Matching in Practice Workshop in October, in Gothenburg, with Parag Pathak. Call for papers.

The 16th Matching in Practice Workshop will be in Gothenburg. The workshop will begin with lunch (12pm) on the 4th of October finishing early afternoon 5th of October (around 4pm), 2019.

The workshop will bring together researchers working on the various aspects of assignment and matching in education, labour and related markets, with a view to actively foster interactions between the various approaches used in this area of research (theory, experiments, analysis of field data, policy/market design) and to share expertise on the actual functioning of these markets in Europe.

The workshop will include presentations from presenters of selected papers, a keynote delivered by Parag Pathak (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) and a policy roundtable on “School choice in practice”, which will bring together policy makers and practitioners.

Interested participants should submit their papers to mip2019@economics.gu.se before 15 August 2019. The programme will be announced shortly afterwards.

Keynote speakers

Parag Pathak, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Participants

Researchers working on the various aspects of assignment and matching, primarily in (but not limited to) education and related labour markets are invited to attend the workshop. There is no participation fee. Travel and accommodation expenses can only be covered for presenters of selected papers. PhD students or early stage researchers who would like to participate the workshop can contact us for possible financial support for travel and accommodation.

Practicalities

The conference will take place at the School of Business, Economics and Law (Handelshögskolan), Vasagatan 1, Gothenburg.

Scientific Committee

Thilo Klein (ZEW Mannheim), Alex Westkamp (University of Cologne), Li Chen (University of Gothenburg), Joseph Vecci (University of Gothenburg).

Important dates

15 August: Deadline for submission
1 September: Notification about acceptance
3 September: Registration deadline

Who gets what at UC Irvine

I'll be speaking today at UC Irvine, here's the announcement:

“Who Gets What? The New Economics of Matching and Market Design”
Date: Friday, June 7, 2019 at 1:30-2:30 p.m.
Location: UCI’s Calit2 Auditorium
Seating is on a first-come, first-served basis
Lunch Reception & Book Signing: 12-1:30 p.m.

Abstract
Market design is an ancient human activity but a relatively new part of economics. It seeks to understand how the design of markets and marketplaces influences their performance, to use this growing understanding to fix markets when they’re broken, and to help to establish markets where they are missing.

Many markets are matching markets, in which you can’t just choose what you want, even if you can afford it: you also have to be chosen. In these markets, prices don’t do all the work. For example, UCI doesn’t choose its new students by raising the tuition until just enough applications remain to fill the entering class; instead they set the price low enough so that lots of people apply, and then they choose from a big pool. (And UCI can’t just choose its students; it has to woo them in competition with other schools...) Other examples of matching markets are labor markets (workers can’t just choose where to work, nor can employers just choose who will work for them), school choice, and kidney exchange. I’ll illustrate with examples from these.

Someone is impersonating me on LinkedIn

An alert MIT grad student received a LinkedIn request that appeared to be from me, except not quite, and was kind enough to let me know. (In fact I don't have a LinkedIn account...)

There is someone on LinkedIn, it turns out, pretending to be me--same name, same jobs at Harvard and Stanford, same 2012 Nobel prize. Here's his profile:
 https://www.linkedin.com/in/alvin-roth-a37995186/

If you have a LinkedIn account, you can go to that profile, click on the three dot link, and get to a link called Report, one of whose options is to 'report an impersonator'.  (You can't send any explanatory text, so maybe getting many such reports will prompt LinkedIn to do something, where one or two haven't yet done the trick...)

thanks,
al

p.s. Here's the LinkedIn help page for reporting fake profiles (if you have a LinkedIn account).
***************
Update: LinkedIn followed up pretty quickly, and apparently nuked the fake account:

Response (06/06/2019 23:02 CST)

Hi Alvin,

I hope this email finds you well and that you are having a fantastic day, I'm Heisenberg from the Safety Operations Team and I'll be happy to assist you!

Thanks for informing us of this situation.

It is against the terms of LinkedIn's User Agreement and Professional Community Policies to impersonate another person on the website. We'll take the appropriate action based on the results of our investigation.

Thanks for your assistance in making LinkedIn a professional and trustworthy site.

