Matching Senators to committees: a(nother) party divide, by Ashutosh Thakur

 Here's an innovative paper by Ashutosh Thakur that does for legislative matching of senators to committees what the study of matching and market design has long been doing in economics, which is discovering and analyzing the underlying institutional mechanisms that make things happen.

Thakur, Ashutosh. "A matching theory perspective on legislative organization: assignment of committees." Political Science Research and Methods (2025): 1-25. 

Abstract: How legislatures allocate power and conduct business are central determinants of policy outcomes. Much of the literature on parties and the committee system in legislatures examines which members serve on which committees. What has received less attention are the mechanisms by which parties allocate members to committees. I show that parties in the US Senate use matching mechanisms, like those used in school choice and the medical residency match. Republicans and Democrats use two distinct matching mechanisms, such that canonical theories of parties cannot apply equally to them. The Republican mechanism is strategyproof, whereas the Democrat mechanism incentivizes politicians to manipulate their reported preferences. Leveraging matching theory, I make theoretical predictions; corroborating them with archival correspondence and committee requests/assignments data.