The NY Times is on the story: A Rush to Recruit Young Analysts, Only Months on the Job
"For Wall Street’s top young analysts, landing at a prestigious investment bank out of college was the easy part. Now comes the fierce competition to line up a high-paying job at a prominent buyout fund, just months into their first professional jobs.
...
"Traditionally, these jobs do not begin immediately but a year and a half later, after analysts finish their two-year contracts.
...
"One second-year analyst at a large bank said she had hardly been exposed to working in the finance world when the rush to find a job on the “buy side” began.
“There’s a progression that people go through,” she said. “You’re two months in, you start getting calls from recruiters, and you feel left out if you’re not participating. It’s a very enticing concept to lock up a job and your ticket out of banking a year and a half out.”
...
"Because they are trying to place analysts with such little work experience, recruiters will look for anything to identify the cream of the crop. College grade-point averages, high school test scores and community service are all fair game, Ms. Morgan said.
...
"Efforts have been made to push back a process that has been inching ahead, earlier and earlier. Last year, a handful of top-flight private equity funds including Blackstone, Carlyle and Warburg Pincus tried to delay recruiting until analysts were halfway through their second year, according to multiple private equity executives.
"The larger private equity funds waited, partly in response to big banks that were cracking down on recruiting. Goldman Sachs fired analysts who conceded they had lined up new positions in their first year, and Morgan Stanley banned first-year bankers from looking for new jobs, according to executives at both banks.
“There has been backlash,” said a former Goldman Sachs analyst who went through the recruiting process three years ago and is now an associate at a midmarket private equity fund. “You don’t really want your full investment banking analyst class checking out with a year and a half left on their contracts because they know they have another job lined up.”
"The banks were not concerned about losing talent but frustrated with the conflicts of interest that emerge after analysts pledge themselves to another employer.
...
“Once you have an offer, maybe you don’t want to work late nights three, four or five nights a week,” she said. “Maybe you don’t want to hop on every single live deal.”
"Morgan Stanley has since bowed to employee complaints, lifting its ban on first-year bankers’ job hunts this spring, according to two people briefed on the decision. Morgan Stanley declined to comment.
...
"The large buyout funds began ratcheting up recruitment drives last month, once again pursuing analysts in their first year.
"The funds that agreed to wait felt they had lost top employees to hedge funds and middle-market shops that aggressively recruited first-year analysts, said a private equity executive who oversees his firm’s hiring efforts.
“It’s back to a knife fight in an alley,” the executive said. “And it’s not fair because these kids get barely any on-the-job training before a recruiter reaches out to them. We should just be recruiting these kids out of middle school. Forget high school, college and Goldman Sachs.”
HT:: Eric Budish
Monday, June 24, 2013
Sunday, June 23, 2013
"דוקטור לשם כבוד" honorary doctorate at the Technion
When I was in Haifa to attend the conference in memory of Uri Rothblum (where I gave this talk), I was reminded that I used to visit often: for many years I was on the Board of Governors of the Technion.
And so, while I was there, I got an honorary degree, and planted a tree.
In Latin, an honorary doctorate is Doctor honoris causa, in Hebrew "דוקטור לשם כבוד" . (Doctor l'shem cavod, i.e. Doctor for the sake of honor...)
Here's an interview I did by phone with a reporter.
Here's a picture of the assembled cast.
 |
(l-r) Prof. Alvin E. Roth; Elisha Yanay; Alfred J. Bar; Yoram Alster; J. Steven Emerson; Daniel Rose; Prof. Peretz Lavie, president of the Technion; Danny Yamin, Chairman of the Technion Council; Lawrence Jackier, Chairman of the Technion Board of Governors; Melvyn H. Bloom; Ilan Biran; and Prof. Jason L. Speyer.
June 10, 2013
|
And here are me and Emilie next to the newly planted tree (the little one on the left, not the big one behind us...)
Update: here's the video of the honorary doctorate ceremonies. (It's long, but I did my best to keep in short, you can see me starting at 1:22:23--most of the applause is for brevity:)
And here is a much shorter video of the tree-planting ceremony, with President Peretz Lavie doing the honors, and Technion chemistry laureate Dan Schechtman and me planting the trees.
Saturday, June 22, 2013
Matching with Couples - Video of my lecture at the Rothblum conference at the Technion
Here's the talk I gave at the memorial conference for Uri Rothblum at the Technion:
Matching with Couples (55 minutes)
Matching with Couples (55 minutes)
Friday, June 21, 2013
Witchcraft as a repugnant transaction in Indonesia?
