The human side of kidney exchange: video from NAS (5 minutes)

This short (5 min) video is the first in a series From Research To Reward  by the National Academy of Sciences about the human side of the benefits from science.  It mostly follows a married, incompatible pair through their kidney exchange transplants, as part of a chain organized by the Alliance for Paired Donation (APD). The Matchmaker: An Economist Tackles Kidney Exchange from The National Academies on Vimeo.
"When Fielding Daniel and his wife Amy discovered that it would take five years for him to to be matched with a kidney donor, they were devastated. They launched a desperate search for a life-saving solution that led them to an unexpected savior - a market economist [then] at Harvard University. 

Learn more at www.nasonline.org/r2r.
xx

xx
"This short film is the first in the series From Research To Reward which examines the impact of social science research on our lives. It was created by Redglass Pictures for The National Academy of Sciences.

"A film by Sarah Klein and Tom Mason
Director of Photography Jon Kasbe
Music by  Ryan Sayward Whittier
Motion Graphics by  Kathleen Chee
Special thanks to: Dr. Alvin Roth. Amy and Fielding Daniel, Nobel Media, Dr. Michael Rees"

The Matchmaker: An Economist Tackles Kidney Exchange from The National Academies on Vimeo.

********************

The video has an animated artist's impression of the 2004 paper "Kidney Exchange" by Roth, Sonmez and Unver in the Quarterly Journal of Economics.

It also has a shout out to Susan Rees, the transplant coordinator at the APD. I've written before about the importance of the nurses and social workers who act as transplant coordinators.

You can also link to the video at
http://www.redglasspictures.com/the-matchmaker-1/

http://www.theatlantic.com/video/index/509054/harvard-economist-redesigned-kidney-marketplace/

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TJio37Fo0BQ

http://www.nasonline.org/publications/from-research-to-reward/

That last link also has a previously published companion story that I blogged about earlier:

The Matchmaker: An Economist Tackles Kidney Exchange from The National Academies on Vimeo.

A NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES SERIES
ABOUT SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY AND HUMAN BENEFIT
Matching Kidney Donors with Those Who Need Them—and Other Explorations in Economics

The chain in which the Daniels participated was featured on the front page of the December 25, 2011 issue of Parade magazine and was started by non-directed donor Deb Shearer.

Here's that story: The Miracle of Life: How One Woman Turned Tragedy into the Ultimate Gift


For kidney exchange history buffs, here's my 2009 post about of the first, pioneering non-simultaneous kidney exchange chain, organized by Dr Mike Rees, who founded the APD: the original paper is here, in the NEJM: Rees, Michael A., Jonathan E. Kopke, Ronald P. Pelletier, Dorry L. Segev, Matthew E. Rutter, Alfredo J. Fabrega, Jeffrey Rogers, Oleh G. Pankewycz, Janet Hiller, Alvin E. Roth, Tuomas Sandholm, Utku Ünver, and Robert A. Montgomery, “A Non-Simultaneous Extended Altruistic Donor Chain,” New England Journal of Medicine, 360;11, March 12, 2009

Matching in Budapest, Dec 14-15

101 years of matching in Hungary will be the subject of two matching conferences are coming up in Budapest.
On Dec 14, 100 years of matching theory in Hungary.  Here is the conference program.

And on Dec 15:

The 12th Matching in Practice workshop, at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in Budapest.

Programme  (also here)

8:30-9:00	Registration
9:00-10:00	Keynote presentation: Utku Unver (Boston College)
	Efficient and Incentive Compatible Liver Exchange
10:00-10:30	Coffee break
10:30-12:30	Session 1
	First Choice-Maximizing School Choice Mechanisms, by Timo Mennle (University of Zurich)
	School Choice with Voucher, by Mustafa Afacan (Sabanci University)
	Iterative Versus Standard Deferred Acceptance: Experimental Evidence, by Rustam Hakimov (WZB Berlin)
12:30-14:00	Lunch
14:00-15:00	Session 2
	Testing different cardinal matching mechanisms in the field, by  Alexander Nesterov (Higher School of Economics, St. Petersburg)
	Hungarian secondary school and higher education admissions data in the Databank, by Zoltán Hermann (Hungarian Academy of Sciences)
15:00-16:00	Policy roundtable: Course allocation
	Estelle Cantillon (Université Libre de Bruxelles) and Utku Unver (Boston College)
16:00-16:30	Coffee break
16:30-18:30	Session 3
	Team Formation as an Incentive Device, by Xiaocheng Hu (University of Southampton)
	Assignment maximisation, by Inacio Bo (WZB Berlin)
	Refugee resettlement, by Alex Teytelboym (University of Oxford)

******************
In November, the Hungarian Academy of Sciences also hosted a
Workshop on Future Directions in Computational Social Choice, which contained papers on stable matching by Ágnes Cseh: Popular Matchings and Zsuzsanna Jankó: Various Stable Matching Concepts.

