Market design conference at Lund, July 25-27

Here is the conference website: Conference on Economic Design 2013 (25-27 July)

Beforehand, The Arne Ryde Foundation will organize a two-day mini-course on Economic Design July 23-24, 2013. The course is directed towards PhD students and post-docs wanting a firm grounding in the subject and consists of four lectures on Economic Design given by leading researchers in the field (Gabrielle Demange, Bettina Klaus, Tayfun Sönmez and William Thomson).

The conference program is here.

The keynote addresses are

Murat Sertel Lecture, Date and time: July 25, 17:35-18:50
Chair: M. Utku Ünver(Department of Economics, Boston College)
Professor Tayfun Sönmez(Department of Economics, Boston College)
Kidney Exchange: Past, Present, and Potential Future

SED Lecture Date and time: July 26, 09:00-10:15
Chair: Lars Ehlers(Département de Sciences Économiques and CIREQ, Université de Montréal)
Professor William Thomson (University of Rochester, Department of Economics)
Allocation when Preferences are Single-peaked: Basic Model and New Directions

SED Lecture, Date and time: July 26, 17:20-18:35
Chair: Tommy Andersson (Department of Economics, Lund University)
Professor Paul Klemperer(Oxford University, Nuffield College)
Geometry, Auctions, and Matching

Tim Besley reviews "What Money Can't Buy" by Michael Sandel

Besley likes Sandel's book (while recognizing its flaws): Here's the opening sentence of his review in the Journal of Economic Literature(2013, 51(2), 478–495):

"Michael Sandel’s What Money Can’t Buy (WMCB hereafter) is a great book and I recommend every economist to read it even though we are not really his target audience."

I've written a bunch of blog posts about Sandel's views on markets, and others on repugnant transactions and markets, so I won't go into the details again here.

Let me instead give Besley the last word. Here are two paragraphs from his Final Remarks:

"The timing of WMCB may seem ironic in a year in which the Nobel Prize was awarded to Alvin Roth and Lloyd Shapley for their important work on market design that underpins a large expansion of exchange and matching into domains such as school choice, labor markets, and kidney exchange.
As Roth (2008) explains, the approach that he has taken is sensitive to issues of social constraints on market allocations. For example, he acknowledges that having a role for prices in kidney exchanges offends societal values. So the market design that has been proposed in this setting looks for exchanges that are feasible without prices. Thus, the concerns in WMCB are already taken on board by those who are actively promoting more socially sensitive forms of exchange.
...
"At the outset, WMCB identifies two obstacles to rethinking the role and reach of markets. One is the power and prestige of market thinking. The other is the rancor and emptiness of public discourse. Most economists will regard the first as well earned and many would gladly take a bow. But it seems hard to dispute that the need to participate in and engage with debates about markets (and governments) is a central obligation of the economics profession. WMCB is to be applauded for supplying both provocation and insight on a wide range of important topics. And it suggests
a range of challenges to which the discipline of economics can respond."


HT: Parag Pathak

From auctions to buy-it-now on eBay

eBay has changed since I started studying in the late 1990's, when it was all auctions all the time.
Here's the story:

SALES MECHANISMS IN ONLINE MARKETS:
WHAT HAPPENED TO INTERNET AUCTIONS?
by Liran Einav
Chiara Farronato
Jonathan D. Levin
Neel Sundaresan
Working Paper 19021
http://www.nber.org/papers/w19021


ABSTRACT
Consumer auctions were very popular in the early days of internet commerce, but today online sellers mostly use posted prices. Data from eBay shows that compositional shifts in the items being sold, or the sellers offering these items, cannot account for this evolution. Instead, the returns to sellers using auctions have diminished. We develop a model to distinguish two hypotheses: a shift in buyer demand away from auctions, and general narrowing of seller margins that favors posted prices. Our estimates suggest that the former is more important. We also provide evidence on where auctions still are used, and on why some sellers may continue to use both auctions and posted prices.

a pre-emptive letter of rejection from one of my favorite journals, Games and Economic Behavior

Along with what I presume are very many other people, I recently received this email from the editors of Games and Economic Behavior (GEB). The first part of the email (reproduced below) reads a lot like the rejection letters I get, and says that only papers of very broad general interest can be accepted (and not papers that are of interest to only some readers..).  But in this case the letter is being sent to people before they submit a paper. (The second part of the email sensibly encourages editors and referees to reject things quickly, at least, and use early desk rejections, so that people will still be willing to submit to a journal that is likely to reject their paper...)

"Dear GEB colleagues,

"We are writing to update you on the state of the journal, remind you of GEB's objective, ask for your help, and thank you for your contributions.

