Scott Kominers on designing matching markets for diversity

Scott Kominers, who finished his Ph.D. in 2011, is on the market this year after a very productive two year postdoc at Chicago.

He has written a lot of papers, many on the frontiers of matching and market design. The one he has designated as his primary  job market paper, joint with Tayfun Sonmez, is Designing for Diversity in Matching.

The idea is that when a school has many places, some intended to facilitate the enrollment of different kinds of students, then a deferred acceptance algorithm can be implemented in a nuanced way, in which different positions may express different preferences. It turns out that this can make a big difference in how slots are filled.

"Abstract: To encourage diversity, schools often "reserve" some slots for students of specific types. Students only care about their school assignments and contractual terms like tuition, and hence are indifferent among slots within a school. Because these indifferences can be resolved in multiple ways, they present an opportunity for novel market design.

"We introduce a two-sided, many-to-one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches, which may have multiple slots available to accept contracts. Each slot has its own linear priority order over contracts; a branch chooses contracts by filling its slots sequentially. We demonstrate that in these matching markets with slot-specific priorities, branches' choice functions may not satisfy the substitutability conditions typically crucial for matching with contracts. Despite this complication, we are able to show that stable outcomes exist in this framework and can be found by a cumulative offer mechanism that is strategy-proof and respects unambiguous improvements in priority. Our results provide insight into the design of transparent affirmative action matching mechanisms, and show the value of a seemingly ad hoc administrative decision in the United States Military Academy's branch-of-choice program."

Scott's work is well worth following, and he's on the market, so you could hire him this year.

Dr. Joseph E. Murray, who won a Nobel for the first kidney transplant, RIP

Nobel winner Dr. Joseph Murray, famous for first successful kidney transplant dies in Boston

See my earlier posts about Dr. Murray and the first kidney transplant,

update: here's a good obit in the NY Times:Joseph E. Murray, Transplant Doctor and Nobel Prize Winner, Dies at 93

"Dr. Joseph E. Murray, who opened a new era of medicine with the first successful human organ transplant, died on Monday. He was 93 and lived in Wellesley and Edgartown, Mass."

Stephanie Hurder on Occupation Choice, Spouse Choice, and Family Labor Supply

What is the most important problem facing young people in modern economies? Maybe it is navigating the joint processes of choosing a career and choosing and being chosen by a spouse. This is the topic that Stephanie Hurder has chosen for her job market paper: An Integrated Model of Occupation Choice, Spouse Choice, and Family Labor Supply

(If that sounds like an ambitious title, it actually doesn't do full justice to the scope of Stephanie's work, which extends to fertility decisions...)

"Abstract:  I present an integrated model of occupation choice, spouse choice, family labor supply, and fertility that unifies an extensive empirical literature on career and family and provides predictions on the relationship among career, family, and marriage market outcomes. Two key assumptions of the model are that occupations differ both in wages and in an amenity termed flexibility, and that children require parental time that has no market substitute. Occupations with high costs of flexibility, modeled as a nonlinearity in wages, have a lower fraction of women, less positive assortative mating on earnings, and lower fertility among dual-career couples. Costly flexibility may induce high-earning couples to share home production, which rewards agents who are simultaneously high-earning and productive in child care. Empirical evidence is consistent with two main theoretical predictions: dual-career couples in more flexible occupations are more likely to have children, and professional women who achieve “career and family” in inflexible occupations are more likely to have lower-earning husbands or husbands less educated than themselves."
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Stephanie’s work allows us to consider how changes in technology that make child-rearing more efficient (e.g. bottle feeding and disposable diapers) also change the labor supply of both men and women, and lead to demand for more family friendly work schedules. It also allows us to consider how these kinds of changes in women’s career aspirations and opportunities may change the demand for husbands who can efficiently produce at home as well as at work, as it changes the marriage market for women with demanding careers.

Stephanie is on the market, so you could hire her this year.

Four Harvard students on the economics job market this year (2012-13)

Moving between universities isn't a simple thing: although I'm no longer at Harvard, I'll be helping four Harvard students go on the market this year.

