2014 ESA International Meetings Honolulu, Hawaiʻi June 26-29

The Department of Economics and the College of Social Sciences at the University of Hawaiʻi, with the help of the University of Hawaiʻi Economic Research Organization, look forward to welcoming you to the 2014 International Meetings of the Economic Science Association. The meetings will run from Thursday, June 26th (evening reception) to Sunday, June 29th, 2014.

Keynote lectures will be delivered by:

1. •Charles Holt (University of Virginia)
   
2. •Rosemarie Nagel (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
3. •Markus Mobius (Microsoft Research)

Here's the program.

The Jerusalem market design lectures are on YouTube

The market design lectures are being put up on YouTube a day at a time. If you couldn't make it to Jerusalem you can see them at home...

25th Jerusalem School in Economic Theory Matching and Market

• by IAS HUJI
• 3 videos

25th Jerusalem School in Economic Theory Matching and Market Design Event date: Jun 23 - Jul 2 ,2014 Organizers: Scott Duke Kominers (Harvard University) Eric Maskin, Director (Harvard University) Alvin Roth (Stanford University) Eyal Winter, C...

Play all  

	Eric Maskin (Harvard University) Introduction to Matching and Allocation Problems (I)		IAS HUJI	1:27:50
			Scott Duke Kominers (Harvard University) Introduction to Matching and Allocation Problems (II)		IAS HUJI	1:29:25
			Alvin E. Roth (Stanford University) The Design of the National Resident Matching Program

Update: the first lecture today (which I guess will be on YouTube tomorrow) was by Itai Ashlagi

Fifth International Workshop on Computational Social Choice, Pittsburgh, June 23-25, 2014

Fifth International Workshop on Computational Social Choice, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, June 23-25, 2014

Invited Speakers Eric Budish (University of Chicago) Edward Felten (Princeton University) Jean-Francois Laslier (Paris School of Economics)

The program is here.

(And if you miss Eric B in Pittsburgh, you can catch him in Jerusalem on June 29).

A job opening in Seattle public schools

Most readers of this blog are, I guess, economists interested in market design. But I know that some education professionals interested in school choice read it too, so here's a notice of a job opening in Seattle, that might be good for someone you know...

From: "Libros, Tracy" <trlibros@seattleschools.org>
To: "'neild@iipsc.org'" <neild@iipsc.org>
Date: June 18, 2014 at 10:35 AM
Subject: Introduction 

Hi Neil,

Seattle Public Schools has an opening for someone to lead district work in demographic analysis and enrollment planning. In addition, we have a large capital program underway, and the Director would also be responsible for phasing in boundary changes as new buildings open. As I’m sure you know, a position such as this deals in both the technical and political realms.

I’m wondering if you know of anyone who might be interested in this position. Here’s a link to the information about the position: Director Enrollment & Planning Services. Also, please feel free to forward this to anyone else you think might be interested.

For more information, you can contact me by phone through June 23, and after that by email. Thanks for any leads you can send our way!

           Tracy

Tracy Libros

Manager, Enrollment Planning

Seattle Public Schools

trlibros@seattleschools.org

206.252.0762

And here's the formal job description

Job Title:	Director Enrollment & Planning Services
Closing Date/Time:	Continuous
Salary:	$82,555.00 - $113,984.00 Annually
Job Type:	Full-Time
Location:	John Stanford Center for Educational Excellence, Washington
Required Attachments:	Cover letter and Resume

Print Job Information | Apply  

Description  Benefits  Supplemental Questions
Supervise the work of the Enrollment Planning and Enrollment Services departments to ensure efficient operations in all aspects of student assignment, including both short- and long-term planning for enrollment projections, program placement, and facilities needs. Provide leadership and staff support to Superintendent and Assistant Superintendent, Capital, Facilities, and Enrollment in strategic work of the district, including development and implementation of the New Student Assignment Plan. Collaborate with multiple central office departments impacted by student enrollment.
Essential Functions:
1.  Leads Transition Planning and implementation of the New Student Assignment Plan, including ongoing monitoring and development of recommended policy and operational changes to better support district strategic objectives. (30%) 2. Collaborates with other central departments and schools regarding student enrollment policies and projections, the impact on program placement and facility needs, and capacity management. (25%) 3. Supports and contributes to VAX migration work; provides high level feedback to program and project managers about priorities for completing this crucial effort; priorities staff time for VAX migration work. (10%) 4. Develops clear written materials to be used for public information about student enrollment (website, mailings, FAQ's,contact center,BFC, other departments; and responds to complex questions from schools, families, and central office departments. (10%) 5. Supports district stakeholder engagement through extensive public speaking and maintaining positive relationships with community groups such as PTSA, CPPS, critical friends, etc. (10%) 6. Supervises and evaluates the work of Enrollment Planning and Enrollment Services department staff. (5%) 7. Supports district efforts to eliminate the achievement gap through a persistent focus on ensuring that enrollment processes do not contribute to lost instructional time; leads and supports efforts to improve customer service, efficiencies, and cost effectiveness through streamlining of processes. (5%) 8. Ensures compliance with relevant state and federal requirements such as NCLB; supports work of other departments in meeting their compliance obligations (special education, ELL, Indian Education, OCR complaince audits, etc.); participates in OSPI hearings on behalf of district. (5%) Performs related duties consistent with the scope and intent of this position.
Minimum Qualifications:
Education:  Master's degree in planning, policy analysis, educational leadership, or related field. Preferred Education:  PhD in planning, policy analysis, educational leadership, or related field. Experience: 5 years of increasingly responsible professional experience in related field(s), including K-12 public school experience, experience in at least one other related planning field, and supervisory experience. Preferred Experience:  Experience in project management desirable. Clearances:  Criminal Justice Fingerprint, Background Clearance

