Today is the third Thursday in March, Match Day for young doctors seeking their first job through the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP).
Here is the NRMP press release. Almost 30,000 applicants (11,000 from foreign medical schools) sought the 22,427 first year positions available in this year's match. About 95% of the available positions were filled through the match, the rest are filled in a post-match "scramble." (The organization of the scramble is under discussion, and here's the WSJ's account of it.)
The NY Times covers match day with a story and a picture: A Medical Student’s Rite of Passage . As in many discussions of labor markets, the author finds that many medical students wish they had more control over where they are going. Some of them attribute this loss of control to the match process, while others know something about how the medical market worked before the match. (Among the online comments on the story is this one:
"I wish they did something like this for law students. The job experiences and training available to new lawyers are extremely uneven. Plus it is on the law student to secure that first job on the open market, with no real guarantees of getting hired."
There's a new book by Brian Eule, Match Day: One Day and One Dramatic Year in the Lives of Three New Doctors, that follows three women through the match, one of them now his wife. I haven't seen the book yet, but I talked to him a number of times while he was writing it, and he once gamely sat through a lecture in my Market Design class.
788 couples went through the match this year as couples (some others may go through without identifying themselves that way, and the NY Times story remarks that some were disappointed not to have gotten jobs together). For the technically inclined, here's an account of how the new couples algorithm works to allow couples to express their preferences over pairs of jobs (and of the design process that led to the new match algorithm that's been in use since 1998):
Roth, A. E. and Elliott Peranson, "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design," American Economic Review, 89, 4, September, 1999, 748-780.
Thursday, March 19, 2009
Black market kidney sales in the Phillipines
Last Friday I was part of a panel at Harvard at the National Undergraduate Bioethics Conference , at which a panel consisting of me, Frank Delmonico, and Nir Eyal, and moderated by Dan Brock, was asked to consider the question "Should willing sellers be permitted to sell body parts to willing buyers?".
Among other things, I defended the point that the performance of a potentially regulated legal market can’t be well predicted from the performance of unregulated, illegal markets. Frank largely disagrees with that, and expects that any regulation short of attempting to ban organ markets outright will inevitably deteriorate into the kinds of illegal markets we see in some parts of the developing world. Regardless, it's good to pay attention to the black and grey markets around the world. Here's an account of such a market in the Phillipines: No Turning Back. Some aspects of this market are quite black (the subject of the story is threatened with retribution if he changes his mind once medical tests have been paid for), and some are grey (quite a few medical tests are done, although perhaps not to the standard we would like), and some are not even so grey (the subject of the story is paid, and gets a motor vehicle and a house out of it, and would do it again).
"Lito, 23, a resident of Gumaca, Quezon, who sold one of his kidneys, knew the stakes just got higher when he was told before the transplant procedure that he could not back out anymore. A friend of his decided to pull-out. “They are hunting him down. They want to have him killed." ... "On February 14, 2007, the friend accompanied Lito to a house in Barangay Tikalan, a village in San Juan, Batangas where a man named “Junior” who was referred to by his men as the “manager,” housed other would-be donors.“Junior” is also an organ donor. The following day, Lito and nine others were brought to a private hospital laboratory in front of the National Kidney and Transplant Institute (NKTI) where many people were having their blood samples taken. They also underwent a number of tests. X-rays were also taken. Junior paid for the procedures. " ... "For over a month after the first tests, Lito shuttled back and forth from Batangas to Metro Manila in order to undergo various tests in different hospitals. In each of the trips, he was accompanied by either “Junior” or one of his men. The purpose, he was told, was to look for a match. ... "Back home in Gumaca, Lito found that money has a way of slipping easily between one’s fingers. In his case, it lasted only for six months. Almost half of the amount he got from selling his kidney—about P40,000—went to the payment of debts. With the rest of the money he was able to buy a tricycle and a small dwelling. Months later, however, he had to pawn the tricycle to pay for his daughter’s hospitalization. Lito does not regret going through the operation. “I was in dire straits,” he explained. If he did not go through it, he said, he would not have been able to pay his debts. Besides, he said, he did it for his family’s sake. “I am ready to give up my life, for the sake of my family.” "
Wednesday, March 18, 2009
Market for information
Mostly we think it is good for information to be freely available, but one place where we often do not is in the adversarial system of trial by jury. The rules of evidence permit judges to decide what evidence is admissable, and what is not. I have served on juries in which we were instructed not to read news accounts of the trial we were part of. Sometimes juries are sequestered, so that they cannot have much contact with the outside world. That has all gotten a little harder to enforce, now that everyone has Google in their pocket: Mistrial by iPhone: Juries’ Web Research Upends Trials .
"Last week, a juror in a big federal drug trial in Florida admitted to the judge that he had been doing research on the case on the Internet, directly violating the judge’s instructions and centuries of legal rules. But when the judge questioned the rest of the jury, he got an even bigger shock.
Eight other jurors had been doing the same thing. The federal judge, William J. Zloch, had no choice but to declare a mistrial, wasting eight weeks of work by federal prosecutors and defense lawyers."
"Last week, a juror in a big federal drug trial in Florida admitted to the judge that he had been doing research on the case on the Internet, directly violating the judge’s instructions and centuries of legal rules. But when the judge questioned the rest of the jury, he got an even bigger shock.
Eight other jurors had been doing the same thing. The federal judge, William J. Zloch, had no choice but to declare a mistrial, wasting eight weeks of work by federal prosecutors and defense lawyers."
Tuesday, March 17, 2009
Patents Versus Markets: a Market Design Experiment
The March 16 issue of Science contains a laboratory experiment concerned with a market design question (subscription required): Promoting Intellectual Discovery: Patents Versus Markets by Debrah Meloso, Jernej Copic, and Peter Bossaerts.