Postdoctoral positions seem to be playing a larger role in the economics job market than they used to; one of the four (Scott Kominers) is going on the market after completing a two year postdoc. Another student of mine (Alex Peysakhovich) is defending this semester but taking a postdoc and planning to go on the general market next year.

On the market this year are Nikhil Agarwal, Stephanie Hurder, Scott Kominers, and Johanna Mollerstrom 

I hope to post a blog about each of them in the coming days (as I did for my students last year), although this year I am busier and later. (Perhaps I'll be able to post a bit about being busy in the next few weeks as well.)  But time and the tide and the job market wait for no man, so keep an eye out for posts on these students.

I'll update this post with links to subsequent posts on these folks.
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Stephanie Hurder on Occupation Choice, Spouse Choice, and Family Labor Supply

Scott Kominers on designing matching markets for diversity

Nikhil Agarwal investigates the medical match (and school choice)

Johanna Mollerstrom on Quotas and Cooperation
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update: and here's where they went--

Update on those Four Harvard students on the economics job market this year (2012-13)

Anti-economics (If Michael Sandel Ruled the World)

If I ruled the world: Michael Sandel

The first sentence of the first paragraph: "If I ruled the world, I would rewrite the economics textbooks."

The first sentence of the second paragraph: "Consider the case for a free market in human organs—kidneys, for example."

Economics is important...sounds like someone should study it...

A philosopher looks at repugnant markets

The Dutch philosopher/economist Ingrid Robeyns writes about Roth and Satz on repugnant/noxious markets

She writes that "economists would benefit from explicitly introducing values in their analysis of repugnant markets (and markets in general)," and holds up the work of Debra Satz as a good example of how to go about this.


(Here are my previous posts related to the work of my now-colleague Debra Satz.)

Happy Thanksgiving (and kidney exchange)

A very happy Thanksgiving to all who read this:)

I got the following very informative greeting (sort of a year-end letter and report) from my friends at the Alliance for Paired Donation. Among the exciting things going on there is an attempt to design a new financial architecture for kidney exchange.

surrogacy

Here are three NPR stories on surrogacy, highlighting some of the legal issues around it.

http://www.npr.org/2012/04/13/150498711/surrogacy-aides-spring-from-murky-legal-waters

http://www.npr.org/2012/04/13/150563803/ties-that-bind-when-surrogate-meets-mom-to-be

http://www.npr.org/2012/04/14/150586618/legal-debate-over-surrogacy-asks-who-is-a-parent

HT: Steve Leider

Breast milk exchange?

Ben Greiner writes:

This might be an interesting upcoming story on repugnance: Due to the general positive effects, but also the social pressure to breast feed, there seems to be a developing exchange market for breast milk. For example there are organizations like

http://worldmilksharing.net

or

http://www.hm4hb.net

or

http://www.eatsonfeets.org

who actively promote breast milk sharing, in particular also with strangers over the internet and/or facebook.

However, in particular in the U.S. mothers are starting to ask for money in exchange for breast milk. There also seem to be stories about some mothers diluting their breast milk with water to make more money out of them. Another issue is hygiene and sterilization.

So I guess in short or long there will be a discussion about whether it is ok to share or even sell breast milk, and if trade is allowed, about how to regulate this trade given baby safety risks etc.

Game theory and differential privacy

Here's a lecture on game theory and differential privacy, by Aaron Roth, an up and coming computer scientist whose work I've followed for a long time

DIMACS Tutorials - Oct 24, 2012: Aaron Roth - Game Theory and Differential Privacy

State laws against price gouging

Michael Giberson provides this list:

