Al Roth in conversation with Paul Milgrom about Moral Economics at Kepler's, Today 7pm

 Paul Milgrom and I will chat about Moral Economics and market design. (However, NB, Kepler's charges admission...:(

 Book talk at Kepler's, Thursday May 21, 7pm: Moral Economics, by Al Roth in conversation with Paul Milgrom

Kepler's Books 1010 El Camino Real Menlo Park, CA, 94025 

 "Nobel Prize–⁠winning economist Alvin E. Roth reframes some of our fiercest moral debates as markets, offering a solution that protects the vulnerable while preserving people’s rights to pursue their own interests. 

"About Moral Economics
Some of the most intractable controversies in our society are, essentially, about which actions and transactions should be banned. Should women and couples be able to purchase contraception, access in vitro fertilization, and end pregnancy by obtaining an abortion? Should people be able to buy marijuana? What about fentanyl? Can someone be paid to donate blood plasma, or a kidney?

"Disagreements are fierce because arguments on both sides are often made in uncompromising moral or religious terms. But in Moral Economics, Nobel Prize–winning economist Alvin E. Roth asserts that we can make progress on these and other difficult topics if we view them as markets—tools to help decide who gets what—and understand how those markets can be finetuned to be more functional. Markets don’t have to allow everything or ban everything. Prudent market design can find a balance between preserving people’s rights to pursue their own interests and protecting the most vulnerable from harm.

"Combining Roth’s unparalleled expertise as market design pioneer with his incisive, witty accounts of complicated issues, Moral Economics offers a powerful and innovative new framework for resolving today’s hardest controversies.

"About the Speakers 

Alvin E. Roth is the Craig and Susan McCaw Professor of Economics at Stanford University and the George Gund Professor of Economics and Business Administration Emeritus at Harvard University. A pioneering expert in the field of market design, he was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2012. A member of the National Academy of Sciences and past president of the American Economic Association, he lives in Stanford, California.

Paul Milgrom is the Shirley R. and Leonard W. Ely, Jr. Professor of Humanities and Sciences in the Department of Economics at Stanford University. He was awarded the 2020 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. His books include Putting Auction Theory to Work (2004) and Economics, Organization, and Management (1992). He has also written dozens of articles on auction design, game theory, and macro- and microeconomics."

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Metro Silicon Valley covers the talk this way:

"Nobel Prize-winning economist Alvin E. Roth is not exactly light entertainment, but this does sound like the rare bookstore talk built to pull in people beyond the usual policy crowd. The book is Moral Economics, his new argument that some of our ugliest public fights make more sense when you stop treating them as pure morality plays and start looking at them as markets with consequences. With fellow Nobel winner Paul Milgrom joining him, this should be smart without getting bloodless, and probably sharper, funnier, and more contentious than the phrase market design first suggests." 

 

Stanford celebrates 100 years of GSB

 GSB at 100: A Century of Impact, by Michael McDowell  interviews leading faculty members including

"Susan Athey: The GSB has had so many impacts, but let me just pick one particular issue that’s close to my heart, which is that it’s been several times in its history, it’s really been on the frontier of important ideas. One of the big ideas in the group that I’m in was market design and the use of formal strategic thinking and game theory and information economics to understand real phenomena. And Bob Wilson, who’s one of the grandfathers of the group that I sit in, Economics, he worked with oil companies in 1960s and looked at their bidding data and then developed formal theories that helped understand what was going wrong in those markets and how to fix it. And then later, he advised one of my advisors, Paul Milgrom, and they shared the Nobel Prize for some of their work on market design.

"And so, there’s many different takes on that, but one of my takes was that there was the connection to the world and the fact that the problem they were solving was coming out of a real problem leading to cutting edge theory that then created a field that didn’t exist. More recently, we were on the cutting edge of using machine learning for decision problems and what’s called causal inference, formally, and now Stanford is the best place in the world to do this kind of research. To go from zero in 2012 to best in the world with multiple amazing young scholars doing cutting edge research in 12 years is really stunning. And the GSB really supported us in that endeavor.

"So I think the GSB has been a really fabulous place for helping us stay grounded and really connected to real problems, but also allowing us to hire the kind of talent and giving us the space to do the pure research that doesn’t just solve today’s practical problems, but that actually builds the foundation for many people to solve applied problems."

