Sunday, July 21, 2013

SITE workship on Dynamic Games, Contracts and Markets, July 29-31 2013

The announcement is here:

Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics
Summer 2013 Workshop

Segment 4: Dynamic Games, Contracts, and Markets
July 29, 30 and 31, 2013
Organized by Yuliy Sannikov, Princeton University; Simon Board, University of California, Los Angeles; Andrzej Skrzypacz, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University and Alexander Wolitzky, Pablo Kurlat, Florian Scheuer, all Department of Economics, Stanford University.
This Segment of SITE is partially sponsored by The Graduate School of Business, Stanford University.


Monday, July 29, 2013
8.30 - 9.00 Breakfast
*Part 1: Agency with Frequent Actions
9.00 - 9.45 Yuliy Sannikov, Princeton University: Moral Hazard and Long-Run Incentives
9.45 - 10.15 Coffee
10.15 - 11.00 Tomasz Sadzik, University of California, Los Angeles and Ennio Stacchetti, New York University: Agency Models with Frequent Actions: A Quadratic Approximation Approach
11.00 - 11.30 Coffee
11.30 - 12.15 George Georgiadis, California Institute of Technology and Boston University: Projects and Team Dynamics
12.15 - 2.00 Lunchtime discussion
*Part 2: Dynamic Agency
2.00 - 2.45 Guy Arie, Rochester University: Dynamic Costs and Moral Hazard
2.45 - 3.15 Coffee
3.15 - 4.00 Qingmin Liu, Marina Halac and Navin Kartik, all Columbia University: Optimal Contracts for Experimentation
4.00 - 4.30 Coffee
4.30 - 5.15 Mikhail Golosov, Princeton University and Luigi Ioviono, Toulous School of Economics:Social Insurance, Information Revelation, and Lack of Commitment

Tuesday, July 30, 2013
*Part 3: Dynamic Mechanism Design
8.30 - 9.00 Breakfast
9.00 - 9.45 Daniel Garrett, Toulouse School of Economics and Alessandro Pavan, Northwestern University: Dynamic Managerial Compensation: On the Optimality of Seniority-Based Schemes
9.45 - 10.15 Coffee
10.15 - 11.00 Andrzej Skrzypacz, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University and Juuso Toikka,Massachusetts Institute of Technology: Mechanisms for Dynamic Bargaining
11.00 - 11.30 Coffee
11.30 - 12.15 Jeffrey Ely, Northwestern University, Alex Frankel and Emir Kamenica, both University of Chicago, Booth School of Business: Suspense and Surprise
12.15 - 2.00 Lunchtime discussion
*Part 4: Repeated Games
2.00 - 2.45 Axel Anderson, Georgetown University and Lones Smith, University of Wisconsin, Madison: Dynamic Deception
2.45 - 3.15 Coffee
3.15 - 4.00 Takuo Sugaya, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University: Efficiency in Markov Games with Incomplete and Private Information
4.00 - 4.30 Coffee
4.30 - 5.15 David Rahman, University of Minnesota: Frequent Actions with Infrequent Coordination
6.30 Continued discussion and dissemination of technical knowledge during dinner

Wednesday, July 31, 2013
*Part 5: Search/Experimentation/Information Aggregation in Markets
8.30 - 9.00 Breakfast
9.00 - 9.45 Yoon Koo Che, Colombia University and Johannes Horner, Yale University: Optimal Design for Social Learning
9.45 - 10.15 Coffee
10.15 - 11.00 Stephan Lauermann, University of Michigan and Asher Wolinsky, Northwestern University: Search with Adverse Selection
11.00 - 11.30 Coffee
11.30 - 12.15 Marzena Rostek, University of Wisconsin, Madison and Semyon Malamud, EPF Lausanne: Dynamic Thin Markets
12.15 - 2.00 Lunchtime discussion
*Part 6: Reputation and Sequential Screening
2.00 - 2.45 Bruno Strulovici, Northwestern University: Coase Conjecture and Efficiency: A Foundation for Renegotiation-proof Contracts
2.45 - 3.15 Coffee
3.15 - 4.00 Dilip Abreu, Princeton University, and David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti, both New York University: One-Sided Uncertainty and Delay in Reputational Bargaining
4.00 - 4.30 Coffee
4.30 - 5.15 Juan Pablo Xandri, Princeton University: Credible Reforms: A Robust Implementation Approach

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