Monday, September 9, 2024

Anticipating kidney exchange in Germany in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung

  Here's an op-ed in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, celebrating the anticipated beginning of kidney exchange in Germany.

Der Volkswirt Hoffnung durch Tausch  by Ágnes CsehChristine KurschatAxel Ockenfels und Alvin E. Roth

Here's the English translation (from a slightly earlier draft):

Hope through exchange

Germany's new draft law on kidney donation

Imagine this: Your child needs a kidney transplant, but due to tissue incompatibility you cannot be a donor yourself. And it's the same for me. What if you donated a kidney to my child and I donated a kidney to yours in return? Through this ‘cross-donation’ we could give our children the chance of a longer life with a better quality of life.

In Germany, such cross-donations are not usually permitted. Only people who are ‘obviously close in a special personal relationship’, such as relatives and spouses, are allowed to donate kidneys. This is now set to change. The Federal Cabinet has presented a draft bill to amend the Transplantation Act, which would allow cross-donations and other forms of living kidney donation. These include ring exchanges with more than two participating couples as well as longer donor chains initiated by a non-directed, anonymous donation.

People who hear about cross-donation for the first time are sometimes skeptical. However, these concerns can be dispelled on closer inspection. In our neighboring countries and in many other countries, such donations have long been successfully established in compliance with the highest ethical standards.

In cross-donation, no prices are paid for kidneys and there is no trading in kidneys. A system in which potential cross-donors are registered and referred centrally can be implemented in an abuse-proof manner, as experience abroad has shown. The Ministry of Health's draft calls for a close relationship to continue to exist between donor and recipient who register together in the kidney donation program, but no longer necessarily between the donor of an organ and the recipient of the same organ. The couples involved can be guaranteed anonymity, so that mutual influence can be ruled out and at the same time the altruistic motive for donating to the next of kin remains unchanged.

But what happens if the donor has already donated their kidney, but the cross-donor suddenly cancels? To avoid such situations, the two kidneys are removed from the two donors at the same time, and the two patients also receive the two organs at the same time. The four surgical teams communicate in order to coordinate the procedure safely.

The argument that authorizing cross-donation could increase the pressure on potential donors does not stand up to closer scrutiny either. The option of cross-donation does not create any additional pressure that is not already exerted on compatible donors. Instead, cross-donation merely expands the pool of potential donors. 

Incidentally, cross-donation also shortens the waiting list for post-mortem donations, so that patients without donors can also be helped. At the same time, cross-donation can protect the legitimate interests of those people who do not wish to donate if it is implemented in a suitable institutionalized manner and the best possible information is provided.

Germany now has the opportunity to learn from the existing systems in Europe in order to avoid mistakes in the regulations and their implementation for the benefit of organ recipients and donors. This applies, for example, to the establishment of a nationwide kidney donation program, from funding and equipment to biomedical expertise. The Federal Ministry of Health is making important proposals here. The large gaps in data on potential donors and recipients could soon be closed, the option of enabling international coordination of cross-donations is being considered from the outset, and the transplant centres are being encouraged to register all donor-patient pairs centrally for referral. Without such regulations, individual clinics could be incentivized to only selectively register pairs, with the result that fewer transplants can be carried out overall.

Other aspects of the draft should be reconsidered. For example, it is not advisable that couples can only participate in the kidney exchange program if donor and recipient are incompatible. Compatible couples can receive a more suitable kidney through participation and at the same time other patients can be helped, as more cross-donations are made possible through participation. This in turn can shorten the waiting list for all patients who do not have their own donor and therefore cannot participate in the kidney exchange program.

It is good news that new forms of living organ donation are now also to be made possible in Germany. The precise organization of these new forms of organ donation is crucial to their success. It can be modelled on the experiences of other countries and at the same time adapted to the specific legal, historical and ethical framework conditions in Germany. The initial investment would be amortized very quickly through the savings in treatment costs for expensive dialysis. 

In view of the draft law, we are optimistic that the wish of many potential donors to help can be fulfilled in the future, thus improving the care situation for kidney patients in Germany.


Ágnes Cseh (University of Bayreuth), Christine Kurschat (University of Cologne), Axel Ockenfels (University of Cologne and Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods in Bonn) and Alvin E. Roth (Stanford University)

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Here's the (rather opaque) graphic the newspaper created (maybe it's a celebration by kidneys):


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Here's a link to what I think was my first op-ed in German on allowing kidney exchange there...

Thursday, March 17, 2016


Sunday, September 8, 2024

Simulating kidney exchange policies in Germany

 Here are a set of simulations designed to help Germany establish a national (rather than a fragmented) kidney exchange system.