KENNETH ARROW’S LAST THEOREM by Paul Milgrom

 Here's a fitting tribute to Ken Arrow, who died in 2017, in the special issue of the Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design in Hono(u)r of (the still very much alive) Vince Crawford, edited by Alex Tetylboym

KENNETH ARROW’S LAST THEOREM  by Paul Milgrom, in The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design 9, no. 1 (2024): 7-11.

ABSTRACT: In Kenneth Arrow’s last week of life at age 95, he reported that “I began my research career with an impossibility theorem. If I had time now, my last theorem would be an impossibility theorem about social choice for environmental policy.” This paper completes the formalization, proof, and discussion of the theorem that Arrow then described. 

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Some earlier tributes to Ken:

Tuesday, February 21, 2017

Ken Arrow (1921-2017)

Saturday, September 23, 2017

Tributes to Ken Arrow

Monday, October 9, 2017

Celebration of Ken Arrow at Stanford

Friday, October 13, 2017

Pictures from the celebration of Ken Arrow

 

 

 

 

Milgrom testifies in Google's defense

 Paul Milgrom forwards me this account of his testimony as an expert for the defense in the DOJ v Google trial on display ads. Expert testimony is partly theater, and parts of the article read like a theater review.

Google’s Lawyers Pitch Competing Explanation of Ad Bidding, Reframe Case in Strong Day for Defense  by Tom Blakely

"Tuesday was dominated by the testimony of Google expert Dr. Paul Milgrom, Professor at Stanford University and the Chairman of “Auctionomics.”

"Dr. Milgrom is Google’s counterweight to the government’s Dr. Ravi.

"As soon as his testimony began, I realized he would be a formidable witness, not just because of his outstanding intellect and subject matter expertise, but because he is the kind of witness that is simply challenging for a counterparty to deal with. An older gentleman, he was equal parts charming, intelligent, poised, unflagging while enduring hours on the stand, and spoke with the quiet confidence and humility of the wisdom of his years.

...

"By presenting with charisma, charm, wit, and as one person described to me during a break, “grandpa vibes,” an outside observer who hails from most of the world’s cultures intrinsically wants to like Prof. Milgrom"

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Yesterday's post also touched on expert witnesses for the defense, from the DOJ's perspective:

Friday, September 27, 2024

Are economist for sale?

Big Ideas: Auctions with Nobel Laureates Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson

Ran Abramitzky interviews Bob Wilson and Paul Milgrom:

Incentive auctions for water rights

 Here's a press release from Auctionomics, the consulting firm run by Paul Milgrom and his business partner Silvia Console Battilana. They propose to repurpose water rights in a way that may resemble the recent incentive auctions for repurposing radio spectrum.

From Lawsuits to Solutions: Auctionomics Is Harnessing Efficient Market Design and Deep Tech for a Litigation-Free Solution to the Water Crisis by Auctionomics 

"Earlier this year, Paul co-hosted a conference at Stanford University attended by a group of economists, lawyers, and water experts. The group developed a proposal for a novel policy to fix the Colorado River crisis: the U.S. should redefine and buy back existing water rights, just as it did for misallocated rights to radio airwaves.

Auctionomics led the development of the FCC's Broadband Incentive Auction, converting TV licenses to new valuable uses. The current issues with water rights are similar to those of the radio spectrum, where existing rights holders with solid legal standing were hesitant to change the status quo, despite the clear misallocation of resources.

However, Auctionomics successfully addressed the problem with its innovative auction design, facilitating next-generation telecommunications and raising $19.8 billion while safeguarding existing broadcasters.

The Colorado River proposal aims to address deficiencies in the current water rights allocation system. The existing system hinders mutually beneficial trades between users and prohibits water banking - a means to enable farmers or cities manage current water use more efficiently, leaving more in reservoirs for future dry periods.

While there are historical reasons for these limitations - the uses of river water are diverse, interconnected, and poorly measured. Modifying them can result in severe consequences in a system that guarantees inefficiency and overconsumption. However, the same model employed to redistribute broadband spectrum can incentivize water rights holders to use their water more efficiently.

Auctionomics aims to adapt this model to the Colorado River with practical steps involving a hydrological survey, voluntary redefinition of water rights, and purchasing enough new rights from willing sellers to meet the necessary reductions in total consumption."

