-anual-de-la-asociacion-argentina-de-economia-politica

• Fecha de Inicio: 16/11/2016
• Fecha de Finalización: 18/11/2016
• Dónde: San Miguel de Tucumán, Tucumán, Argentina
• Dirección: Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales- UNT

DESCRIPCIÓN

En esta ocasión con motivo del Bicentenario de la Independencia, se decide que nuestra provincia sea anfitriona, destacando la participación de los siguientes emblemas del ámbito de la economía:
• Alvin Roth. Premio Nobel en Economía, año 2012.
• Profesor Iván Werning. Referente del MIT (Massachussetts Institute of Tecnology)
• Federico Sturzennegger. Presidente del Banco Central.
En cuanto a las actividades que se realizarán, los causantes informan que están programadas conferencias magistrales a cargo de los disertantes mencionados, además de mesas panel y sesiones simultáneas donde se tratan temas de interés para la profesión y su incidencia en la sociedad.
Considerando que la Reunión de la AAEP es el evento más importante de la profesión y la importancia de los disertantes confirmados, los organizadores estiman la participación de 300 asistentes. 

• INFORMACIÓN DE UTILIDAD
• CONTACTO

Conferencia Nobel – Who Gets What and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design. (Viernes 18/11 a las 11.15 hs)

Alvin Roth se graduó de investigación de operaciones en la Universidad de Columbia (1971), y realizó su master (1973) y su doctorado (1974) también en investigación de operaciones en la Universidad de Standford.

Roth es catedrático universitario en Harvard y Stanford e investiga en teoría de los juegos, la economía experimental y el diseño del mercado. Es conocido por su enfoque en la aplicación de su teoría económica a soluciones en los problemas del mundo real.

En 2012 ganó el Premio Nobel de Economía conjuntamente con Lloyd Shapley por su trabajo: “La teoría sobre la asignaciones estables y la práctica del diseño de mercado”. 

Market Design Perspectives on Inequality--conference at HCEO, Chicago, Aug 6-7

The Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Global Working Group at Chicago is holding a conference on Market Design Perspectives on Inequality

The discussants look exciting:)

Some snapshots of the ASSA meetings

Some snapshots from the ASSA meetings

Recap of the Sonnenschein celebration at Chicago (with a video)

Here's a recap from the Becker Friedman Institute: The Path Ahead for Economic Theory

Here's the video of a panel discussion on the future of economic theory, in which I get to talk about the work of Eric Budish, among other things, as an example of economic engineering. .(I speak for about 10 minutes after the introduction by Nancy Stokey, then Roger Myerson, Ariel Rubinstein and Lars Hansen speak)

Improving Schools in MA: conference in Boston tomorrow

The conference in Boston tomorrow looks like a nice mix of academic researchers and education officials:
 Leveraging Research and Policy to Improve K-12 Education in Massachusetts

December 7, 2015, 8:00am - 5:30pm

Overview:

A num­ber of impor­tant issues are now on the state K-12 edu­ca­tion pol­icy agenda. In the past few years, schol­ars have pro­duced a wide range of results highly rel­e­vant for this agenda. The con­fer­ence is meant to bring mul­ti­ple stake­hold­ers together for a dis­cus­sion of research find­ings and future work that will be help­ful at this vital time.

Audience:

Policymakers, researchers, non-profit lead­ers and edu­ca­tion jour­nal­ists will be invited.

Agenda:

Click here for the agenda.

Registration:

Registration is now closed. Any jour­nal­ists who wish to attend should con­tact Annice Correia Gabel (acorreia@mit.edu).

Location:Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
600 Atlantic Ave #100
Boston, MA 02210

Keynote Speaker:Roland Fryer, Henry Lee Professor of Economics at Harvard University and fac­ulty direc­tor of the Education Innovation Laboratory.

Conference Organizers:

Katharine Bradbury, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
Mary Burke, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
Robert Triest, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
Joshua Angrist, MIT and SEII
Parag Pathak, MIT and SEII

Contact:Please address any ques­tions to acorreia@mit.edu.

Among the talks are some that touch on school choice: 

Charters Without Lotteries: Testing Takeovers in New Orleans and Boston Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Duke University Joshua Angrist, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER Peter Hull, Massachusetts Institute of Technology* Parag A. Pathak, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER

Leveraging Lotteries for School Value-Added: Testing and Estimation Joshua Angrist, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER* Peter Hull, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Parag A. Pathak, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER Christopher Walters, University of California, Berkeley and NBER

Overview of Unified Enrollment in American Cities Parag A. Pathak, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER

Market Design conference at the NBER, Oct 23-24

I'll be elsewhere, but this looks like fun:

Market Design Working Group Meeting

Michael Ostrovsky and Parag Pathak, Organizers

October 23-24, 2015

NBER 2nd Floor Conference Room 1050 Massachusetts Avenue  Cambridge, MA

PROGRAM

PROGRAM

Participant List

Friday, October 23
8:00 AM	Shuttle leaves Royal Sonesta Hotel for NBER
8:30 AM	Shuttle leaves Royal Sonesta Hotel for NBER
8:30 AM	Continental Breakfast
9:00 AM	Tayfun Sonmez, Boston College Utku Unver, Boston College Ozgur Yilmaz, Koç University How (not) to Integrate Blood Subtyping Technology to Kidney Exchange Mehmet Ekmekci, Boston College M. Bumin Yenmez, Carnegie Mellon University Integrating Schools for Centralized Admissions
10:30 AM	Break
11:00 AM	Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Duke University Joshua Angrist, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER Yusuke Narita, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Parag Pathak, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER Research Design meets Market Design: Using Centralized Assignment for Impact Evaluation
	Shuchi Chawla, University of Wisconsin Jason Hartline, Northwestern University Denis Nekipelov, University of Virginia Mechanism Design for Data Science
12:30 PM	Lunch
2:00 PM	John Hatfield, University of Texas at Austin Scott Duke Kominers, Harvard University Alexandru Nichifor, University of St Andrews Michael Ostrovsky, Stanford University and NBER Alexander Westkamp, University of Bonn Full Substitutability
	Thanh Nguyen, Purdue University Rakesh Vohra, University of Pennsylvania Near Feasible Stable Matchings with Complementarities
3:30 PM	Break
4:00 PM	Ali Hortaçsu, University of Chicago and NBER Jakub Kastl, Princeton University and NBER Allen Zhang, Department of the Treasury Bid Shading and Bidder Surplus in the U.S. Treasury Auction System Jonathan Levin, Stanford University and NBER Andrzej Skrzypacz, Stanford University Are Dynamic Vickrey Auctions Practical? Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction
5:30 PM	Adjourn
5:30 PM	Shuttle leaves NBER for Royal Sonesta Hotel
6:30 PM	Dinner – Dante Restaurant at the Royal Sonesta Hotel
Saturday, October 24
8:00 AM	Shuttle leaves Royal Sonesta Hotel for NBER
8:30 AM	Shuttle leaves Royal Sonesta Hotel for NBER
8:30 AM	Continental Breakfast
9:00 AM	Nick Arnosti, Stanford University Marissa Beck, Stanford University Paul Milgrom, Stanford University Adverse Selection and Auction Design for Internet Display Advertising
	Daniela Saban, Stanford University Gabriel Weintraub, Columbia University Procurement Mechanisms for Differentiated Products
10:30 AM	Break
11:00 AM	Steven Lalley, University of Chicago Glen Weyl, Microsoft Corporation Quadratic Voting Canice Prendergast, University of Chicago The Allocation of Food to Food Banks
12:30 PM	Adjourn