Here's a report, 3 years after, of the first global kidney exchange chain. Among the authors are the Filipino physicians who are providing ongoing care for the Filipino donor and recipient:
Wednesday, August 29, 2018
Tuesday, August 28, 2018
Blockchain and legal but repugnant markets--a guest post by Stephanie Hurder
Below is a guest post, by Stephanie Hurder — a Harvard Economics Ph.D. (who I've blogged about
before, here,
and here)
and a founder of blockchain economics startup Prysm Group (that
I’ve blogged about here). She discusses
how blockchain may impact repugnant markets.
As Al has written about for years, repugnance -- the distaste
for certain kinds of transactions -- can be a serious constraint on markets. Repugnance can stem from numerous sources,
such as a fear of coercion or of a slippery slope. And while the constraints created by
repugnance sometimes end up incorporated in to law, they do
not need to be legal to have significant impact. Businesses may voluntarily choose not to
provide services that some set of consumers might find repugnant, in order to
maintain their brand reputation and prevent a loss of those customers.
Firms that engage in legal, adult activities
-- such as pornography and the sale of sex toys -- have significant issues
accessing financial services due to the constraints imposed by repugnance. Most commercial banks include “morality clauses”
forbidding service of businesses engaging in adult activities, for reputational
reasons. Newer
payment services that would like to serve “repugnant” industries are
constrained by these more conservative organizations, with whom they must do
business in order to effectively process payments and offer services.
Stripe, the payments processor, has publicly discussed this phenomenon
on their blog. Stripe was approached by OMGYes, a website that provides actionable,
research-backed information on sex. They
write:
The business
approached us and we were eager to work with them, but after a month of
deliberations, our financial partners did not agree. Instead, because the
website has explicit tutorials, it still falls under the umbrella of
unsupportable businesses. While we were not able to persuade our financial
partners this time around, we will continue to holistically look at and
advocate for businesses that sell adult products and services.
- - -
By now, almost all industries are exploring
how to leverage the economic benefits of blockchain, especially those arising
from blockchain’s ease of verification and decentralization. One type of use case with significant
potential is using blockchain to provide services to markets constrained by
repugnance.
Cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin are a
potential payments solution for industries not served by traditional financial
service providers. However, a payment
system by itself is not enough -- the anonymity of some cryptocurrencies can
increase the probability that genuinely coercive or even illegal activities
will take place. Effective platforms
serving repugnance markets will need to combine the decentralized benefits of
blockchain and cryptocurrencies with more traditional levers of market design,
such as reputation.
An example of a company doing exactly this is intimate.io. intimate.io is an Ethereum-based platform for
individuals engaged in the adult industry.
It provides secure, decentralized transfer of payments for adult
services. It also includes pseudonymous
reputation and user information (such as age verification and relevant health
information) to help service providers vet customers and vice versa. Two-party escrow provides financial
incentives for users to behave cooperatively.
intimate.io CEO, Leah
Callon-Butler, writes:
Blockchain
is a technology crying out for a use-case and intimate.io brings together
several different blockchain-based technologies, to demonstrate unprecedented
real-world utility through application to an industry that is sorely in need of
emancipation from centralised bodies who have assumed the role of moral arbiter
for too long.
While platforms like intimate.io open the
possibility for market participants to work around roadblocks imposed by repugnance,
they face many of the same market design
and data management challenges as other industries. How will sensitive information (such as
health data) be verified and provided to the market, while preserving
privacy? How will the platform ensure
that users banned for poor behavior do not create new identities? Innovative solutions to these issues can
inform market design more broadly.
It will also be interesting to see how the
“traditional” financial system reacts to blockchain platforms like intimate.io. Luke Coffman at Harvard has shown
that introducing an intermediary in a business transaction can lessen the
punishments for “immoral” behavior that consumers give to companies. How many steps of separation -- and of what
kind -- will be required between traditional banks and platforms like
intimate.io so that markets constrained by repugnance can finally be served?