Paul Milgrom on auctions for water rights

 ZME Science (in Romania) interviews Paul Milgrom about water shortages (in California):

Could auctions help California make better use of its water? This leading economist believes so.  by Mihai Andrei  

"“People get confused when they think about auctions, they think about bidding for a piece of art or something like that,” Milgrom told ZME Science in an interview. “What economists mean when we talk about auction is a process of decentralized resource allocation using prices. It means that we’ve got people who have knowledge about what they need and how valuable things are to them, and we take account of that information to allocate resources specifically, we make bids, and those things are converted to determine prices.”

“If you’re not using an auction you either mean you’re not using prices to guide the resource allocation or you’re not using individual bids. If you don’t use that information, you’re gonna have waste.”

"Waste also means opportunity, and the opportunity Milgrom sees would be transferring water use from those who value it less to those who value it more (and are willing to pay more for it).

...

“In California, less than 5% of water is reallocated, even in the most severe drought,” Milgrom says

“The prices adjust [water gets more expensive], but the reallocation doesn’t adjust even when there is insufficient water. The prices are responsive, but the value of trade isn’t very responsive. So why doesn’t the market work, and what can we do to fix it?”

“It’s not what you expect in a market. What you would expect in a well-functioning market is that the water allocation would increase more to adapt to sending more water into higher value uses and less water into less-value uses. So we’d expect more trading to go on. The fact that it didn’t suggests there’s a problem with the market.”

...

"Designing a large-scale market for water isn’t without precedent. In Australia, a much larger proportion of water is being traded (about 50%); with a roughly similar standard of living, and similar environmental challenges, people in Sydney use about half that amount. But while Australia can serve as an inspiration for California, the same system can’t be replicated exactly.

“We can’t apply the Australian model to California because there are different property rights regimes, the rights are defined differently. They also don’t take into account return flows, which California water law does.”

...

"“I’m cautiously optimistic,” Milgrom says, drawing from his experience with auctioning broadcast spectrum space. “Part of what’s making me optimistic that this is the right time is the progress in measurements and hydrological models.”

Honoring Milgrom and Wilson at the ASSA meetings in January (video)

 The video is at the link, there are four ten minute discussions, followed by brief responses by Paul and Bob. 

My discussion of Bob Wilson begins at around 27:20, and my final words to him were "Bob: you saw and demonstrated the future of game theory in economics, earlier and more clearly than anyone else.  We’re all lucky to know you."

AEA Nobel Laureate Address Honoring the 2020 Nobel Laureates Paul R. Milgrom (Stanford University) and Robert B. Wilson (Stanford University)
January 8, 2022 at 2:30 PM ET
View Recording

Presiding: Christina D. Romer, University of California-Berkeley

Susan Athey

, 

Stanford University

Topic: Honoring Paul R. Milgrom

Bengt Holmstrom

, 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Topic: Honoring Paul R. Milgrom

Alvin Roth

, 

Stanford University

Topic: Honoring Robert B. Wilson

Srihari Govindan

, 

University of Rochester

Topic: Honoring Robert B. Wilson

Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson. From theory to practice in auctions (in French)

 Here's a tribute to Milgrom and Wilson in French (but Google translate does a pretty good job):

Paul Milgrom et Robert Wilson. De la théorie à la pratique des enchères, par Florence Naegelen, Dans Revue d'économie politique 2021/6 (Vol. 131), pages 825 à 847

G translate: Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson. From theory to practice in auctions

Here's one snippet:

"R. Wilson ([1967], [1969] and [1977]) provided the first analysis of Bayesian equilibrium strategies in the case of a common and uncertain value. This work was extended by P. Milgrom [1981a] and by many other authors subsequently. [6] Introducing the hypothesis of conditional independence according to which the signals received are positively correlated, Wilson [1969] thus showed that, in this context, the winner was the one who overestimated the true value of the object the most. He also highlighted how agents should determine their offers by incorporating into their strategies that the winner is the one with the highest signal."

The Economist celebrates Milgrom and Wilson, and economic engineering

 The Economist has weighed in on the 2021 Nobel Prize in Economics:

The Nobel prize in economics rewards advances in auction theory. For the third time since 2007, it goes to designers of market mechanisms, Oct 17th 2020

"In 1991 Alvin Roth, who in 2012 would share the Nobel prize for economics, was asked how the discipline might change over the century to come. “In the long term”, he wrote, “the real test of our success will be not merely how well we understand the general principles which govern economic interactions, but how well we can bring this knowledge to bear on practical questions of microeconomic engineering.” Sweden’s Royal Academy of Science seems to agree. On October 12th it gave this year’s Nobel prize to Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson, both of Stanford University, for their work on auction theory and design. Their work epitomises economics as engineering.