"Journals that publish papers in game theory
Currently, there are six journals devoted entirely to publishing game theory papers:
1. Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier
2. International Journal of Game Theory, Springer
3. International Game Theory Review, World Scientific
4. International Journal of Mathematics, Game Theory and Algebra, Nova Publishers
5. Journal of Game Theory, Scientific & Academic Publishing - Open Access (Peer Review) 
6. Games, MDPI - Open Access (Peer Review) 

"In addition, most economic theory journals publish game theory papers and there is a fast growing number of game theory papers published in computer science and operations research journals. For example, one of the four sections of Mathematics of Operations Research is devoted entirely to game theory and ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation is heavily concentrated on game theory. 

"The unique role of GEB
The stated goal of GEB is to "facilitate cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning." With the expansion of game theory into a variety of subjects beyond economics (computer science, operations research and management, biology, sociology, psychology, linguistics, philosophy), it is important to communicate and coordinate game-theoretic research across these fields. To be effective in this mission, it is important to restrict publications in GEB to papers that are of general game theoretic interest (in a broad sense) and not to publish papers that are of interest only to narrow groups, even if they are high quality. With the current rate of more than 700 new submissions a year, this means that GEB has to maintain a high rate of rejection. The current rate of rejection is approximately five out of six newly submitted papers."

2013 Best paper prize to Michael Ostrovsky and Michael Schwarz for AEJ: Micro, 2 (2), "Information Disclosure and Unraveling in Matching Markets,"

A Best Paper Prize for the matching market view of grade inflation:)

AEJ: Micro, 2 (2), "Information Disclosure and Unraveling in Matching Markets," Michael Ostrovsky and Michael Schwarz

Abstract

This paper explores information disclosure in matching markets. A school may suppress some information about students in order to improve their average job placement. We consider a setting with many schools, students, and jobs, and show that if early contracting is impossible, the same, "balanced" amount of information is disclosed in essentially all equilibria. When early contracting is allowed and information arrives gradually, if schools disclose the balanced amount of information, students and employers will not find it profitable to contract early. If they disclose more, some students and employers will prefer to sign contracts before all information is revealed. 

Matching with couples in large markets: Kojima, Pathak and Roth

Fuhito Kojima, Parag Pathak and I have a paper coming out that suggests a beginning of an answer to the empirical puzzle presented by the fact that the many annual labor matching markets with couples that use the Roth-Peranson algorithm overwhelmingly find stable matchings, even though in principle they might fail to exist.  In large markets with short preference lists and without too many couples, the answer seems to be related to the fact that there remain sufficiently many unfilled positions so that vacancy chains are more likely to end than to cycle.

Here's the paper:
Kojima, Fuhito, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth, “Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets,” April 2010, revised April 2013, Quarterly Journal of Economics, forthcoming.

Abstract: Accommodating couples has been a longstanding issue in the design of centralized labor market clearinghouses for doctors and psychologists, because couples view pairs of jobs as complements. A stable matching may not exist when couples are present. This paper's main result is that a stable matching exists when there are relatively few couples and preference lists are sufficiently short relative to market size. We also discuss incentives in markets with couples. We relate these theoretical results to the job market for psychologists, in which stable matchings exist for all years of the data, despite the presence of couples.

Game theory festival(s) at Stony Brook, July 8-18, and tribute to Lloyd Shapley

Each year for a long time now there has been a summer festival of game theory at Stony Brook.
Here's the announcement of this summer's events:

The 24th Stony Brook Game Theory Festival

The Festival Events:

July 08 - 12, 2013: International Conference on Game Theory Organizers:  Bernard De Meyer (Universite de Paris 1) Srihari Govindan (University of Rochester) Consulting Committee:  Abraham Neyman (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem) Sylvain Sorin (Universite Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 6) View Program Details

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July 14 - 15, 2013: Workshop on Experimental Game Theory Organizer:  Drew Fudenberg (Harvard University) View Program Details

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July 16 - 18, 2013: Workshop on Computational Game Theory Organizer:  Bernhard von Stengel (London School of Economics) Details

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CONGRATULATIONS!

It is a truth universally acknowledged that much that is fundamental and beautiful in the field of Game Theory has been shaped, and nurtured over the years, by Lloyd Shapley. One need merely name topics where his work was seminal and path-breaking, and served to define entire areas of research: the value (with finite and continuum player sets), core, voting games and power indices, stochastic games, repeated games, matching, potential games, market games in coalitional and strategic form, the convergence phenomenon for perfectly competitive economies (core and value in the coalitional setting, and non-cooperative equilibrium in the strategic), convex games, fictitious play,....

The list is by no means exhaustive, nor chronological, and others have expanded and elaborated on his work elsewhere. It was for one of these topics, his joint work with David Gale on matching, that he got the Nobel prize --- a prize that so many in the game theory community felt was long, long, overdue; and for which they would sincerely want to laud the Nobel committee.

