Here's a paper on signaling and matching in a prominent but un-named online labor market that is readily identifiable.
Engineering a Separating Equilibrium
John J. Horton and Ramesh Johari
August 14, 2018
Abstract: This paper explores whether platform-created signaling opportunities can move designed markets to more desirable equilibria. In a large on-line labor market, buyers were given the opportunity to signal their relative preferences over price and quality. The intervention caused substantial sorting by sellers to buyers of the right “type.” However, sellers clearly tailored their bids to the type of buyer they faced, bidding up against sellers with a high revealed willingness to pay. Despite this “markup,” a separating equilibrium was sustained over time, suggesting buyers found revelation incentive compatible. We find evidence that informative signaling improved matching efficiency and match quality.
"The signaling opportunity was simple: when posting a job opening, employers selected one of three “tiers” to describe the kinds of applicants they were most interested in: (1) Entry level: “I am looking for [workers] with the lowest rates.”; (2) Intermediate: “I am looking for a mix of experience and value.”; (3) Expert: “I am willing to pay higher rates for the most experienced [workers].” We refer to these tiers as “low,” “medium,” and “high,” respectively. When the signaling opportunity was introduced market-wide (which occurred after an experimental period), the tier choice was revealed publicly to all job-seeking workers."
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Engineering a Separating Equilibrium
John J. Horton and Ramesh Johari
August 14, 2018
Abstract: This paper explores whether platform-created signaling opportunities can move designed markets to more desirable equilibria. In a large on-line labor market, buyers were given the opportunity to signal their relative preferences over price and quality. The intervention caused substantial sorting by sellers to buyers of the right “type.” However, sellers clearly tailored their bids to the type of buyer they faced, bidding up against sellers with a high revealed willingness to pay. Despite this “markup,” a separating equilibrium was sustained over time, suggesting buyers found revelation incentive compatible. We find evidence that informative signaling improved matching efficiency and match quality.
"The signaling opportunity was simple: when posting a job opening, employers selected one of three “tiers” to describe the kinds of applicants they were most interested in: (1) Entry level: “I am looking for [workers] with the lowest rates.”; (2) Intermediate: “I am looking for a mix of experience and value.”; (3) Expert: “I am willing to pay higher rates for the most experienced [workers].” We refer to these tiers as “low,” “medium,” and “high,” respectively. When the signaling opportunity was introduced market-wide (which occurred after an experimental period), the tier choice was revealed publicly to all job-seeking workers."
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