Regards,

Heisenberg
LinkedIn Safety Operations Support Specialist 

Stanford GSB interviews Ashutosh Thakur PhD ’20, about market design, and coffee

GSB interviews Ashutosh Thakur, PhD ’20, who speaks about market design, his work on political allocation systems in India and the U.S., and coffee. (He'll be on the market next year...)

"Ashutosh Thakur is using matching and game theory to study institutional design in some unusual places.

"Thakur, a doctoral candidate in political economics at Stanford GSB, is trying to determine if systems designed for matching, say, medical students with residency posts can also be used to improve the effectiveness of public administration. He is specifically interested in the allocation of civil servants to diverse regions across India and in the party-specific procedures used in the U.S. Senate to assign politicians to committees.

“These projects take the theoretical tools and apply them to real-world problems and systems in practice,” says the Princeton graduate. “I’m hoping to improve government administration and development, trying to not just write academic papers but also use the findings to inform policymaking.”

"Thakur is also an expert chess player and an accomplished musician — pastimes that connect in their own way to his work."

Read about his work at the link. Here's the final question and answer:

"Have you had any memorable Stanford GSB experiences or encounters?
"One of the primary reasons the Stanford market design group is so tightly knit is due to Alvin Roth’s efforts in bringing the group together. He institutionalized this 45-minute coffee every Wednesday morning. It’s an informal, interdisciplinary gathering of faculty and students from the economics department, business school, engineering, and computer science, along with occasional guests and practitioners who might be visiting the area. It’s just a bunch of people getting together to talk about things they find interesting and what they’re working on. It’s been great at helping to build a community across all these different disciplines and getting exposure to a broad range of topics and applications."

MARKETPLACE INNOVATION WORKSHOP at Stanford GSB

Here's the program for the MARKETPLACE INNOVATION WORKSHOP at Stanford GSB:

JUNE 4, 2019

June 5

Steps towards reimbursing kidney donors--update from Frank McCormick

 I've written before about NLDAC, the federally funded National Living Donor Assistance Center, which operates under many regulatory constraints. (I'm on their advisory board.)

Frank McCormick brings us up to date on recent steps to relax some of those constraints.  Below I quote from his recent email:

"Since 2007, the federal government has had a program to reimburse low income organ donors for their travel and lodging expenses.  This program is currently administered by National Living Donor Assistance Center (NLDAC) at the University of Arizona.   The Secretary of Health and Human services (HHS) has the legal authority to administratively expand the mandate of this program.  Toward that end, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has just scheduled a new rule change:

Title: Removing Financial Disincentives to Living Organ Donation 

Abstract: This proposed rule would amend the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) final rule to further remove financial barriers to living organ donation by expanding allowable costs that can be reimbursed.  The changes would apply to specified incidental nonmedical expenses incurred toward living organ donation. 


2. The second front is centered on the Advisory Committee on Organ Transplant (ACOT), a non-government committee that advises the Secretary of HHS on organ transplant matters.  At its meeting on May 20, the committee heard a very informative presentation by Robert Merion of NLDAC: 

A key part of the presentation was NLDAC’s Vision for Expansion:
1. Expand eligibility for reimbursement to donors with incomes up to 500% of the federal poverty guidelines (it is currently 300%)
2. Waive income verification for donors needing less than $500
3. Approve applications from non-directed donors (i.e., living donors who do not have a specific intended recipient)
4. Reimburse wages lost due to organ donation
5. Reimburse child care/elder care expenses due to organ donation
6. Require NLDAC information to be given to all recipients and donors

ACOT endorsed the first five recommendations and forwarded them to the Secretary of HHS. "

A third life for a transplanted liver in Hong Kong

The South China Morning Post has the story, of a transplanted liver that survived its recipient and was successfully transplanted into a second recipient following the death of the first recipient (11 years after receiving the transplant):

World first as Hong Kong surgeons transplant single liver into second patient
World-first procedure sees organ transplanted 11 years ago successfully given to another patient

"Hong Kong surgeons have performed a double world first with a transplant from one Hepatitis B sufferer to another of a liver that had already been transplanted once 11 years ago.
Bodybuilder Wong Wan-shing, 37, received the graft at Queen Mary Hospital from a 60-year-old donor identified only as Mr So, who died of a stroke on October 1."