(Science is one of those journals with a pre-publication news embargo designed to promote press coverage; here is the corresponding Cal Tech press release (HT to Alex Tabarrok at MR).
While a lot of market design work is prompted by very specific markets, this paper deals with a more abstract question: could a market system without patents do as well as a patent system in encouraging innovation, if innovators could use their private information to make investments that would have unusually high returns?
Here is the abstract:
"Because they provide exclusive property rights, patents are generally considered to be an effective way to promote intellectual discovery. Here, we propose a different compensation scheme, in which everyone holds shares in the components of potential discoveries and can trade those
shares in an anonymous market. In it, incentives to invent are indirect, through changes in share prices. In a series of experiments, we used the knapsack problem (in which participants have to determine the most valuable subset of objects that can fit in a knapsack of fixed volume) as a
typical representation of intellectual discovery problems. We found that our “markets system” performed better than the patent system."
The key experimental treatment is described thus:
"In the markets system, participants were given an equal number of shares in each of the items of the particular KP, as well as cash. They could trade these shares in an anonymous, electronic exchange platform during a preset amount of time (840 s). The allowed time was double that of the prize system to compensate for the fact that subjects needed to perform two tasks: to solve the KP and to trade (to exploit the knowledge they gained from solving the KP). The platform was organized as a continuous double-sided open book (Fig. 1B), like most purely electronic stock markets in the world. The accumulation of orders generated the first transactions after about 100 s. Thereafter, trading remained brisk in virtually all markets (Fig. 1C). After markets closed, each share in an item that was in the optimal solution paid a liquidating dividend of $1; shares corresponding to items not in the optimal solution expired worthless."
The main results:
"The correct solution was found under the markets system whenever this was the case under the prize system. Therefore, if the concern is to design a system that produces the optimal solution, the markets and prize systems are equivalent. In one important respect, however, the markets system outperformed: Significantly more participants reported the correct solution than under the prize system (Fig. 2A). For both systems, the fraction of participants who reported the correct solution declined with problem difficulty (Fig. 2B). The fraction may seem to decline faster for the markets treatment, but the difference in slopes was not significant. An outlier influenced the fits: Nobody ever solved the most difficult problem (difficulty = 6). It was solved in follow-up experiments [ran to check for robustness (11)], but only with the markets system, further corroborating its superiority.
"In the prize system, only the first to find the optimal solution is compensated, which may discourage many from spending effort. In the markets system, everyone could be compensated in principle, which may be sufficient to explain why more participants find the optimal solution. Alternatively, prices may convey information that facilitates problem solving for participants who would never find the optimal knapsack on their own. Figure 3A shows that prices indeed do provide a potential channel of communication: Prices of shares of items that were part of the optimal knapsack (“in” items) tended to be higher than shares of items that were not part of it (“out” items); the mean transaction price of in items was significantly higher than that of out items (P < 0.01)."
HT Joshua Gans of Core Economics
(Science is one of those journals with a pre-publication news embargo designed to promote press coverage; here is the corresponding Cal Tech press release (HT to Alex Tabarrok at MR).
While a lot of market design work is prompted by very specific markets, this paper deals with a more abstract question: could a market system without patents do as well as a patent system in encouraging innovation, if innovators could use their private information to make investments that would have unusually high returns?
Here is the abstract:
"Because they provide exclusive property rights, patents are generally considered to be an effective way to promote intellectual discovery. Here, we propose a different compensation scheme, in which everyone holds shares in the components of potential discoveries and can trade those
shares in an anonymous market. In it, incentives to invent are indirect, through changes in share prices. In a series of experiments, we used the knapsack problem (in which participants have to determine the most valuable subset of objects that can fit in a knapsack of fixed volume) as a
typical representation of intellectual discovery problems. We found that our “markets system” performed better than the patent system."
The key experimental treatment is described thus:
"In the markets system, participants were given an equal number of shares in each of the items of the particular KP, as well as cash. They could trade these shares in an anonymous, electronic exchange platform during a preset amount of time (840 s). The allowed time was double that of the prize system to compensate for the fact that subjects needed to perform two tasks: to solve the KP and to trade (to exploit the knowledge they gained from solving the KP). The platform was organized as a continuous double-sided open book (Fig. 1B), like most purely electronic stock markets in the world. The accumulation of orders generated the first transactions after about 100 s. Thereafter, trading remained brisk in virtually all markets (Fig. 1C). After markets closed, each share in an item that was in the optimal solution paid a liquidating dividend of $1; shares corresponding to items not in the optimal solution expired worthless."
The main results:
"The correct solution was found under the markets system whenever this was the case under the prize system. Therefore, if the concern is to design a system that produces the optimal solution, the markets and prize systems are equivalent. In one important respect, however, the markets system outperformed: Significantly more participants reported the correct solution than under the prize system (Fig. 2A). For both systems, the fraction of participants who reported the correct solution declined with problem difficulty (Fig. 2B). The fraction may seem to decline faster for the markets treatment, but the difference in slopes was not significant. An outlier influenced the fits: Nobody ever solved the most difficult problem (difficulty = 6). It was solved in follow-up experiments [ran to check for robustness (11)], but only with the markets system, further corroborating its superiority.
"In the prize system, only the first to find the optimal solution is compensated, which may discourage many from spending effort. In the markets system, everyone could be compensated in principle, which may be sufficient to explain why more participants find the optimal solution. Alternatively, prices may convey information that facilitates problem solving for participants who would never find the optimal knapsack on their own. Figure 3A shows that prices indeed do provide a potential channel of communication: Prices of shares of items that were part of the optimal knapsack (“in” items) tended to be higher than shares of items that were not part of it (“out” items); the mean transaction price of in items was significantly higher than that of out items (P < 0.01)."