Program for the recent Montreal conference on matching

Here's the program for the conference on matching held in Montreal earlier this month.

Colloque CIREQ Montréal de théorie microéconomique

Samedi et dimanche, les 19 et 20 novembre 2016
Organisateur(s)Lars Ehlers (Université de Montréal, CIREQ), Sean Horan (Université de Montréal, CIREQ)

New Zealand's new Compensation for Live Organ Donors Bill

Here's the link to the new New Zealand legislation on removing disincentives from kidney donation, sent by  Frank McCormick.

Compensation for Live Organ Donors Bill (formerly titled Financial Assistance for Live Organ Donors Bill)

3.Purpose

The purpose of this Act is to remove a financial deterrent to the donation of organs by live donors.

...

9Who are qualifying donors

(1)

A person is a qualifying donor in relation to a donor surgery if, on application under Part 3, the Director-General is satisfied that—

(a)

the person will forgo earnings as a result of taking unpaid leave or otherwise ceasing employment to allow for his or her recuperation from the surgery; and

(b)

both the donor surgery and the surgery to implant the organ will be carried out in New Zealand; and

(c)

the recipient of the organ is eligible to receive services funded under the New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000; and

(d)

the organ will be collected, implanted, and dealt with lawfully.

(2)

For the purposes of subsection (1)(d), the Director-General may assume the organ will be collected, implanted, and dealt with lawfully in the absence of information to the contrary.

Entitlement to earnings compensation while recuperating

10Qualifying donors entitled to earnings compensation for up to 12 weeks while recuperating

******

Public lecture at Rice University, Dec 2

I'll be giving the RISE Lecture at Rice (RISE = The Rice Initiative for the Study of Economics).

Here are some other links with logistics (the event is free, but they want to know who is coming...):
http://news.rice.edu/2016/11/21/nobel-laureate-alvin-roth-to-discuss-the-new-economics-of-matchmaking-and-market-design-dec-2/

https://www.eventbrite.com/e/rice-university-presents-nobel-laureate-alvin-roth-tickets-29130669617

Removing financial dis-incentives from kidney donation in New Zealand

Frank McCormick points out this encouraging story from New Zealand, about removing financial disincentives from donating a kidney:

'Recognising the heroes' - MP's bill will give organ donors full compo while they recover

"Mr Bishop has steered a Member's Bill into law that will pay donors 100 per cent of their income for up to eight weeks plus childcare costs if needed.

In 2015 there were 78 live donors who donated a kidney or part of their liver, and "while the rate of live and deceased donors is slowly increasing, New Zealand still has one of the lowest organ donation rates in the world.

"The evidence is pretty clear that financial barriers is one thing that people do think about," Mr Bishop said."

Game theoretic questions and the Trump transition, on Bloomberg Surveillance

Early yesterday morning I was interviewed on Bloomberg Surveillance, about what I thought were some game theoretic questions facing the Trump transition and administration. We talked about cabinet choices as commitments, and trade and climate agreements as collective action problems...

My contribution starts at minute 7:30 and goes until 12:35.

Play episode 
 

Fairness for Digital Infrastructure conference, January 19-20, 2017, at Penn

Fairness for Digital Infrastructure, January 19-20, 2017, UPenn, Philadelphia PA

"A large part of our digital infrastructure is designed to automate decision making, and ideally should improve economic efficiency. Automated decisions now govern, among many other things, whether we are approved for credit cards, what advertisements we are shown, and what search results we see. Algorithms determine the government’s perception of an individual’s risk (e.g. at airport security) or trustworthiness (e.g. in evaluating recidivism risk for parole decisions). The aim of the workshop is to better understand issues surrounding “unfairness” associated with the use of machine learning and automated decision making. This includes the frictions that are the cause of such inadvertent unfairness, and novel technical solutions to solve these problems.
This workshop will take place at the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia on January 19th and 20th 2017.
Co-organizers: Sampath Kannan, Jamie Morgenstern, Mallesh Pai, Aaron Roth, Rakesh Vohra"

An interview with computer scientist Cynthia Dwork

Quanta Magazine, a publication of the Simons foundation, has an interview with Cynthia Dwork on differential privacy and fairness among other things.