...

"The pursuit of economics as a form of engineering means that Messrs Milgrom and Wilson are more enmeshed in the real world than the typical academic. Both have consulted for regulators and firms. Mr Milgrom advised Time Warner and Comcast on their participation in radio-spectrum auctions in 2006; his efforts helped save his clients more than $1bn. In 2009 he co-founded a firm, Auctionomics, that provides consulting services to those looking to operate and to bid in auctions (many of the sort designed by the prizewinners).

"It is a different sort of work from that which many aspiring scholars imagine themselves to be pursuing. But the rewards the laureates have reaped in academia and beyond certainly advertise the power wielded by economic engineers."

Paul Milgrom''s autobiography now available on the Nobel website

 Paul Milgrom's autobiography is now online, and well worth reading.  It's last line is 

"As Tennyson wrote in his poem Ulysses: “Some work of noble note may yet be done, not unbecoming men that strove with Gods.”

Paul R. Milgrom

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Earlier:

Saturday, August 28, 2021

Bob Wilson's autobiography is now available on the Nobel Prize website

The Power of Market Design, by Paul Milgrom and Silvia Console Battilana in Project Syndicate

 Paul Milgrom and his business partner Silvia Console Battilana describe how market design can reallocate scarce resources from spectrum licenses to water rights.

The Power of Market Design, by Paul Milgrom and Silvia Console Battilana 

"Misallocation of scarce resources too often deprives users of them even as others waste their supply. Well-designed markets can overcome such problems by enabling voluntary transactions that allow existing users to retain their allotments while enabling higher-value uses.

...

"Many of the world’s existing rights to fresh water – both surface water and groundwater – have already been granted and grandfathered in complex ways to cities, farmers, and industrial users. In some cases, each individual trade of these rights requires governmental approval; other jurisdictions prohibit such trading entirely.

"These restrictions and historical rules have led to highly inefficient allocations. Water may be unavailable to towns that require more of it as they grow, even when those urban and residential uses are a hundred times more valuable than the rural ones they would supplant. Certain industrial firms whose rights are based on historical use may have an incentive to overuse water, even during droughts, to retain their rights to future allotments. Where trading of rights is limited or prohibited, poor price signals make it difficult even to assess which uses are most valuable. And water demand will increase and shift as climate change continues to upend historical usage patterns.

"The success of the US radio spectrum auction points to a solution. Instead of revoking incumbents’ spectrum rights unilaterally, Congress redefined them in a way that made trading them possible and simple, and then allowed TV broadcasters to decide for themselves whether to continue their previous uses or decline to participate. The rights that were sold were then reconfigured to be suitable for new uses and efficient trading, while those that were unsold remained fit for existing purposes."

Milgrom on Auctions, Theorems, and the practice of Market Design, in the AER

 The latest issue of the AER publishes a version of Paul Milgrom's Nobel lecture:

Auction Research Evolving: Theorems and Market Designs  By Paul Milgrom

American Economic Review 2021, 111(5): 1383–1405   https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.111.5.1383

Here are a few of the introductory paragraphs:

"Game-theoretic modeling of auctions began in the 1960s with a pair of seminal papers by William Vickrey (1961, 1962) and the brilliant but unpublished doctoral dissertation of Armando Ortega-Reichert (1968). Robert Wilson (1977, 1979) became the next important contributor to auction theory research and, as Wilson’s student, I was inspired to make auctions and bidding the subject of my doctoral dissertation.

...

"Most of my work published in academic journals is theoretical, proving theorems about the properties of abstract models, but developing and participating in real-world mechanisms requires more than that. Two important lessons that I learned from working on high-stakes auctions are that they operate in an almost infinite variety of contexts, and that this variety is the reason for the paradoxical importance of including unrealistic assumptions in models built to understand and illuminate reality. No single set of assumptions is adequate to describe all the various settings in which auctions are used, and too much specificity in models can blind the analyst to important general insights.

...

