European Economic Review Summer School in Experimental and Behavioral Economics, June 1-4, 2026.

 

 It's never too late to learn about experiments:

3rd European Economic Review Summer School  in Experimental and Behavioral Economics

The European Economic Review is pleased to announce their third Summer School in Experimental and Behavioral Economics to be held at ISEG in Lisbon from June 1 to June 4, 2026. The School will feature lectures by leading researchers in state-of-the-art topics in experimental and behavioral economics in addition to a research workshop. Throughout the School the students will be able to present their own research in poster sessions and receive feedback from leading faculty and fellow participants. 

The 3rd European Economic Review Summer School is very privileged to feature lectures by leading figures such as Isabelle Brocas (University of Southern California), Juan D. Carrillo (University of Southern California), Vincent Crawford (Oxford University and University of California at San Diego), Michalis Drouvelis (University of Birmingham), Ernst Fehr (University of Zurich) and David Levine (Royal Holloway University of London). The goal of the School is to deepen attendants’ understanding and knowledge of recent advances in the field of Experimental and Behavioral Economics. The topics taught will cover a broad range of methodologies such as theory, laboratory and field experiments, as well as applications. The School will provide a unique environment where students can expand their knowledge on topical research issues and engage with leading figures in the field. Scholars who have been admitted to the School will be taught the following subjects:

• decision-making and its biological causal processes (Isabelle Brocas)

• decision-making in children and adolescents (Juan D. Carrillo) 

• behavioral game theory and topics in behavioral decision theory (Vincent Crawford)

• experimental games in the lab; emotions and human cooperation (Michalis Drouvelis)

• economics of social preferences; product obfuscation in markets (Ernst Fehr)

• quantitative behavioral theories of long term play in experiments (David Levine)

Further details on the content of the lectures, as well as background material, will be uploaded gradually in the Program of the School. 

The Summer School invites applications from Ph.D and MSc students in Economics, Business, Psychology, Behavioral Science, Political Science and related fields from all over the world. Faculty and professionals are also welcome. To apply to the School, please submit a CV using our Application Form. The deadline for applications is January 31, 2026. Decisions will be sent to applicants by February 14, 2026. 

Summer School in Experimental and Behavioral Economic, University of Crete, July 2025

 Here's an announcement of a summer school in experimental economics this summer in Crete

We are delighted to announce the 2nd Summer School in Experimental and Behavioral Economics for PhD and MSc students, which will take place at the Department of Economics, University of Crete, Rethymno, Greece, from July 7 to July 11, 2025. The School will feature lectures by leading faculty in Experimental and Behavioral Economics. Further, students can present their work in poster sessions and participate in our novel Bring your Experiment! sessions.

We are privileged that our speakers this year are:

Ariel Rubinstein, Tel Aviv University & New York University

Charles Holt, University of Virginia

Simon Gaechter, University of Nottingham

Roberto A. Weber, University of Zurich

John Duffy, University of California, Irvine

Nikos Georgantzis, Burgundy Business School

The topics of the lectures include Experimental Markets, Individual Decision Making, Experimental Games, Macroeconomic Experiments, Experimental Asset Pricing, Auctions, Organizational Behavior.

Bring your Experiment!

This year we have the novelty of offering special sessions with the title "Bring Your Experiment!" where experienced Lab Managers Jose Vicente Guinot Saporta (University of Nottingham) and Andonis Proestakis (Technical University of Crete), with the support of Lab Technician Dimitris Georgantzis Garcia (University of Sheffield), will answer questions on issues related to the implementation of students' experimental designs, protocols and/or programs. Ρilot sessions with small size groups will be also performed when necessary.

Free accommodation
We offer free accommodation for all students at the Student Dorms of the University of Crete.

Application procedure: see https://ebe.soc.uoc.gr/

Application deadline: March 1

Organizing Committee
Nikos Georgantzis, Burgundy Business School
Panagiotis Skartados, University of Crete
Giorgos Stamatopoulos, University of Crete

 

Computational and Experimental Economics Summer School June 11-16, 2023, Barcelona

 Rosemarie Nagel sends me the following announcement:

We invite graduate students and young faculty to the
2nd Computational and Experimental Economics Summer School
June 11-16, 2023, BESLAB, UPF, Barcelona, Spain

The goal of the summer school is to develop a foundation for using computational models
and simulations to complement and/or explain results from human subject experiments.
In particular, throughout the curriculum, students will learn how to implement a variety of agent-based models
that have successfully captured regularities observed in the experimental and field data.
They will participate in experiments and develop an original project in groups of 3-4 participants.