How to Force Our Machines to Play Fair
The computer scientist Cynthia Dwork takes abstract concepts like privacy and fairness and adapts them into machine code for the algorithmic age.

Here are some earlier news stories about Apple's introduction of differential privacy to the iPhone,  which I've been following for a number of reasons.

From TechCrunch: What Apple’s differential privacy means for your data and the future of machine learning

From Wired: Apple’s ‘Differential Privacy’ Is About Collecting Your Data—But Not ​Your Data

Apple's differential privacy analyzes the group, protects the individual
Posted on June 21, 2016 

Organ donation in Singapore: not rocking the boat

The Singapore Medical Journal publishes an extremely cautious article on Policy options for increasing the supply of transplantable kidneys in Singapore

It concludes with these
"Recommendations:
In order to increase the number of LDs within the existing regulatory framework, non-repugnant incentives can be considered, such as an organ donation award that not only recognises the significance of the donor’s act but also creates meaningful conversation on the importance of organ donation in saving lives. In addition, local online platforms can be created to help ESRD patients appeal to the public for directed kidney donations.

Meanwhile, in order to increase the number of DDs, it is critically important to establish administrative incentives for healthcare professionals to take responsibility for improving the organ transplantation process through QI programmes. Therefore, measures that can be considered include stronger incentives and training for personnel involved in donor-identification, coupled with greater transparency for both individual hospital DD actualisation rates and DCD statistics. Finally, potential donors and their immediate families can be further incentivised through a transplant priority system which favours donors’ families.

In conclusion, greater measures to encourage and facilitate donation can be implemented at all levels to meet society’s transplantation needs. Moving forward, all relevant institutions in Singapore are encouraged to contribute their insights and experience in increasing the supply of kidneys for transplantation so that a meaningful national conversation can commence and best practices adopted to address this urgent shortage."

An interview in the Buenas Aires Herald (in English): "All market design is political"

I went to Argentina hopeful that I could get some insight there into our new president-elect, since they have had a lot of experience with populist politicians. The consensus there seemed to be that we shouldn't expect campaign promises to be taken too seriously, since populist voters quickly forget them and can be mollified with new promises. And maybe we should expect inflation...

While I was there, newspaper reporters couldn't resist asking me about the election results, together with market design...

Here's an interview (in English) in the Buenos Aires Herald.

‘All market design is political’

Marilda Sotomayor wins the 2016 TWAS prize for Social Science

THE WORLD ACADEMY OF SCIENCES (TWAS), for the advancement of science in developing countries, has just announced its 2016 prizes:

Winners of 2016 TWAS Prizes announced

TWAS has announced the winners of the TWAS Prizes for 2016 at the Academy's 27th General Meeting in Kigali, Rwanda.

TWAS Prizes are awarded in nine fields: Agricultural Sciences, Biology, Chemistry, Earth Sciences, Engineering Sciences, Mathematics, Medical Sciences, Physics, and Social Sciences (called the TWAS-Celso Furtado Prize). This year, there are 10 prize winners: two from Brazil; one from Chile; two from China; two from India; one from Mexico; one from Pakistan and one from Turkey. The prize winners include one woman.

Each TWAS Prize carries a cash award of USD15,000. The winners will lecture about their research at TWAS's 28th General Meeting in 2017, when they will also receive a plaque and the prize money.

****************
Here is the part about Marilda:

Social Sciences

• Marilda SOTOMAYOR of Brazil for her extraordinary contribution and innovative research in the field of matching markets  

My talk at UCEMA in Buenos Aires (video)

On my visit to Argentina my first talk (of 5) was at UCEMA, on November 16. You can see some pictures here.

Here is a video of my talk, about market design and my book Who Gets What and Why. My talk starts at minute 7:50.

Kidney exchange talk at INCUCAI in Buenos Aires

On my visit to Argentina last week I gave a talk Wednesday on kidney exchange at the Argentine transplant coordination authority INCUCAI, which was followed by a lively and largely positive discussion of how (and whether) to try to bring kidney exchange to Argentina.

El Premio Nobel de Economía Alvin Roth brindó una charla sobre donación y trasplante en el INCUCAI  (Google Translate: "The Nobel Prize in Economics Alvin Roth gave a talk about donation and transplantation in the INCUCAI"}

Both at INCUCAI and in my subsequent meeting in Tucuman, there was interest not only in kidney exchange, but in global kidney exchange, as Argentina presently has foreign patients on the deceased donor waiting lists at public hospitals.

