Good news from ec18 now going on at Cornell.
The Best Paper Award goes to "Credible Mechanisms" by Mohammad Akbarpour and Shengwu Li
Here is the paper: Credible Mechanisms
Abstract: Consider an extensive-form mechanism, run by an auctioneer who communicates sequentially and privately with agents. Suppose the auctioneer can deviate from the rules provided that no single agent detects the deviation. A mechanism is credible if it is incentive-compatible for the auctioneer to follow the rules. We study the optimal auctions in which only winners pay, under symmetric independent private values.The first-price auction is the unique credible static mechanism. The ascending auction is the unique credible strategy-proof mechanism.
And here are their websites
Mohammad Akbarpour
Shengwu Li
The Best Paper Award goes to "Credible Mechanisms" by Mohammad Akbarpour and Shengwu Li
Here is the paper: Credible Mechanisms
Abstract: Consider an extensive-form mechanism, run by an auctioneer who communicates sequentially and privately with agents. Suppose the auctioneer can deviate from the rules provided that no single agent detects the deviation. A mechanism is credible if it is incentive-compatible for the auctioneer to follow the rules. We study the optimal auctions in which only winners pay, under symmetric independent private values.The first-price auction is the unique credible static mechanism. The ascending auction is the unique credible strategy-proof mechanism.
And here are their websites
Mohammad Akbarpour
Shengwu Li
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