Will NYC ban fur sales?

The NY Times has the story:

Proposed Fur Ban in New York Pits Animal Rights Advocates Against Black Ministers

"As Corey Johnson, the speaker of the New York City Council, urged his colleagues on Wednesday to ban the sale of fur in the city, he argued that it was the “moral thing to do.”

"But the proposed ban, backed by animal rights advocates, has met an unexpected challenge from a diverse set of opponents, including black pastors and Hasidic leaders. They say a prohibition would fly in the face of centuries of religious and cultural tradition.

"Black ministers have staged protests, saying that for many African-Americans, wearing furs is a treasured hallmark of achievement. Hasidic rabbis point to the many men who wear fur hats on the Sabbath. And fur shop owners and garment manufacturers have raised alarms over the potential loss of jobs and an attack on an industry with a deep history in New York
...
"The bill being considered by the Council would ban the sale of fur garments and accessories, but it would allow the sale of used fur garments and new apparel using fur from older garments. Violators would be subject to fines of $500 to $1,500, and any money made from selling banned fur would be subject to forfeiture. The bill would not ban wearing fur.

"Los Angeles is the largest city in the country to have banned the sale of fur; other cities include San Francisco and West Hollywood. But New York City is the largest fur retail market in the United States, according to FurNYC, a trade group representing 130 fur retailers in the city. The 150 fur businesses in the city create 1,100 jobs and produce $400 million in revenue per year, according to the group."

Xenotransplants, Baby Fae, and the complex pioneering efforts of Dr. Leonard Bailey, RIP

The recent death of Dr. Leonard Bailey (who performed the first successful heart transplant to an infant) reminded me of how so many ultimately successful stories in organ transplantation begin with rather wild shots in the dark, involving patients who have little to lose.

Here's the NY Times obituary:

Dr. Leonard Bailey, Who Gave a Baby a Baboon’s Heart, Dies at 76
By Denise Grady, May 22, 2019

"Dr. Leonard L. Bailey, who elicited both admiration and outrage by transplanting the heart of a baboon into a dying infant in 1984, died on May 12 at his home in Redlands, Calif. He was 76.
...
"Although Dr. Bailey went on to pioneer human heart transplants for infants, and to build a renowned center for children’s cardiac surgery at Loma Linda University in Southern California, he remained best known to the public as the doctor behind the wrenching story of the infant known as Baby Fae.

...
"“I knew she was going to die, and I had to try,” Ms. Beauclair [Baby Fae's mom] said in a telephone interview. “If I hadn’t tried, I always would have wondered, could we have saved her?
...
"The operation took place on Oct. 26, 1984. At first, Stephanie seemed to thrive. During a news conference at the hospital, Dr. Bailey was ebullient, describing her as a “beautiful, healthy baby” whose transplanted heart was doing “everything it should.”

"Baby Fae made headlines around the world. The public was enchanted by her. But reactions to the surgery ranged from awe to horror.
...
"Animal rights groups said killing the baboon was immoral and held demonstrations outside the hospital and Dr. Bailey’s home. He and the hospital received threats.

“This wasn’t a wild whim,” Dr. Roger Hadley, dean of Loma Linda University School of Medicine, said in an interview. “He had worked for years on doing cross-species transplants in animals. We had a whole lab of animals who had somebody else’s heart.”

"Dr. Hadley added that the hospital at Loma Linda is faith-based — the hospital and the university are run by the Seventh-day Adventist Church — and said that all its ethicists and theologians had thought that the transplant was the right thing to do.

“We stood by him here,” he said.
...
"Stephanie’s initial rally after the surgery did not last. Rejection and organ failure set in, and she died on Nov. 15, 1984. She had survived for 21 days.

"Her case helped focus concern on the plight of babies born with fatal heart defects, and the desperate need for organs. The next year, Dr. Bailey performed the first successful heart transplant in an infant, from a human donor. He went on to perform 375 more over the course of his career, as well as other types of pediatric heart surgery. He continued operating until 2017.