Global Kidney Exchange to Overcome Financial Barriers to Kidney Transplantation

 Forthcoming in the American Journal of Transplantation:

Kidney Exchange to Overcome Financial Barriers to Kidney Transplantation
by
Michael A. Rees, Ty B. Dunn, Christian S. Kuhr, Christopher L. Marsh, Jeffrey Rogers, Susan E. Rees, Alejandra Cicero, Laurie J. Reece, Alvin E. Roth,
Obi Ekwenna, David E. Fumo, Kimberly D. Krawiec, Jonathan E. Kopke, Samay Jain, Miguel Tan, Siegfredo R. Paloyo

Accepted manuscript online: 7 November 2016


"This article has been accepted for publication and undergone full peer review but has not been through the copyediting, typesetting, pagination and proofreading process, which may lead to differences between this version and the Version of Record. Please cite this article as doi: 10.1111/ajt.14106"

Abstract:
Organ shortage is the major limitation to kidney transplantation in the developed world. Conversely, millions of end-stage renal disease patients in the developing world die because they cannot afford renal replacement therapy—even when willing living kidney donors exist. This juxtaposition between countries with funds but no available kidneys and those with available kidneys but no funds, prompts us to propose an exchange program utilizing each nation's unique assets. Our proposal leverages the cost savings achieved through earlier transplantation over dialysis to fund the cost of kidney exchange between developed-world patient/donor pairs with immunological barriers and developing-world patient/donor pairs with financial barriers. By making developed-world healthcare available to impoverished patients in the developing world, we replace unethical transplant tourism with global kidney exchange—a modality equally benefitting rich and poor. We report the one-year experience of an initial Filipino pair, whose recipient was transplanted in the US with an American donor's kidney at no cost to him. The Filipino donor donated to an American in the US through a kidney exchange chain. Follow-up care and medications in the Philippines were supported by funds from the US. We show that the logistical obstacles in this approach, although considerable, are surmountable.

*******************
And here's that first GKE chain to date: it started with an American non-directed donor (blood type A) donating to the Filipino patient, and this chart shows the first 11 transplants that resulted.

Visit to Tucuman, Argentina, where there may be prospects for kidney exchange

During my visit to Argentina, my host, Julio Elias, arranged a number of talks and meetings which I'll report on as I get organized.  Some of the meetings were about the prospects of organizing kidney exchange in Argentina (where there has already been one famous exchange).  My first meeting on this subject was in Buenos Aires, my second in Tucuman. Both were promising.

Here are some reports from Tucuman.
Here's an account of my meeting with Governor  Juan Manzur and the Minister of Public Health Rossana Chahla and their colleagues, on November 18.
Manzur se reunió con el premio Nobel de Economía Alvin Roth

***********
Here's a news story that combines an interview with me (the reporter asked first about Donald Trump and only then about kidneys), followed by some comments by the Minister of Public Health on the prospects for kidney exchange:

“Las barreras al comercio en Estados Unidos afectarán a países desarrollados y a emergentes”

from Google Translate:
"The health minister of the province, Rossana Chahla said that the Government was interested in the visit of the American expert for their expertise in increasing the number of transplants and ablations, and the possibility of replicating this model in Tucuman.

"from here we will coordinate with Argentine economists studying this issue and we want to have a specialist to see visit how to work in Chicago (United States) and bring solutions to the province benefit people , "he said.

on the other hand, the official said that the work of Roth have shown that interventions crossed kidney transplants allow the state to reduce costs in dialysis treatments and reduce waiting lists of patients.

" in the United States there is a law that allows cross and living donor transplants, which means that by a living donor, you can make a donation chain where several people benefit , "said Health Minister, as appropriated news agency Telam .

he added that in Argentina this can only be done with a court order and stressed that, therefore, only transplants are specified with cadaver donor, generating extensive waiting lists for access to organs.

"the US system reduces lists and Roth shows that these interventions reduces health costs, and helps solve the quality of life of people because not to do dialysis and can be reinserted fast occupationally "analyzed Chahla. "
**********
And here's a report of a subsequent meeting held by Dr Chahla:

Mejoras en materia de trasplantes (Improvements in transplant).
"Minister of Public Health, Dr. Rossana Chahla, met with the director of Cucaituc, Dr. Aldo Bunader to treat transplant referral service issues in the province. They were attended by Nobel Prize-winning economist Alvin Roth, who offered to work together in what refers to Software, donation and transplantation cross.

