Showing posts sorted by date for query school choice. Sort by relevance Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by date for query school choice. Sort by relevance Show all posts

Thursday, May 28, 2026

"How Moral Panic Creates Black Markets," interview by Nick Gillespie about Moral Economics

Nick Gillespie, from Reason Magazine,  interviews me about "How Moral Panic Creates Black Markets"

"Nobel Prize-winning economist Alvin E. Roth discusses the moral limits of markets, how bans create black markets, and why harm reduction often works better than prohibition."

"Today's guest is Nobel Prize-winning economist Alvin E. Roth, the author of Moral Economics: From Prostitution to Organ Sales, What Controversial Transactions Reveal About How Markets Work.

He talks with Nick Gillespie about why some voluntary transactions provoke moral outrage even when no one is being directly harmed. Roth explains why black markets often emerge when governments try to ban activities with persistent demand, why both markets and prohibitions require social support to function, and how unintended consequences can make moralistic policies backfire. They discuss the war on drugs, prostitution, surrogacy, same-sex marriage, price gouging, and why Iran remains the only country in the world with a legal market for kidney donors.

They also explore Roth's work designing kidney exchange networks and school choice systems, how digital technology and private transactions make certain bans harder to enforce, and why harm reduction may work better than prohibition in areas ranging from drug policy to sex work."

Saturday, May 23, 2026

Work and Moral Economics: Two Podcasts (Dart Lindsley's "Work for Humans" and Ben Zweig's "The Economics of Work).

Two podcasts interview me about Moral Economics, starting from a concern with work. 

 Dart Lindsley interviews me on his Podcast "Work for Humans":

Moral Economics: Where Human Values Shape Markets | Alvin Roth
Work For Humans 

Here it is on every platform 

 Moral Economics: Where Human Values Shape Markets | Alvin Roth

"A kidney transplant does not work like buying a gallon of milk. Neither does hiring or getting into a medical residency. In these markets, both sides care deeply about who they end up with, and a good outcome depends on more than money. 

Alvin Roth has spent his career studying what makes those systems succeed or fail. His work designing kidney exchange programs showed that even when people desperately want to help each other, the market can still break down unless the rules create the right kind of match. In this episode, Dart and Al discuss matching markets, moral economics, and the hidden rules that shape opportunity, fairness, and work itself.

Alvin Roth is an economist and professor at Stanford University best known for his work on market design and matching theory. He received the 2012 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for his work on stable matching and the design of markets used in medical residencies, school choice, and kidney exchange.

In this episode, Dart and Al discuss:
- Why some markets depend on matching
- Why fit matters more than money
- What makes a market stable
- Why real markets are messy
- The difference between theory and engineering
- What “repugnant transactions” are
- Why societies ban some exchanges
- How social norms shape markets
- Why work is also a matching problem
- And other topics…

Alvin Roth is the Craig and Susan McCaw Professor of Economics at Stanford University and recipient of the 2012 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, awarded with Lloyd Shapley for the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design. His work has helped design matching systems for medical residencies, public school admissions, and kidney exchange programs. He is the author of Who Gets What — and Why and Moral Economics: Why Good and Bad Markets Exist.

Resources Mentioned:
Al’s Book, Moral Economics: From Prostitution to Organ Sales, What Controversial Transactions Reveal About How Markets Work

Al’s Book, Who Gets What — and Why

##########

And here's Ben Zweig's The Economics of Work:

  "It was so fun talking to Alvin Roth, winner of the 2012 Nobel Prize in Economics. "One of my favorite books of all time is Who Gets What and Why, which has shaped the way I view labor markets. His second book, Moral Economics, came out last week and it’s so so good - endlessly thought provoking, funny, and sharp. In the podcast, we talk about controversial markets and what makes something repugnant, how to think about exploitation and coercion, and what that means for labor markets. "Check out the latest episode of The Economics of Work and Al's new book Moral Economics! "Moral Economics from Basic Books: Amazon: https://a.co/d/0cu6ZCLm Podcast Episode: Apple: https://lnkd.in/esVGQQx5 Spotify: https://lnkd.in/e4sr844Q Youtube: https://lnkd.in/eif7DHMS" 

Friday, February 20, 2026

French medical residents struggle without a way for couples to match together

 Esther Duflo sent me a link to the story below in Le Monde, describing the difficulty facing married doctors in France who wish to match to first jobs in the same city.

