My new address:
Al Roth
Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
(Previous announcement here:)
I'll post market design related news and items about repugnant markets. See also my Stanford profile. I have a general-interest book on market design: Who Gets What--and Why The subtitle is "The new economics of matchmaking and market design."
(2)
A Field Study on Matching with Network Externalities
|
Mariagiovanna
Baccara, AyÅŸe Ä°mrohoroÄŸlu, Alistair J. Wilson and Leeat Yariv
|
We
study the effects of network externalities within a protocol for matching
faculty to offices in a new building. Using web and survey data on faculty's
attributes and choices, we identify the different layers of the social network:
institutional affiliation, coauthorships, and friendships. We quantify the
effects of network externalities on choices and outcomes, disentangle the
layers of the networks, and quantify their relative influence. Finally, we
assess the protocol used from a welfare perspective. Our study suggests the
importance and feasibility of accounting for network externalities in
assignment problems and evaluates techniques that can be employed to this
end. (JEL C78, C93, D62, D85, Z13)
|
(10)
Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate
|
Judd
B. Kessler and Alvin E. Roth
|
Organ
donations from deceased donors provide the majority of transplanted organs in
the United States, and one deceased donor can save numerous lives by
providing multiple organs. Nevertheless, most Americans are not registered
organ donors despite the relative ease of becoming one. We study in the
laboratory an experimental game modeled on the decision to register as an
organ donor and investigate how changes in the management of organ waiting
lists might impact donations. We find that an organ allocation policy giving
priority on waiting lists to those who previously registered as donors has a
significant positive impact on registration. (JEL C91, D64, I11)
|
(17)
The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation
at Harvard
|
Eric
Budish and Estelle Cantillon
|
We
use theory and field data to study the draft mechanism used to allocate
courses at Harvard Business School. We show that the draft is manipulable in
theory, manipulated in practice, and that these manipulations cause
significant welfare loss. Nevertheless, we find that welfare is higher than
under its widely studied strategyproof alternative. We identify a new link
between fairness and welfare that explains why the draft performs well
despite the costs of strategic behavior, and then design a new draft that
reduces these costs. We draw several broader lessons for market design,
regarding Pareto efficiency, fairness, and strategyproofness. (JEL D63, D82,
I23)
|
Justin
M. Rao and David H. Reiley
|
"We
estimate that American firms and consumers experience costs of almost $20
billion annually due to spam. Our figure is more conservative than the $50
billion figure often cited by other authors, and we also note that the figure
would be much higher if it were not for private investment in anti-spam
technology by firms, which we detail further on. Based on the work of crafty
computer scientists who have infiltrated and monitored spammers' activity, we
estimate that spammers and spam-advertised merchants collect gross worldwide
revenues on the order of $200 million per year. Thus, the "externality
ratio" of external costs to internal benefits for spam is around 100:1.
In this paper, we start by describing the history of the market for spam,
highlighting the strategic cat-and-mouse game between spammers and email
providers. We discuss how th e market structure for spamming has evolved from
a diffuse network of independent spammers running their own online stores to
a highly specialized industry featuring a well-organized network of
merchants, spam distributors (botnets), and spammers (or
"advertisers"). We then put the spam market's externality ratio of
100 into context by comparing it to other activities with negative externalities.
Lastly, we evaluate various policy proposals designed to solve the spam
problem, cautioning that these proposals may err in assuming away the
spammers' ability to adapt."
|