HT Joshua Gans of Core Economics
Monday, March 16, 2009
The marketplace for peer reviewed economics
Journals are the clearinghouses of academic economics, providing the proximate demand for the articles that economists supply. In my previous post (Science journals and science journalism) I discussed the fact that economics journals have a much longer delay between submission and publication than journals in science and medicine. Some of this has to do with the reviewing process.
Preston McAfee, a veteran editor, has written a wise and not so funny* article about the editing process, based on his long experience at the AER and, more recently, Economic Inquiry (where he initiated a policy of allowing authors to opt for an accept or reject decision without revision).
I recommend the article, even though it is difficult to summarize. It is not an apologia; he says:
"The way economists operate journals is perhaps the most inefficient operation I encounter on a regular basis."
*He also says "There is a lot of heartbreak in journal editing since most of the job is rejecting papers. If you are looking for amusing anecdotes, subscribe to Readers’ Digest."
Preston McAfee, a veteran editor, has written a wise and not so funny* article about the editing process, based on his long experience at the AER and, more recently, Economic Inquiry (where he initiated a policy of allowing authors to opt for an accept or reject decision without revision).
I recommend the article, even though it is difficult to summarize. It is not an apologia; he says:
"The way economists operate journals is perhaps the most inefficient operation I encounter on a regular basis."
*He also says "There is a lot of heartbreak in journal editing since most of the job is rejecting papers. If you are looking for amusing anecdotes, subscribe to Readers’ Digest."
Sunday, March 15, 2009
Science journals and science journalism
After my recent post The production of news: The NEJM news cycle about the effects of the New England Journal of Medicine's news embargo policy on the production of news stories, I corresponded with two of the young leaders in the new economics of media, Matt Gentzkow and Jesse Shapiro. They pointed out that, aside from increasing the number of stories, an embargo might increase their quality, by preventing a "race to the bottom" in which the shortest, least well reported stories can come out before more carefully researched stories. With an embargo, reporters don't have an incentive to rush to publish, they know they can work on their story up until the embargo expires.
A separate issue was raised in an article Matt pointed me to, one that I had already noticed sharply distinguishes scientific journals like the NEJM and Science, which publish short articles weekly, from journals like the ones economists normally publish in, which publish longer articles, much less frequently, and with much longer delay. In Ingelfinger, Embargoes, and Other Controls on the Dissemination of Science News, Vincent Kiernan explores not only the effect of embargos, but also of the "Ingelfinger rule" (named after a former NEJM editor), which is that NEJM, Science, etc. won't publish an article that has in any substantial way been made available before publication. So, in particular, papers appearing in those journals can't first be posted on the web as working papers.
This is in stark contrast to the way economists work; the usual practice these days for an economist who finishes a paper is to put it up on the web even before it has been submitted for publication. Economics journals function as the archival sources of papers, not as the place they are first distributed. And this predates the internet; economists have communicated via pre-publication working papers at least since I entered the business, after the invention of the printing press, but before the word processor.
Partly this difference has to do with the speed of publication. A paper accepted by Science or the NEJM will likely appear not too many months after it has been submitted, while the process at most economics journals takes well over a year (and two is not so unusual). As a result, the weekly science journals seek to be a combination of science journals and science news sources, in a way that economics journals do not.
The difference between the two was first brought home to me in 1990, when I received a call from the then editor of Science, which turned into a proposal that I write an article for them summarizing work I had done studying various labor markets for new doctors. I had circulated a working paper on that subject in 1989, and at the time of the phone call from Science it was forthcoming in the American Economic Review, in 1991. I told the editor of Science that I would have to check with the AER, but that if I wrote the article, it would state clearly that it was a summary of the longer AER article. He replied that he would like to have the article, provided the short summary in Science came out before the original article in the AER.
I called Orley Ashenfelter, who was then the editor of the AER, and he said something very close to "go ahead and give Science the summary, a five page paper can't scoop a twenty five page paper." His feeling was that as long as the AER had the definitive version, there was no problem. And that is how I came to have two papers on that subject, published out of order, in
Roth, A.E., "New Physicians: A Natural Experiment in Market Organization," Science, 250, 1990, 1524-1528.
and
Roth, A.E., "A Natural Experiment in the Organization of Entry Level Labor Markets: Regional Markets for New Physicians and Surgeons in the U.K.," American Economic Review, Vol. 81, June 1991, 415-440.
(These papers were posted to the web so long ago that they are html versions made from the original text files, rather than pdf versions of the actual publications.)
A separate issue was raised in an article Matt pointed me to, one that I had already noticed sharply distinguishes scientific journals like the NEJM and Science, which publish short articles weekly, from journals like the ones economists normally publish in, which publish longer articles, much less frequently, and with much longer delay. In Ingelfinger, Embargoes, and Other Controls on the Dissemination of Science News, Vincent Kiernan explores not only the effect of embargos, but also of the "Ingelfinger rule" (named after a former NEJM editor), which is that NEJM, Science, etc. won't publish an article that has in any substantial way been made available before publication. So, in particular, papers appearing in those journals can't first be posted on the web as working papers.
This is in stark contrast to the way economists work; the usual practice these days for an economist who finishes a paper is to put it up on the web even before it has been submitted for publication. Economics journals function as the archival sources of papers, not as the place they are first distributed. And this predates the internet; economists have communicated via pre-publication working papers at least since I entered the business, after the invention of the printing press, but before the word processor.