State	Year	Notes
Alabama	1996	Code of Ala. § 8-31-1 thru § 8-31-6. LINK Alabama law; Any commodity or rental facility.
Arkansas	1997	A.C.A. § 4-88-301 – 4-88-305.
California	1994	Cal. Pen. Code § 396.
Connecticut	1986	Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-230.
District of Columbia	2007	D.C. Code § 28-4101 thru 28-4102.
Florida	1992	Fla. Stat. § 501.160.
Georgia	1995	O.C.G.A. § 10-1-393.4.
Hawaii	1983	Haw. Rev. Stat. § 209-9
Idaho	2002	Idaho Code § 48-603; Food, fuel, pharmaceuticals, water.
Illinois	2005	Ill. Admin. Code tit. 14, §§ 465.10 thru 465.30.
Indiana	2002	Ind. Code §§ 4-6-9.1-1 thru 4-6-9.1-7; Fuel.
Iowa	1993	61 IAC 31.1(714); Merchandise needed by victims of disasters.
Kansas	2002	K.S.A. § 50-6,106; Any necessary property or service.
Kentucky	2004	Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.  § 367.374.
Louisiana	1993	La. R.S. 29:732 LINK Louisiana law.
Maine	2006	10 M.R.S.A. § 1105.
Massachusetts	1990	Md. Reg. Code tit. 940, § 3.18; Petroleum products only.
Michigan	*	Mich. Stat. Ann. § 445.903(1)(z); General consumer code provisions not limited to emergencies.
Mississippi	1986	Miss. Code Ann. § 75-24-25(2).
Missouri	1994	15 CSR § 60-8.030; Necessities.
New Jersey	2001	N.J.S.A. §§ 56:8-107 to 8:109; LINK New Jersey law; Necessities.
New York	1979	NY Gen Bus §396-r.
North Carolina	2003	N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-38; LINK North Carolina law.
Oklahoma	1999	15 OK St. §§ 777.1 thru 777.5.
Oregon	2007	ORS 401.960 thru 401.970; LINK Oregon law; Essential consumer goods and services.
Pennsylvania	2006	Link Pennsylvania law.
Rhode Island	2012	Rhode Island General Laws §30-15-19; Essential commodities including home heating fuels, motor fuels, food and water.
South Carolina	2002	SC Code 39-5-145.
Tennessee	2002	TCA Title 47 Chapter 18 Part 51; LINK Tennesee Law.
Texas	1995	Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.46(b)(27) LINK Texas law; Necessities.
Utah	2005	Utah Code § 13-41-101 thru 13-41-202. Link Utah law; Retail goods and services.
Vermont	2006	9 V.S.A. § 2461d; LINK Vermont law; Petroleum or heating fuel product only.
Virginia	2004	Va. Code §§ 59.1-525 et seq., LINK Virginia law; Any necessary goods and services.
West Virginia	2002	W.V. Code § 46A-6J-1
Wisconsin	2006	Wisc. ATCP Ch. 106; Link Wisconsin law.
		List updated November 3, 2012 by Michael Giberson. Please see list of resources below for useful links on price gouging. (http://knowledgeproblem.com/2012/11/03/list-of-price-gouging-laws/

Organ harvesting and Chinese-Israeli diplomacy

How Israel and China got into a diplomatic row over Knesset members and organ harvesting: Chinese embassy demands clarifications from Jerusalem after report on the settler radio station with the headline 'Israeli MKs to the UN: Investigate China’s organ harvest.'

Signing petitions without reading them can cause diplomatic problems (or maybe claiming not to have read them is a diplomatic solution).

Israel Radio: Douglas Goldstein interviews Bob Aumann about 2012 Economics Nobel

Bob Aumann is interviewed on Israel Radio, and talks about the 2012 Nobel Memorial Prize in economics.

"What is pairwise matching, and how does it affect our decisions in life, such as who we marry or where we study? Nobel Prize winner Robert Aumann explains the meaning of pairwise matching, which was the subject that brought the current winners, Alvin Roth and Lloyd Shapley, their prize."

Economic Science Association conference in Tucson, Nov 15-17

The North American regional conference will be held again in Tucson this year,from Thursday evening November 15 (reception) through Saturday 6:00p.m. November 17 (but there's a good chance that it will move in the future, as none of the current organizers are presently located in Tucson...)

The keynote speakers will be Ulrike Malmendier and Guillaume Frechette.

And "Four pioneers of experimental economics (John Kagel, Charles Plott, Reinhard Selten, and Vernon Smith) will offer their perspectives on how the field developed and where it should be headed."

Matching in the EU: Market Failures and Solutions

The Bellaterra Campus of the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona is the center of matching and market design this week, with two conferences.