If I understand correctly, the old system ranked students by their exam results on the  épreuves classantes nationales (ECN), after which the students  then chose among the jobs available to them in rank order. A couple could decide to choose jobs at the same time, by waiting till the turn of the worse ranked member of the couple.  In this way they could choose two jobs in the same city.  But a new system ranks doctors differently, by specialties, and resolves itself for everyone at the same time. So couples can now have no way to assure themselves of being matched in the same city. 

Here's the article (which I sense isn't completely clear either in English translation or in the original French): 

"We are pawns to be moved": the geographical conundrum of medical intern couples
Since the last reform of medical studies, the algorithm that distributes future interns in the university hospitals of France no longer guarantees their assignment in the same city as their partner.  By Diane Merveilleux 

" Since 2023, the three-day ECNs giving rise to a single national ranking have been replaced by a sixth year punctuated by tests in the form of multiple-choice questions (MCQs) in October, then oral exams in the spring, which make it possible to establish 13 rankings by specialty groups.

"When summer comes, each student makes up to 80 wishes, a wish corresponding to a specialty in a city. Then an algorithm makes it possible to assign each person an assignment according to the ranking of their wishes. This algorithm will run eight times, each time simulating a final result and allowing students to adapt their wishes and review their ambitions. Their final assignment falls at the same time for everyone, at the end of the last round, in September. They are then hired for four to six years of boarding in the same place, without any possibility of change.

"For young medical couples, this is where the problem lies: those who would like to spend these years in the same city have no way of being sure.

...

"Thus, until 2023, the national ranking led students to choose their assignment one after the other – the first, then the second, and so on. In this configuration, the member of the couple who had obtained the highest score could "downgrade" themselves to join their partner's level so that they could make their decision at the same time. "Today, this downgrading is no longer possible, it's the very principle of the algorithm: we have a system that is totally different," says Philippe Touzy."

########## 

It seems that the couples algorithm that they have abandoned is much more primitive than the Roth-Peranson algorithm* now used in the American medical match, which allows couples to submit much more expressive joint preferences over pairs of jobs.

As it happens, just a few years ago there was a proposal for a two-part match that would have inadvertently disabled the US couples match.  Itai Ashlagi and I were able to convince the American Medical Association (which had sponsored the proposal) that it was a bad idea.  We ran the match under a variety of conditions.  So Itai  has an efficient implementation of the Roth-Peranson algorithm available if it could be helpful in France.

Here’s a blog post about that…

Friday, April 21, 2023

########

 From     Roth, Alvin E. "What have we learned from market design?" Reprinted with a postscript in The Handbook of Market Design, Nir Vulkan, Alvin E. Roth and Zvika Neeman editors, Oxford University Press, 2013, Chapter 1, 7-50

Wednesday, November 19, 2025

MATCH-UP 2026, Paris 1-3 July, 2026, call for papers

 

MATCH-UP 2026

8th International Workshop on Matching Under Preferences

NYU Paris, Paris, France

1-3 July, 2026

MATCH-UP is a series of interdisciplinary and international workshops on matching under preferences. The remit of these workshops is to explore matching problems with preferences from the perspective of algorithms and complexity discrete mathematics, combinatorial optimization, game theory mechanism design and economics, and thus a key objective is to bring together the research communities of the related areas. Another important aim is to convey the excitement of recent research and new application areas, exposing participants to new ideas, new techniques, and new problems.