Partly this difference has to do with the speed of publication. A paper accepted by Science or the NEJM will likely appear not too many months after it has been submitted, while the process at most economics journals takes well over a year (and two is not so unusual). As a result, the weekly science journals seek to be a combination of science journals and science news sources, in a way that economics journals do not.
The difference between the two was first brought home to me in 1990, when I received a call from the then editor of Science, which turned into a proposal that I write an article for them summarizing work I had done studying various labor markets for new doctors. I had circulated a working paper on that subject in 1989, and at the time of the phone call from Science it was forthcoming in the American Economic Review, in 1991. I told the editor of Science that I would have to check with the AER, but that if I wrote the article, it would state clearly that it was a summary of the longer AER article. He replied that he would like to have the article, provided the short summary in Science came out before the original article in the AER.
I called Orley Ashenfelter, who was then the editor of the AER, and he said something very close to "go ahead and give Science the summary, a five page paper can't scoop a twenty five page paper." His feeling was that as long as the AER had the definitive version, there was no problem. And that is how I came to have two papers on that subject, published out of order, in
Roth, A.E., "New Physicians: A Natural Experiment in Market Organization," Science, 250, 1990, 1524-1528.
and
Roth, A.E., "A Natural Experiment in the Organization of Entry Level Labor Markets: Regional Markets for New Physicians and Surgeons in the U.K.," American Economic Review, Vol. 81, June 1991, 415-440.
(These papers were posted to the web so long ago that they are html versions made from the original text files, rather than pdf versions of the actual publications.)
Saturday, March 14, 2009
Personalized advertising
As the world wide web is increasingly accessed by mobile devices (equipped with GPS, and used largely by a single individual) the ability to narrowly target advertisements is increasing: Advertisers Get a Trove of Clues in Smartphones .
"Advertisers will pay high rates for the ability to show, for example, ads for a nearby restaurant to someone leaving a Broadway show, especially when coupled with information about the gender, age, finances and interests of the consumer. "
"Applications that use GPS can offer even more specificity, including Loopt, Yelp, Urbanspoon, Where and almost any iPhone application that shows the pop-up box saying it “would like to use your current location.” Several firms are experimenting with a program called AisleCaster that can offer specials based on a person’s exact location in a supermarket aisle or mall.
Advertising systems can track not only the location of the phone, but also that person’s travel pattern: uptown New York to Nob Hill in San Francisco, for instance."
"For now, there are not enough people using smartphones to make it worthwhile for advertisers to use highly specific criteria. But as more people switch to smartphones, that will happen more frequently."
The article also discusses the privacy issue, and whether customers will be "creeped out" by ads that reveal how specifically they have been targeted. (I wonder if people will find it equally creepy to be targeted by a computer from a big database that no human looks at as by a human being at a dinner time call center...)
"Advertisers will pay high rates for the ability to show, for example, ads for a nearby restaurant to someone leaving a Broadway show, especially when coupled with information about the gender, age, finances and interests of the consumer. "
"Applications that use GPS can offer even more specificity, including Loopt, Yelp, Urbanspoon, Where and almost any iPhone application that shows the pop-up box saying it “would like to use your current location.” Several firms are experimenting with a program called AisleCaster that can offer specials based on a person’s exact location in a supermarket aisle or mall.
Advertising systems can track not only the location of the phone, but also that person’s travel pattern: uptown New York to Nob Hill in San Francisco, for instance."
"For now, there are not enough people using smartphones to make it worthwhile for advertisers to use highly specific criteria. But as more people switch to smartphones, that will happen more frequently."
The article also discusses the privacy issue, and whether customers will be "creeped out" by ads that reveal how specifically they have been targeted. (I wonder if people will find it equally creepy to be targeted by a computer from a big database that no human looks at as by a human being at a dinner time call center...)
Friday, March 13, 2009
Costs of unraveling: elementary school basketball players
One of the costs of "unraveling," in which transactions come to be made increasingly early, is that matches are made on the basis of very noisy information. I've posted earlier about the competition by colleges for basketball players (Market for (seventh grade) basketball players ), and a recent story highlights just how noisy those early signals can be: First Impressions Can Create Unrealistic Expectations for Recruits .
"Amid the clamor to find the next basketball wunderkind, the evaluation of sixth graders remains an uncertain pursuit. Francis, who runs the Hoop Scoop recruiting service, said the process involved much guesswork.
The players can stop improving, stop caring or stop growing." (emphasis added: the source of uncertainty is different in different markets:)
"In January, the N.C.A.A.lowered the school year a basketball player was considered a prospect from ninth grade to seventh grade.
Though the change seemed curious, it closed a loophole that had allowed college coaches to gain a recruiting edge by inviting middle school players to private camps. Those middle school prospects are now protected by the N.C.A.A. the same way as high school recruits.
For now, elementary school students are not included in this new rule. An associate commissioner of the Big East, Joseph D’Antonio, the chairman of the N.C.A.A.’s legislative council, hopes there is no need to change that.
“I think the seventh- and eighth-grade endpoint is a place to begin, because that’s where the problem has been identified,” D’Antonio said. “Whether or not we see bylaws in the future that lower the age even further is going to be driven by what the coaching involvement is.”"
HT Muriel Niederle
"Amid the clamor to find the next basketball wunderkind, the evaluation of sixth graders remains an uncertain pursuit. Francis, who runs the Hoop Scoop recruiting service, said the process involved much guesswork.
The players can stop improving, stop caring or stop growing." (emphasis added: the source of uncertainty is different in different markets:)
"In January, the N.C.A.A.lowered the school year a basketball player was considered a prospect from ninth grade to seventh grade.