Monday, August 27, 2018
Five approaches to the opioid crisis, by pharmacologists, doctors, insurers, prosecutors, and legislators
Five very different approaches to the opioid crisis--by
1. pharmacologists/biologists, 2. physicians, 3. payers, 4. prosecutors, and 5.legislators:
1. From PNAS:
Safer opioids may be on the horizon, but mitigating addiction is a long shot, by Jyoti Madhusoodanan
2. From Science:
Opioid prescribing decreases after learning of a patient’s fatal overdose, by
Jason N. Doctor, Andy Nguyen, Roneet Lev, Jonathan Lucas, Tara Knight, Henu Zhao, Michael Menchine
3. From the Chicago Trib, and from Stat:
Chicago limits opioid prescriptions for city employees
Tapered to zero: In radical move, Oregon’s Medicaid program weighs cutting off chronic pain patients from opioids
4. From Reuters:
New York sues OxyContin maker Purdue Pharma over opioids
5. From the NY Times
Congress Is Writing Lots of Opioid Bills. But Which Ones Will Actually Help?
******************
And here's an article from the NY Times on the magnitude of the crisis:
Bleak New Estimates in Drug Epidemic: A Record 72,000 Overdose Deaths in 2017: Fentanyl is a big culprit, but there are also encouraging signs from states that have prioritized public health campaigns and addiction treatment.
"Strong synthetic opioids like fentanyl and its analogues have become mixed into black-market supplies of heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine and the class of anti-anxiety medicines known as benzodiazepines."
1. pharmacologists/biologists, 2. physicians, 3. payers, 4. prosecutors, and 5.legislators:
1. From PNAS:
Safer opioids may be on the horizon, but mitigating addiction is a long shot, by Jyoti Madhusoodanan
2. From Science:
Opioid prescribing decreases after learning of a patient’s fatal overdose, by
Jason N. Doctor, Andy Nguyen, Roneet Lev, Jonathan Lucas, Tara Knight, Henu Zhao, Michael Menchine
3. From the Chicago Trib, and from Stat:
Chicago limits opioid prescriptions for city employees
Tapered to zero: In radical move, Oregon’s Medicaid program weighs cutting off chronic pain patients from opioids
4. From Reuters:
New York sues OxyContin maker Purdue Pharma over opioids
5. From the NY Times
Congress Is Writing Lots of Opioid Bills. But Which Ones Will Actually Help?
******************
And here's an article from the NY Times on the magnitude of the crisis:
Bleak New Estimates in Drug Epidemic: A Record 72,000 Overdose Deaths in 2017: Fentanyl is a big culprit, but there are also encouraging signs from states that have prioritized public health campaigns and addiction treatment.
"Strong synthetic opioids like fentanyl and its analogues have become mixed into black-market supplies of heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine and the class of anti-anxiety medicines known as benzodiazepines."
Sunday, August 26, 2018
Signaling and matching in an online labor market, by Horton and Johari
Here's a paper on signaling and matching in a prominent but un-named online labor market that is readily identifiable.
Engineering a Separating Equilibrium
John J. Horton and Ramesh Johari
August 14, 2018
Abstract: This paper explores whether platform-created signaling opportunities can move designed markets to more desirable equilibria. In a large on-line labor market, buyers were given the opportunity to signal their relative preferences over price and quality. The intervention caused substantial sorting by sellers to buyers of the right “type.” However, sellers clearly tailored their bids to the type of buyer they faced, bidding up against sellers with a high revealed willingness to pay. Despite this “markup,” a separating equilibrium was sustained over time, suggesting buyers found revelation incentive compatible. We find evidence that informative signaling improved matching efficiency and match quality.
"The signaling opportunity was simple: when posting a job opening, employers selected one of three “tiers” to describe the kinds of applicants they were most interested in: (1) Entry level: “I am looking for [workers] with the lowest rates.”; (2) Intermediate: “I am looking for a mix of experience and value.”; (3) Expert: “I am willing to pay higher rates for the most experienced [workers].” We refer to these tiers as “low,” “medium,” and “high,” respectively. When the signaling opportunity was introduced market-wide (which occurred after an experimental period), the tier choice was revealed publicly to all job-seeking workers."
*************
Engineering a Separating Equilibrium
John J. Horton and Ramesh Johari
August 14, 2018
Abstract: This paper explores whether platform-created signaling opportunities can move designed markets to more desirable equilibria. In a large on-line labor market, buyers were given the opportunity to signal their relative preferences over price and quality. The intervention caused substantial sorting by sellers to buyers of the right “type.” However, sellers clearly tailored their bids to the type of buyer they faced, bidding up against sellers with a high revealed willingness to pay. Despite this “markup,” a separating equilibrium was sustained over time, suggesting buyers found revelation incentive compatible. We find evidence that informative signaling improved matching efficiency and match quality.