"Why do economists rely on such unrealistic assumptions? It is because a well-chosen simplification can remove the dust and smoke that obscures our view of the workings of economic forces. Although we celebrate the resulting theorems for the insights they deliver, we can apply them successfully only by being vigilant, working hard to understand not just the insights that simplified analyses provide but also how the designs and rule choices they inspire must be adapted to withstand the dust and smoke and also the much larger disturbances of the particular worlds in which the mechanisms will operate."

And here are the concluding paragraphs:

"Auction theory has changed substantially since I made my first studies in what were still its early days. Although the “unrealistic” models of those times have proved their worth in guiding practical auction designs, some of that guidance was off point. In my own work, this showed up in the traditional analysis of the exposure problem. Despite the theoretical worst-case conclusion that exposure problems are intractable, we found that they could sometimes be quite manageable in practice.

"For the future, simulations and computational methods are likely to be increasingly important. Yet, it still takes theory to understand problems and the scope of proposed solutions. The time has come for old methods and new to work hand in hand."

Discovering Auctions: Contributions of Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson by Teytelboym, Li, Kominars, Akbarpour and Dworczak

 Here's a celebratory account of the Nobel winning work of Milgrom and Wilson. The authors have used the new AEA symbol for random ordering of authors, which I can't reproduce here (it's an r in a circle..)

Discovering Auctions: Contributions of Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson

by (in random order) Alexander Teytelboym  Shengwu Li  Scott Duke Kominers Mohammad Akbarpour Piotr Dworczak,  March 13, 2021

Abstract: The 2020 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel was awarded to Paul R. Milgrom and Robert B. Wilson for “improvements to auction theory and inventions of new auction formats.” In this survey article, we review the contributions of the laureates, emphasizing the subtle interplay between deep theoretical questions and practical design challenges that resulted in one of the most successful fields of economics.

Prices and Decentralization Without Convexity: Milgrom's Arrow Lecture at Columbia (video)

 Columbia University Press posts a "video of Paul Milgrom's 2014 Kenneth J. Arrow Lecture that inspired Discovering Prices: Auction Design in Markets with Complex Constraints. Paul Milgrom discusses how prices can guide decentralized resource allocations in environments with non-convexities. His work on auctions led the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences to award him and Robert Wilson the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for improvement to auction theory and invention of new auction formats."

Prices and Decentralization Without Convexity

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Related post:

Saturday, May 20, 2017

Discovering Prices, by Paul Milgrom

Some more Nobel links for Wilson and Milgrom

 This was a Nobel year unlike any in recent memory, since the Covid pandemic prevented the festivities from being held in Stockholm as they usually are.  The Nobel lectures by Milgrom and Wilson were recorded at Stanford, and they received their medals from the Swedish consul in a private ceremony.

Here's the text of the Award Ceremony Speech by Tommy Andersson

Here's Bob Wilson's Nobel lecture:

Here's Paul Milgrom's Nobel lecture: 

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Paul Milgrom posted some reflections on his website:

2020 Nobel Prize Firsts and Lectures

1. "It was the first to be awarded outdoors and the first outside of Stockholm.
2. It was the first economics prize awarded to a student (Paul) with his disseration adviser (Bob).
3. It was the first awarded jointly to two people living across the street from one another.
4. Paul became the first to give TWO Nobel prize lectures, having already lectured on behalf of Vickrey in 1996.
5. The backyard ceremony was held behind a residence that had housed two economics laureates (Paul Milgrom & Joe Stiglitz), plus 3-time SuperBowl winning coach Bill Walsh!

"Also unusual is that, by focusing on Paul's auction contributions, the Nobel Committee had left unmentioned ten of Paul's twelve most highly cited publications."

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Here's an essay by Jacob Goeree:

How market design is transforming the role of economists into engineers

"there are many cases where the “invisible hand” does not work. Prof. Wilson’s analysis of the winner’s curse in common-value auctions is a prominent example. “Sometimes the invisible hand needs a bit of help, and that’s where market design comes in – for instance, making sure bidders can update their value estimates during the bidding process itself” 

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Here (live streamed today on Dec. 16) is an event originating in Vienna, including a video interview in which I talk to Ben Greiner. (It starts at 6pm CET, i.e. 9am PST):

The Nobel Prize in layperson’s terms

"This event is being organized by the WU Department of Economics

"Nobel Prizes are awarded every year in December, on the anniversary of Alfred Nobel’s death. Nobel laureates are celebrated in the media, but hardly anyone knows anything about the research that goes on behind the scenes. We plan to change that. In cooperation with experts, we will be introducing the work of the winners of this year’s Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in terms that even laypeople can understand. We will analyze the innovative power of the work and discuss its significance and potential applications in practice.