List of Topics

The matching problems under consideration include, but are not limited to:

  • Two-sided matchings involving agents on both sides (e.g., college admissions, medical resident allocation, job markets, and school choice)
  • Two-sided matchings involving agents and objects (e.g., house allocation, course allocation, project allocation, assigning papers to reviewers, and school choice)
  • One-sided matchings (e.g., roommate problems, coalition formation games, and kidney exchange)
  • Multi-dimensional matchings (e.g., 3D stable matching problems)
  • Matching with payments (e.g., assignment game)
  • Online and stochastic matching models (e.g., Google Ads, ride sharing, Match.com)
  • Other recent applications (e.g., refugee resettlement, food banks, social housing, and daycare)

Invited speakers:
Itai Ashlahi – Stanford University
Irene Lo – Stanford MSE
Rebecca Reiffenhäuser – University of Amsterdam

Dates:
Submission deadline: February 15, 2026.
Notification: April 15, 2026.
Final registration: June 1, 2026

Organizers: CREST, ERC MADPART, Ecole polytechnique

 

Thursday, November 13, 2025

Nikhil Agarwal Wins Infosys Prize 2025

 From Inomics:

Nikhil Agarwal (MIT) Wins Infosys Prize 2025 for Groundbreaking Work in Market Design 

Recognising innovation in the field of economics, the Infosys Science Foundation (ISF) has awarded the prestigious Infosys Prize 2025 in Economics to Nikhil Agarwal, the Paul A. Samuelson Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 

Nikhil Agarwal's pioneering contributions to market design have set new standards in empirical studies for allocation mechanisms, affecting critical areas such as school choice, medical residency, and kidney exchanges, and make him a worthy winner of the 2025 Infosys Prize in Economics.

The selection of Agarwal comes as part of the ISF's initiative to promote early-career researchers by honoring individuals under 40 years of age. This shift, introduced in 2024, underscores the foundation's commitment to recognizing and nurturing talent that shapes the future of scholarship and innovation. 

Agarwal's research addresses complex "matching problems," scenarios where traditional market principles fall short. His work elucidates how individuals seeking vital resources—like patients in need of kidney transplants or students aiming for college admission—can be systematically matched through innovative market design techniques. By anchoring his theories in empirical data, Agarwal provides profound insights that have the potential to influence policy design and enhance societal welfare. 

The Infosys Prize is renowned for being one of the most significant awards in India, which not only honors excellence but also fosters a scientific culture that drives innovation across multiple disciplines. Each laureate receives a gold medal, a citation, and a prize purse of USD 100,000, along with international recognition, often leading to further prestigious awards. 

 

Thursday, November 6, 2025

School choice and performance gaps in England: a report by Burgess, Cantillon, Greaves and Cavallo

 Estelle Cantillon writes to tell me about her new report with Simon Burgess, Ellen Greaves, and  Mariagrazia Cavallo  on changing the priority criteria in secondary school admissions in England.

"Our starting point was the equity of access to effective schools in England and the role of priority criteria in this regard. England is special in that secondary schools can choose their own priority criteria (within guidelines). Many schools choose geographical criteria or tie-breaking rules, and we show that this is reducing the set of effective schools that disadvantaged pupils have access to. We explore three potential policy reforms: a quota for free-school-meal (FSM) pupils, a lottery for a quota of seats and banding. We find that the FSM quota is not only more effective at increasing access for disadvantaged but does so with less disruption (distance travelled, change in school intakes). Another special feature of our study is that our policy simulations cover all 150+ school districts (called Local Authorities) in England. So no need to worry about: would the effect you find in city X also apply in city Y.  
 
The full report is here: Modifying school choice for more equitable access in England

 Here's a blog post:  Access to highly effective schools: The case for reform
Posted on November 6, 2025 by Ffion Lindsay 

 "How do we address the gap in attainment between the most advantaged and disadvantaged students in the UK? Pioneering research, led by the University of Bristol, reveals the reforms most likely to equalise our education system.
Lead author Simon Burgess, Professor of Economics, explains how the team’s findings could lead to much-needed changes in how school places are allocated.