Lloyd has always been shy, often self-effacing and detached, at a personal level. But we know very few who have been so forthcoming when it comes to matters academic. He is a founding member of the Center for Game Theory in Economics at Stony Brook, and has regularly participated in our summer conferences for the last 23 years (indeed from even before, since 1984, in the earlier incarnation of the Center as the "Institute for Decision Sciences"). Lloyd's presence has been a constant source of inspiration for us. He gives freely of his time, and the generous overflow of his ideas have stimulated many and frequently proved decisive for their research. In particular, Lloyd goes out of his way to interact with young scholars. All of us look forward very much to the "60th anniversary" of his paper on stochastic games in the summer of 2013 at Stony Brook, in the same spirit as the earlier "50th anniversary" of the value. (The event will also contribute towards the celebration of his 90th birthday, though we know that for Lloyd this will have marginal value.)

Pradeep Dubey & Yair Tauman
Center for Game Theory in Economics, Stony Brook

Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply

Here's a new old paper (written quite a while ago, but recently published...):

Niederle, Muriel, Alvin E. Roth and M. Utku Unver, “Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation,” Games, 2013, 4, no. 2: 243-282 (Special Issue on Games and Matching Markets), http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/4/2/243.

Abstract: Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply, typically excess demand for workers. However this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms are willing to make early offers and workers are willing to accept them. We present a model and experiment in which workers’ quality becomes known only in the late part of the market. However, in equilibrium, matching can occur (inefficiently) early only when there is comparable demand and supply: a surplus of applicants, but a shortage of high quality applicants.

Conference on game theory in honor of Marilda Sotomayor: July 2014

Here's the announcement:

INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS
OF THE GAME THEORY SOCIETY, celebrating the 70th birthday of Marilda Sotomayor

July 25 to July 31, 2014, University of São Paulo, São Paulo, Brasil.

It is a great pleasure to invite you to participate in the INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP
ON GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS OF THE GAME THEORY
SOCIETY to celebrate the 70th birthday of Marilda Sotomayor. It will be held at the University
of São Paulo, from July 25 to July 31, 2014.

The workshop will offer the participants the opportunity to interact with some of the most
productive researchers in Game Theory. The week-long event will consist of mini-courses,
conferences and contributed papers sessions, which will be complemented with a round table for
discussions on themes of interest of the participants. The courses will start at the introductory
level and will reach the frontiers of current research.
Graduate students should send a recommendation letter from their supervisors and an
abstract of his/her thesis project. A limited financial support for graduate students, will be
available.

The deadline for extended abstracts and paper submissions as well as for students
applications are due February 15th and are encouraged since there are limited seats for the short
courses. All submissions should be made via on-line. You should send either an extended
abstract (up to 3 pages), or, if possible, a full paper, written in English, before February 15th.
This paper will become downloadable from our website if your submission is accepted. A short
abstract (up to 2000 symbols) is also required. The abstract will be printed in the book of
abstracts. Presentations should be made in English, the official language of the workshop.
Acceptable formats for the files are pdf, ps and word. Articles in all areas of Game Theory and
Applications are welcome. The selected articles will be announced by March 20th. The schedule
of talks on the workshop will be announced by the end of May