Itai Ashlagi, Ágnes Cseh, David Manlove, Axel Ockenfels & William Pettersson,  Designing a kidney exchange program in Germany: simulations and recommendations. Central European Journal of Operations Research  (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10100-024-00933-0

"Abstract: We examine some of the opportunities and challenges concerned with establishing a centralized national kidney exchange program in Germany. Despite the many advantages of a national program, without deliberate design and policy intervention, a fragmented kidney exchange program may emerge. We study a number of collaboration strategies, and resulting simulations suggest that transplant centers may find it advantageous not to fully participate, resulting in a net reduction in the number of transplants. These results also suggest that allowing more forms of kidney exchange, such as three-way exchanges and non-directed donations, can significantly increase the number of transplants while making participation in a national program more attractive and thus national coordination and cooperation more robust. We propose a multi-level policy approach that is easy to implement and would promote an efficient German kidney exchange program that benefits recipients, donors and hospitals."

...

The concluding sentence of the paper is:

"Germany should establish a robust, well-functioning national KEP that can be easily and straightforwardly integrated into an international KEP."

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Background:

Thursday, July 18, 2024

Saturday, September 7, 2024

Market design at Iowa State: course invites remote access

 Bertan Turhan writes to tell me about the market design course he is offering this semester, to which he invites remote participation (for access you can email him at bertan@iastate.edu ).

He writes:

"I wanted to inform you about a second-year PhD course I am teaching this semester with great guest lecturers. It is in person and taken by both Econ, OR, and CS students at ISU, but I also live broadcast it so that others can benefit. ... The course is mainly based on the Online and Matching-Based Market Design (Echenique, Immorlica, and Vazirani). "

Here is the syllabus and other readings.


Friday, September 6, 2024

Stanford celebrates Susan Athey

 This  from Stanford Report:

What motivates Susan Athey. The economist weighs in on incremental innovation, data-driven impact, and how economics is evolving to include a healthy dose of engineering. 

"Today, Athey, the Economics of Technology Professor at Stanford GSB, is using her expertise to promote the public good. In 2019, she founded the Golub Capital Social Impact Lab, which uses digital technology and social science research to improve the effectiveness of social sector organizations.

...

"For more than a decade, Athey’s professional passions have been linked to their potential for impact. She chose to return to Stanford — after six years teaching at Harvard — because of the opportunity for cross-disciplinary collaboration. And she has helped make such collaboration possible. In 2019, she was a founding associate director of the Stanford University Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence Institute. She is also a leader of the Business and Beneficial Technology pillar within Stanford GSB’s newly launched Business, Government, & Society Initiative, which brings together academics, practitioners, and policymakers to address issues such as technology, free markets, and sustainability.

"Athey’s Golub Capital Social Impact Lab epitomizes interdisciplinary work, putting students from computer science, engineering, education, and economics backgrounds to work helping partner organizations leverage digital tools and expertise that are generally only available to — or affordable for — large technology companies.

“I like building things that demonstrate how a class of problems can be solved,” Athey says. “If there is a problem worth solving, and I can solve it myself in a particular case, I know there are other people like me who are going to encounter the same problem. Part of the motivation and theory of change of the lab is that we will solve particular problems for particular social-impact organizations but also create the research that will guide others in solving similar problems.”

...

"Athey says some parts of economics are evolving to include a healthy dose of engineering. In the Microsoft Research interview, she described stereotypical economics research as evaluating existing programs and often finding that “stuff doesn’t work.”

“There’s a lot of negativity,” she says. With help from data and machine learning techniques, “my prediction is that economists are going to become more [like] engineers. Instead of complaining that nothing works, we’re going to start building things that do work to achieve economic outcomes…. We’re going to realize that nothing works if it’s one size fits all, but that a lot of things work if they are actually personalized and appropriately delivered.”

Thursday, September 5, 2024

Social Choice & Fair Division: Theory & Applications, at the University of Tehran this weekend

 Mehdi Feizi (مهدی فیضی) writes to alert me to the upcoming conference, at the University of Tehran, on Social Choice & Fair Division: Theory & Applications

"The Tehran Economic Policy-Making Think-Tank (TEPT) at the University of Tehran and the Ferdowsi Center for Market Design (FCMD) at the Ferdowsi University of Mashhad invite applications for the 2024 Summer School on Social Choice and Fair Division (SCFD): Theory and Applications. The School will take place at the University of Tehran on September 6th and 7th and at the Ferdowsi University of Mashhad on September 8th. The SCFD2024 Summer School is aimed at advanced graduate students, post-docs, and junior faculty members. All courses are taught in English.