"Because of growing ethical concerns about experimenting on primates, research on using them as a source of organ transplants has mostly been abandoned. But efforts are underway to genetically alter pigs to make their organs compatible with humans."

Alumni medals at Columbia

I am a proud grad of the Columbia University School of Engineering, which I attended as an undergraduate from 1968-1971.  I'll be back on campus this evening to get a medal, as will Dr. Harry L. Tuller.

You can read about us in the Columbia Engineering Magazine: Alumni Medalists 

Black markets in college graduation tickets

Here's a seasonal story, from the Guardian;

Need a college graduation ticket? There's a black market for that
Tickets for New York University’s 2019 commencement ceremony are being advertised for as much as $250

"It’s graduation season in the United States, which means lots of caps, gowns, pomp and circumstance, corny speeches, selfies – and an underground trade in graduation tickets to top off the celebrations.

"Many colleges and universities limit the number of people who can attend a graduation ceremony, providing students with tickets to the event they can distribute to friends and family. These tickets are often transferable, meaning someone can give a ticket to a friend who needs an extra seat. But this also means that students can sell their tickets – though banned by most schools – to get some extra cash.

"This “black market” around graduation has been documented for years, especially with the rise of social media networks. People from schools like Princeton, University of San Francisco and College of Charleston have advertised tickets for hundreds of dollars, the Wall Street Journal reported in 2007. At the University of Virginia, students sold tickets for an average price of $150 for last year’s commencement ceremony in Charlottesville.

"Now at New York University (NYU), tickets for the class of 2019’s commencement ceremony are being advertised for as much as $250."

Surrogacy and citizenship: bringing the babies home isn't always so easy

Even the U.S., which is a center of surrogacy, employs outdated rules to determine which surrogate children born overseas are automatically American citizens.  Here's a story from the NY Times which (among other things) involves reverse fertility tourism. The American male couple had a friend in Britain serve as the surrogate. (Mostly the tourism goes the other way, because British surrogates can't be paid, so they aren't easy to arrange....)

Both Parents Are American. The U.S. Says Their Baby Isn’t. By Sarah Mervosh.

"James Derek Mize is an American citizen, born and raised in the United States. His husband, who was born in Britain to an American mother, is a United States citizen, too.

"But the couple’s infant daughter isn’t, according to the State Department.

"She was born abroad to a surrogate, using a donor egg and sperm from her British-born father. Those distinct circumstances mean that, under a decades-old policy, she did not qualify for citizenship at birth, even though both her parents are American.
...
"The interpretation [of the law] has led the State Department to regard births from assisted reproductive technology as “out of wedlock,” if the source of the sperm and the egg do not match married parents. Such a designation comes with extra requirements for transmitting citizenship, including showing that a biological parent is an American citizen who has spent at least five years in the United States."

California surrogacy

Surrogacy serves all sorts of people, mostly couples who don't have a working womb between them. But, as Jenny Kleeman reports in the Guardian, it also can serve those whose need isn't medical. She interviews the controversial fertility doctor Vicken Sahakian, who is  known among other things for having helped a Spanish woman become the oldest known person to give birth, at 67.  Here's a link with some excerpts from the excellent, long article (read it all for more about the clients and the surrogates).

'Having a child doesn’t fit into these women's schedule': is this the future of surrogacy? 