November 15: 4th Workshop of Matching-in-Practice:

Scientific Comittee: Estelle Cantillon (ECARES), Antonio Miralles (UAB-MOVE) and Péter Biro (HAS)

Program: download pdf

For further information: please write at info@movebarcelona.eu This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it

November 16: The European Science Foundation is sponsoring a workshop called

Matching in the EU: Market Failures and Solutions
Convened by: Péter Biró, Estelle Cantillon and Flip Klijn


"The proposed workshop (and future research) is exploratory and novel as it focuses on the frontiers at the interface of matching theory, laboratory experiments, empirical analysis and market design / policy making. The goal is to bring together active researchers from different fields to systematically explore the current European practices in student admissions (primary, secondary, and higher), entry-level professional labour markets, and other matching markets. We aim to find out
- which clearinghouses and decentralized matching markets are at work in the EU;
- what are the economical and social implications of the different policies;
- which problems (if any) are experienced by the matching schemes;
- how market failures can be solved; and
- how cultural differences between different EU countries do or should play a role in the redesign of the matching markets that experience failures."

Dean Rachel Croson

Economist Rachel Croson Named Dean of the UT Arlington College of Business

"Much of Croson’s research has centered on experimental and behavioral economics, investigating how people make economic decisions and how to improve them, she said.

"Those subject areas draw on and contribute to many disciplines, including economics, management, marketing, operations, political science and sociology, and her work has been published in myriad journals. As director of UT Dallas’ Negotiations Center, she connected negotiation scholars with practitioners and business leaders to inform business practice through education and outreach.

"Croson also is the co-editor of a forthcoming book, Oxford Handbook of Economic Conflict Resolution, with Gary Bolton, and is currently researching motivations for charitable giving, among other subjects."
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A big mabruk to Dean Rachel Toni Algaze Croson.

Bicker at Princeton

Vikram Rao writes about recent changes in the matching process of students to eating clubs at Princeton:

Professor Roth,

I'm a fan of your blog and recently came across an event that you might find interesting. I studied as an undergrad at Princeton, which is known for its "eating clubs" - similar to frats or sororities, but they are co-ed, serve meals, and function as daytime study and lounge spaces. Anyway, admission to half the eating clubs is by "sign-in" where a lottery occurs if too many students try to sign in. The other half of the clubs have a process called "bicker" - a traditional matching process where prospective members show up for a few days of events and then members discuss and vote on each prospective member.

Recently, a few of the clubs decided to allow prospective members to bicker two clubs instead of one (http://www.dailyprincetonian.com/2012/11/08/31741/). Students rank their clubs and then show up to events for both; they are NOT allowed to indicate equal preference for both clubs (this fact isn't in the article but I know from friends). The interesting situation arises when a student is accepted at both clubs - the matching algorithm will always default to the student's preference for club (so if I get into club A and B and said I preferred B beforehand, I will be placed in B). 

On the face of things, this sounds unremarkable. However, I think this matching market has an interesting wrinkle for students who are admitted to two clubs. 

Following the "bicker" process, prospective members are ranked by each club. Prospective members aren't supposed to find out how they did at bicker, but as you might imagine gossip spreads and the people who were ranked the highest often find out about it. Those who did well feel like they belong and are more excited about the club. 

Given the opportunity to bicker more than one club, I suspect that some students will be indifferent or close to indifferent between two clubs. But they will be forced to rank the two clubs. Following the bicker process, it might turn out that they did much better at their #2 ranked club. But the match will sort them into their #1 ranked club. Given the aforementioned desire to “belong”, it’s possible that this could lead to instability in the match (Student: “Now that I know I did so much better at club C bicker, I wish I ranked it ahead of club D!”). Perhaps a way to solve this is to let students indicate indifference between the two clubs beforehand and then have the algorithm place them in the club that ranked them higher.

This situation seems to differ from say a medical residency or a job where most people probably want their best possible job regardless of how well their application was perceived by those doing the evaluation. With a social group like this, you don’t just want to get in but might also want to feel “wanted” in an ongoing way.