DEADLINES:
Pre-registration: 04/30/2014
Late on-site registration: 07/04/2014
Extended abstract and paper submission: 02/15/2014
Students application: 02/15/2014
Acceptance: 03/20/2014
SCIENTIFIC ORGANIZER:
Marilda Sotomayor, USP, Brazil.
LOCAL ORGANIZER COMMITTEE:
Chair: Joaquim Guilhoto, USP/SP
Maurício Bugarin, UnB
Gustavo Andrey, FGV/SP
Adhemar Villani Junior, INSPER/SP
Paula Pereda, USP/SP
PROGRAM COMMITTEE
Chair: Marilda Sotomayor, Universidade de São Paulo/SP, Brazil
• Steven Brams (NYU)
• Mauricio Bugarim ( INSPER)
• Geoffroy De Clippel (BROWN UNIV.)
• Olivier Gossner (LONDON AND PARIS SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS)
• Paulo Klinger (FGV/RJ)
• Fuhito Kojima (STANFORD UNIV.)
• Wilfredo Maldonado (UNIV. CATÓLICA DE BRASILIA)
Humberto Moreira (FGV/RJ)
• Hervé Moulin (GLASGOW UNIV.)
• Marina Nunez (UNIV. DE BARCELONA)
• Alvaro Sandroni (UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA)
• Amparo Urbano (UNIV. DE VALENCIA)
• Federico Valenciano (UNIV. DEL PAIS BASCO)
• Bernhard von Stengel (LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS)
• John Wooders (UNIV. OF ARIZONA)
• Myrna Wooders (VANDERBILT UNIV.)
Mini-courses
• M1. MARKET DESIGN - ALVIN ROTH
• M2. SOCIAL CHOICE AND FAIR DIVISION - HERVÉ MOULIN
• M3. INFORMATION THEORY - DAVID PEREZ-CASTRILLO
• M4. COOPERATIVE GAMES - ROBERTO SERRANO
• M5. STOCHASTIC GAMES: ALGORITHMS AND EXISTENCE -
 T. E. S. RAGHAVAN
The courses M2 and M3, as well as M4 and M5, will be ministered in parallel.
Plenary lecturers
• AUMANN, ROBERT, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel and State University of
New York at Stony Brook, USA. (not confirmed yet)
• HART, SERGIU, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel.
• MASKIN, ERIC, Princeton University, USA
• NASH, JOHN, Princeton University, USA
• ROTH, ALVIN Stanford University, USA.
• SCHMEIDLER, DAVID, Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya, Israel.
• SOTOMAYOR, MARILDA, Universidade de São Paulo, Brazil.
 Semi-plenary lecturers:
• ARAÚJO, ALOÍSIO, Instituto de Matemática Pura e Aplicada, Fundação Getúlio
Vargas/RJ, Brazil.
• BRAMS , STEVEN, New York University, USA.
• DUBAY, PRADEEP, State University of New York, Stony Brook, USA
• WOODERS, MYRNA, Vanderbilt University, USA
• NEYMAN, ABRAHAM, Hebrew University of Jerusalém, Israel
• RENY, PHILIP, University of Chicago, USA
• SAMUELSON, LARRY, University of Yale, USA
• THOMSON,WILLIAM, University of Rochester, USA
• ZAMIR, SHMUEL, Hebrew University of Jerusalém, Israel
• KLINGER, PAULO, Fundação Getúlio Vargas/RJ, Brazil.

Different views of organ donation in China

When I visited the Ministry of Health in Beijing last Friday, their estimate was that 60% of the organs used for transplant still come from executed prisoners.  They defend this practice (in part by saying that the prisoners consent to this donation), while at the same time indicate that they would like to build a system of voluntary donation to replace it.  Subsequently I had some very interesting conversations about that in Hong Kong, which I'll try to blog about sometime soon.

Two stories from Australia illustrate the debate that is going on in China and around the world regarding how China's organ donation policy should be regarded. No one denies that it still relies heavily on organs from executed prisoners, although not as heavily as in the past.

A focus of this debate, at least in the press, has been Dr.Jeifu Wang, a transplant surgeon who was recently China's deputy minister for health. He was educated in Australia, and has recently become a subject of controversy after the University of Sydney offered him an honorary degree.  The first article takes issue with that, and the second details his position.

Honorary Professor Was an Organ Harvester, Say Critics

"A prestigious Australian university has come under scrutiny recently for giving an honorary professorship to a former top Chinese health official who has been involved in unethical organ harvesting. 

Researchers of organ harvesting in China spoke to the influential Australian news program the “7:30 Report” with information about Huang Jiefu’s involvement in organ harvesting in China; they called on the University of Sydney to rescind the honorary professorship they gave to Huang in 2008 and renewed in October 2011.  "

DOCTOR HITS BACK OVER TIES TO CHINA ORGAN HARVESTING

"Last year there were 5,846 kidney transplants in China and more than half of the organs came from prisoners. Of all liver transplants, 80 per cent came from executed prisoners.

"We call it human value," Dr Huang said. "Everybody has a weak point and a strong point. So in the human values you can say 'he's a bad man, he's not on the good side'.

"So then before he died he found his conscience and found he needed to do something to repay society. So why do you object?"

"While Dr Huang, a transplant doctor who studied at the University of Sydney, says his own practice has not taken any organs from the prisons for two years, he continues to defend the policy.

"I feel that at first I respect the donor. I think that probably he committed some very severe crime," he said.

"It's not my part, it's the judicial part to deserve the death penalty. However I respect his last will. I respect the life he donated for another three people."

July 4 and July 1: U.S. and Hong Kong remember British rule

Happy Independence Day to all my fellow Americans. We remember today that we aren't British, and how that came to pass.

I was just in Hong Kong, and there July 1 is the anniversary of Handover Day, when Britain handed back control of Hong Kong over to the Chinese government. The celebrations include political protests, for Hong Kong's lost separateness...

Lecture in Guangzhou: market design, and possible opportunities in China

Here's the announcement of the talk I gave at Sun Yat Sen University, sponsored by the Business school, in Guangzhou.