"There is much to applaud about the school system in England, but also deep problems. Chief among these is the wide and persistent gap in educational attainment between disadvantaged children and pupils from more affluent families.

"For example, in 2019, around 30% of pupils eligible for Free School Meals (FSM) achieved the benchmark performance in GCSEs, compared to double that among more affluent pupils. This gap has barely changed for at least 20 years.

"Part of this gap arises from differences in the effectiveness of the schools these children attend. Richer pupils are much more likely to be assigned to effective secondary schools.

"In fact, richer pupils are over 40% more likely to attend a highly effective secondary school (in the top 25% of value-added, in England called Progress 8). Not only might this be considered unfair for the current generation, it can also perpetuate income inequality through the generations.

 "The geography problem
Differences in the effectiveness of schools attended might simply be the result of families’ preferences for schools. Our research, however, shows that admissions arrangements play an important role in explaining the observed unequal attendance at effective secondary schools.

"Specifically, most English secondary schools explicitly prioritise pupils according to where they live – either through defined catchment areas or by ranking applicants by straight-line distance between home and school.

"This is not neutral: desirable schools generate substantial house price premiums in their catchment areas, effectively pricing out lower-income families. School choice through residential location appears not to be an option for poorer families. We show that richer pupils disproportionately move into the catchment areas of popular schools during their primary school years."

########

Reading this from the U.S., I'm struck by how our problem of sending poor children to poor schools is similar across the pond.  In the US we often attribute this in part to the fact that US schools are funded by municipal  real estate taxes, so schools in richer towns are better funded. But it appears that this problem can be reproduced in England simply by admitting students preferentially based on their nearness to schools, when better schools are located near more expensive houses. (This happens in US cities, too.) The between-country comparisons might help to disentangle peer effects from funding effects in what leads to school effectiveness.

Wednesday, October 29, 2025

The role of 'public entrepreneurs' in city government (and a shoutout to Jeremy Lack)

With a focus on New York City's mayoral election  next week,  this Bloomberg.com column considers things that mayors can do, including  school choice reform during the time Michael Bloomberg was mayor of NYC.  It points out the critical role played by Jeremy Lack when he was Director of Strategic Planning for the New York City Department of Education.

How Mayors Can Reclaim Government Efficiency
Amid budget cuts, city leaders are confronting how to get by with less.  By Cara Eckholm 

"Working with university researchers can offer exceptional value for money for cities. Researchers can deliver impartial analysis and technical skills that agencies struggle to hire — and are often willing to work at no cost to the city, in return for access to data and the ability to publish their findings.

"A strong illustration of the potential for impact comes from New York City. In 2003, Jeremy Lack, then the director of strategic planning at the Department of Education, reached out to economist Alvin Roth after reading about his work designing the medical residency match. The DOE had a problem: Its high school admissions process was leaving a third of students unmatched to any school they had ranked. Roth and his coauthors developed a new algorithm that solved the DOE’s matchmaking problem. The algorithm was so successful it was later copied in Boston, and contributed to Roth’s 2012 Nobel Prize.

"But the initial collaboration only happened thanks to the initiative of a public entrepreneur in an agency. Through setting up structured research exchanges, cities can make academic partnerships the norm, rather than the exception."

Tuesday, September 9, 2025

Matching Senators to committees: a(nother) party divide, by Ashutosh Thakur

 Here's an innovative paper by Ashutosh Thakur that does for legislative matching of senators to committees what the study of matching and market design has long been doing in economics, which is discovering and analyzing the underlying institutional mechanisms that make things happen.

Thakur, Ashutosh. "A matching theory perspective on legislative organization: assignment of committees." Political Science Research and Methods (2025): 1-25. 