Algorithms: "Special Issue on Matching under Preferences"

Algorithms journal: "Special Issue on Matching under Preferences"

Open Access Editorial: Editorial: Special Issue on Matching under Preferences by Péter Biró and David F. Manlove Algorithms 2014, 7(2), 203-205; doi:10.3390/a7020203 Received: 14 March 2014; Accepted: 14 March 2014 / Published: 8 April 2014 Show/Hide Abstract | PDF Full-text (29 KB)

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Open Access Article: Faster and Simpler Approximation of Stable Matchings by Katarzyna Paluch Algorithms 2014, 7(2), 189-202; doi:10.3390/a7020189 Received: 5 September 2013; in revised form: 22 March 2014 / Accepted: 27 March 2014 / Published: 4 April 2014 Show/Hide Abstract | PDF Full-text (234 KB)

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Open Access Article: Choice Function-Based Two-Sided Markets: Stability, Lattice Property, Path Independence and Algorithms by Tamàs Fleiner and Zsuzsanna Jankó Algorithms 2014, 7(1), 32-59; doi:10.3390/a7010032 Received: 23 June 2013; in revised form: 29 December 2013 / Accepted: 18 January 2014 / Published: 14 February 2014 Show/Hide Abstract | PDF Full-text (312 KB)

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Open Access Article: On Stable Matchings and Flows by Tamás Fleiner Algorithms 2014, 7(1), 1-14; doi:10.3390/a7010001 Received: 1 August 2013; in revised form: 9 January 2014 / Accepted: 10 January 2014 / Published: 22 January 2014 Show/Hide Abstract | PDF Full-text (231 KB)

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Open Access Article: Overlays with Preferences: Distributed, Adaptive Approximation Algorithms for Matching with Preference Lists by Giorgos Georgiadis and Marina Papatriantafilou Algorithms 2013, 6(4), 824-856; doi:10.3390/a6040824 Received: 21 June 2013; in revised form: 7 November 2013 / Accepted: 8 November 2013 / Published: 19 November 2013 Show/Hide Abstract | PDF Full-text (952 KB)

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Open Access Article: Stability, Optimality and Manipulation in Matching Problems with Weighted Preferences by Maria Silvia Pini, Francesca Rossi, K. Brent Venable and Toby Walsh Algorithms 2013, 6(4), 782-804; doi:10.3390/a6040782 Received: 9 July 2013; in revised form: 7 November 2013 / Accepted: 8 November 2013 / Published: 18 November 2013 Show/Hide Abstract | PDF Full-text (242 KB)

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Open Access Article: Local Search Approaches in Stable Matching Problems by Mirco Gelain, Maria Silvia Pini, Francesca Rossi, K. Brent Venable and Toby Walsh Algorithms 2013, 6(4), 591-617; doi:10.3390/a6040591 Received: 14 August 2013; in revised form: 4 September 2013 / Accepted: 22 September 2013 / Published: 3 October 2013 Show/Hide Abstract | PDF Full-text (454 KB)

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Open Access Article: Stable Flows over Time by Ágnes Cseh, Jannik Matuschke and Martin Skutella Algorithms 2013, 6(3), 532-545; doi:10.3390/a6030532 Received: 31 December 2012; in revised form: 27 July 2013 / Accepted: 9 August 2013 / Published: 21 August 2013 Show/Hide Abstract | PDF Full-text (223 KB)