The larger theme,which the other speakers also engaged in, is what are the opportunities for market design in China?

Deceased organ donation in China, and Hong Kong

I just arrived in Hong Kong (via a fast train from Guangzhou).

On Friday I spoke in Beijing about organ donation and allocation with officials of the Ministry of Health, and today (Tuesday) I'll be speaking with people in Hong Kong who are active in trying to reform the Chinese organ transplant system. Here's some background material (and here):

       Report on the Cooperation of the Chinese Ministry of Health and

           RID 3450 in the Promotion of Organ Donation in China

The Milestone on 26 December 2012

       A Letter of Intent was signed on 26 December 2012 between the Chinese Ministry of Health (MoH) and Rotary International District 3450 (D3450) whereby the two parties, together with the China Organ Transplant Response System Research Center at the University of Hong Kong and the No. 1 Hospital Affiliated to the Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou, will cooperate in the promotion of organ donation and international exchanges in this field.

Background

2.   Many major transplant countries used the organs from executed prisoners in the course of developing their organ transplant services.  As this unethical practice was abandoned with social progress, many countries have developed national donation systems to address the need for transplant organs.  In 2007, the State Council of China passed the human organ transplant regulation, a crucial piece of legislation for the development of an organ transplantation system for Chinese people.  The MoH plans to start implementing the new national system in 2013.  This will mark the start of the phasing out of the old practice of relying on organs from executed convicts, who have the right to decide whether or not to donate their organs after death as any other people in the community.  The law is being revised in China to establish the new national system for transplant, including the definition of the role of national accountable organizations and their responsibilities in line with the guidelines of the World Health Organization (WHO).  Apart from scientific issues, the plan also includes addressing cultural and societal issues, i.e. non-scientific aspects of organ donation to gain public confidence and support.

The New National System of China on Organ Transplant

3.     A research team of the MoH at the University of Hong Kong has developed a national organ computer system, which allocates organs according to national policy that reflects urgency, compatibility and patient need, known as the China Organ Transplant Response System (COTRS), which is free of human intervention and monitored by many bodies to ensure the transparency, fairness and traceability of organ procurement and allocation.  The Red Cross Society of China has been commissioned by the MoH to run the organ donation system, and to ensure that organ donation, procurement and allocation within the medical system are in accordance with the law.  These measures provide the basis for public trust in organ donation.

4.     The new system will ensure donors not only that they can donate their organs to save people as they wish, but also that their organs will not be traded.  Furthermore, deliberations are being made on how to provide social support for the disadvantaged donor and recipient families, such as using China’s existing social support mechanism to cover their expenses but not to be a form of payment for the organs.  While this is not necessarily reflected in the regulations, it has to be decided and built into policies governing the process as a whole.

Cultural and Societal Issues

5.    One major cultural and societal difference between western countries and China relates to the definition of death.  Brain death, as defined in law, is used to determine death in many countries and is often taken as the basis for the surgical removal of organs for transplant.  Without such legislation on brain death, China makes reference to current cultural and societal norms in its deceased organ donation criteria which provide three options for the Chinese people who want to donate organs after death: (i) organ donation after brain death; (ii) organ donation after circulatory death (heart stop) and (iii) organ donation after brain death followed by circulatory death.  Data from a pilot study in China reveal that only 9% of organ donations were on the basis of brain death, while the rest were based on brain death with circulatory death or just on circulatory death.  It is possible that as China makes progress with the new organ donation system, its cultural and societal norms regarding death will shift.

Future Plan

6.    Based on the results of a two year pilot program, the MoH and the Red Cross Society of China decided to implement the new system on a national scale.  The national organ procurement and allocation system, the centerpiece of the new national organ donation system in China, has been launched in September 2012.  Time and coordination will be needed for the new system to be carried out among hospitals in China.  It is planned that the new system will be implemented in the Guangdong Province as a start, and the experience gained will help improve the system which will ultimately be implemented throughout the nation.   

The Role of D3450

7.    Rotary is no stranger to the MoH with its significant efforts over the years in conducting various humanitarian programs in China.   In particular, the success of the Hepatitis B Vaccination Program conducted for over a million children in China by D3450 has probably engendered trust and confidence of MoH in the professionalism, dedication and capability of Rotary in rendering assistance in this important and nation-wide project of promoting organ donation.  Furthermore, the vast international network available through Rotary connections among its 1.2 million members from 33,000 clubs distributed in more than 200 countries will be an invaluable asset to the project team which would need close and continuous exchange with the international community.

8.    DG Kenneth and his team met Minister Chen Zhu in end August, and Deputy Minister Huang Jiefu in October, to discuss prospective Rotary projects in China.  In December 2012, MoH formally invited D3450 to participate in this project of promotion of organ donation, through the Director of the COTRS Research Center, Dr. Wang Haibo, and proposed that a letter of intent be signed between MoH and D3450 on 26 December 2012.   