"The signaling opportunity was simple: when posting a job opening, employers selected one of three “tiers” to describe the kinds of applicants they were most interested in: (1) Entry level: “I am looking for [workers] with the lowest rates.”; (2) Intermediate: “I am looking for a mix of experience and value.”; (3) Expert: “I am willing to pay higher rates for the most experienced [workers].” We refer to these tiers as “low,” “medium,” and “high,” respectively. When the signaling opportunity was introduced market-wide (which occurred after an experimental period), the tier choice was revealed publicly to all job-seeking workers."
*************
Saturday, August 25, 2018
No comment(s)
In July, just before travelling, I closed the comments on this blog, not because I don't appreciate
smart topical comments, but because every morning I had to delete
spammy comments on old posts by people purporting to buy kidneys.
Here are those from the last day I allowed comments
|
We
are urgently in need of kidney donors in wockhardt hospital India for the sum
of $500,000,00,( 3 CRORE INDIA RUPEES) All donors are to reply via Email:
wockhardthospital7@gmail.com on The Econometrics of
Matching Models by Pierre-André Chiappori and Bernard Salanié in the JEL
|
on 7/12/18
|
|
|
We
are urgently in need of kidney donors in wockhardt hospital India for the sum
of $500,000,00,( 3 CRORE INDIA RUPEES) All donors are to reply via Email:
wockhardthospital7@gmail.com on Organ donation rates in
Canada
|
on 7/12/18
|
|
|
We
are urgently in need of kidney donors in wockhardt hospital India for the sum
of $500,000,00,( 3 CRORE INDIA RUPEES) All donors are to reply via Email:
wockhardthospital7@gmail.com on Raj Chetty at the LSE:
How Can We Improve Economic Opportunities for Low-Income Children?
|
on 7/12/18
|
|
|
We
are urgently in need of kidney donors in wockhardt hospital India for the sum
of $500,000,00,( 3 CRORE INDIA RUPEES) All donors are to reply via Email:
wockhardthospital7@gmail.com on More on kidney black
markets in India
|
on 7/12/18
|
|
|
We
are urgently in need of kidney donors in global hospitals group India for the
sum of $500,000,00,( 3 CRORE INDIA RUPEES) All donors are to reply via Email:
onlinecareunit@gmail.com on 77 Kidney Exchange
transplants in 2015 at one transplant center in India
|
on 7/12/18
|
|
|
We
are urgently in need of kidney donors in global hospitals group India for the
sum of $500,000,00,( 3 CRORE INDIA RUPEES) All donors are to reply via Email:
onlinecareunit@gmail.com on Ten kidney exchange
transplants on World Kidney Day in Ahmedabad, India
|
on 7/12/18
|
Labels:
black market,
compensation for donors,
kidneys,
spam
Friday, August 24, 2018
Pay transparency, by Cullen and Pakzad-Hurson
Here's a contribution to the sometimes confusing debate about salary transparency.
''Equilibrium Effects of Pay Transparency in a Simple Labor Market"
Zoe B. Cullen and Bobak Pakzad-Hurson
Abstract: Public discourse on pay transparency has not focused on equilibrium effects: how greater transparency impacts hiring and bargaining. To study these effects, we combine a dynamic wage-bargaining model with unique data of temporary work arrangements that differ in their level of transparency. Full transparency lowers wages by up to 25% and increases hiring by similar magnitudes. Earnings inequality falls, and employer profits rise significantly. A key intuition is high transparency commits employers to negotiating aggressively, because a highly paid worker’s salary affects negotiations with other workers. We discuss implications for the gender wage gap and employers’ endogenous transparency choices.
**********
Here are some earlier posts that touch on related issues:
''Equilibrium Effects of Pay Transparency in a Simple Labor Market"
Zoe B. Cullen and Bobak Pakzad-Hurson
Abstract: Public discourse on pay transparency has not focused on equilibrium effects: how greater transparency impacts hiring and bargaining. To study these effects, we combine a dynamic wage-bargaining model with unique data of temporary work arrangements that differ in their level of transparency. Full transparency lowers wages by up to 25% and increases hiring by similar magnitudes. Earnings inequality falls, and employer profits rise significantly. A key intuition is high transparency commits employers to negotiating aggressively, because a highly paid worker’s salary affects negotiations with other workers. We discuss implications for the gender wage gap and employers’ endogenous transparency choices.