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Open Access Article: Linear Time Local Approximation Algorithm for Maximum Stable Marriage by Zoltán Király Algorithms 2013, 6(3), 471-484; doi:10.3390/a6030471 Received: 1 August 2013; in revised form: 6 August 2013 / Accepted: 7 August 2013 / Published: 15 August 2013 Show/Hide Abstract | PDF Full-text (103 KB)

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Open Access Article: Maximum Locally Stable Matchings by Christine T. Cheng and Eric McDermid Algorithms 2013, 6(3), 383-395; doi:10.3390/a6030383 Received: 4 January 2013; in revised form: 2 June 2013 / Accepted: 4 June 2013 / Published: 24 June 2013 Show/Hide Abstract | PDF Full-text (187 KB)

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Open Access Article: Improving Man-Optimal Stable Matchings by Minimum Change of Preference Lists by Takao Inoshita, Robert W. Irving, Kazuo Iwama, Shuichi Miyazaki and Takashi Nagase Algorithms 2013, 6(2), 371-382; doi:10.3390/a6020371 Received: 27 December 2012; in revised form: 17 May 2013 / Accepted: 20 May 2013 / Published: 28 May 2013 Show/Hide Abstract | PDF Full-text (153 KB)

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Open Access Article: Stable Multicommodity Flows by Tamás Király and Júlia Pap Algorithms 2013, 6(1), 161-168; doi:10.3390/a6010161 Received: 31 December 2012; in revised form: 25 January 2013 / Accepted: 8 March 2013 / Published: 18 March 2013 Show/Hide Abstract | PDF Full-text (165 KB)

25th Jerusalem School in Economic Theory :Matching and Market Design, June 23-July 2

I'm off to Jerusalem for the 25th Jerusalem School in Economic Theory. This year the topic is Matching and Market Design

Event date: Jun 23 - Jul 2 ,2014 

Organizers:

Scott Duke Kominers (Harvard University)
Eric Maskin, Director (Harvard University)
Alvin Roth (Stanford University)
Eyal Winter, Codirector (The Hebrew University)


Models of matching---in which agents are paired with one another to undertake transactions---have played an important role in contemporary economic theory. Matching algorithms have proven valuable in many real-life applications, including the assignment of students to schools, medical residents to hospitals, and organ donors to recipients. Matching theory has also helped illuminate thorny problems such as inequality and unemployment. The summer school will place greatest emphasis on design issues, but will touch on other aspects of matching as well.

LIST OF SPEAKERS
NAME	AFFILIATION
Atila Abdulkadiroglu	Duke University
Itai Ashlagi	MIT
Eric Budish	Universty of Chicago
Scott Duke Kominers	Harvard University
Jacob D. Leshno	Columbia University
Eric S. Maskin	Harvard University
Paul R. Milgrom	Stanford University
Elliott Peranson	National Matching Services, Inc
Assaf Romm	Harvard University
Alvin E. Roth	Stanford University

PROGRAM 
Monday, June 23
8:30-9:30 REGISTRATION IN IIAS LOBBY
9:30-11:00 Eric Maskin (Harvard University)
 Introduction to Matching and Allocation Problems (I)
11:00-11:30 Coffee break
11:30-13:00 Scott Duke Kominers (Harvard University)
 Introduction to Matching and Allocation Problems (II)
13:00-14:30 Lunch break
14:30-16:00 Alvin E. Roth (Stanford University)
 The Design of the National Resident Matching Program

16:00 Reception

Tuesday, June 24
9:30- 11:00 Itai Ashlagi (MIT)
 Unbalanced Random Matching Markets: Competition and Complementarities
11:00-11:30 Coffee break
11:30-13:00 Elliott Peranson (National Matching Services, Inc.)
 Issues in Real-World Matching Market Design
13:00-14:30 Lunch break
14:30-16:00 Eric Maskin (Harvard University)
 Assortative Matching and Inequality

Wednesday, June 25
9:30-11:00 Paul R. Milgrom (Stanford University)
 Matching with Contracts
11:00-11:30 Coffee break
11:30-13:00 Scott Duke Kominers (Harvard University)
 Substitutability in Generalized Matching
13:00-14:30 Lunch break
14:30 TOUR OF JERUSALEM

Thursday, June 26
9:30-11:00 Paul R. Milgrom (Stanford University)
 Deferred Acceptance Heuristic Auctions
11:00-11:30 Coffee break

11:30-13:00 Paul R. Milgrom (Stanford University)
 Auctions for Internet Advertising
13:00-14:30 Lunch break
14:30 FIRST STUDENT POSTER SESSION

