Showing posts with label matching. Show all posts
Showing posts with label matching. Show all posts

Tuesday, March 11, 2025

Technology and the health care labor force--perfusionists

 The evolving health care labor force provides a window on technology and employment.  There are now a substantial number of clinical perfusionists, who are health care workers who operate heart-lung machines during open heart surgery.  In fact, there are now calls for a centralized clearinghouse for their training programs.

 Johnson, Blaine. "The feasibility of a national matching service for perfusion education program applicants." The Journal of ExtraCorporeal Technology 57, no. 1 (2025): 53-55. 

"Abstract: The perfusion profession is experiencing rapid advancement, creating an array of new opportunities for professional growth and educational expansion. However, this increase in demand is juxtaposed with a concerning limitation in the availability of positions for prospective students and may leave many qualified applicants without admission. This letter explores how implementing a national matching service alongside a centralized application service could streamline the application process for perfusion education programs in the United States. Over the last two decades, the number of available positions in perfusion education programs has surged significantly. This growth presents new challenges in recruitment due to varying requirements and timelines, often resulting in unstable matches. A national matching service could standardize acceptances, mitigate unfair practices, and enhance applicants’ and program decision-making. By ensuring a fair and efficient system, the national matching service could support the growing need for qualified healthcare perfusionists and promote the perfusion profession’s advancement."

Wednesday, February 12, 2025

Stable Matching with Interviews, by Ashlagi, Chen, Roghani and Saberi

 Job applicants can now easily submit many job applications, and so interviewing applicants, which is time consuming, has become a major source of congestion in many labor markets.  But even in labor markets that use a clearinghouse to process offers and acceptances (like the market for medical residents in the U.S., the NRMP match) interviews are often organized in a decentralized manner. Here's a paper that tackles the question of how to organize an interview match, under some assumptions about what kind of information is obtained in interviews.  Two approaches are considered: an 'adaptive' algorithm that takes into account the results of previous interviews in assigning subsequent interviews, and a 'non-adaptive' algorithm that matches candidates to interviews before any interview results are known.

Stable Matching with Interviews, by Itai Ashlagi, Jiale Chen, Mohammad Roghani, and Amin Saberi (all at Stanford)


Abstract
"In several two-sided markets, including labor and dating, agents typically have limited information about their preferences prior to mutual interactions. This issue can result in matching frictions, as arising in the labor market for medical residencies, where high application rates are followed by a large number of interviews. Yet, the extensive literature on two-sided matching primarily focuses on models where agents know their preferences, leaving the interactions necessary for preference discovery largely overlooked. This paper studies this problem using an algorithmic approach, extending Gale-Shapley’s deferred acceptance to this context. Two algorithms are proposed. The first is an adaptive algorithm that expands upon GaleShapley’s deferred acceptance by incorporating interviews between applicants and positions. Similar to deferred acceptance, one side sequentially proposes to the other. However, the order of proposals is carefully chosen to ensure an interim stable matching is found. Furthermore, with high probability, the number of interviews conducted by each applicant or position is limited to O(log^2 n).
"In many seasonal markets, interactions occur more simultaneously, consisting of an initial interview phase followed by a clearing stage. We present a non-adaptive algorithm for generating a single stage set of in tiered random markets. The algorithm finds an interim stable matching in such markets while assigning no more than O(log^3 n) interviews to each applicant or position. "

Friday, January 3, 2025

Sessions that caught my eye in the ASSA program

Economics of Higher Education

Lightning Round Session

 Saturday, Jan. 4, 2025   8:00 AM - 10:00 AM (PST)

 Hilton San Francisco Union Square, Golden Gate 3
Hosted By: American Economic Association
  • Chair: Caroline Hoxby, Stanford University

Cap-and-Apply: Unintended Consequences of College Application Policy in South Korea

Taekyu Eom
, 
SUNY-Buffalo
 

 