**********
Here are some earlier posts that touch on related issues:
Wednesday, August 17, 2016
Salary negotiation: some Massachusetts market design
The NY Times has the story: Massachusetts Bans Employers From Asking Applicants About Previous Pay
Sunday, May 5, 2013
Thursday, August 23, 2018
Martin Shubik, 1926-2018
Ed Kaplan emails me with the sad news that Martin Shubik died yesterday.
Here's the first brief announcement from Yale School of Management:
Prof. Martin Shubik, Influential Game Theory Scholar, Dies
He was a pioneering game theorist, and a frequent collaborator with his graduate school roommate Lloyd Shapley. My understanding is that the two of them shared a double room, in a suite with John Nash.
He suffered from a rare disease, Inclusion Body Myositis, and established a charity to organize research about it, Inclusion Body Myositis Registry at Yale.
He was a man of many parts. (See here, for example.)
Here are two photos I took of him at a Stonybrook conference in honor of Shapley. (In the second he must have been proving an especially difficult theorem...)
Two papers by Shapley and Shubik played important roles in areas in which I've worked:
The second (by publication date) was their landmark 1971 paper on matching as an assignment game (with all payments freely transferable), published in volume 1 number 1 of the International Journal of Game Theory: The assignment game I: The core
(Years after it was published, I asked Shapley what ever happened to part II, and his reply was "Never call a paper part I unless you have already written part II." As I recall, he further said that the plan for the never-written part II had been to study the von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions of the assignment game.)
The first was their famous 1954 paper in the American Political Science Review, perhaps Shubik's most cited, on how to evaluate the strength of each position in "simple" coalitional games, in which every coalition is either 'winning' or 'losing'
A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System
I have many times used his model of escalation, The Dollar Auction Game, as an in-class demonstration of the importance of auction rules for auction outcomes and strategies.
Historians of game theory are sure to learn a lot from the archives of his papers and correspondence at Duke:
The Martin Shubik Papers: From Early Game Theory to the Strategic Analysis of War
************
Update: Yale SOM has now published a long, fond remembrance:
Remembering Prof. Martin Shubik, 1926–2018
Here's the first brief announcement from Yale School of Management:
Prof. Martin Shubik, Influential Game Theory Scholar, Dies
He was a pioneering game theorist, and a frequent collaborator with his graduate school roommate Lloyd Shapley. My understanding is that the two of them shared a double room, in a suite with John Nash.
He suffered from a rare disease, Inclusion Body Myositis, and established a charity to organize research about it, Inclusion Body Myositis Registry at Yale.
He was a man of many parts. (See here, for example.)
Here are two photos I took of him at a Stonybrook conference in honor of Shapley. (In the second he must have been proving an especially difficult theorem...)
Martin Shubik in 2003 |
Two papers by Shapley and Shubik played important roles in areas in which I've worked:
The second (by publication date) was their landmark 1971 paper on matching as an assignment game (with all payments freely transferable), published in volume 1 number 1 of the International Journal of Game Theory: The assignment game I: The core
(Years after it was published, I asked Shapley what ever happened to part II, and his reply was "Never call a paper part I unless you have already written part II." As I recall, he further said that the plan for the never-written part II had been to study the von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions of the assignment game.)
The first was their famous 1954 paper in the American Political Science Review, perhaps Shubik's most cited, on how to evaluate the strength of each position in "simple" coalitional games, in which every coalition is either 'winning' or 'losing'
A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System
I have many times used his model of escalation, The Dollar Auction Game, as an in-class demonstration of the importance of auction rules for auction outcomes and strategies.
Historians of game theory are sure to learn a lot from the archives of his papers and correspondence at Duke:
The Martin Shubik Papers: From Early Game Theory to the Strategic Analysis of War
************
Update: Yale SOM has now published a long, fond remembrance:
Remembering Prof. Martin Shubik, 1926–2018
Take a break: avoiding congestion in ant colonies and elsewhere
A recent paper in Science is introduced by the NY Times under this headline:
The Secret to Ant Efficiency Is Idleness
Here's the paper:
Collective clog control: Optimizing traffic flow in confined biological and robophysical excavation
J. Aguilar, D. Monaenkova, V. Linevich, W. Savoie, B. Dutta, H.-S. Kuan, M. D. Betterton, M. A. D. Goodisman, D. I. Goldman
Here's the abstract of the paper (preceded by another description, perhaps written by a writer for Science(?) meant to be more intelligible...
