Showing posts with label transplants. Show all posts
Showing posts with label transplants. Show all posts

Wednesday, December 18, 2024

New rules for evaluating transplant centers

 Historically, transplant centers ('hospitals') have been primarily evaluated on the one year graft survival on the transplants that they do.*  Now Medicare announces it will test a new model, that will emphasize the number of transplants conducted ("achievement"), in addition to somewhat less emphasis on the ratio of deceased donor kidneys accepted or rejected ("efficiency") and graft survival ("quality").

Medicare Program; Alternative Payment Model Updates and the Increasing Organ Transplant Access (IOTA) Model.  A Rule by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services on 12/04/2024 

"a. Proposed IOTA Model Overview

"End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) is a medical condition in which a person's kidneys cease functioning on a permanent basis, leading to the need for a regular course of long-term dialysis or a kidney transplant to maintain life.[2]

"The best treatment for most patients with kidney failure is kidney transplantation. Nearly 808,000 people in the United States are living with ESRD, with about 69 percent on dialysis and 31 percent with a kidney transplant.[3]

"Relative to dialysis, a kidney transplant can improve survival, reduce avoidable health care utilization and hospital acquired conditions, improve quality of life, and lower Medicare expenditures.[4 5]

"However, despite these benefits of kidney transplantation, evidence shows low rates of ESRD patients placed on kidney transplant hospitals' waitlists, a decline in living donors over the past 20 years, and underutilization of available donor kidneys, coupled with increasing rates of donor kidney discards, and wide variation in kidney offer acceptance rates and donor kidney discards by region and across kidney transplant hospitals.[6 7] 

...

"The IOTA Model will be a mandatory model that will begin on July 1, 2025, and end on June 30, 2031, resulting in a 6-year model performance period comprised of 6 individual performance years (“PYs”). The IOTA Model will test whether performance-based incentives paid to, or owed by, participating kidney transplant hospitals can increase access to kidney transplants for patients with ESRD, while preserving or enhancing quality of care and reducing Medicare expenditures. CMS will select kidney transplant hospitals to participate in the IOTA Model through the methodology proposed in section III.C.3.d of this final rule. As this will be a mandatory model, the selected kidney transplant hospitals will be required to participate. CMS will measure and assess the participating kidney transplant hospitals' performance during each PY across three performance domains: achievement, efficiency, and quality.

"The achievement domain will assess each participating kidney transplant hospital on the overall number of kidney transplants performed during a PY, relative to a participant-specific target. The efficiency domain will assess the kidney organ offer acceptance rate ratios of each participating kidney transplant hospital relative to a national ranking or the participating kidney transplant hospital's past organ offer acceptance rate ratio. The quality domain will assess the quality of care provided by the participating kidney transplant hospitals via a composite graft survival ratio. Each participating kidney transplant hospital's performance score across these three domains will determine its final performance score and corresponding amount for the upside risk payment that CMS would pay to the participating kidney transplant hospital, or the downside risk payment that would be owed by the participating kidney transplant hospital to CMS. The upside risk payment will be a lump sum payment paid by CMS after the end of a PY to a participating kidney transplant hospital with a final performance score of 60 or greater. Conversely, beginning in PY 2, the downside risk payment will be a lump sum payment paid to CMS by any participating kidney transplant hospital with a final performance score of 40 or lower. There is no downside risk payment for PY 1 of the model.

...

"The three performance domains will include: (1) an achievement domain worth up to 60 points, (2) an efficiency domain worth up to 20 points, and (3) a quality domain worth up to 20 points.

"The achievement domain will assess the number of kidney transplants performed by each IOTA participant for attributed patients, with performance on this domain worth up to 60 points. The final performance score will be heavily weighted on the achievement domain to align with the IOTA Model's goal to increase access to kidney transplants to improve the quality of care and reduce Medicare expenditures. The IOTA Model theorizes that improvement activities, including those aimed at reducing unnecessary deceased donor discards and increasing living donors, may help increase access to kidney transplants."