Al Jazeera reports on efforts to ban witchcraft in Indonesia: Indonesia considers ban on witchcraft
"People accused of practising black magic in Indonesia could be jailed for five years if a revised criminal code is accepted by parliament.
"However, there is a lot of resistance to the proposed new law, as witchcraft is big business in the country."
*********
In the United States and elsewhere, there are all sorts of laws and regulations about who may (and who may not) practice medicine, and I expected the story to be about efforts to ban witchdoctors on the grounds of practicing medicine without a license. But the story suggests that at least some of the motivation for the ban comes from a feeling that witchcraft is effective...
"People accused of practising black magic in Indonesia could be jailed for five years if a revised criminal code is accepted by parliament.
"However, there is a lot of resistance to the proposed new law, as witchcraft is big business in the country."
*********
In the United States and elsewhere, there are all sorts of laws and regulations about who may (and who may not) practice medicine, and I expected the story to be about efforts to ban witchdoctors on the grounds of practicing medicine without a license. But the story suggests that at least some of the motivation for the ban comes from a feeling that witchcraft is effective...
Thursday, June 20, 2013
Kidney exchange about to begin in France?
The story (in French) is here: Dons croisés d'organe : c'est maintenant (ou presque) !
Here's Google translate:
"In France, the law authorizing donations cross between living persons of July 2011 and its implementing decree was published in the Official Journal in September 2012. With the development of matching software, the first cross-kidney donation could take place before the end of 2013. Experts expect twenty additional transplants per year in the country.
Organ donation called "crossover" allows a living person who has expressed its intention to grant the benefit of a receiver identified on hold, to be offered to participate in a cross organ donation in cases of medical incompatibility receiver initially selected. General ethical principles for donations and uses of elements and products of the human body must be met: consent to the collection, revocable at any time, free, anonymous; estimate of the risk / benefit of interventions and implementation of the system of health surveillance . That the pairing mechanism is put in place, there must be at least 50 "couples" of volunteers. The selection process is currently underway. Each donor should have a complete medical checkup. The "couples" then pass a special committee to verify the absence of coercion and financial dealings. The donor is heard by a court. Then the couples are reviewed by the National Center for allocating grafts, which decides on their eligibility or not the database pairs.
It must be the work of computerized winners of Nobel Prize in Economics in 2012 matching the Americans Alvin Roth and Lloyd Shapley. Their game theory has revolutionized the organization of cross donation for kidney transplantation in the United States by allowing the matching of thousands of donors and recipients of organs. It is estimated that about 2000 patients so far received a kidney through this system, without which they would not have been grafted.
On the occasion of the third day of the Biomedicine Agency, held in Paris on Thursday 30 and Friday, May 31, Marie-Alice Macher, the transplant center strategy, announced the start of the first cross donations, originally scheduled for last spring, was now imminent. "The matching software is ready, the agreements were signed with most departments of institutions, which must leave the operating room available in case of successful matching. The only thing we lack is a sufficient number of pairs of donors in the database, "she said. The logistics system is also heavy as to ensure the reciprocity of gifts, the two samples and two transplants must be performed simultaneously, requiring the mobilization of four operating theaters."
Here's Google translate:
"In France, the law authorizing donations cross between living persons of July 2011 and its implementing decree was published in the Official Journal in September 2012. With the development of matching software, the first cross-kidney donation could take place before the end of 2013. Experts expect twenty additional transplants per year in the country.
Organ donation called "crossover" allows a living person who has expressed its intention to grant the benefit of a receiver identified on hold, to be offered to participate in a cross organ donation in cases of medical incompatibility receiver initially selected. General ethical principles for donations and uses of elements and products of the human body must be met: consent to the collection, revocable at any time, free, anonymous; estimate of the risk / benefit of interventions and implementation of the system of health surveillance . That the pairing mechanism is put in place, there must be at least 50 "couples" of volunteers. The selection process is currently underway. Each donor should have a complete medical checkup. The "couples" then pass a special committee to verify the absence of coercion and financial dealings. The donor is heard by a court. Then the couples are reviewed by the National Center for allocating grafts, which decides on their eligibility or not the database pairs.
It must be the work of computerized winners of Nobel Prize in Economics in 2012 matching the Americans Alvin Roth and Lloyd Shapley. Their game theory has revolutionized the organization of cross donation for kidney transplantation in the United States by allowing the matching of thousands of donors and recipients of organs. It is estimated that about 2000 patients so far received a kidney through this system, without which they would not have been grafted.
