International Conference on Game Theory, Zoom Webinar, July 20 - 24, 2020 (Registration here)
Monday, July 20
09:30 - 10:15 Éva Tardos (Cornell University)
Stability and Learning in Strategic Queuing Systems
10:15 - 11:00 Tilman Börgers (University of Michigan)
Learning Simplicity
11:00 - 11:15 Break
11:15 - 12:00 Plenary Address
Daron Acemoglu (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Too Much Data: Prices and Inefficiencies in Data Markets
12:00 - 12:45 Break
12:45 - 13:30 Plenary Address
Yuliy Sannikov (Stanford Graduate School of Business)
TBA
13:30 - 13:45 Break
13:45 - 14:30 John Geanakoplos (Yale University)
Money and Status: How to Incentivize Work in a Meritocracy
14:30 - 15:15 Alexander Frankel (University of Chicago Booth School of Business)
Information Hierarchies
15:15 - 16:00 Andreas Blume (University of Arizona)
Information Processing: Contracts versus Communication
Tuesday, July 21
09:30 - 10:15 Ran Spiegler (Tel Aviv University )
Cheating with (Recursive) Models
10:15 - 11:00 Kareen Rozen (Brown University)
TBA
11:00 - 11:15 Break
11:15 - 12:00 Plenary Address
Robert J. Aumann (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
A Synthesis of Behavioral and Mainstream Economics
12:00 - 12:45 Break
12:45 - 13:30 J. Aislinn Bohren (University of Pennsylvania)
Inaccurate Statistical Discrimination: An Identification Problem
13:30 - 14:15 Ignacio Esponda (University of California Santa Barbara)
Asymptotic Behavior of Bayesian Learners with Misspecified Models
14:15 - 14:30 Break
14:30 - 15:15 Dirk Bergemann (Yale University)
Search, Information and Prices
15:15 - 16:00 Hector Chade (Arizona State University)
Screening in Vertical Oligopolies
Wednesday, July 22
09:30 - 10:15 Myrna Wooders (Vanderbilt University)
Non-Cooperative Team Formation and a Team Formation Mechanism
10:15 - 11:00 George J. Mailath (University of Pennsylvania)
Coalition-Proof Risk Sharing Under Frictions
11:00 - 11:15 Break
11:15 - 12:00 Plenary Address
Oliver Hart (Harvard University)
Prosocial Corporate Governance
12:00 - 12:45 Break
12:45 - 13:30 Vasiliki Skreta (UT Austin and University College London)
Information Design by an Informed Designer
13:30 - 14:15 Kyungmin Kim (Emory University)
Competition under Moment Conditions
14:15 - 14:30 Break
14:30 - 15:15 Juan Ortner (Boston University)
Bargaining with Evolving Private Information
15:15 - 16:00 Marcin Pęski (University of Toronto)
Bargaining under Incomplete Information
Thursday, July 23
09:30 - 10:15 Jörgen Weibull (Stockholm School of Economics)
John Nash Meets Immanuel Kant: Moral Motivation in Strategic Interactions
10:15 - 11:00 Aviad Heifetz (The Open University of Israel)
Liberal Parentalism
11:00 - 11:15 Break
11:15 - 12:00 Plenary Address
Parag Pathak (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Leaving No Ethical Value Behind: Triage Protocol Design for Pandemic Rationing
12:00 - 12:45 Break
12:45 - 13:30 Plenary Address
Matthew Gentzkow (Stanford University)
Ideological Bias and Trust in Information Sources
13:30 - 13:45 Break
13:45 - 14:30 Marzena Rostek (University of Wisconsin-Madison)
Decentralized Market Design
14:30 - 15:15 Yeon-Koo Che (Columbia University)
Weak Monotone Comparative Statics
15:15 - 16:00 Leeat Yariv (Princeton University)
Dominance Solvability in Random Games
Friday, July 24
09:30 - 10:15 Nicole Immorlica (Microsoft Research New England)
Incentivizing Exploration with Selective Data Disclosure
10:15 - 11:00 Sven Rady (Universitat Bonn)
Overcoming Free-Riding in Bandit Games
11:00 - 11:15 Break
11:15 - 12:00 Plenary Address
Jean Tirole (Toulouse School of Economics)
Digital Dystopia
12:00 - 12:45 Break
12:45 - 13:30 S. Nageeb Ali (Pennsylvannia State University)
Reselling Information
13:30 - 14:15 Rachel E. Kranton (Duke University)
Social Networks and the Market for News
14:15 - 14:30 Break
14:30 - 15:15 Hülya K. K. Eraslan (Rice University)
Efficiency with Political Power Dynamics and Costly Policy Change
15:15 - 16:00 Lones Smith (University of Wisonsin-Madison)
The Behavioral SIR Model with Applications to COVID-19 and the Swine Flu Pandemics