Abstract: How legislatures allocate power and conduct business are central determinants of policy outcomes. Much of the literature on parties and the committee system in legislatures examines which members serve on which committees. What has received less attention are the mechanisms by which parties allocate members to committees. I show that parties in the US Senate use matching mechanisms, like those used in school choice and the medical residency match. Republicans and Democrats use two distinct matching mechanisms, such that canonical theories of parties cannot apply equally to them. The Republican mechanism is strategyproof, whereas the Democrat mechanism incentivizes politicians to manipulate their reported preferences. Leveraging matching theory, I make theoretical predictions; corroborating them with archival correspondence and committee requests/assignments data.

Thursday, August 28, 2025

The Walras-Bowley Lecture: Fragmentation of Matching Markets and How Economics Can Help Integrate Them, by Kamada, Kojima, and Matsushita

 Fuhito Kojima's 2023 Walras Bowley Lecture has just been uploaded to arxiv, and it looks to be an exciting contribution to the market design literature.  It considers the fact that administrative boundaries cause many markets to be fragmented, and hence less thick than they might otherwise be, and how some of the resulting efficiency loss can be recovered.

The Walras-Bowley Lecture: Fragmentation of Matching Markets and How Economics Can Help Integrate Them, by Yuichiro Kamada, Fuhito Kojima, and Akira Matsushita
(August 27, 2025) 

Below is the abstract and opening paragraphs. 

"Abstract
Fragmentation of matching markets is a ubiquitous problem across countries and across applications. In order to study the implications of fragmentation and possibilities for integration, we first document and discuss a variety of fragmentation cases in practice such as school choice, medical residency matching, and so forth. Using the real-life dataset of daycare matching markets in Japan, we then empirically evaluate the impact of interregional transfer of students by estimating student utility functions under a variety of specifications and then using them for counterfactual simulation. Our simulation compares a fully integrated market and a partially integrated one with a “balancedness” constraint—for each region, the inflow of students from the other regions must be equal to the outflow to the other areas. We find that partial integration achieves 39.2 to 59.6% of the increase in the child welfare that can be attained under full integration, which is equivalent to a 3.3 to 4.9% reduction of travel time. The percentage decrease in the unmatch rate is 40.0 to 52.8% under partial integration compared to the case of full integration. The results suggest that even in environments where full integration is not a realistic option, partial integration, i.e., integration that respects the balancedness constraint, has a potential to recover a nontrivial portion of the loss from fragmentation.


Introduction
Many of the most consequential markets in our societies—school admissions, medical resident matching, daycare placements, kidney exchanges—are matching markets, where centralized mechanisms are often employed to improve efficiency and fairness. Over the past several decades, the field of market design has made substantial progress in developing and implementing such mechanisms (e.g., AbdulkadiroÄŸlu and Sönmez (2003) for school choice, Roth (1984) for medical residency matching, Kamada and Kojima (2023) for daycare placements, and Roth et al. (2004) for kidney exchanges). In doing so, it has led economists to assume a dual role as both analysts and engineers (Roth, 2002).

How are those sophisticated mechanisms implemented in practice? Typically, these mechanisms are run by individual cities, districts or institutions, and the implementation is usually confined to narrowly defined administrative or political boundaries. These boundaries can reflect long-standing institutional arrangements, localized funding responsibilities, or jurisdictional autonomy. Regardless of their origins, the consequence is that agents on different sides of a boundary are matched as if they participated in entirely separate markets—even when they live mere blocks apart.

The aim of this paper is to study the implications of fragmentation of matching markets and possibilities for integration. To do so, we begin by offering a detailed descriptive account of fragmented matching markets in practice. We observe that fragmentation is prevalent across a variety of settings globally, from public school systems and childcare allocation to medical residency assignments, foster care placements, and public housing markets, among others. We highlight how institutional boundaries and localized governance create fragmented, parallel markets. Each case underscores the potential inefficiencies due to constrained choices caused by fragmentation, motivating our inquiry into mechanisms that can integrate markets effectively.