On the occasion of the third day of the Biomedicine Agency, held in Paris on Thursday 30 and Friday, May 31, Marie-Alice Macher, the transplant center strategy, announced the start of the first cross donations, originally scheduled for last spring, was now imminent. "The matching software is ready, the agreements were signed with most departments of institutions, which must leave the operating room available in case of successful matching. The only thing we lack is a sufficient number of pairs of donors in the database, "she said. The logistics system is also heavy as to ensure the reciprocity of gifts, the two samples and two transplants must be performed simultaneously, requiring the mobilization of four operating theaters."
Wednesday, June 19, 2013
Compensating kidney donors with charitable contributions--Choi, Gulati and Posner
Organ shortages remain despite the increase in live donation that has accompanied kidney exchange. But it is illegal to pay donors, so there's an ongoing discussion of other ways to induce a greater supply. Here's a proposal by Choi, Gulati and Posner...
Stephen J. Choi
New York University School of Law
G. Mitu Gulati
Duke University - School of Law
Eric A. Posner
University of Chicago - Law School
January 16, 2013
University of Chicago Institute for Law & Economics Olin Research Paper No. 630
NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 13-03
Abstract:
Not enough kidneys are donated each year to satisfy the demand from patients who need them. Strong moral and legal norms interfere with market-based solutions. To improve the supply of kidneys without violating these norms, we propose legal reforms that would strengthen the incentive to donate based on altruistic motives. We propose that donors be permitted to donate kidneys in exchange for commitments by recipients or their benefactors to engage in charitable activity or to donate funds to charities chosen by donors. And we propose that charities be permitted to create Altruism Exchanges, which would permit large numbers of altruists to make charitable exchanges with each other, including but not limited to kidney donations. Altruism Exchanges would solve two significant problems with the current system of voluntary kidney donations: the risk of default and the lack of liquidity.
HT: Alexander Berger
Tuesday, June 18, 2013
My graduation speech to Stanford economics grads, June 16, 2013
On Sunday I got to dress as Harry Potter and give the Stanford economics graduation speech (on matching and graduation) at Stanford's commencement exercises.
Monday, June 17, 2013
Non-directed kidney donation is up in the UK
Altruistic organ donations rise in UK almost three-fold
"The number of living people giving one of their organs to a stranger almost tripled last year in the UK, according to new figures.
The Human Tissue Authority (HTA) approved 104 so-called altruistic organ donations in 2012-13 compared with 38 the previous year."
*******************
Here are the UK statistics, and here is the page for the UK's kidney exchange program: Paired donation matching scheme
"The number of living people giving one of their organs to a stranger almost tripled last year in the UK, according to new figures.
The Human Tissue Authority (HTA) approved 104 so-called altruistic organ donations in 2012-13 compared with 38 the previous year."
*******************
Here are the UK statistics, and here is the page for the UK's kidney exchange program: Paired donation matching scheme
Sunday, June 16, 2013
Deceased organ donation and solicitation in Israel: video of my talk at the conference in memory of Jean Francois Mertens in Jerusalem
Here's a video of the talk I gave at the Center for Rationality conference in memory of Jean Francois Mertens on June 7 2013.
Saturday, June 15, 2013
An unusual blogging distinction, if it were true
Science writer Colin Schultz writing about Why Scientists Shouldn’t Be Afraid of Blogging and Social Media, presents a slide show that makes the following claim:
So this is Market Design. It’s written by Alvin Roth. Alvin stands as being, as far as I know, the only person with a Nobel prize who runs a blog. Alvin, along with Lloyd Shapley, won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences last year, and this was Alvin’s blog post that day.
******************
I would count the Becker-Posner blog in this category too, but I can't tell whether Mr. Schultz overlooked it, or doesn't count it as what he thinks of as a blog...
Are there any others that you know of?
So this is Market Design. It’s written by Alvin Roth. Alvin stands as being, as far as I know, the only person with a Nobel prize who runs a blog. Alvin, along with Lloyd Shapley, won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences last year, and this was Alvin’s blog post that day.
******************
I would count the Becker-Posner blog in this category too, but I can't tell whether Mr. Schultz overlooked it, or doesn't count it as what he thinks of as a blog...
Are there any others that you know of?
Friday, June 14, 2013
EC 13: ACM conference on Electronic Commerce, in Philadelphia, June 16-20 2013
EC 13, the 14th ACM conference on Electronic Commerce, will be held in Philadelphia, at Penn.
There will be workshops the 16th and 17th, and the conference proper will be the 18-20th. Some of the sessions that may be of particular interest to readers of this blog are Monday June 17 tutorials on market design by Utku Unver from 9-12:30 and by Tayfun Sonmez from 2-5:30, a session on kidney exchange on Wednesday June 19 (chaired by Aaron Roth) from 10:20-11:20, my talk on kidney exchange on Thursday June 20 from 9-10:00, and a session on Matching (chaired by Itai Ashlagi) from 11:40-12:40. There are also a bunch of sessions on mechanism design, with and without money.