"His clients are straight, gay, young and old, and they come to him from across the globe, particularly from China, or parts of Europe where surrogacy is either illegal or very tightly regulated. In the UK, surrogacy is legal, but surrogates can claim only expenses for carrying a child for another person. California law allows surrogates to earn a profit, and upholds the rights of intended parents over anyone else who is involved in the creation of their babies. It’s given the state a reputation as the most surrogacy-friendly place in the world.
...
"And as the range of fertility options open to clients has diversified, so have their requests. Now, a growing number of women are coming to Sahakian for “social” surrogacy: they want to have babies that are biologically their own, but don’t want to carry them. There is no medical reason for them to use a surrogate; they just choose not to be pregnant, so they conceive babies through IVF and then hire another woman to gestate and give birth to their baby. It is the ultimate in outsourced labour.
...
"Five years ago, Sahakian says he would preside over a handful of social surrogacy cases a year; now he sees at least 20. “More and more every year. ... It costs $150,000 to have a baby this way. “If social surrogacy was more affordable, more women would be doing it, absolutely. There’s an advantage to being pregnant, the bonding, I understand that, and from experience I can say that most women love to be pregnant. But a lot of women don’t want to be pregnant and lose a year of their careers.”
...
"The typical candidates are models and actors who are doing well but haven’t yet made their name. “They tell me point blank, ‘If I get pregnant, I will lose my part. I work, I don’t have time because of work. I model, I act, I look good like this and I don’t want to disfigure my body.’”
...
"The official guidelines set out by the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) say that gestational carriers – surrogates who carry babies conceived through IVF, with eggs from another woman – should be used only when there is a medical need. But Sahakian has no qualms about “defining medical reasons broadly”, as he puts it. “What’s the end result here? Somebody wants to be a parent. I’m facilitating that. I understand that it’s controversial, it’s borderline unethical for some people, but put yourself in the shoes of a 26-year-old model who is making her living by modelling swimsuits. Tell me something – is it that unethical, to say let’s not destroy this woman’s career?”
...
"Sahakian has a reputation for pushing boundaries, and he relishes it: it’s given him a notoriety that drives his business. In 2001, he helped the oldest woman on record in France, Jeanine Salomone, conceive using donor eggs and give birth at 62. A scandal erupted in France – where both surrogacy and artificial insemination of post-menopausal women are illegal – when it emerged that Jeanine’s brother, Robert, was the biological father of the son she gave birth to. ...
The press descended on Sahakian, who said the siblings had presented themselves in his consulting room as a married couple [they had the same last names], and that Jeanine had lied about her age. "

Same sex marriage comes to Taiwan

Here's the NY Times story on the new law allowing marriage, and on still to be debated issues including family formation (adoption, surrogacy...):

After a Long Fight, Taiwan’s Same-Sex Couples Celebrate New Marriages
By Chris Horton, May 24, 2019

"TAIPEI, Taiwan — Typically drab and nondescript, Taipei’s Xinyi District Household Registration office exploded with life and color on Friday morning.

"Taiwanese and foreign reporters surrounded the office’s main desk to witness history, as Taiwan became first in Asia to legally recognize same-sex marriages.
...
"The registrations came exactly a week after Taiwan’s legislature made headlines worldwide by voting to recognize same-sex marriage.
...
"Mr. Chi said that Taiwan’s separate-but-equal law for same-sex couples was a step in the right direction, but that more work remained to be done. Instead of having a separate law for gay couples, he said, Taiwan’s civil code should be amended to simply include all couples. The issues of transnational couples and full adoption rights also need the be addressed, he said.
...
"The law passed last Friday went beyond what the constitutional court demanded. The 2017 court ruling spoke in terms of the right to equality and freedom of marriage, but it did not address equality with respect to building a family, said Margaret Lewis, a law professor at Seton Hall.

“Now the question is whether the court will be asked to rule on how the constitutional right to equality applies to adoption by married couples of the same sex,” she said. “Other issues of concern include whether to legalize surrogacy and changes to laws related to assisted reproductive technology.”

Matching comic from Saturday Morning Breakfast Cereal

I rely on comics to let me know important subjects to study (doesn't everyone?). Here's one from Saturday Morning Breakfast Cereal

Match-Up 2019 in Switzerland, May 26-29

Here's the program. (It contains abstracts following the schedule...)