Topics and Speakers

The SCFD2024 Summer School will address the most important recent developments in social choice and fair division. It will be practice-orientated with a solid theoretical grounding, combining international policy relevance with a state-of-the-art high-level scientific program. At SCFD2024 Summer School, we have a collection of leading experts in their fields who strongly engage with policy-making institutions.

Keynote Speakers

Haris Aziz (University of New South Wales, Australia)

Fuhito Kojima (University of Tokyo, Japan)

François Maniquet (Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium)

Marcus Pivato (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, France)

Arunava Sen (Indian Statistical Institute, India)

 

Lecturers

Inácio Bó (University of Macau, China)

Satya Chakravarty (Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, India)

Sinan Ertemel (Istanbul Technical University, Turkey)

Flip Klijn (Institute for Economic Analysis, Spain)

Alexander Nesterov (HSE University, Russia)

Kemal Yildiz (Bilkent University, Turkey)


Wednesday, September 4, 2024

Incentives matter for getting participation in clinical trials by low income households

 Here's a study that casts some light (via a randomized experiment) on the importance of incentives to get representative participation in clinical trials.

Nonrepresentativeness in Population Health Research: Evidence from a COVID-19 Antibody Study By Deniz Dutz, Michael Greenstone, Ali Hortaçsu, Santiago Lacouture, Magne Mogstad, Azeem M. Shaikh, Alexander Torgovitsky, and Winnie van Dijk, AER: Insights 2024, 6(3): 313–323, https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20230195

Abstract: "We analyze representativeness in a COVID-19 serological study with randomized participation incentives. We find large participation gaps by race and income when incentives are lower. High incentives increase participation rates for all groups but increase them more among underrepresented groups. High incentives restore representativeness on race and income and also on health variables likely to be correlated with seropositivity, such as the uninsured rate, hospitalization rates, and an aggregate COVID-19 risk index."


"We analyze representativeness in a unique COVID-19 serological study. Unlike most studies, the Representative Community Survey Project (RECOVER)COVID-19 serological study experimentally varied financial incentives for participation. The study was conducted on households in Chicago (the target population). Randomly sampled households were sent a package that contained a self-administered blood sample collection kit and were asked to return the sample by mail to be tested for the presence of COVID-19 antibodies (“seropositivity”). Households in the sample were randomly assigned one of three levels of financial compensation for participating in the study: $0, $100, or $500.

"We find that households in neighborhoods with high shares of minority and poor households are grossly underrepresented at lower incentive levels. High incentives increase participation rates for all groups but increase them more among underrepresented groups. A $500 incentive restores representativeness in terms of neighborhood-level race and poverty status. Representativeness is also restored in health variables likely to be correlated with seropositivity, such as the uninsured rate, hospitalization rates, and an aggregate COVID-19 risk index. Since incentives were randomly assigned and only revealed after the household was contacted, the noncontact rates at $0 and $100 should be the same as at $500, implying that differential hesitancy to participate is responsible for much of the nonrepresentativeness that we find at lower incentives.

"We are not aware of studies that randomize financial incentives in population health studies. It is well appreciated that racial minorities and lower-income households participate in health research at lower rates.1  The impact of incentives on survey participation rates conditional on demographic characteristics has been studied in the survey methodology literature (see Groves et al. 2009; Singer and Ye 2013, and references therein). The incentives used in this literature are typically an order of magnitude smaller than the incentives in the RECOVER study."

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Some earlier related posts:

Thursday, October 29, 2020

Paying participants in challenge trials of Covid-19 vaccines, by Ambuehl, Ockenfels, and Roth

"we note that increasing hourly pay by a risk-compensation percentage as proposed in the target article provides compensation proportional to risk only if the risk increases proportionally with the number of hours worked. (Some risky tasks take little time; imagine challenge trials to test bulletproof vests.) "


Tuesday, September 3, 2024

It's illegal to sell cicada infused liquor in Illinois

 Alcohol and insects don't mix in Illinois.  

The Chicago Sun Times has the story:

Suburban brewery fined for selling cicada-infused Malört shot. Noon Whistle Brewing garnered headlines for selling the creative drink during the rare overlap of two cicada broods. But it turns out the shot wasn’t just disgusting — it was also illegal.  By  David Struett 


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It's a good think the Illinois Liquor Control Commission wasn't running the IRB that approved Sandro Ambuehl's experiment that involved eating insects.

Sunday, March 10, 2024