Here's the program (and here are the abstracts):
There will be workshops the 16th and 17th, and the conference proper will be the 18-20th. Some of the sessions that may be of particular interest to readers of this blog are Monday June 17 tutorials on market design by Utku Unver from 9-12:30 and by Tayfun Sonmez from 2-5:30, a session on kidney exchange on Wednesday June 19 (chaired by Aaron Roth) from 10:20-11:20, my talk on kidney exchange on Thursday June 20 from 9-10:00, and a session on Matching (chaired by Itai Ashlagi) from 11:40-12:40. There are also a bunch of sessions on mechanism design, with and without money.
Here's the program (and here are the abstracts):
Thursday, June 13, 2013
Is the set of stable matchings generically small? Ashlagi, Kanoria and Leshno on large random marriage markets
Suppose you have a matching market with two kinds of players, say each player of one kind owns a single left shoe and the other kind each owns a single right shoe, and they can earn $1 by assembling a pair of shoes. Then if there are more left shoe owners than right shoe owners, the core of the game will give $1 to every right shoe owner and $0 to every left shoe owner. (Here's an old experiment on such a game.)
The situation is very much less clear if the game isn't played for money, and if the players are not all identical. But in a surprising result, Itai Ashlagi, Yash Kanoria and Jacob Leshno have shown that in a two sided marriage model (in which each man has preferences over all the women and each women over all the men, so agents aren't at all identical), then even a slight imbalance in the sizes of the two sides of the market makes the set of stable matchings very small: Unbalanced random matching markets, by Itai Ashlagi, Yashodhan Kanoria, and Jacob D. Leshno.
"Abstract: We analyze large random matching markets with unequal numbers of men and women. We fi nd that being on the short side of the market confers a large advantage. For each agent, assign
a rank of 1 to the agent's most preferred partner, a rank of 2 to the next most preferred partner
and so forth. If there are n men and n + 1 women then, we show that with high probability, in
any stable matching, the men's average rank of their wives is no more than 3 logn, whereas the
women's average rank of their husbands is at least n/(3 logn). If there are n men and (1 +lamda )n
women for lamda> 0 then, with high probability, in any stable matching the men's average rank of
wives is O(1), whereas the women's average rank of husbands is Omega(n). Simulations show that
our results hold even for small markets."
Wednesday, June 12, 2013
Who Gets What: video of a lecture I gave at Stanford GSB
One hour of market design (45 minutes of lecture, 15 of very good questions and my attempts to answer them...)
"Published on May 13, 2013
Stanford University Professor and 2012 Nobel Laureate Al Roth speaks on his prize-winning research and ground-breaking successes with exchange markets and his life-saving favorite, kidney exchanges.
Dr. Roth was the keynote speaker for the GSB Spring Reunions on May 3, 2013. He was introduced by Dean Garth Saloner.
Roth is the Craig and Susan McCaw Professor of Economics at Stanford University.
Related Links
http://alumni.gsb.stanford.edu/events...
Selected Works from Dr. Roth
Dr. Roth was the keynote speaker for the GSB Spring Reunions on May 3, 2013. He was introduced by Dean Garth Saloner.
Roth is the Craig and Susan McCaw Professor of Economics at Stanford University.
Related Links
http://alumni.gsb.stanford.edu/events...