Sunday, May 26th
14:00 - 14:15    Conference Opening (Bettina Klaus)
14:15 - 14:40“Stability Against Robust Deviations in the Roommate Problem”Daisuke Hirata, Yusuke Kasuya, andKentaro Tomoeda
14:40 - 15:05“Robust   Group   Strategy-Proofness”Steven   KivinenandNorovsambuu Tumennasan
15:05 - 15:30“Robust Design in Monotonic Matching Markets: A Case for Firm-Proposing Deferred-Acceptance”Lars Ehlersand Jordi Masso
15:30-16:00Coffee Break
16:00 - 17:20    Poster Presentation Session 1
“Preprocessing  in  Matching  Problems”  Maxence  Delorme,  Ser-gio  Garc`ıa,  Jacek  Gondzio,  Joerg  Kalcsics,  David  Manlove,  andWilliam Pettersson
“Legal  Assignments,  the  EADAM  (Efficiency  Adjusted  DeferredAcceptance   Mechanism)   Algorithm”   Yuri   Faenza   andXuanZhang
“A General Framework for Stable Roommate Problems: A Preliminary Report”Muge Fidan and Esra Erdem
“Preference Manipulation in Two-Sided Matching - Strategic Behavior and Robustness of Solution Algorithms” Christian Haas
“Practical Issues in Matching - A Case Study on Genetic Counseling Admissions in North America” Jonah Peranson
“Unpopularity Factor in the Marriage and Roommates Problems”Suthee Ruangwises and Toshiya Itoh
“School choice with priority levels:  Constrained Efficient and FairAssignment” Thomas Wouters

Monday,May 27

09:10 CSF Welcome Address

09:25 - 10:10    Invited  Talk“Parameterizing  Stable  Matching  Problems” Ildi Schlotter

10:10 - 10:35“Stable   Noncrossing   Matchings” Suthee   Ruangwises and Toshiya Itoh

10:35 - 11:05    Coffee Break

11:05 - 11:30 “Refugee Resettlement” David Delacretaz, Scott Duke Kominers, and Alexander Teytelboym

11:30 - 11:55 “Matching Problem of Civil Service”Ashutosh Thakur

11:55 - 12:20 “Trading  Networks  with  General  Preferences” Jan  Christoph Schlegel

12:20 - 13:45    Lunch

13:45 - 14:30    Invited Talk “International Kidney Exchange Programmes:  Op-timisation and Games”Peter Biro

14:30 - 14:55 “Pareto Optimal Coalitions of Fixed Size” ́Agnes Cseh,  Tam ́as Fleiner, and Petra Harjan 

14:55 - 15:20 “Balanced Stable Marriage:  How Close is Close Enough?” Sushmita Gupta, Sanjukta Roy, Saket Saurabh, and Meirav Zehavi

15:20 - 15:50    Coffee Break

15:50 - 16:15“Flexibility in House Allocation and Housing Markets” Madhav Raghavan

16:15 - 16:40 “Endowment Manipulations in Probabilistic Assignment Problem”Yuki Tamura

16:40 - 17:05“Equivalent   Choice   Functions   and   Stable   Mechanisms” Jan Christoph Schlegel

17:05 - 17:15    Short Break (no coffee)

17:15 - 17:40 “Centralized  Matching  with  Incomplete  Information” Marcelo Ariel Fernandezand Leeat Yariv

17:40 - 18:05“Simultaneous  Search:   Beyond  Independent  Successes” Ran  I.Shorrer

18:05 - 18:30 “Deferred Acceptance and Regret-free Truth-telling:  A Character-ization Result” Marcelo Ariel Fernandez

 Tuesday, May 28

09:00 - 09:45    Invited  Talk “Balanced  Exchange  in  a  Multi-Object  Shapley-Scarf Market” P ́eter Biro,Flip Klijn, and Szilvia Papai

09:45 - 10:10 “Competing for Priorities in School Choice” Greg Leo and MartinVan der Linden

10:10 - 10:35 “Information  Acquisition  Costs  in  Matching  Markets”  Nicole  S. Immorlica, Jacob D. Leshno, and Irene Y. Lo

10:35 - 11:05    Coffee Break

11:05 - 11:30 “Efficient and (Pretty) Fair Course Assignment with Quotas” Martin  Bichler,  Alexander  Hammerl,  Thayer  Morrill,  and StefanWaldherr

11:30 - 11:55 “An Algorithm for Strong Stability in the Student-Project Alloca-tion Problem with Ties” Sofiat Olaosebikan and David Manlove