Friday, June 27
9:30-11:00 Alvin E. Roth (Stanford University)
 Kidney Exchange
11:00-11:30 Coffee break
11:30-13:00 Itai Ashlagi (MIT)
 Current Challenges in Kidney Exchange

Saturday, June 28
TOUR OF MASADA

Sunday, June 29
9:30-11:00 Eric Budish (University of Chicago)
 Combinatorial Assignment
11:00-11:30 Coffee break
11:30-13:00 Eric Budish (University of Chicago)
 Financial Market Design

Monday, June 30
9:30-11:00 Atila Abdulkadiroglu (Duke University)
Theory of School Choice
11:00-11:30 Coffee break

11:30-13:00 Atila Abdulkadiroglu (Duke University)
 Empirics of School Choice
13:00-14:30 Lunch break
17:00-18:30 ARROW LECTURE
19:00 Dinner (invited speakers only)

Tuesday, July 1
9:30-11:00 Jacob D. Leshno (Columbia University)
 Dynamic Matching in Overloaded Systems
11:00-11:30 Coffee break
11:30-13:00 Assaf Romm (Harvard University)
 Efficient Assignment and the Israeli Medical Match
13:00-14:30 Lunch break
18:30 Concert at the Jerusalem Music Center and dinner at the Terasa Restaurant

Wednesday, July 2
9:30-11:00 Jacob D. Leshno (Columbia University)
 Large-Market Matching

Here's the poster .
************
Updates:

Eric Maskin giving the opening lecture

Slowing Down the Stock Market: design proposal in the news again

Eric Budish and his colleagues Peter Cramton and John Shim  are in the news again, for their proposals for frequent batch auctions as being better suited to algorithmic trading than the current design of continuous double auctions.  This kind of coverage is probably a hopeful sign for financial markets. Here's the latest from Bloomberg:  Slowing Down the Stock Market

JUN 18, 2014 9:33 AM EDT

By The Editors

• a
 
• A

Many a fortune has been won (and lost) in the U.S. stock market. The market's primary purpose, though, is not to dispense riches but to serve the public good by allocating capital to the best uses -- to the ideas most likely to drive sales, earn profits and reward shareholders.

Today's stock market is falling short. A wasteful arms race among high-frequency traders, the growth of dark pools (private trading venues) and assorted conflicts of interest have undermined its performance. If investors don't trust the market, that hurts capital formation, not to mention retirement and college savings. The number of Americans who own stock directly or through mutual funds is at a 12-year low -- a sign that individual investors think the market isn't for them.

Fixing the problems will require more than a tweak here and there. One idea that's winning converts would replace the 24-hour, continuous trading of stocks with frequent auctions at regular intervals.

Why would that help? Because it would lessen the emphasis on speed and direct more attention to the price that investors are willing to pay for stocks, given the prospects of the companies concerned, their industries and the broader economy. The high-speed arms race would subside, because shaving another millisecond off the time it takes to trade would confer no benefit.

The idea has a good pedigree. It has been around at least since 1960, when Milton Friedman proposed a version for the sale of U.S. Treasury bonds. Researchers led by the University of Chicago's Eric Budish refined the concept in a paper last year.

Under their system, orders would be sent to the exchanges, as they are now, but instead of being processed immediately, they'd be collected into batches, based on when they arrived at the exchange. A computer would then use an algorithm to match the orders. Auctions would take place at least every second (for 23,400 auctions per day, per stock), matching supply with demand at the midpoint, or the uniform price. Orders that don't get matched -- either because they exceeded the volume of shares available or because their buy or sell quotes didn't conform to the uniform price -- would automatically be included in the next auction.

As well as prioritizing price over speed, this approach would make another flash crash less likely. That's because it would stem the flood of buy, sell and cancel commands that high-frequency traders issue every second in their efforts to probe the market.

Auctions would also reduce the need for dark pools, because the orders of institutional investors wouldn't be visible to other participants. The fear among big investors such as mutual funds -- that placing an order will move the price against them -- is the reason dark pools caught on in the first place. The result should be lower transaction costs and higher investment returns for 401(k) owners and other savers.

The conflicts of interest that brokers now face when they send orders to the trading venue that pays them the highest rebate or fee, rather than the one that offers the best execution, would recede as well. That's a good thing. Brokers who put their own financial interests above their clients' are violating a duty to get them the best price.

Goldman Sachs Group Inc., among others, is interested enough in frequent batch auctions that it's working with Budish to find an exchange that will conduct a pilot program and a regulatory agency that will monitor the results. Mary Jo White, the Securities and Exchange Commission chair, indicated in a June 5 speech her interest in batch auctions. She should make it a priority to conduct a test program. It's a promising idea.

And here's more from the Budish fan club.