When fewer workers are more efficient:
"A narrow passageway can easily become clogged or jammed if too much traffic tries to enter at once or there is competition between the flow of traffic in each direction. Aguilar et al. studied the collective excavation observed when ants build their nests. Because of the unequal workload distribution, the optimal excavation rate is achieved when a part of the ant collective is inactive. Numerical simulations and the behavior of robotic ants mimic the behavior of the colony."
Abstract: Groups of interacting active particles, insects, or humans can form clusters that hinder the goals of the collective; therefore, development of robust strategies for control of such clogs is essential, particularly in confined environments. Our biological and robophysical excavation experiments, supported by computational and theoretical models, reveal that digging performance can be robustly optimized within the constraints of narrow tunnels by individual idleness and retreating. Tools from the study of dense particulate ensembles elucidate how idleness reduces the frequency of flow-stopping clogs and how selective retreating reduces cluster dissolution time for the rare clusters that still occur. Our results point to strategies by which dense active matter and swarms can become task capable without sophisticated sensing, planning, and global control of the collective.
The Secret to Ant Efficiency Is Idleness
Here's the paper:
Collective clog control: Optimizing traffic flow in confined biological and robophysical excavation
J. Aguilar, D. Monaenkova, V. Linevich, W. Savoie, B. Dutta, H.-S. Kuan, M. D. Betterton, M. A. D. Goodisman, D. I. Goldman
Here's the abstract of the paper (preceded by another description, perhaps written by a writer for Science(?) meant to be more intelligible...
When fewer workers are more efficient:
"A narrow passageway can easily become clogged or jammed if too much traffic tries to enter at once or there is competition between the flow of traffic in each direction. Aguilar et al. studied the collective excavation observed when ants build their nests. Because of the unequal workload distribution, the optimal excavation rate is achieved when a part of the ant collective is inactive. Numerical simulations and the behavior of robotic ants mimic the behavior of the colony."
Abstract: Groups of interacting active particles, insects, or humans can form clusters that hinder the goals of the collective; therefore, development of robust strategies for control of such clogs is essential, particularly in confined environments. Our biological and robophysical excavation experiments, supported by computational and theoretical models, reveal that digging performance can be robustly optimized within the constraints of narrow tunnels by individual idleness and retreating. Tools from the study of dense particulate ensembles elucidate how idleness reduces the frequency of flow-stopping clogs and how selective retreating reduces cluster dissolution time for the rare clusters that still occur. Our results point to strategies by which dense active matter and swarms can become task capable without sophisticated sensing, planning, and global control of the collective.
Wednesday, August 22, 2018
Modern congestion pricing, by Cramton, Geddes and Ockenfels
Here's a short paper in the July 31 Nature:
Set road charges in real time to ease traffic
Track vehicles to link tolls with demand and cut congestion, urge Peter Cramton, R. Richard Geddes and Axel Ockenfels
And here's the longer working paper:
Markets for Road Use: Eliminating Congestion through Scheduling, Routing, and Real-Time Road Pricing
Peter Cramton, R. Richard Geddes, and Axel Ockenfels
Their vision:
"Efficient pricing of network capacity is not new. Indeed, wholesale electricity markets have been dynamically priced for over a decade. Communications markets are adopting dynamic pricing today. Efficient pricing of road use, however, has only recently become feasible. Advances in mobile communications make it possible to identify and communicate the location of a vehicle to within one cubic meter—allowing precise measurement of road use. User preferences can be communicated both in advance to determine scheduled transport and in real time to optimize routes based on the latest information. Computer advances also facilitate efficient scheduling and pricing of road use. Consumer apps help road users translate detailed price information into preferred transport plans. Computers also allow an independent system operator to better model demand and adjust prices to eliminate congestion and maximize the total value of road infrastructure. An independent market monitor, distinct from the
operator, observes the market, identifies problems, and suggests solutions. A board governs the market subject to regulatory oversight."
Set road charges in real time to ease traffic
Track vehicles to link tolls with demand and cut congestion, urge Peter Cramton, R. Richard Geddes and Axel Ockenfels
And here's the longer working paper:
Markets for Road Use: Eliminating Congestion through Scheduling, Routing, and Real-Time Road Pricing
Peter Cramton, R. Richard Geddes, and Axel Ockenfels
Their vision:
"Efficient pricing of network capacity is not new. Indeed, wholesale electricity markets have been dynamically priced for over a decade. Communications markets are adopting dynamic pricing today. Efficient pricing of road use, however, has only recently become feasible. Advances in mobile communications make it possible to identify and communicate the location of a vehicle to within one cubic meter—allowing precise measurement of road use. User preferences can be communicated both in advance to determine scheduled transport and in real time to optimize routes based on the latest information. Computer advances also facilitate efficient scheduling and pricing of road use. Consumer apps help road users translate detailed price information into preferred transport plans. Computers also allow an independent system operator to better model demand and adjust prices to eliminate congestion and maximize the total value of road infrastructure. An independent market monitor, distinct from the
operator, observes the market, identifies problems, and suggests solutions. A board governs the market subject to regulatory oversight."