Selected Works from Dr. Roth
Category
License
Standard YouTube License"
Tuesday, June 11, 2013
Matching in Paris: conference this week
Workshop on “Advances in Mechanism Design”, June 11–12, 2013
Paris School of Economics, “Grande Salle”, 48 Boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, France
Here's the program:
Tuesday, June 11
09:00 - 10:00: Fuhito Kojima (Stanford):
“Efficient Matching under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications”
10:00 - 11:00: Dorothea Kubler (WZB Berlin):
“Implementing Quotas in University Admissions: Experimental Evidence”
Coffee Break
11:30 - 12:30: Yinghua He (TSE):
“Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes for Two-Sided Matching”
Lunch
14:00 - 15:00: Alfred Galichon (Sciences Po):
“The Roomate Problem Is More Stable Than You Think”
15:00 - 16:00: Estelle Cantillon (ULB):
“Endogenous Preferences and the Role of the Mechanism in School Choice”
Coffee Break
16:30 - 17:30: Eduardo Azevedo (U Penn):
“A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-Sided Matching Markets”
Wednesday, June 12
09:00 - 10:00: Jinwoo Kim (Seoul National U):
“Stable Matching in Large Economies”
10:00 - 11:00: Francis Bloch (Polytechnique):
“Dynamic Allocation of Objects to Queuing Agents”
Coffee Break
11:30 - 12:30: Sonia Jaffe (Harvard):
“Taxation in Matching Markets”
Lunch
14:00 - 15:00: Tadashi Hashimoto (Stanford):
“The Generalized Random Priority Mechanism with Budgets”
15:00 - 16:00: Clayton Featherstone (U Penn):
“A Rank-based Refinement of Ordinal Efficiency and a New (but familiar) Class of Ordinal
Assignment Mechanisms”
Coffee Break
16:30 - 17:30: Muriel Niederle (Stanford):
“Propose with a Rose? Signaling in Internet Dating Markets”
Paris School of Economics, “Grande Salle”, 48 Boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, France
Here's the program:
Tuesday, June 11
09:00 - 10:00: Fuhito Kojima (Stanford):
“Efficient Matching under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications”
10:00 - 11:00: Dorothea Kubler (WZB Berlin):
“Implementing Quotas in University Admissions: Experimental Evidence”
Coffee Break
11:30 - 12:30: Yinghua He (TSE):
“Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes for Two-Sided Matching”
Lunch
14:00 - 15:00: Alfred Galichon (Sciences Po):
“The Roomate Problem Is More Stable Than You Think”
15:00 - 16:00: Estelle Cantillon (ULB):
“Endogenous Preferences and the Role of the Mechanism in School Choice”
Coffee Break
16:30 - 17:30: Eduardo Azevedo (U Penn):
“A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-Sided Matching Markets”
Wednesday, June 12
09:00 - 10:00: Jinwoo Kim (Seoul National U):
“Stable Matching in Large Economies”
10:00 - 11:00: Francis Bloch (Polytechnique):
“Dynamic Allocation of Objects to Queuing Agents”
Coffee Break
11:30 - 12:30: Sonia Jaffe (Harvard):
“Taxation in Matching Markets”
Lunch
14:00 - 15:00: Tadashi Hashimoto (Stanford):
“The Generalized Random Priority Mechanism with Budgets”
15:00 - 16:00: Clayton Featherstone (U Penn):
“A Rank-based Refinement of Ordinal Efficiency and a New (but familiar) Class of Ordinal
Assignment Mechanisms”
Coffee Break
16:30 - 17:30: Muriel Niederle (Stanford):
“Propose with a Rose? Signaling in Internet Dating Markets”
Matching news from Peter Biro: a conference volume, a summer school at the end of the month and a workshop in October
Peter Biro writes:
The proceedings of the Japanese-Hungarian Symposium is
now available online:
with papers on stable matchings and flows from pages: 55,
65, 133, 225, 243, 301, 347
Our summer school starts in 2 weeks time with 83
participants (+speakers)
The COST Action will have a workshop on 16-18 October in
Barcelona, organised locally by Flip. The topics will be matchings and
information merging (WGs 3 and 4 of the action: http://www.illc.uva.nl/COST-IC1205/).
You would be very welcome there as well if you have time.
Monday, June 10, 2013
Operations Research Conference in Memory of Professor Uriel G. Rothblum (June 11, 2013)
I am in Israel to participate in a conference honoring my old friend Uri Rothblum. The instructions to the presenters were to try to present a talk that Uri would have liked to hear...
Technion honorary doctorate ceremony
The Technion will broadcast its honorary doctorate ceremony here: Honorary Doctors Ceremony - June 10, 2013 – 8:00 pm, 1:00 pm EDT, USA
I don't imagine that it will be gripping to watch, but I will be there. I served for a number of years on the Technion's Board of Governors, and I am in Israel for the memorial conference of my old friend Uri Rothblum.
I don't imagine that it will be gripping to watch, but I will be there. I served for a number of years on the Technion's Board of Governors, and I am in Israel for the memorial conference of my old friend Uri Rothblum.
Sunday, June 9, 2013
Honorary 7th dan black belt in JKA Shotokan karate, presented by Sensei Masataka Mori
When I was an undergraduate at Columbia University, from the Fall of 1968 through the summer of 1971, I spent a lot of time practicing Shotokan karate, which was very satisfying and which taught me that I could work harder than I had thought. Our instructor was the now legendary Sensei Masataka Mori, who came to New York in 1968, where he founded the NY Dojo, and also taught at Columbia.