9.     The major areas of work in which D3450, through rotary clubs in Hong Kong and Macau, will be engaged according to the letter of intent will include the following:

(i) to support the construction and enhancement of the management system on Organ Donation and Allocation in the Mainland;

(ii) to promote organ donation through publicity and advocacy programs in the Mainland; and

(iii) to promote international cooperation and exchange in organ donation between China and members of the World Health Organization (WHO).

10.     While Rotary Clubs in Hong Kong and Macau will participate in the above work on voluntary basis and provide suitable professional input/advice where appropriate, the MoH will oversee the implementation of the new organ donation and transplant system by the two universities and the hospitals in the Mainland, provide the necessary financing and support to the parties concerned and give due attention and response to the views, assessment and suggestions provided by the Rotary team appointed by the Governor of D3450.  All the above will take place in the Guangdong Province as a start.  It is expected that experience gained from the Guangdong Province will help in further improving the system which will eventually be implemented in all other provinces of China.

The Signing Ceremony and Press Conference

11.     A Delegation of 46 Rotarians led by DG Kenneth attended the Signing Ceremony held on 26 December 2012 at the International Conference Center of the Guangdong Hotel in Guangzhou, including DGE Eugene, 6 PDGs, Presidents, Past Presidents, District Officers and their family members.  Dr. KO Wing-man, Secretary of Food and Health of the HKSAR Government, and Dr. CH Leong, Chairman of the Council of the University of Hong Kong, also attended and addressed the audience.  The Deputy Minister of Health, the Chairlady of the Red Cross of China and representatives of the HKMAO, the two universities and the No. 1 Hospital Affiliated to the Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou represented the Chinese Government.  The Letter of Intent was signed by DG Kenneth Wong and Director General Wang Liji of the MoH and witnessed by all present.  A press conference chaired by the Deputy Minister of Health was held immediately after the signing ceremony.

12.      The subject was widely reported by the media in China, notably by the China Daily and the Phoenix TV Channel.  The presence of RID 3450 as a key party in ensuring the openness and fairness in the promotion and implementation of the new organ donation and allocation system was succinctly presented by the speakers and reflected in the media reporting.  For the easy reference of readers of this report, copy of the full script of the China Daily’s article on the subject is at Appendix 1.  The video script of the Phoenix TV Channel on the subject can be accessed through this link: http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/detail_2012_12/27/20560185_0.shtml.  Some pictures taken on the occasion are also attached.

What Next

13.      No doubt promotion of organ donation is a highly worthwhile project to which Rotarians are expected to be fully prepared to make their contributions.  It will bring significant benefits to people in China which is the country ranked second in the number of organ transplant but with a significant shortfall in organs donated vis-a-vis organs needed for transplant.  Successful promotion of knowledge in and advocacy for organ donation in the Mainland will likely lead to significant increase in the number of organ donors and hence the number of organ recipients (the beneficiaries).   

14.     D3450 will soon initiate programs and activities through which Rotary Clubs in Hong Kong and Macau will be able to contribute to the areas of work mentioned above.  The views of Rotary Clubs will be consulted in drawing up the programs and planning the activities.  Committees for overseeing the implementation of the project will be set up as necessary and appropriate.

Market design and computer assisted markets: video of my talk at the Simons Institute at Berkeley

Market Design and Computer-Assisted Markets: An Economist's Perspective

Here is the video of a talk I gave at Berkeley. (I can't figure out how to embed this one, for some reason.)

Published on Jun 14, 2013

Alvin Roth, Stanford University
Symposium on Visions of the Theory of Computing, May 31, 2013, hosted by the Simons Institute for the Theory of Computing at UC Berkeley.

Update: here is the embedded video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wvG5b2gmk70

Open software as a way to find programmers

The NY Times has an article that focuses on the company Gild and how they go headhunting among the reputational rankings on coder sites: How Big Data Is Playing Recruiter for Specialized Workers

"Gild is not the only company now scouring for information. TalentBin, another San Francisco start-up firm, searches the Internet for talented programmers, trawling sites where they gather, collecting “data exhaust,” according to the company Web site, and creating lists of potential hires for employers. Another competitor is RemarkableHire, which assesses a person’s talents by looking at how his or her online contributions are rated by others.

"And there’s Entelo, which tries to figure out who might be looking for a job before they even start their exploration. According to its Web site, the company uses more than 70 variables to find indications of possible career change, such as how someone presents herself on social sites. The Web site reads: “We crunch the data so you don’t have to.”