11:55 - 12:20“Strategy-Proof  Approximation  Algorithms  for  the  Stable  Mar-riage  Problem  with  Ties  and  Incomplete  Lists”,  Koki  Hamada, Shuichi Miyazaki, and Hiroki Yanagisawa

Wednesday, May 29th

09:00 - 09:45    Invited  Talk “Efficient  and  Incentive-Compatible  Liver  Ex-change” Haluk Ergin, Tayfun Sonmez, andM. Utku Unver

09:45 - 10:10 “Matching  for  the  Israeli  “Mechinot”  Gap-Year  Programs:  Handling Rich Diversity Requirements” Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Lior Kovalio, Noam Nisan, and Assaf Romm

10:10 - 10:35 “Recourse in Kidney Exchange Programs” Valentin Bartier, Yves Crama, Bart Smeulders, and Frits C.R. Spieksma

10:35 - 11:05    Coffee Break

11:05 - 11:30 “Obvious Dominance and Random Priority” Marek Pycia and Peter Troyan

11:30 - 11:55 “Subgame Perfect Equilibria under the Deferred Acceptance Algo-rithm” Keisuke Bando andYasushi Kawase

11:55 - 12:20 “Optimizing Reserves in School Choice:  A Dynamic ProgrammingApproach” Franklyn  Wang,  Ravi  Jagadeesan,  and  Scott  Duke Kominers

12:20 - 13:45    Lunch

13:45 - 14:10 “Strategy-proof,  Envy-free  and  Pareto  Efficient  Online  Mecha-nisms for Fair Division with Additive Valuations” Martin Aleksandrov and Toby Walsh

14:10 - 14:35 “An Alternative Approach to Asylum Assignment” Gian Caspari

14:35 - 15:00 “Matching  with  Myopic  and  Farsighted  Players” Jean-Jacques Herings, Ana Mauleon, and Vincent Vannetelbosch

15:00 - 15:30    Coffee Break

15:30 - 16:15    Invited Talk “Pareto Optimal Allocation under Uncertain Pref-erences” Haris Aziz,  Peter Bir ́o,  Ronald de Haan,  and Baharak Rastegari

16:15 - 16:40    CSF Award and Algorithms Award

16:40 - 18:00    Poster Presentation Session 2A

ll papers as in Poster Presentation Session 1 (except for Jonah Peranson and Christian Haas).

19:00Dinner

Matching early when information is costly, by Grenet, He, and Kübler

Here's a new paper on school matching that takes preference formation seriously:

Decentralizing Centralized Matching Markets:
Implications from Early Offers in University Admissions
by Julien Grenet, Yinghua He, and Dorothea Kübler
May 2019

Abstract
 The matching literature commonly rules out that market design itself shapes agent preferences. Underlying this premise is the assumption that agents know their own preferences at the outset and that preferences do not change throughout the matching process. This assumption implies that a centralized market where agents receive at most one offer can dominate a decentralized market where multiple offers to agents are possible. Using a quasi-experiment in Germany’s university admissions, we provide evidence against this assumption. We study a centralized clearinghouse that implements the early stages of the university-proposing Gale-Shapley deferred-acceptance mechanism in real time, resembling a decentralized market with continuous offers, rejections, and acceptances. With data on the exact timing of every decision, we show that early offers are more likely to be accepted than (potential) later offers, despite early offers not being made by more desirable universities. Furthermore, early offers are only accepted after some time rather than immediately. These results and direct survey evidence are consistent with a model of information acquisition: it is costly for students to learn about universities and accepting a university that turns out to be inferior causes regret. We discuss and rule out some alternative hypotheses. Our findings motivate a hybrid mechanism that balances centralization and decentralization. By allowing sequential learning, it improves welfare, especially in markets with substantial learning costs.

Vic Fuchs on the problems of employment-based health insurance, in JAMA

Vic Fuchs, the dean of American health economists, argues that employment-based insurance has an assortment problem focused on high income consumers (he compares it to Whole Foods versus Walmart) and a related high cost of administration.