Though the change seemed curious, it closed a loophole that had allowed college coaches to gain a recruiting edge by inviting middle school players to private camps. Those middle school prospects are now protected by the N.C.A.A. the same way as high school recruits.
For now, elementary school students are not included in this new rule. An associate commissioner of the Big East, Joseph D’Antonio, the chairman of the N.C.A.A.’s legislative council, hopes there is no need to change that.
“I think the seventh- and eighth-grade endpoint is a place to begin, because that’s where the problem has been identified,” D’Antonio said. “Whether or not we see bylaws in the future that lower the age even further is going to be driven by what the coaching involvement is.”"
HT Muriel Niederle
Thursday, March 12, 2009
The production of news: The NEJM news cycle
My previous post was about the recent kidney exchange innovation by the Alliance for Paired Donation, just reported in today's issue of the New England Journal of Medicine. That NEJM immediately attracted some press, and in this post I consider the role that the NEJM's press embargo policy might play in generating news stories about some of the articles they publish.
The press policy of the NEJM is communicated to authors as follows (emphasis added):
"Your Brief Report will appear in the March 12, 2009 issue of the New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM). This information is confidential. There is a press embargo on the contents of the issue until 5:00 PM ET on Wednesday March 11, 2009. On Friday, March 6, 2009 the content of the March 12, 2009 issue will made available to reporters who have agreed to respect our embargo. "
That is, a week before publication, the NEJM makes the forthcoming issue available to reporters who have agreed not to write about it until a specified time the next week.
To better understand how this kind of policy plays out, I asked a public relations person about the NEJM and their policy, and got the following reply:
"...they have a reputation of being one of the best PR machines there is. Their embargo is one of the toughest on the planet as well; reporters and any others who violate it are dead for the rest of their lives in getting information on future NEJM articles. Anyone in the medical writing community knows and fears this."
At 9 pm on March 11, four hours after the embargo ended, here's what a Google news search for "kidney exchange" looked like (note the link to "all 217" news articles):
Kidney-transplant chain broadens donations
Boston Globe - 1 hour ago
Dr. Frank Delmonico of Massachusetts General Hospital, one of the architects of the New England Program for Kidney Exchange, disagreed. ...
New Computer Models Successfully Link Donors And Kidney Transplant ... Science Daily (press release)
Living Kidney Donation Chains May Help More Get Transplants U.S. News & World Report
Chain results in 10 kidney swaps among strangers The Associated Press
Pittsburgh Post Gazette
all 217 news articles »
The first of these articles, in the Globe, was written by a reporter who talked to several of the participants, concentrating on those in Boston (which is where the economists on the team all reside, and also where another kidney exchange program, the New England Program for Kidney Exchange was started). The second (in Science Daily) is a press release issued by Boston College (where my economist colleagues Tayfun Sonmez and Utku Unver both teach). Some of the remaining stories have original content, but many are largely if not completely taken from some of the original reporting and press material. (I like the story that ran in the Washington Post, because it has a slideshow that shows off Mike Rees, the innovative--and apparently good looking--surgeon who is the lead author of the NEJM article, and a figure of emerging importance in the national discussion of kidney exchange).
So...I've written a lot of articles that attract little or no press, and certainly not a flood in a few hours. While kidney exchange is undoubtedly a subject with wider popular appeal than, say, the lattice structure of fixed points, I'm guessing that the NEJM's embargo policy plays at least some role (recall the comment that they are one of the best PR machines...). Here are three hypotheses--one psychological and two economic--about why the embargo might matter.
Hypothesis 1 (behavioral/psychological): telling reporters they can't publish before 5PM Wednesday makes them want to write about the story more...
Hypothesis 2. (coordination equilibrium): telling reporters that no one can publish before 5PM Wednesday reassures them that the time they put into the story won't be wasted, they won't be scooped by someone else who finishes their story earlier.
Hypothesis 3. (common value/winner's curse): in the absence of an embargo, a reporter tempted to try to write the first story might be worried that the absence of previous stories means that the subject isn't as interesting as it looks, won't be picked by editors, etc. To put it another way, whoever writes the first story might be (like the high bidder in a common value auction) the person who thought it was the most interesting, and the fact that no one else agreed how interesting it was might mean that he has overestimated its value. But, when there is an embargo, this kind of negative selection can't be going on; no one else could have published earlier, so the absence of earlier stories isn't a negative signal.
(Blogs, incidentally, seem to work on a different schedule; here are the March 12 takes by Steve Levitt and by Tim Harford on the original story...)
Update: television works on a different schedule still: Mike Rees was interviewed later that evening (March 12) on the CBS Evening News: A Transplant Surgeon Matches 10 Donors With Recipients In The Longest Chain In History
The press policy of the NEJM is communicated to authors as follows (emphasis added):
"Your Brief Report will appear in the March 12, 2009 issue of the New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM). This information is confidential. There is a press embargo on the contents of the issue until 5:00 PM ET on Wednesday March 11, 2009. On Friday, March 6, 2009 the content of the March 12, 2009 issue will made available to reporters who have agreed to respect our embargo. "
That is, a week before publication, the NEJM makes the forthcoming issue available to reporters who have agreed not to write about it until a specified time the next week.
To better understand how this kind of policy plays out, I asked a public relations person about the NEJM and their policy, and got the following reply:
"...they have a reputation of being one of the best PR machines there is. Their embargo is one of the toughest on the planet as well; reporters and any others who violate it are dead for the rest of their lives in getting information on future NEJM articles. Anyone in the medical writing community knows and fears this."
At 9 pm on March 11, four hours after the embargo ended, here's what a Google news search for "kidney exchange" looked like (note the link to "all 217" news articles):
Kidney-transplant chain broadens donations
Boston Globe - 1 hour ago
Dr. Frank Delmonico of Massachusetts General Hospital, one of the architects of the New England Program for Kidney Exchange, disagreed. ...