In addition, the summer school will include a two-day workshop on computational and experimental economics (June 14-15)
with presentations by leading researchers who are interested in experimental and computational economics.

The deadline for applications is March 31, 2023.

You can find how to participate here:

Organizers
Herbert Dawid (Bielefeld University)
John Ledyard (Caltech)
Rosemarie Nagel (ICREA-UPF, and BSE)

Yaroslav Rosokha  (Purdue University)

Guest lecturers

Mikhail Anufriev (University of Technology Sydney)
Cars Hommes (University of Amsterdam and Bank of Canada)
Annie Liang (Northwestern. University)
Valentyn Panchenko (University of New South Wales)

 

Marketplace Design: summer school at Paris School of Economics in June

Olivier Tercieux forwarded this announcement:

THE DESIGN OF MARKET PLACES - Recent development in matching theory and empirical methods of matching  June 22 to June 26, 2020

"Allocation procedures have recently become a new and exciting field of economic research, with a wide range of applications. Since the seminal work by Gale and Shapley (1962) and Shapley and Shubik (1971), matching theory has developed and matured to a point where matching theorists could guide designs of medical match and other entry-level labor markets, school choice, course allocation and organ donation, among others. This course will introduce you to the frontier of research, including theoretical developments, applications, and empirical analysis"

The professors are:
•       Olivier Tercieux, Two-sided matching theory and application to school choice
•       Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Empirics of school choice
•       Alfred Galichon, Matching theory with transfers: optimal transport and economic applications

Dynamic Games: 26th Jerusalem Summer School in Economic Theory (deadline April 27)

Theory and experiments in Jerusalem this summer...

26th Jerusalem School in Economic Theory

Dynamic Games

Event date: Jun 24 - Jul 3, 2015

Organizers:

Eric Maskin, Director (Harvard University)
Elchanan Ben-Porath, Codirector (The Hebrew University)
Drew Fudenberg (Harvard University)



In many economic, social, and political settings, participants interact strategically not just once but over time.


When raising its import tariffs today, for example, a country will try to anticipate the reactions of its trading partners tomorrow. And an oligopolistic firm can learn from its rivals’ past pricing behavior so as to gauge what prices they are likely to set now.


The Summer School will emphasize theoretical aspects of dynamic games, but will also include work on experiments.


List of speakers:
Robert Aumann (The Hebrew University)
Martin Cripps (University College London)
Guillaume Fréchette (New York University)
Drew Fudenberg (Harvard University)
Sergiu Hart (The Hebrew University)
Johannes Hörner (Yale University)
Navin Kartik (Columbia University)
George Mailath (University of Pennsylvania)
Eric Maskin (Harvard University)
Abraham Neyman (The Hebrew University)
Larry Samuelson (Yale University)
Alistair Wilson (University of Pittsburgh)

• Application Form

Deadline for applications: April 27

Recap of the 25th Jerusalem School in Economic Theory- Matching and Market Design

The 25th Jerusalem School in Economic Theory- Matching and Market Design was, in my humble opinion, a great success. If you click on the link above you can see videos of all 20 lectures.  (There's even a "play all" button, which I presume (I haven't tried it) would launch 30 hours of lectures that you could binge-watch.)

Over a hundred students attended the lectures, given by ten speakers over nine days (plus a day off). Many visitors attended at least some of the lectures, led by Ken Arrow who attended them all. Eyal Winter was celebrated as he finished 15 years as director of the summer school, and prepared to hand the reins to Elchanan Ben-Porath.

Topics covered ranged from elegant abstract theory to fully implemented practical designs, from matching markets to auctions and financial markets, and from designs implemented two decades ago to designs successfully implemented this year.

The quality of the students, and of the new generation of market designers who lectured, makes me very optimistic about the future of market design as "the source of practical advice, solidly grounded in well tested theory, on designing the institutions through which we interact with one another."