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CMS gives a high level overview here: Increasing Organ Transplant Access (IOTA) Model

and later today there's a webinar you can register for:

"The CMS Innovation Center will be hosting a welcome webinar to present an overview of the model on December 18, 2024, from 2 to 3 p.m. ET. Register to attend: https://cms.zoomgov.com/webinar/register/WN_hvGDyZTxQ5eNhX1OBolevA
 

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*see Wednesday, October 2, 2024 Regulation of Organ Transplantation and Procurement (Chan and Roth in the JPE)

That paper suggests desirable regulations  would coordinate transplant and OPO incentives, and link them both to the health outcomes of all patients attributable to a given transplant center (and not just those patients who were transplanted). 

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quick update (from the Q&A following the webinar): 

this is viewed as an experiment on roughly half the transplant centers, but there isn't currently a commitment about what to do after the projected 6 years of the experiment.

. all transplant patients are considered, but payments are only for Medicare fee for service patients

achievement: . each center's target for annual transplants will be it's average number over the three years ending a year before the beginning of the experiment...(at least that was the answer for the first year).

    . both deceased and living donor outcomes will be included in the achievement metric.

quality: .the first year will consider one-year graft survival, and year n will consider graft survival for the first n years.

OPOs: there are no requirements for OPOs within the IOTA model 

risk adjustment: not for year 1, they are hoping to have risk adjustment measures in subsequent years.

Sunday, November 17, 2024

Opt-out defaults do not increase organ donation rates, in Public Health

 No one said market design was going to be easy...(well, some people did, but it turns out it isn't.)

Dallacker, M., L. Appelius, A. M. Brandmaier, A. S. Morais, and R. Hertwig. "Opt-out defaults do not increase organ donation rates." Public Health 236 (2024): 436-440. 

"Objectives: To increase organ donation rates, many countries have switched from an opt-in (‘explicit consent’) default for organ donation to an opt-out (‘presumed consent’) default. This study sought to determine the extent to which this change in default has led to an increase in the number of deceased individuals who become organ donors.
 

"Study design: Longitudinal retrospective analysis.
 

"Methods: We conducted a retrospective analysis of within-country longitudinal data to assess the effect of changing the organ donation default policy from opt-in to opt-out. Our analysis focused on the longitudinal deceased donor rates in five countries (Argentina, Chile, Sweden, Uruguay, Wales) that had adopted this change. Using a Bayesian aggregated binomial regression model, we estimated the odds of organ donation within each country over time, as well as the effect of the policy switch.
 

"Results: Switching from an opt-in to an opt-out default did not result in an increase in donation rates when averaged across countries. Moreover, the opt-out default did not lead to even a gradual increase in donations: there was no discernible difference in the linear rate of change of donations after the change in default. Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic was associated with a reduction in the odds of donation across all five countries.
 

Conclusions: Our longitudinal analysis suggests that changing to an opt-out default does not increase organ donation rates. Unless flanked by investments in healthcare, public awareness campaigns, and efforts to address the concerns of the deceased's relatives, a shift to an opt-out default is unlikely to increase organ donations."

 


...

"Family objections, often a significant barrier to deceased organ donation, should also be addressed. In many countries—including Chile, Sweden, and Wales—the consent of next of kin is necessary for organ donation. The veto power given to families has also been cited as a reason why the opt-out default does not significantly improve donation rates over the opt-in system.27,28 Considering expressed preferences, whether of the deceased or their relatives, overrides the default. Ultimately, the implications for transplantation outcomes between opt-in and opt-out defaults only differ in the rare cases when no explicit statements of preference were made by either the deceased or their relatives. A previous cross-country scenario analysis has shown that, when family preferences are honoured, shifting from an opt-in to an opt-out default alone would only increase organ recovery by 0%–5%.29 

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 HT: Frank McCormick


Related:

Monday, July 22, 2024 Don't take "No" for an answer in deceased organ donor registration (a paper forthcoming after ten+ years)