New Computer Models Successfully Link Donors And Kidney Transplant ... Science Daily (press release)
Living Kidney Donation Chains May Help More Get Transplants U.S. News & World Report
Chain results in 10 kidney swaps among strangers The Associated Press
Pittsburgh Post Gazette
all 217 news articles »
The first of these articles, in the Globe, was written by a reporter who talked to several of the participants, concentrating on those in Boston (which is where the economists on the team all reside, and also where another kidney exchange program, the New England Program for Kidney Exchange was started). The second (in Science Daily) is a press release issued by Boston College (where my economist colleagues Tayfun Sonmez and Utku Unver both teach). Some of the remaining stories have original content, but many are largely if not completely taken from some of the original reporting and press material. (I like the story that ran in the Washington Post, because it has a slideshow that shows off Mike Rees, the innovative--and apparently good looking--surgeon who is the lead author of the NEJM article, and a figure of emerging importance in the national discussion of kidney exchange).
So...I've written a lot of articles that attract little or no press, and certainly not a flood in a few hours. While kidney exchange is undoubtedly a subject with wider popular appeal than, say, the lattice structure of fixed points, I'm guessing that the NEJM's embargo policy plays at least some role (recall the comment that they are one of the best PR machines...). Here are three hypotheses--one psychological and two economic--about why the embargo might matter.
Hypothesis 1 (behavioral/psychological): telling reporters they can't publish before 5PM Wednesday makes them want to write about the story more...
Hypothesis 2. (coordination equilibrium): telling reporters that no one can publish before 5PM Wednesday reassures them that the time they put into the story won't be wasted, they won't be scooped by someone else who finishes their story earlier.
Hypothesis 3. (common value/winner's curse): in the absence of an embargo, a reporter tempted to try to write the first story might be worried that the absence of previous stories means that the subject isn't as interesting as it looks, won't be picked by editors, etc. To put it another way, whoever writes the first story might be (like the high bidder in a common value auction) the person who thought it was the most interesting, and the fact that no one else agreed how interesting it was might mean that he has overestimated its value. But, when there is an embargo, this kind of negative selection can't be going on; no one else could have published earlier, so the absence of earlier stories isn't a negative signal.
(Blogs, incidentally, seem to work on a different schedule; here are the March 12 takes by Steve Levitt and by Tim Harford on the original story...)
Update: television works on a different schedule still: Mike Rees was interviewed later that evening (March 12) on the CBS Evening News: A Transplant Surgeon Matches 10 Donors With Recipients In The Longest Chain In History
Wednesday, March 11, 2009
Advances in kidney exchange, in the New England Journal of Medicine
One of the satisfying things about the ongoing collaboration between economists and kidney surgeons is that sometimes the results are very concrete. Today's New England Journal of Medicine reports on such a case in the article:
Rees, Michael A., Jonathan E. Kopke, Ronald P. Pelletier, Dorry L. Segev, Matthew E. Rutter, Alfredo J. Fabrega, Jeffrey Rogers, Oleh G. Pankewycz, Janet Hiller, Alvin E. Roth, Tuomas Sandholm, Utku Ünver, and Robert A. Montgomery, “A Non-Simultaneous Extended Altruistic Donor Chain,” New England Journal of Medicine, 360;11, March 12, 2009.
The paper reports a chain of kidney surgeries that resulted in ten transplants. It began with an altruistic donor, and was able to accomplish so many transplants because they didn't all have to be done simultaneously.
There's a simple economic idea at work here. Mostly in kidney exchange, all the surgeries are done simultaneously. The reason is that if two patient-donor pairs are exchanging kidneys, and if one pair were to donate a kidney to the other first, and the other were subsequently unable or unwilling to reciprocate, the pair that donated the kidney would be severely harmed; not only wouldn't they get the kidney they had been counting on, but they would have donated their donor's kidney and thus be unable to participate in a future exchange. But if there is an altruistic donor who doesn't have a specific patient in mind, and if he or she gives to a patient-donor pair, and they can't subsequently continue the chain, that is a loss, but no one is irreparably harmed. So, when chains begin with an undirected donor, they don't have to be simultaneous, since the costs of a breach are less.
Mike Rees and the Alliance for Paired Donation are the heroes of this story: here is the APD's press release.
Here's a story from the Boston Globe, that emphasizes the Boston/economist connection of Roth, Sonmez and Unver: Kidney-transplant chain broadens donations. Here's an article from the Pittsburgh Post Gazette that takes note of the collaboration with Carnegie Mellon computer scientists, represented in the NEJM paper by Tuomas Sandholm: Altruistic kidney donations.
Market for airline flights
As the pricing, scheduling, and seating options grow more complex, booking an airline ticket is looking more like a combinatorial auction. Some travel sites, like TripAdvisor and Kayak.com aim to help with that by displaying more clearly the available bundles of choices: A Clearing in the Fog of Complicated Booking.
" ' We’re bringing clarity to the marketplace, with disclosure up front,” said Bryan Saltzburg, the TripAdvisor general manager for new initiatives. More clarity and disclosure in the marketplace? Let’s hope it’s a trend."
" ' We’re bringing clarity to the marketplace, with disclosure up front,” said Bryan Saltzburg, the TripAdvisor general manager for new initiatives. More clarity and disclosure in the marketplace? Let’s hope it’s a trend."
Tuesday, March 10, 2009
Financial market design: the view from the Fed
Fed chairman Ben Bernanke, in a speech today (March 10) to the Council on Foreign Relations, after speaking of immediate steps to bail out financial institutions, talks about ways in which the financial markets might be redesigned in the longer term.