Welcoming words: Tatjana Oppitz, Vice-​Rector for Infrastructure and Digitalization

Discussion: Maarten Janssen, Professor of Economics, University of Vienna

Maarten Janssen is Professor of Microeconomics at the University of Vienna. Among many others, his research interests are in the fields of game theory, industrial organization and competition policy, and in particular auctions. He is particularly interested in the implications of information asymmetries in markets and market design.

Stefan Felder, Rundfunk und Telekom Regulierungs-​GmbH: RTR

Stefan Felder studied at Technical University and University of Economics and Business in Vienna. He worked in the telecommunications industry and at the University of Vienna. As of 1998, he has been a member of the Austrian Regulatory Authority for Broadcasting and Telecommunications (RTR). He is an expert on spectrum auctions, competition analysis, and mobile communications. He is Head of Spectrum and Mobile Market at RTR.

Moderation: Maria Marchenko, WU

Maria Marchenko is an Assistant Professor at the WU Department of Economics. Her research lies in the fields of applied and theoretical econometrics using state-​of the art techniques and theoretical concepts with applications to networks and labor market.

Video interview: Alvin E. Roth, Winner of the Nobel Prize 2012; Professor of Economics, Stanford University

Alvin E. Roth is Professor of Economics at Stanford University. In 2012, he won the Nobel Prize in Economic jointly with Lloyd Shapley “for the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design.’’

Update: here's the video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oE2e6HynPvg&feature=youtu.be

 

Milgrom's "Discovering Prices" reviewed in the JEL by Kominers and Teytelboym

 In the December Journal of Economic Literature:

The Parable of the Auctioneer: Complexity in Paul R. Milgrom's Discovering Prices

by Scott Duke Kominers and Alexander Teytelboym, JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE, VOL. 58, NO. 4, DECEMBER 2020, (pp. 1180-96)

Abstract: Designing marketplaces in complex settings requires both novel economic theory and real-world engineering, often drawing upon ideas from fields such as computer science and operations research. In Discovering Prices: Auction Design in Markets with Complex Constraints, Milgrom (2017) explains the theory and design of the United States' "incentive auction" that reallocated wireless spectrum licenses from television broadcasters to telecoms. Milgrom's account teaches us how economic designers can grapple with complexity both in theory and in practice. Along the way, we come to understand several different types of complexity that can arise in marketplace design."

And from the conclusion:

"So what have we discovered from Prices? Modern marketplace design increasingly wrestles with complexity; as it does so, we need novel, tailor-made theory as well as supporting infrastructure. Complexity has real economic meaning—and can take multiple forms."

Bob Wilson and Paul Milgrom, interviewed about their work

 Stanford News has the story:

The bid picture: Stanford economists explain the ideas behind their 2020 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences

"If designed correctly, auctions can distribute resources fairly, according to Stanford economists Robert Wilson and Paul Milgrom. The pair were awarded the 2020 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for their improvements to auction theory and inventions of new auction formats."

Here's the video:

Joshua Gans on Paul Milgrom

 In Vox.EU:

Paul Milgrom, price discoverer and Nobel laureate--Joshua Gans 15 November 2020

"One thing I remember clearly about Paul Milgrom as an advisor is the child-like glee he would exhibit when he had found a new and interesting problem to solve. That happened one day in 1993 when he had been asked to consult on the proposal by the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to auction off spectrum for the next generation of mobile phones."

The Economist reflects on market designers as economic engineers, in celebration of the Milgrom-Wilson Nobel

 Here is The Economist on Milgrom and Wilson:

The Nobel prize in economics rewards advances in auction theory--For the third time since 2007, it goes to designers of market mechanisms

HT: Mary Wilson

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Related recent posts:

Monday, October 12, 2020

Finally! Paul Milgrom and Bob Wilson win the 2020 Nobel Prize in Economics

Wednesday, October 14, 2020

Some links following the Nobel Prize to Milgrom and Wilson