Algorithmics Of Matching Under Preferences by David Manlove

A new book on matching, from a computer science perspective:

Algorithmics Of Matching Under Preferences

Manlove, D. (2013) Algorithmics Of Matching Under Preferences. Series: Theoretical Computer Science . World Scientific Publishing. ISBN 9789814425247

Publisher's URL: http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/pdf/10.1142/9789814425254_fmatter

Abstract

A new book by Dr David Manlove of the School of Computing Science has recently been published by World Scientific as part of their Series on Theoretical Computer Science. This book, called “Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences”, deals with algorithms and complexity issues surrounding the matching of agents to one another when preferences are involved. For example, in several countries, centralised matching schemes handle the annual allocation of intending junior doctors to hospitals based on their preferences over one another. Efficient algorithms required to solve the underlying theoretical matching problems. Similar examples arise in the allocation of pupils to schools, students to projects, kidney patients to donors, and so on. The book surveys algorithmic results for a range of matching problems involving preferences, with practical applications areas including those mentioned above. It covers the classical Stable Marriage, Hospitals/Residents and Stable Roommates problems, where so-called stable matchings are sought, thereby providing an update to “The Stable Marriage problem, Structure and Algorithms”, by Dan Gusfield and Rob Irving, published by MIT Press in 1989. It also extends the coverage to the House Allocation problem, where stability is no longer the key requirement for a matching, and other definitions of optimality hold. This book builds on the author’s prior research in this area, and also his practical experience of developing, with colleagues including Rob Irving and Gregg O’Malley, algorithms for matching kidney patients to donors in the UK (collaborating with NHS Blood and Transplant), for assigning medical students to hospitals in Scotland (in collaboration with NHS Education for Scotland), and for allocating students to elective courses and projects (within the Schools of Medicine and Computing Science at the University of Glasgow, respectively). The book is also timely, as the research area recently came to the forefront in 2012 following the award of the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences to Alvin Roth and Lloyd Shapley, two leading contributors to the field of matching theory and its application in practical settings, whose work is described in detail throughout the book. A Foreword is contributed by Kurt Mehlhorn of Max-Planck Institut fur Informatik, Saarbrucken, who wrote: “This book covers the research area in its full breadth and beauty. Written by one of the foremost experts in the area, it is a timely update to “The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms” (D. Gusfield and R.W. Irving, 1989). This book will be required reading for anybody working on the subject; it has a good chance of becoming a classic.”

Chinese auctions of auto registrations, and the market for cars in China

To keep down congestion in big cities, Chinese authorities limit who can drive, either by lottery or by auction.  Here's a story suggesting that the high price of driving drives inexpensive cars out of the market:
In China, the license plates can cost more than the car


"Shanghai’s busy streets teem with Buicks, Fords, Volkswagens, and Toyotas. More than 9 out of 10 cars in the world’s most populous city are made by foreign companies, and it’s not just a reflection of mainlanders’ preference for Western design. Some local automakers say the city’s license plate auctions are responsible for their weak sales. Shanghai is one of four Chinese cities that limit car purchases by imposing quotas on registrations. The prices paid at Shanghai’s license auctions in recent months—90,000 yuan ($14,530)—have exceeded the cost of many entry-level cars, the stronghold of Chinese brands such as Chery, Geely, and Great Wall. While residents with modest incomes may be able to afford an inexpensive car, the registration cost is often beyond their reach. “Whenever there’s a restriction of new car purchases through the quota system, there is always a big impact on lower-price cars like the ones we make,” says Lawrence Ang, executive director of Geely Automobile Holdings (175), whose Panda minicar sells for 37,800 yuan.

"After Beijing (pop. 21 million) introduced a license plate lottery in January 2011, the combined share of Chinese brands sold there plunged by more than half, to 9.7 percent for the year, according to researcher IHS Automotive. In Shanghai, which began auctioning license plates in 1994, domestic brands made up only 8.9 percent of cars sold in 2011 (the most recent data available), less than a third the level nationwide, IHS reports."

Another long kidney chain: 56 people, 28 transplants

Non-simultaneous chains started by non-directed donors have assumed a large role in American kidney exchange for a number of reasons (on which, see e.g. here, and here...). The average chain isn't too long (about 5 or 6 in some of the exchanges with which Itai Ashlagi and I have been working lately), but the longest chains can be quite long. Here are some reports (a press release, another press release, and a news story) of one of those, organized by the National Kidney Registry, which included 56 people (28 donors and 28 recipients).