"At the same time that we are addressing such immediate challenges, it is not too soon for policymakers to begin thinking about the reforms to the financial architecture, broadly conceived, that could help prevent a similar crisis from developing in the future. We must have a strategy that regulates the financial system as a whole, in a holistic way, not just its individual components. In particular, strong and effective regulation and supervision of banking institutions, although necessary for reducing systemic risk, are not sufficient by themselves to achieve this aim.
Today, I would like to talk about four key elements of such a strategy. First, we must address the problem of financial institutions that are deemed too big--or perhaps too interconnected--to fail. Second, we must strengthen what I will call the financial infrastructure--the systems, rules, and conventions that govern trading, payment, clearing, and settlement in financial markets--to ensure that it will perform well under stress. Third, we should review regulatory policies and accounting rules to ensure that they do not induce excessive procyclicality--that is, do not overly magnify the ups and downs in the financial system and the economy. Finally, we should consider whether the creation of an authority specifically charged with monitoring and addressing systemic risks would help protect the system from financial crises like the one we are currently experiencing."
Regarding the financial infrastructure, he mentions among other things that
"To help alleviate counterparty credit concerns, regulators are also encouraging the development of well-regulated and prudently managed central clearing counterparties for OTC trades. Just last week, we approved the application for membership in the Federal Reserve System of ICE Trust, a trust company that proposes to operate as a central counterparty and clearinghouse for CDS transactions. "
On the subject of clearinghouses, he goes on to say
"The Federal Reserve and other authorities also are focusing on enhancing the resilience of the triparty repurchase agreement (repo) market, in which the primary dealers and other major banks and broker-dealers obtain very large amounts of secured financing from money market mutual funds and other short-term, risk-averse sources of funding.
...
it may be worthwhile considering the costs and benefits of a central clearing system for this market, given the magnitude of exposures generated and the vital importance of the market to both dealers and investors. "
His comments on "procyclicality" e.g. on making sure that regulation of capital reserves don't cause banks to cut back lending just when credit needs to be loosened, are also worth reading. His concluding paragraph is a sober look at market design contemplated (as it often must be) in advance of reliable scientific knowledge, but in light of recent experience:
"Financial crises will continue to occur, as they have around the world for literally hundreds of years. Even with the sorts of actions I have outlined here today, it is unrealistic to hope that financial crises can be entirely eliminated, especially while maintaining a dynamic and innovative financial system. Nonetheless, these steps should help make crises less frequent and less virulent, and so contribute to a better functioning national and global economy."
"At the same time that we are addressing such immediate challenges, it is not too soon for policymakers to begin thinking about the reforms to the financial architecture, broadly conceived, that could help prevent a similar crisis from developing in the future. We must have a strategy that regulates the financial system as a whole, in a holistic way, not just its individual components. In particular, strong and effective regulation and supervision of banking institutions, although necessary for reducing systemic risk, are not sufficient by themselves to achieve this aim.
Today, I would like to talk about four key elements of such a strategy. First, we must address the problem of financial institutions that are deemed too big--or perhaps too interconnected--to fail. Second, we must strengthen what I will call the financial infrastructure--the systems, rules, and conventions that govern trading, payment, clearing, and settlement in financial markets--to ensure that it will perform well under stress. Third, we should review regulatory policies and accounting rules to ensure that they do not induce excessive procyclicality--that is, do not overly magnify the ups and downs in the financial system and the economy. Finally, we should consider whether the creation of an authority specifically charged with monitoring and addressing systemic risks would help protect the system from financial crises like the one we are currently experiencing."
Regarding the financial infrastructure, he mentions among other things that
"To help alleviate counterparty credit concerns, regulators are also encouraging the development of well-regulated and prudently managed central clearing counterparties for OTC trades. Just last week, we approved the application for membership in the Federal Reserve System of ICE Trust, a trust company that proposes to operate as a central counterparty and clearinghouse for CDS transactions. "
On the subject of clearinghouses, he goes on to say
"The Federal Reserve and other authorities also are focusing on enhancing the resilience of the triparty repurchase agreement (repo) market, in which the primary dealers and other major banks and broker-dealers obtain very large amounts of secured financing from money market mutual funds and other short-term, risk-averse sources of funding.
...
it may be worthwhile considering the costs and benefits of a central clearing system for this market, given the magnitude of exposures generated and the vital importance of the market to both dealers and investors. "
His comments on "procyclicality" e.g. on making sure that regulation of capital reserves don't cause banks to cut back lending just when credit needs to be loosened, are also worth reading. His concluding paragraph is a sober look at market design contemplated (as it often must be) in advance of reliable scientific knowledge, but in light of recent experience:
"Financial crises will continue to occur, as they have around the world for literally hundreds of years. Even with the sorts of actions I have outlined here today, it is unrealistic to hope that financial crises can be entirely eliminated, especially while maintaining a dynamic and innovative financial system. Nonetheless, these steps should help make crises less frequent and less virulent, and so contribute to a better functioning national and global economy."
Job fairs and flower shows
Job fairs, which are intended to reduce search costs and make it easier for recruiters and recruits to find each other, seem to persist both in good times, when it may be hard for firms to fill their openings, and in hard times, when it may be hard for job seekers to find firms with openings:
At Career Fairs, Anxiety and Hope for Job-Seekers.
Flower shows, which are similarly intended to make it easier for big nurseries and their potential customers to find each other, only recover their costs when there are lots of potential customers: Economic Crisis Takes a Toll on Flower Shows. So the recession is causing many traditionally annual shows to be cancelled.
At Career Fairs, Anxiety and Hope for Job-Seekers.