QED

25th Jerusalem School in Economic Theory :Matching and Market Design, June 23-July 2

I'm off to Jerusalem for the 25th Jerusalem School in Economic Theory. This year the topic is Matching and Market Design

Event date: Jun 23 - Jul 2 ,2014 

Organizers:

Scott Duke Kominers (Harvard University)
Eric Maskin, Director (Harvard University)
Alvin Roth (Stanford University)
Eyal Winter, Codirector (The Hebrew University)


Models of matching---in which agents are paired with one another to undertake transactions---have played an important role in contemporary economic theory. Matching algorithms have proven valuable in many real-life applications, including the assignment of students to schools, medical residents to hospitals, and organ donors to recipients. Matching theory has also helped illuminate thorny problems such as inequality and unemployment. The summer school will place greatest emphasis on design issues, but will touch on other aspects of matching as well.

LIST OF SPEAKERS
NAME	AFFILIATION
Atila Abdulkadiroglu	Duke University
Itai Ashlagi	MIT
Eric Budish	Universty of Chicago
Scott Duke Kominers	Harvard University
Jacob D. Leshno	Columbia University
Eric S. Maskin	Harvard University
Paul R. Milgrom	Stanford University
Elliott Peranson	National Matching Services, Inc
Assaf Romm	Harvard University
Alvin E. Roth	Stanford University

PROGRAM 
Monday, June 23
8:30-9:30 REGISTRATION IN IIAS LOBBY
9:30-11:00 Eric Maskin (Harvard University)
 Introduction to Matching and Allocation Problems (I)
11:00-11:30 Coffee break
11:30-13:00 Scott Duke Kominers (Harvard University)
 Introduction to Matching and Allocation Problems (II)
13:00-14:30 Lunch break
14:30-16:00 Alvin E. Roth (Stanford University)
 The Design of the National Resident Matching Program

16:00 Reception

Tuesday, June 24
9:30- 11:00 Itai Ashlagi (MIT)
 Unbalanced Random Matching Markets: Competition and Complementarities
11:00-11:30 Coffee break
11:30-13:00 Elliott Peranson (National Matching Services, Inc.)
 Issues in Real-World Matching Market Design
13:00-14:30 Lunch break
14:30-16:00 Eric Maskin (Harvard University)
 Assortative Matching and Inequality

Wednesday, June 25
9:30-11:00 Paul R. Milgrom (Stanford University)
 Matching with Contracts
11:00-11:30 Coffee break
11:30-13:00 Scott Duke Kominers (Harvard University)
 Substitutability in Generalized Matching
13:00-14:30 Lunch break
14:30 TOUR OF JERUSALEM

Thursday, June 26
9:30-11:00 Paul R. Milgrom (Stanford University)
 Deferred Acceptance Heuristic Auctions
11:00-11:30 Coffee break

11:30-13:00 Paul R. Milgrom (Stanford University)
 Auctions for Internet Advertising
13:00-14:30 Lunch break
14:30 FIRST STUDENT POSTER SESSION

Friday, June 27
9:30-11:00 Alvin E. Roth (Stanford University)
 Kidney Exchange
11:00-11:30 Coffee break
11:30-13:00 Itai Ashlagi (MIT)
 Current Challenges in Kidney Exchange

Saturday, June 28
TOUR OF MASADA

Sunday, June 29
9:30-11:00 Eric Budish (University of Chicago)
 Combinatorial Assignment
11:00-11:30 Coffee break
11:30-13:00 Eric Budish (University of Chicago)
 Financial Market Design

Monday, June 30
9:30-11:00 Atila Abdulkadiroglu (Duke University)
Theory of School Choice
11:00-11:30 Coffee break

11:30-13:00 Atila Abdulkadiroglu (Duke University)
 Empirics of School Choice
13:00-14:30 Lunch break
17:00-18:30 ARROW LECTURE
19:00 Dinner (invited speakers only)

Tuesday, July 1
9:30-11:00 Jacob D. Leshno (Columbia University)
 Dynamic Matching in Overloaded Systems
11:00-11:30 Coffee break
11:30-13:00 Assaf Romm (Harvard University)
 Efficient Assignment and the Israeli Medical Match
13:00-14:30 Lunch break
18:30 Concert at the Jerusalem Music Center and dinner at the Terasa Restaurant

Wednesday, July 2
9:30-11:00 Jacob D. Leshno (Columbia University)
 Large-Market Matching

Here's the poster .
************
Updates:

Eric Maskin giving the opening lecture