May 9, 2019
Does Employment-Based Insurance Make the US Medical Care System Unfair and Inefficient?
Victor R. Fuchs, JAMA. Published online May 09, 2019. doi:10.1001/jama.2019.4812

"In the United States, the interests of high-income individuals dominate decisions about what medical care is offered and how it is financed. The result is a less efficient and less equitable medical care system than in other high-income countries. Employment-based insurance plays a key role in determining the production and financing of US medical care.
...
"Emphasis is on specialty and subspecialty care, expensive technology, extra capacity to facilitate access (US hospitals have an average occupancy rate of 65% compared with an average of 76% according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), and more and better-quality amenities, including space and privacy in the hospital.3 Architects who build in many countries suggest that design for US hospitals must also include better space for visitors and professional staff. This more costly product mix (specialty care and hospital amenities) is appreciated by patients at all income levels, but higher-income patients would and sometimes do pay extra for them. Many low- and middle-income households would be better off if medical care was less costly, and they had more money for other public and private goods and services.
...
"The preference of high-income patients for a costly product mix also adversely affects the efficiency of research and development in the choice of projects because market size influences the direction of investment in innovation. Almost all private medical research and development is directed toward extending the product mix with few attempts to discover new lower-cost interventions with truly disruptive innovations. The interests of high-income patients not only result in inefficiency in medical care production and innovation, but also adversely affect the way the United States finances health care. The present system, which is a mix of employment-based insurance, other private insurance, numerous government programs, including Medicaid and Medicare, each with its own eligibility rules and payment schemes, and out-of-pocket payments, is extremely costly to administer.4,5 The large role played by private insurance in the United States helps high-income households because the price of the insurance is the same regardless of income, whereas government plans typically require higher-income individuals to pay a larger share of the nation’s medical care bill."

Kidney exchange in India: the legal framework

Last week in Ahmedabad I had a chance to interact with Dr. Vivek Kute and his colleagues at the Trivedi Institute, to better understand the setting of their innovative kidney exchange program.  The legal framework is of course a big part of that environment.

Here's India's Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Act (THOA), 2014 (scroll down for the English language version).

As in other places, much of the law is shaped by  repugnance towards kidney sales. To this end, the law requires that an Authorisation Committee approve donation from someone who is not a "near relative," in the immediate nuclear family.

"Authorisation Committee.
(3) When the proposed donor and the recipient are not near relatives, the Authorisation Committee shall,- 
(i)evaluate that there is no commercial transaction between the recipient and the donor and that no payment has been made to the donor or promised to be made to the donor or any other person; 
(ii)prepare an explanation of the link between them and the circumstances which led to the offer being made;"

In the case of kidney exchange, only a near relative may serve as the intended donor (i.e. no uncles, aunts, cousins, etc.).

"(4)Cases of swap donation referred to under subsection (3A) of section 9 of the Act shall be approved by Authorisation Committee of hospital or district or State in which transplantation is proposed to be done and the donation of organs shall be permissible only from near relatives of the swap recipients."

The present law also does not allow nondirected donors.
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Here are some related earlier posts:

Tuesday, May 21, 2019 Robot-assisted kidney transplantation in Ahmedabad, India.

Monday, July 2, 2018

Kidney exchange in all its aspects: a view from India

Monday, May 14, 2018

Kidney Exchange in India: current conditions and recommendations for the future

Robot-assisted kidney transplantation in Ahmedabad, India.

I just returned from a very interesting visit to Ahmedabad, Gujarat, India, part of which was at the Trivedi Institute of Transplantation Sciences. There I had the privilege of sitting in on a robot-assisted kidney transplant operation conducted by Dr. Pranjal Modi. In the picture below, Dr. Modi is seated at the robot, that he operates with his hands and feet, while I watch on a screen, behind which is the patient (surrounded by doctors maintaining the various instruments inside him, through small incisions).

Dr. Pranjal R. Modi at the robot controls, while I watch him perform a kidney transplant.

Below is the two-dimensional image in which I followed what he was doing (but when he looks through the binoculars of the robot, he sees it in very clear 3 dimensions).

The high magnification is apparently a big aid to fast and precise surgery, which (together with small incisions) is one of the attractions of robotic surgery.

The robot was made by Da Vinci.
I think this is the patient-facing part of the particular robot being used: