When it's costly to gather information needed to inform yourself about your own preferences, having a guaranteed offer in hand may justify the effort to gather necessary information. Here's a paper that considers that as a first order issue:
The Case for Dynamic Multi-offer Mechanisms, by Julien Grenet YingHua He Dorothea Kübler
January 2022, (Forthcoming: The Journal of Political Economy)
Abstract: We document quasi-experimental evidence against the common assumption in the matching literature that agents have full information on their own preferences. In Germany’s university admissions, the first stages of the Gale-Shapley algorithm are implemented in real time, allowing for multiple offers per student. We demonstrate that non-exploding early offers are accepted more often than later offers, despite not being more desirable. These results, together with survey evidence and a theoretical model, are consistent with students’ costly discovery of preferences. A novel dynamic multi-offer mechanism that batches early offers improves matching efficiency by informing students of offer availability before preference discovery.
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Update: the paper appears as
Grenet, Julien, YingHua He, and Dorothea Kübler. "Preference Discovery in University Admissions: The Case for Dynamic Multi-offer Mechanisms." Journal of Political Economy, volume 130, number 6, June 2022, 1427-1476, https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/epdf/10.1086/718983
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