It turns out that Nobel prizes are followed by other recognitions, and the most unexpected of those that I have received is that the Japan Karate
Association in Tokyo has made me an honorary 7th-degree black
belt, something that, given my athletic abilities, is even more unimaginable
than being a Nobel laureate.
Sensei Mori came out to San Francisco earlier this year to make the presentation: in the photo below, he and I are holding the certificate.
Next to me is my wife Emilie, and next to Sensei Mori is T.J. Stiles, the Pulitzer Prize/National Book Award winning biographer of Cornelius Vanderbilt (and Jesse James, too, but in a different book, it turns out that they weren't the same person:). T.J. is a 5th dan black belt and the chief instructor of the JKA San Francisco dojo.
Behind the camera was Dr. Jacob Levitt, a 4th dan black belt who made the trip with Sensei Mori from New York, where he teaches and practices dermatology at Mt. Sinai Hospital.
Emilie and I felt that we were in the company of three unusually accomplished people.
Here is what I gather is an approximate English translation of the Japanese certificate:
Sensei Mori came out to San Francisco earlier this year to make the presentation: in the photo below, he and I are holding the certificate.
Next to me is my wife Emilie, and next to Sensei Mori is T.J. Stiles, the Pulitzer Prize/National Book Award winning biographer of Cornelius Vanderbilt (and Jesse James, too, but in a different book, it turns out that they weren't the same person:). T.J. is a 5th dan black belt and the chief instructor of the JKA San Francisco dojo.
Behind the camera was Dr. Jacob Levitt, a 4th dan black belt who made the trip with Sensei Mori from New York, where he teaches and practices dermatology at Mt. Sinai Hospital.
Emilie and I felt that we were in the company of three unusually accomplished people.
Here is what I gather is an approximate English translation of the Japanese certificate:
Saturday, June 8, 2013
Information about live kidney donors, for those who need them
The Living Kidney Donors Network is organizing two webinars:
LKDN is Offering two Kidney Kampaign Webinars:
Click here to register for June 10, 2013, 7:00 PM - 8:00 PM CDT or
Click here to register for June 18, 2013, 7:00 - 8:00 PM CDT.
To learn more about the LKDN Webinars, Click Here
NEW link and information: Developing Your Kidney Kampaign. Click HERE
The Living Kidney Donors Network is a not-for-profit organization whose primary Mission is to educate people who need a kidney transplant about the living donation process and to prepare them to effectively communicate their need to family members and friends.
Friday, June 7, 2013
Notes on teachers and students from the rabbinical literature
As I get older I appreciate more the bonds between teachers and students. These aren't as recognized in modern literature as are other kinds of bonds, between parents and children, husbands and wives, brothers and sisters... One exception is in the rabbinical literature.
Here's a brief collection of quotes, I'd be glad to know of more.
Rabbi Yitzchok Etshalom Talmud Torah 5:13
13. The students add to the teacher's wisdom and expand his understanding. The sages said: I have learned much wisdom from my teacher, more from my colleagues and the most from my students (BT Ta'anit 7a); and just as a small piece of wood ignites a large one, similarly a small student sharpens the teacher['s mind] until he extracts from him, through his questions, wondrous wisdom.
Here's a brief collection of quotes, I'd be glad to know of more.
Rabbi Yitzchok Etshalom Talmud Torah 5:13
13. The students add to the teacher's wisdom and expand his understanding. The sages said: I have learned much wisdom from my teacher, more from my colleagues and the most from my students (BT Ta'anit 7a); and just as a small piece of wood ignites a large one, similarly a small student sharpens the teacher['s mind] until he extracts from him, through his questions, wondrous wisdom.
alternate translation, from Maimonides, Laws of Torah Study, http://www.panix.com/~jjbaker/MadaTT.html chapt 5:
13) Students add to the wisdom of their Rabbi, and open his heart. The Sages said that they learnt more from their Rabbis than from their friends, but learnt even more from their students. Just as a small candle can light a big one so a student sharpens his Rabbi's wits, by extracting from him his wisdom by means of questions.
Pirkei avot: Chapter 1.1
The Men of the Great Assembly had three sayings:
Be deliberate in judging;
Educate many students;
Make a fence around the Torah.
Pirkei avot: (Chapte 1, 6) Joshua ben Perachyah and Nittai the Arbelite received the Torah from them. Joshua ben Perachyah said: Provide [make] for yourself a teacher and get [acquire] yourself a friend; and judge every man towards merit. http://www.shechem.org/torah/avot.html
Some commentaries have trouble with the first two clauses, and I've seen "get a friend" translated as "find someone to study with." But another way to understand it (maybe, I'm no Talmud scholar) is that teachers and friends (and students and friends) can intersect and be the same folks...