Here's an excerpt from the U. Penn release:

"Earlier this month, the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania and the National Kidney Registry, in partnership with 18 transplant centers across the country, successfully completed the second largest kidney exchange in history and the largest to be concluded in under 40 days. Dubbed Chain 221, the swap involved 56 participants (28 donors and 28 recipients).  "

Deceased organ donation by xkcd

http://imgs.xkcd.com/comics/lego.png

UNOS approves new deceased donor allocation rules

OPTN/UNOS Board approves significant revisions to deceased donor kidney allocation policy

Richmond, Va. - The OPTN/UNOS Board of Directors, meeting June 24 and 25, approved substantial amendments to OPTN policy for deceased donor kidney allocation. The policy will maintain access to kidney transplantation for all groups of candidates while seeking to improve outcomes for kidney transplant recipients, increase the years recipients may have a functioning transplant and increase utilization of available kidneys. The implementation date of the policy was not immediately established but is expected to occur in 2014.

"These changes will result in better long-term kidney survival and more balanced waiting times for transplant candidates," said OPTN/UNOS President John Roberts, M.D.

Matching to increase benefit and utilization

More than 96,000 people are currently listed for kidney transplantation nationwide. About 10 percent of kidney candidates die each year while waiting. Because there are not enough kidneys donated to meet the need, it is important to improve benefit by matching recipients according to the potential function of the kidney and ensure as many kidneys as possible are transplanted.

The newly approved policy includes new factors not used in the current policy. Their use is recommended to enhance survival benefit and use of available kidneys.

Existing policy definitions of "standard criteria" and "extended criteria" donors will be replaced with the Kidney Donor Profile Index (KDPI), a clinical formula that classifies donor kidneys based upon how long they are likely to function once transplanted. Kidney transplant professionals already have access to this index as an informational resource.

The policy will also include a clinical formula to estimate the number of years each specific candidate on the waiting list would be likely to benefit from a kidney transplant. This score is called the Estimated Post-transplant Survival formula (EPTS).

Under the new policy, when a kidney donor is entered into the matching system, that individual donor's KDPI score will be considered along with the individual EPTS for compatible candidates. "A limited number of kidneys expected to function the very longest will be considered first for the candidates expected to need them for the longest amount of time," said John Friedewald, M.D., chairman of the OPTN/UNOS Kidney Transplantation Committee.

The policy is expected to increase overall "life-years" (time that recipients retain kidney function after the transplant). It may also reduce recipients' future need for repeat transplants, thus allowing more transplants among candidates awaiting their first opportunity.

The kidney matching process would not change for the majority of kidney transplant candidates unless they receive additional priority based on other considerations addressed below.

Promoting greater utilization

The 15 percent of kidney offers estimated to have the shortest potential length of function based on KDPI score will be offered on a wider geographic basis. Transplant programs may be most likely to consider these offers for candidates who would have a better life expectancy with a timely transplant than they would remaining on dialysis. This feature is expected to increase utilization of donated kidneys currently available for transplant. It may also help minimize differences in local transplant waiting times across different regions of the country.

The policy does not affect the decision-making process between an individual candidate and his or her transplant team regarding kidney offers they would be willing to accept for a transplant. The use of KDPI will provide the candidate and transplant team a clearer understanding of the potential function of the kidney to allow for more informed treatment decisions.

Waiting time calculation

As in the current kidney allocation system, the longer a candidate has waited for a transplant, the more priority he or she will have compared to others who have waited less time.

The current national default policy assigns waiting time when the candidate is listed with a program, even if he or she had begun dialysis or met other criteria for end-stage kidney failure before being listed.

Under the amended policy, once a person is accepted as a transplant candidate, waiting time will be calculated from the date the person first had a GFR score (a standard clinical measure of kidney function) less than or equal to 20 ml/minute, or when the candidate began dialysis or other renal replacement therapy, even if that date preceded the transplant listing.

Access for candidates with biological disadvantages

The revised policy will enhance access to transplantation for candidates with biological disadvantages including less common blood types and/or high immune system sensitivity.

The policy will facilitate kidney offers from donors with certain subtypes of blood type A for transplant candidates with blood type B. Some type B candidates are compatible with donors who have these specific subtypes.

The policy also creates a sliding scale of additional priority for candidates with an immune system sensitivity, measured in a percentage using a calculated panel reactive antibody (CPRA) score, beginning at 20 percent. Since extremely highly sensitized candidates (CPRA score of 98 percent or higher) have very few opportunities for a compatible transplant, they would receive higher proportional priority than those with more moderate sensitization levels.

Additional considerations

Upon implementation of the policy, local organ allocation areas will no longer owe "payback" kidney debts when a transplant center accepts a well-matched kidney offer from a different local donation service area. Research has not shown any definable benefit in recipient outcomes from payback offers.

A number of alternate kidney allocation systems currently operated in different local areas of the country will also end upon policy implementation. Many of these local systems were intended to study allocation methods now incorporated into the national policy proposal.