NBER Market Design Working Group Meeting, Fall 2021

Market Design Working Group Meeting, Fall 2021

DATE October 21-23, 2021 (Times in EDT)

ORGANIZERS Michael Ostrovsky and Parag A. Pathak

NBER conferences are by invitation. All participants are expected to comply with the NBER's Conference Code of Conduct.

Thursday, October 21

12:00 pm

Randomized FIFO Mechanisms 

Francisco Castro, UCLA

Hongyao Ma, Columbia University

Hamid Nazerzadeh, University of Southern California

Chiwei Yan, University of Washington

12:45 pm

The Value of Excess Supply in Spatial Matching Markets 

Mohammad Akbarpour, Stanford University

Yeganeh Alimohammadi, Stanford University

Shengwu Li, Harvard University

Amin Saberi, Stanford University

1:30 pm

Break

2:00 pm

Choices and Outcomes in Assignment Mechanisms: The Allocation of Deceased Donor Kidneys 

Nikhil Agarwal, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER

Charles Hodgson, Yale University

Paulo J. Somaini, Stanford University and NBER

2:45 pm

Price Discovery in Waiting Lists: A Connection to Stochastic Gradient Descent 

Itai Ashlagi, Stanford University

Jacob D. Leshno, University of Chicago

Amin Saberi, Stanford University

Pengyu Qian, Columbia Business School

3:30 pm

Adjourn

Friday, October 22

12:00 pm

Linear Pricing Mechanisms without Convexity 

Paul Milgrom, Stanford University

Mitchell L. Watt, Stanford University

12:45 pm

The Equilibrium Existence Duality: Equilibrium with Indivisibilities and Income Effects 

Elizabeth C. Baldwin, University of Oxford

Omer Edhan, University of Manchester

Ravi Jagadeesan, Stanford University

Paul D. Klemperer, University of Oxford

Alexander Teytelboym, University of Oxford

1:30 pm

Break

2:00 pm

Flow Trading 

Eric Budish, University of Chicago and NBER

Peter Cramton, University of Cologne

Albert "Pete" Kyle, University of Maryland

Jeongmin (Mina) Lee, Washington University in St. Louis

David Malec, University of Maryland

2:45 pm

Designing a Combinatorial Financial Options Market 

Xintong Wang, Harvard University

David Pennock, Microsoft Research

Nikhil Devanur, Amazon

David M. Rothschild, Microsoft Research

Biaoshuai Tao, Shanghai Jiao Tong University

Michael Wellman, University of Michigan

3:30 pm

Adjourn

Saturday, October 23

12:00 pm

Choice Screen Auctions 

Michael Ostrovsky, Stanford University and NBER

12:45 pm

Mechanism Design meets Priority Design: Redesigning the US Army's Branching Process 

Kyle Greenberg, United States Military Academy at West Point

Parag A. Pathak, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER

Tayfun Sönmez, Boston College

1:30 pm

Break

2:00 pm

Decentralizing Centralized Matching Markets: Implications from Early Offers in University Admissions  

Julien Grenet, Paris School of Economics

Yinghua He, Rice University

Dorothea Kübler, WZB

2:45 pm

Mechanism and Priority Design for Distributional Objectives: An Application to Decrease Inequalities in Access to Experienced Teachers 

Julien Combe, CREST - Ecole polytechnique

Umut M. Dur, North Carolina State University

Olivier Tercieux, Paris School of Economics

Camille Terrier, University of Lausanne

M. Utku Ünver, Boston College

3:30 pm

Adjourn