Tuesday, August 21, 2018
An egregious repugnant transaction
When I speak about repugnant transactions--transactions which some people voluntarily engage in, but other people think they shouldn't, or perhaps shouldn't even be allowed to--I sometimes run into some skepticism from economists who point out that voluntary transactions generally increase welfare, and that to restrict them is paternalistic.
Nevertheless, many people have that (paternalistic) impulse at least sometimes.
Test yourself on this one, from the Guardian:
British stag group in Spain 'paid homeless man to get face tattoo'
Anger in Benidorm as Polish national given £90 to have groom’s name on forehead
"British tourists on a stag party in Benidorm have provoked outrage by paying a homeless man to have the name of the groom tattooed on his forehead, a local business leader has said.
Karen Maling Cowles, the president of the Benidorm British Business Association, said the group gave 34-year-old Tomek, originally from Poland, €100 (£89) to have “Jamie Blake, North Shields, NE28” inked on his head...
...
"Residents of the Spanish resort criticised the stag group after the tattoo parlour posted a photo on Facebook, since taken down, of Tomek getting the tattoo."
***********
HT: Muriel Niederle
Nevertheless, many people have that (paternalistic) impulse at least sometimes.
Test yourself on this one, from the Guardian:
British stag group in Spain 'paid homeless man to get face tattoo'
Anger in Benidorm as Polish national given £90 to have groom’s name on forehead
"British tourists on a stag party in Benidorm have provoked outrage by paying a homeless man to have the name of the groom tattooed on his forehead, a local business leader has said.
Karen Maling Cowles, the president of the Benidorm British Business Association, said the group gave 34-year-old Tomek, originally from Poland, €100 (£89) to have “Jamie Blake, North Shields, NE28” inked on his head...
...
"Residents of the Spanish resort criticised the stag group after the tattoo parlour posted a photo on Facebook, since taken down, of Tomek getting the tattoo."
***********
HT: Muriel Niederle
Monday, August 20, 2018
Medically assisted death debated in Australia
A bill is under consideration in Australia regarding medically assisted suicide, aka death with dignity. (The politics are complicated by the fact that Australia has both states and territories.) Here's the story from the Guardian:
David Leyonhjelm confident voluntary euthanasia bill will pass Senate
Liberal Democrat pressures Malcolm Turnbull to permit vote in lower house
"The bill to allow the Northern Territory and Australian Capital Territory to legislate for euthanasia – reversing a ban imposed by the commonwealth in 1997 – has support from at least 18 Labor senators, the nine Greens, eight crossbench senators and a small but growing group of Coalition senators. It needs 39 to pass the Senate.
...
"“Australians with a terminal illness should have a right to die with dignity, ideally with effective palliative care, but with sufficient safeguards, that right, in extreme cases, should also extend to voluntary euthanasia.”
***************
An earlier, related post:
David Leyonhjelm confident voluntary euthanasia bill will pass Senate
Liberal Democrat pressures Malcolm Turnbull to permit vote in lower house
"The bill to allow the Northern Territory and Australian Capital Territory to legislate for euthanasia – reversing a ban imposed by the commonwealth in 1997 – has support from at least 18 Labor senators, the nine Greens, eight crossbench senators and a small but growing group of Coalition senators. It needs 39 to pass the Senate.
...
"“Australians with a terminal illness should have a right to die with dignity, ideally with effective palliative care, but with sufficient safeguards, that right, in extreme cases, should also extend to voluntary euthanasia.”
***************
An earlier, related post:
Friday, May 4, 2018
Sunday, August 19, 2018
Data mining for knowledge discovery in London
24rd SIGKDD Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining
August 19 - 23, 2018 - London, UK
Here's the program. I'll be speaking on Wednesday morning, on Market Design and Computerized Marketplaces:
Keynote speakers
August 19 - 23, 2018 - London, UK
Here's the program. I'll be speaking on Wednesday morning, on Market Design and Computerized Marketplaces:
Keynote speakers
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)