Bunader was satisfied with the points raised and by the visit of economist Roth. "We have been meeting with him. He offered all their service, make an agreement and exchange; We're very pleased with that part, "he said."

Match-Up 2017, call for papers

MATCH-UP 2017

Overview

Date: April 20 2017 - April 21 2017

Location: Cambridge, MA, USA

MATCH-UP 2017, the fourth workshop in the series of interdisciplinary and international workshops on matching under preferences, will take place on April 20-21, 2017.

Venue:Microsoft Research New EnglandCambridge, MA 02142

Registration: TBA, February 2017

Contact us: If you have any questions regarding this event please send email to MATCHUP2017@microsoft.com

• About
 
• Submissions
 
• Schedule
 
• Local Information
 
• Committees
 
• Previous Workshops

Submissions

We solicit papers and posters on matching under preferences.  The matching problems under consideration include, but are not limited to:

• Two-sided matchings involving agents on both sides (e.g., college admissions, medical resident allocation, job markets)
• Two-sided matchings involving agents and objects (e.g., house allocation, course allocation, project allocation, assigning papers to reviewers, and  school choice)
• One-sided matchings (e.g., roommate problems and kidney exchanges)

Paper Submissions

Authors should indicate which format type their paper should be considered under. The proceedings will take the form of informal working notes distributed at the workshop and online.

Format A

• Original contribution, not previously published in (or accepted by) another conference proceedings or journal
• Not under review for a conference or journal elsewhere
• At most 12 pages (including bibliography) using 11 point font or larger with at least 1″ margins all round, and in single-column format. Any material beyond this limit should be placed in a clearly marked appendix which will be read at the discretion of the programme committee
• Accepted papers will be published in proceedings (however, this should not prevent the simultaneous or subsequent submission of contributed papers to other workshops, conferences or journals)

Format B

• Not necessarily original work
• Can have been published already in (or accepted by) another conference proceedings or journal
• Can be under review for a conference or journal elsewhere
• No page limit
• Only the abstract will be published in proceedings

Information on submitting papers:

• Submission site: EasyChair
• Paper submission deadline : Friday, December 9th, 2016
• Selected papers will be notified at the beginning of February, 2017

Poster Submissions & Submission Site

• TBA, 2017

LI Reunión Anual de la Asociación Argentina de Economía Política: Nov 16-18

I'll be speaking today at the Conference of the Argentine Association of Political Economy:
http://www.tucumanturismo.gob.ar/evento/1490/li-reunion-anual-de-la-asociacion-argentina-de-economia-politica

• Fecha de Inicio: 16/11/2016
• Fecha de Finalización: 18/11/2016
• Dónde: San Miguel de Tucumán, Tucumán, Argentina
• Dirección: Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales- UNT

DESCRIPCIÓN

En esta ocasión con motivo del Bicentenario de la Independencia, se decide que nuestra provincia sea anfitriona, destacando la participación de los siguientes emblemas del ámbito de la economía:
• Alvin Roth. Premio Nobel en Economía, año 2012.
• Profesor Iván Werning. Referente del MIT (Massachussetts Institute of Tecnology)
• Federico Sturzennegger. Presidente del Banco Central.
En cuanto a las actividades que se realizarán, los causantes informan que están programadas conferencias magistrales a cargo de los disertantes mencionados, además de mesas panel y sesiones simultáneas donde se tratan temas de interés para la profesión y su incidencia en la sociedad.
Considerando que la Reunión de la AAEP es el evento más importante de la profesión y la importancia de los disertantes confirmados, los organizadores estiman la participación de 300 asistentes. 

• INFORMACIÓN DE UTILIDAD
• CONTACTO

Conferencia Nobel – Who Gets What and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design. (Viernes 18/11 a las 11.15 hs)

Alvin Roth se graduó de investigación de operaciones en la Universidad de Columbia (1971), y realizó su master (1973) y su doctorado (1974) también en investigación de operaciones en la Universidad de Standford.

Roth es catedrático universitario en Harvard y Stanford e investiga en teoría de los juegos, la economía experimental y el diseño del mercado. Es conocido por su enfoque en la aplicación de su teoría económica a soluciones en los problemas del mundo real.

En 2012 ganó el Premio Nobel de Economía conjuntamente con Lloyd Shapley por su trabajo: “La teoría sobre la asignaciones estables y la práctica del diseño de mercado”.