Do Double Majors Face Less Risk? An Analysis of Human Capital Diversification

Andrew S. Hanks
, 
Ohio State University
Shengjun Jiang
, 
Wuhan University
Xuechao Qian
, 
Stanford University
 
Bo Wang
, 
Nankai University
Bruce A. Weinberg
, 
Ohio State University

 

Inequality-Aware Market Design

Paper Session

 Sunday, Jan. 5, 2025   10:15 AM - 12:15 PM (PST)

 Hilton San Francisco Union Square, Union Square 1 and 2
Hosted By: Econometric Society
  • Chair: Piotr Dworczak, Northwestern University

Waiting or Paying for Healthcare: Evidence from the Veterans Health Administration

Anna Russo
, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
 

Optimal Redistribution via Income Taxation and Market Design

Mohammad Akbarpour
, 
Stanford University
Pawel Doligalski
, 
University of Bristol
Piotr Dworczak
, 
Northwestern University
 
Scott Duke Kominers
, 
Harvard University

Should the Government Sell You Goods? Evidence from the Milk Market in Mexico

Diego Javier Jimenez Hernandez
, 
Chicago Federal Reserve
 
Enrique Seira
, 
Michigan State University

Taxing Externalities without Hurting the Poor

Mallesh M. Pai
, 
Rice University
Philipp Strack
, 
Yale University
 

Discussant(s)
Vasiliki Skreta
, 
University of Texas-Austin and University College London
Dmitry Taubinsky
, 
University of California-Berkeley
Mohammad Akbarpour
, 
Stanford University
Dan Waldinger
, 
New York University

 

 

Market Design in College Admissions

Paper Session

 Sunday, Jan. 5, 2025   10:15 AM - 12:15 PM (PST)

 Hilton San Francisco Union Square, Union Square 11
Hosted By: Econometric Society
  • Chair: Evan Riehl, Cornell University

College Application Mistakes and the Design of Information Policies at Scale

Anaïs Fabre
, 
Toulouse School of Economics
Tomas Larroucau
, 
Arizona State University
Christopher Andrew Neilson
, 
Princeton University
Ignacio Rios
, 
University of Texas-Dallas
 

Inequity in Centralized College Admissions with Public and Private Universities: Evidence from Albania

Iris Vrioni
, 
University of Michigan
 

Stakes and Signals: An Empirical Investigation of Muddled Information in Standardized Testing

Germán Reyes
, 
Middlebury College
Evan Riehl
, 
Cornell University
 
Ruqing Xu
, 
Cornell University

 

Finance and Development

Paper Session

 Sunday, Jan. 5, 2025   1:00 PM - 3:00 PM (PST)

 Hilton San Francisco Union Square, Continental Ballroom 9
Hosted By: American Economic Association
  • Chair: Martin Kanz, World Bank

Default Contagion in Microfinance

Natalia Rigol
, 
Harvard Business School
Ben Roth
, 
Harvard Business School
 

Abstract

Joint liability is one of the hallmarks of microfinance. Though it is intended to reduce non-payment, it has also been hypothesized to lead to default contagion, whereby non-payment by one borrower may reduce the likelihood of repayment by groupmates. Utilizing unexpected deaths, we document significant default contagion in one of Chile's largest microfinance institutions. We estimate that a single default causes an additional 0.8 borrowers to default, indicating that nearly half of observed default is due to contagion. 

Credit Contracts, Business Development, and Gender: Evidence from Uganda

Selim Gulesci
, 
Trinity College Dublin
 
Francesco Loiacono
, 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
Miri Stryjan
, 
Aalto University
Andreas Madestam
, 
Stockholm University

Discrimination Expectations in the Credit Market: Survey Evidence from India

Stefano Fiorin
, 
Bocconi University
Joseph Hall
, 
Stanford University
Martin Kanz
, 
World Bank
 

Discussant(s)
Simone Gabrielle Schaner
, 
University of Southern California
Anna Vitali
, 
New York University
Janis Skrastins
, 
Washington University-St. Louis