Sanhedren p105, side B: no man envies the accomplishments of his children or his students
"דאמר רב יוסי בר חוני בכל אדם מתקנא חוץ מבנו ותלמידו" "Reb Yossi bar Honi said 'of everyone a man is envious except his son and his student'."
( סנהדרין • קה ב )
*******
update: I should note that another literature/tradition in which bonds between teachers and students are noted is in martial arts .
"דאמר רב יוסי בר חוני בכל אדם מתקנא חוץ מבנו ותלמידו" "Reb Yossi bar Honi said 'of everyone a man is envious except his son and his student'."
( סנהדרין • קה ב )
*******
update: I should note that another literature/tradition in which bonds between teachers and students are noted is in martial arts .
Update: Charlie Nathanson reminds me of Perkei Avot chapter 4, verse 12 (https://www.sefaria.org/Pirkei_Avot.4.12
רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן שַׁמּוּעַ אוֹמֵר, יְהִי כְבוֹד תַּלְמִידְךָ חָבִיב עָלֶיךָ כְּשֶׁלְּךָ, וּכְבוֹד חֲבֵרְךָ כְּמוֹרָא רַבְּךָ, וּמוֹרָא רַבְּךָ כְּמוֹרָא שָׁמָיִם:
"Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua said: let the honor of your student be as dear to you as your own, and the honor of your colleague as the reverence for your teacher, and the reverence for your teacher as the reverence of heaven."
Thursday, June 6, 2013
Kidney exchange between Jewish and Arab families in Israel
Kidney exchange erases boundaries, here's the story from Haaretz (in Hebrew, with Google translate:)
Coexistence: Jews receive Arab donated kidney; son contributed to an Arab
Jewish kidney donation saves Palestinian boy
"Kidney of Israeli boy who suffered brain death saves Palestinian child; Peres: We are proud of your contribution to peace."
דו קיום: ערבייה תרמה כליה ליהודי; בנו תרם לערבי
Coexistence: Jews receive Arab donated kidney; son contributed to an Arab
Cross-transplant saved lives - and put hearts: the wife of Muhammad Eckert Haifa donated a kidney to Ben Yair. Exchange contributed son of Yair kidney to her husband. "For them it does not matter who contributed to whom. Them they saved the family"
A more usual story is of ordinary deceased donation: here's one from the Jerusalem PostJewish kidney donation saves Palestinian boy
"Kidney of Israeli boy who suffered brain death saves Palestinian child; Peres: We are proud of your contribution to peace."
Wednesday, June 5, 2013
Conference in Memory of Jean Francois Mertens, Jerusalem, June 6,7, and 9.
Conference in Memory of Jean Francois Mertens, Jerusalem, June 6,7, and 9.
Thursday, June 6
09:00 – 09:30 Welcome
09:30 – 10:15 Robert J. Aumann , “My Jean-François”
10:15 – 11:00 Françoise Forges, “Bayesian Repeated Games”
11:00 – 11:30 Break
11:30 – 12:15 Claude d'Aspremont, “Some Remarks on Bayesian Incentive Compatibility and the Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects”
12:15 – 13:00 Hari Govindan, “Toward a Theory of Stability in Repeated Games”
(joint with Aldo Rustichini and Bob Wilson)
13:00 – 14:30 Lunch
14:30 – 15:15 François Maniquet, “Strategic Voting under Proportional Representation”
15:15 – 16:00 Anna Rubinchik, “Regularity and Stability of Equilibria in an Overlapping Generations Model with Exogenous Growth” (joint with Jean François-Mertens)
16:00 – 16:15 Break
16:15 – 17:00 Sergiu Hart, “Correlated Equilibria: Markets, Dynamics, and Computation”
Friday, June 7
09:30 – 10:15 Alvin Roth, “Deceased Organ Donation and Solicitation in Israel and the U.S”
10:15 – 11:00 Geoffroy de Clippel , “Egalitarianism under Incomplete Information”
11:00 – 11:30 Break
11:30 – 12:15 Olivier Gossner , “The Value of Information in Zero-Sum Games” (joint with Jean- François Mertens)
12:15 – 13:00 Yair Tauman ,“Voting Power and Proportional Representation of Voters”
(joint with Artyom Jelnov)
13:00 – 14:30 Lunch
14:30 – 15:15 Elon Kohlberg , “The Shapley Value of Stochastic Games”
Sunday, June 9
09:30 – 10:15 Eric Maskin , “Markov Equilibrium” (joint with Jean Tirole)
10:15 – 11:00 Bernard de Meyer, “Risk Aversion and Price Dynamics on the Stock Market”
