Tuesday, April 24, 2012

Yuichiro Kamada defends his Ph.D. dissertation

Defense 2 (Offense 0)

Yuichiro (in suit:), with Tomasz Strzalecki and Al Roth (and Drew Fudenberg and Attila Ambrus via skype)
Yuichiro with the full defense team

Yuichiro had to choose three out of his many papers for his dissertation, which he called "Essays on Revision Games." Those papers all concern the difficult problem of analyzing incentives in non-stationary environments.

Multi-Agent Search with Deadline (joint with Nozomu Muto), December 31, 2011.(An earlier version of this paper referred to in the new version is here)

Revision Games (joint with Michihiro Kandori), December 31, 2011

Asynchronicity and Coordination in Common and Opposing Interest Games (joint with Riccardo CalcagnoStefano Lovo, and Takuo Sugaya), March 2012, Revise and Resubmit, Theoretical Economics(This paper is a result of a merger between two independent papers: Preopening and Equilibrium Selection by Calcagno and Lovo, and Asynchronous Revision Games with Deadline: Unique Equilibrium in Coordination Games by Kamada and Sugaya)

I earlier blogged about another of his papers, on the design of the market for new Japanese doctors:

Matching Japanese Doctors: problems with the current mechanisms, and suggestions for improvement by Yuichiro Kamada and Fuhito Kojima

Yuichiro is one of the group of job market candidates I blogged about here: Five Harvard candidates for the Economics job market this year (2011-12)

 He will be going next year to a postdoc at Yale, after which he'll take up a position at Berkeley-Haas.

Two more defenses are coming up this week.

 Welcome to the club, Yuichiro.

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