Against this background, we then investigate public daycare assignment in Japan in detail. "


Thursday, June 5, 2025

Yale celebrates Larry Samuelson

 

Economist Larry Samuelson on Pioneering Game Theory Research at Cowles.  Yale professor Larry Samuelson's research was pivotal in the evolution of game theory economics. The former Cowles Foundation Director and president of the Econometrics Society sits down with Richard Panek to explain his motivations behind the work Samuelson is best known for. 

"Larry Samuelson was born in 1953 in Rockford, Illinois, then a solidly blue-collar, middle-class, Midwest industrial town. After high school Samuelson decided to go away to college—the University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana (today, Urbana-Champaign), a three-hour drive from Rockford—although he had "not much of an idea” about what he wanted to study. Instead, he had chosen to attend college because, on the scale of good-for-me/bad-for-me, he guessed it would be more advantageous than the alternative.

"His willingness to take the road less traveled resurfaced when the time came to choose classes. He happened upon an economics course and, without knowing why, signed up. The course proved to be revelatory. The teacher was “particularly inspiring,” Samuelson says, but it was the subject itself that riveted him.

"He already knew that he liked mathematics—its “logic,” he says, its “beauty.” But in economics he discovered “an ideal blend of precision and rigor on the one hand, and relevance on the other hand.” After graduation he stayed at the University of Illinois to pursue a masters in economics and then a doctorate. “Being an economist,” he says, explaining the reasoning behind his choice of career, “you’re doing math in the service of what looked like some really important questions.”

"In the mid-1970s game theory wasn’t part of the standard curriculum in the study of economics; it was what Samuelson calls “a specialty.” Nonetheless, Illinois did offer a course on the topic, and as a graduate student Samuelson, once again electing for an option off the beaten path, took the course—and, once again, found a fortunate combination of inspiring instructor and compelling topic. One of the teachers in that class was Alvin E. Roth, future co-recipient, with Lloyd Shapley, of the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences partly for his work on, yes, game theory.

...

"After completing his PhD in economics at Illinois, Samuelson embarked on the life of an itinerant academic. For a year he taught at the University of Florida, Gainesville, then for three years at Syracuse University, then for the rest of the 1980s at Pennsylvania State University. In 1990 he settled down at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, and there he remained for nearly two decades, before joining the faculty at Yale in 2007. Along the way Samuelson became a leading figure in two subsets of game theory in economics.

One was evolutionary game theory.

At first, the evolution in evolutionary game theory was metaphorical. From the late 1980s through the 1990s, Samuelson studied scenarios in which players would adjust their behavior over the course of repeated plays of a single game, experimenting with various actions and gravitating toward those that had tended to bring good outcomes and away from actions that had produced disappointing results. The basic question was whether such learning would lead players in a game to a Nash equilibrium, and the basic answer, albeit with many caveats and qualifications, was yes: Stable outcomes of learning dynamics are Nash equilibria.

Then Samuelson began taking the word evolution more literally, extending his mathematical work on evolutionary game theory into biology. In collaboration with Yale evolutionary biologist and ornithologist Richard Prum, for instance, Samuelson studied cases of members of a species mimicking the members of other, typically more dominant, species. The example they used in a 2012 paper was the evolution of Downy Woodpeckers that are now nearly identical in appearance to the generally larger Hairy Woodpeckers.

...

"More recently, Samuelson has extended his literal interpretation of the word evolution. Rather than using evolution to study other species, he has begun applying it to the biology of humans.  An old joke: The reason economists don’t sell their children is that they might be worth more later. And yes, Samuelson grants, “the mechanics of evolutionary selection are fundamentally selfish. Evolution selects for traits, behaviors, and preferences that increase the reproduction prospects of the individual, or indeed more precisely the gene.”

But.