11:00 – 11:30 Break
11:30 – 12:15 Adi Karni & Jacques Drèze , “Subjective Expected Utility with State-Dependent Utility and ActionDependent Probabilities”
12:15 – 13:00 Pierre Dehez , “How to Share Joint Liability: A Cooperative Game Approach”
(joint with Samuel Ferey)
13:00 – 14:30 Lunch
14:30 – 15:15 Abraham Neyman , “Continous-Time Stochastic Games”
15:15 – 16:00 Shmuel Zamir , “The MZ Formula: Origins and Recent Application”
16:00 – 16:15 Break
16:15 – 17:00 Roger Myerson , “Settled Equilibria” (joint with Jörgen Weibull)
Thursday, June 6
09:00 – 09:30 Welcome
09:30 – 10:15 Robert J. Aumann , “My Jean-François”
10:15 – 11:00 Françoise Forges, “Bayesian Repeated Games”
11:00 – 11:30 Break
11:30 – 12:15 Claude d'Aspremont, “Some Remarks on Bayesian Incentive Compatibility and the Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects”
12:15 – 13:00 Hari Govindan, “Toward a Theory of Stability in Repeated Games”
(joint with Aldo Rustichini and Bob Wilson)
13:00 – 14:30 Lunch
14:30 – 15:15 François Maniquet, “Strategic Voting under Proportional Representation”
15:15 – 16:00 Anna Rubinchik, “Regularity and Stability of Equilibria in an Overlapping Generations Model with Exogenous Growth” (joint with Jean François-Mertens)
16:00 – 16:15 Break
16:15 – 17:00 Sergiu Hart, “Correlated Equilibria: Markets, Dynamics, and Computation”
Friday, June 7
09:30 – 10:15 Alvin Roth, “Deceased Organ Donation and Solicitation in Israel and the U.S”
10:15 – 11:00 Geoffroy de Clippel , “Egalitarianism under Incomplete Information”
11:00 – 11:30 Break
11:30 – 12:15 Olivier Gossner , “The Value of Information in Zero-Sum Games” (joint with Jean- François Mertens)
12:15 – 13:00 Yair Tauman ,“Voting Power and Proportional Representation of Voters”
(joint with Artyom Jelnov)
13:00 – 14:30 Lunch
14:30 – 15:15 Elon Kohlberg , “The Shapley Value of Stochastic Games”
Sunday, June 9
09:30 – 10:15 Eric Maskin , “Markov Equilibrium” (joint with Jean Tirole)
10:15 – 11:00 Bernard de Meyer, “Risk Aversion and Price Dynamics on the Stock Market”
11:00 – 11:30 Break
11:30 – 12:15 Adi Karni & Jacques Drèze , “Subjective Expected Utility with State-Dependent Utility and ActionDependent Probabilities”
12:15 – 13:00 Pierre Dehez , “How to Share Joint Liability: A Cooperative Game Approach”
(joint with Samuel Ferey)
13:00 – 14:30 Lunch
14:30 – 15:15 Abraham Neyman , “Continous-Time Stochastic Games”
15:15 – 16:00 Shmuel Zamir , “The MZ Formula: Origins and Recent Application”
16:00 – 16:15 Break
16:15 – 17:00 Roger Myerson , “Settled Equilibria” (joint with Jörgen Weibull)
Tuesday, June 4, 2013
Jerusalem School in Economic Theory: Decision Making: June 10-19 2013
The 24th Jerusalem School in Economic Theory
Decision Making
Lecturers
| Maya Bar-Hillel | Hebrew University |
| Itzhak Gilboa | Tel Aviv University |
| Daniel Kahneman | Princeton University |
| David Laibson | Harvard Universit |
| Mark Machina | University of California, San Diego |
| Eric Maskin | Harvard Universit |
| Wolfgang Pesendorfer | Princeton University |
| Ariel Rubinstein | Tel Aviv University |
| Eyal Winter | Hebrew University |
Decision making is at the heart of economics: production, exchange, and consumption are all the result of choices made by individual agents. For over sixty years, the benchmark framework for studying agents' decisions whose consequences are uncertain has been the expected utility model. But anomalies from experimental work in psychology and behavioral economics have led to revisions of expected utility and of utility theory more generally. The Summer School will explore both the standard model and some of the most important alternatives
Here's the program (Manny Yaari speaks about Newcomb's paradox on the last day, although he's not listed as one of the 'lecturers'...)
Here's the program (Manny Yaari speaks about Newcomb's paradox on the last day, although he's not listed as one of the 'lecturers'...)
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