“There's nothing intrinsic to economics that requires people to be selfish,” Samuelson says. Economic theory assumes that behaviors follow preferences, but it makes no assumptions about the content, whether selfish or selfless, of those preferences. “To an economist Mother Teresa is as good a model of economic behavior as is”—a pause—“Elon Musk might come to mind. Mother Teresa was as selfless as could be, but she followed that goal consistently and coherently, and one would have no trouble fitting that into an economic model.”

And because preferences “are the point of departure for models of individual behavior,” they are also the point of departure “for all of economics.” Biological and cultural evolution helped shape our preferences just as it helped shape many of our characteristics. By identifying aspects of preferences that would have conferred an advantage on our evolutionary ancestors, Samuelson’s research has allowed economists to sharpen their assumptions about preferences and therefore the subsequent economic analyses.  

In the late 1990s Samuelson began investigating the topic that would become his second major area of research: repeated games, especially the concept of reputations. As the name suggests, repeated games involve modeling that extends beyond the decision-making apparatuses of a one-off competition.

...

"By the 2010s Samuelson had become somewhat of an elder statesmen in the field of game theory economics. In 2011 he was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. The following year he received a fellowship from the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. From 2014 to 2020 he served as the director of the Cowles Foundation, where he initiated a homecoming of sorts: In 1934 Alfred Cowles, champion of the use of statistics in economics, helped fund the launch of the Econometrics Society, and Samuelson, in his role at the head of the Cowles Foundation, orchestrated the transfer of the Society’s office to Yale. As of 2025 Samuelson is serving as the president of the Society.

Not surprisingly his five-decade immersion in game theory has affected his view of the world. “I think about incentives a lot,” he says. “If I had to summarize all of economics in one phrase, that phrase would be: Incentives matter. That sounds trite,” he quickly adds, “but it’s something people very easily lose sight of.”

So what, I wonder, was his incentive to sit for this interview? What went through his game theorist’s brain when the current director of the Cowles Foundation invited him to be the subject of the first of what might become a series of faculty profiles on the Cowles website? Can Samuelson describe his decision in terms of game theory?

He immediately defaults to a familiar framing.

“This could be good for the organization, and indirectly that’s good for me. Or,” he goes on, after a moment’s reflection, “at least it makes me feel good about me.”





Wednesday, May 14, 2025

Matching Theory and Market Design: conference in Sicily.

 Here's the preliminary program for the

20th Matching in Practice Workshop  University of Messina, Department of Economics, Aula Magna 2, 15-16 May 2025

Thursday 15 May

9:00-9:15 Opening

9:15-11:00 Presentation session “Matching with externalities and equity concerns I” 

 Alexander Nesterov, Higher School of Economics  “Reserves in Targeted Admissions: A Mechanism Design Approach” 

 Guillaume Haeringer, Baruch College  “School Choice under Uncertainty: an Experiment” 

Antonio Romero Medina, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid  “Optimizing Daycare Enrollment: How To Avoid Early Applications”

11:00-11:15 Coffee break

11:15-13:00 Presentation session “Dynamic matching and incentives to participation I”

 Duygu Sili, Università degli Studi di Messina  “Costly Multi-Hospital Dynamic Kidney Exchange”

 Subhajit Pramanik, Università degli Studi di Padova  “A Dynamic Bargaining Framework for International Kidney Paired Exchange Program”

 Ã–zgür Yilmaz, Koç University “Dynamically Optimal Kidney Exchange” 

13:00-14:00 Lunch

14:00-15:15 Seminar presented by the 2012 Nobel Prize in Economics Prof. Alvin Roth (Stanford University)  “The Economics of Kidney Exchange: Kidneys and Controversies”  (open to the public)

16:00-22:00 Departure to and walk across Taormina, with gala dinner to follow at Ristorante La Botte.

Friday 16 May

9:00-10:45 Presentation session “Matching with externalities and equity concerns II” 

Flip Klijn, Institute for Economic Analysis (CSIC) and Barcelona School of Economics  “Characterizing No-Trade-Bundled Top-Trading Cycles Mechanisms for Multiple-Type Housing Markets”

 Péter Biró, Institute of Economics, HUN-REN KRTK “Ex-post Stability under Two-Sided Matching: Complexity and Characterization”

 Emre Dogan, HSE University “Incentivizing Public Lawyers and Enhancing Fairness via Sorting in Adversarial Systems”

10:45-11:00 Coffee break

11:00-12:45 Presentation session “Dynamic matching and incentives to participation II”

 Pietro Salmaso, Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II  “Rationalizable Conjectures in Dynamic Matching”

Johanna Raith, IHW – Leibniz Institute for Economic Research “College Application Choices in a Repeated DA Setting: Evidence from Croatia”

 Sonal Yadav, University of Liverpool “Teacher Redistribution in Public Schools”

12:45-13:40 Roundtable  “Organ-donor exchange programs, international comparison” Moderator Prof. Antonio Nicolò (Università degli Studi di Padova), with the participation of Prof. Alvin Roth (Stanford University) and Dr. Giuseppe Feltrin (National Transplant Center)

13:40-14:30 Farewell lunch.

 The MiP Workshop is an annual meeting organized by the Matching in Practice network of European researchers working in the research field of Matching Theory and Market Design.

This year’s MiP workshop is funded by the following projects: Prin2022 “Externalities and fairness in allocations and contracts” (CUP J53D23004650006 – ID 2022HLPMKN) and PrinPNRR2022 “Incentivizing participation of compatible pairs in Kidney Paired Exchange Programs” (CUP J53D23015460001- ID P2022P5CHH), both funded by the European Union – Next Generation EU.

The Organizing Committee includes the Messina Unit Manager of the aforementioned projects, Prof. Antonio Miralles Asensio, and the Principal Investigators of both funding projects, respectively Prof. Maria Gabriella Graziano (University of Naples Federico II) and Prof. Antonio Nicolò (University of Padua). External members of the Scientific Committee are Prof. Caterina Calsamiglia (IPEG and ICREA, Spain), Prof. Rustam Hakimov (Université de Lausanne, Switzerland) and Prof. Péter Biró (Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Hungary).


Tuesday, May 6, 2025

Public Lecture on Market Design at Prague Castle, Wednesday, 7 May, 6 p.m

 I'll be speaking at Prague Castle: here's the official announcement:

Science at the Prague Castle: Who Gets What? The New Economics of Matching and Market Design 

Speaker: Alvin Roth

Al Roth is the Craig and Susan McCaw Professor of Economics at Stanford University and the George Gund Professor Emeritus of Economics and Business Administration at Harvard. He shared the 2012 Nobel memorial prize in Economics. He was President of the American Economic Association in 2017, and is a member of the National Academy of Science. He directed the redesign of the National Resident Matching Program, through which most American doctors find their first employment. He helped design the school choice systems used in several large American cities. He is one of the organizers and designers of kidney exchange in the United States, which helps incompatible patient-donor pairs find compatible kidneys for transplantation.   

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Science-popularizing lecture from the series Science at the Prague Castle

Market design is an ancient human activity but a relatively new part of economics. It seeks to understand how the design of markets and marketplaces influences their performance, and to use this growing understanding to fix markets when they're broken, and to help establish markets where they are missing.  Many markets are matching markets, in which you can't just choose what you want, even if you can afford it: you also have to be chosen. In these markets, prices don’t do all the work. Examples of matching markets are labor markets (workers can't just choose where to work, nor can employers just choose who will work for them), school choice, and kidney exchange. I'll illustrate with examples from these. 

The lecture will be given in English.

Organized by Prague Castle Administration, Institute of Organic Chemistry and Biochemistry  of the CAS, and Charles University. Supported by IOCB Tech Foundation.

Date and place

Wednesday, 7 May, 6 p.m.
Lecture takes place in the lecture room in the Supreme Burgrave´s House
(entrance from the Golden Lane)
map


If you are interested in this lecture, please make reservation here.   Free admission