Flower shows, which are similarly intended to make it easier for big nurseries and their potential customers to find each other, only recover their costs when there are lots of potential customers: Economic Crisis Takes a Toll on Flower Shows. So the recession is causing many traditionally annual shows to be cancelled.
Monday, March 9, 2009
Prediction markets: why aren't they used more?
While prediction markets have a distinguished history, and are currently used in some interesting applications, the Economist magazine writes: Prediction markets: An uncertain future, A novel way of generating forecasts has yet to take off.
"NOT SO long ago, prediction markets were being tipped as a fantastic new way to forecast everything from the completion date of a vital project to a firm’s annual sales. But although they have spread beyond early-adopting companies in the technology industry, they have still not become mainstream management tools. Even fervent advocates admit much remains to be done to convince sceptical managers of their value. “It’s still a pretty evangelical business,” says Leslie Fine of CrowdCast, one of the firms that provide trading platforms for companies keen to pool the collective wisdom of their employees."
The Economist has some hypotheses about the difficulties so far:
"A big hurdle facing managers using prediction markets is getting enough people to keep trading after the novelty has worn off. "...
"Another reason prediction markets flop is that employees cannot see how the results are used, so they lose interest. "...
"Bosses may also be wary of relying on the judgments of non-experts."
At Crowdcast (formerly Xpree) they have a market design hypothesis. They blog in response to the Economist article:
"we believe prediction markets are not yet mainstream because the current solutions rely on mechanisms designed for the stock market, not for the enterprise."
(N.B. A blog that follows prediction markets is Midas Oracle .ORG )
"NOT SO long ago, prediction markets were being tipped as a fantastic new way to forecast everything from the completion date of a vital project to a firm’s annual sales. But although they have spread beyond early-adopting companies in the technology industry, they have still not become mainstream management tools. Even fervent advocates admit much remains to be done to convince sceptical managers of their value. “It’s still a pretty evangelical business,” says Leslie Fine of CrowdCast, one of the firms that provide trading platforms for companies keen to pool the collective wisdom of their employees."
The Economist has some hypotheses about the difficulties so far:
"A big hurdle facing managers using prediction markets is getting enough people to keep trading after the novelty has worn off. "...
"Another reason prediction markets flop is that employees cannot see how the results are used, so they lose interest. "...
"Bosses may also be wary of relying on the judgments of non-experts."
At Crowdcast (formerly Xpree) they have a market design hypothesis. They blog in response to the Economist article:
"we believe prediction markets are not yet mainstream because the current solutions rely on mechanisms designed for the stock market, not for the enterprise."
(N.B. A blog that follows prediction markets is Midas Oracle .ORG )
Sunday, March 8, 2009
College admissions decisions: signaling and waiting
Right now, American high school seniors who have applied to colleges are mostly waiting to hear where they will be admitted. (The major exceptions are seniors who applied and were admitted to a college through a single-application, binding early admissions program, in which they agreed in advance to attend if accepted.) Once the colleges make their acceptance decisions, it will be their turn to wait, to see which students will accept their offers. Because of the recession, there is more uncertainty than usual: In a Shifting Era of Admissions, Colleges Are Sweating.
So colleges are trying to determine which students are likely to come if admitted, and the signals that students send (and have sent) in this regard may turn out to be important in admissions decisions.
"Typically, they rely on statistical models to predict which students will take them up on their offers to attend. But this year, with the economy turning parents and students into bargain hunters, demographics changing and unexpected jolts in the price of gas and the number of applications, they have little faith on those models.
...
"In response, colleges are trying new methods to gauge which applicants are serious about attending: Wake Forest, in North Carolina, is using Webcam interviews, while other colleges say they are scrutinizing essays more closely."
...
"Colleges consider an amalgam of factors, comparing them to past trends, to predict whether a student will attend, including, for example, what high school he went to; the strength of his grades, scores and recommendations; how much financial aid he has been offered; and whether he plays the cello or wants to study ethnobotany or economics. (If he is a she, the equation looks different still.)
They consider how many phone calls, Web hits, campus visits and applications they have received. "
Hat tip to Neil Dorosin of the Institute for Innovation in Public School Choice (IIPSC).
So colleges are trying to determine which students are likely to come if admitted, and the signals that students send (and have sent) in this regard may turn out to be important in admissions decisions.
"Typically, they rely on statistical models to predict which students will take them up on their offers to attend. But this year, with the economy turning parents and students into bargain hunters, demographics changing and unexpected jolts in the price of gas and the number of applications, they have little faith on those models.
...
"In response, colleges are trying new methods to gauge which applicants are serious about attending: Wake Forest, in North Carolina, is using Webcam interviews, while other colleges say they are scrutinizing essays more closely."
...
"Colleges consider an amalgam of factors, comparing them to past trends, to predict whether a student will attend, including, for example, what high school he went to; the strength of his grades, scores and recommendations; how much financial aid he has been offered; and whether he plays the cello or wants to study ethnobotany or economics. (If he is a she, the equation looks different still.)
They consider how many phone calls, Web hits, campus visits and applications they have received. "
Hat tip to Neil Dorosin of the Institute for Innovation in Public School Choice (IIPSC).
Saturday, March 7, 2009
Microstructure of Macro Behavior
In connection with the launch of the paperback version of his book The Logic of Life, Tim Harford has a nice video illustrating one of Tom Schelling's demonstrations of how market outcomes may not reflect the preferences of any individual market participant: The Logic of Life: Racial Segregation and Thomas Schelling.
Schelling's demo had to do with a residential real estate market in which everyone preferred to live in a racially integrated neighborhood in which people of their own race were in a slight majority, and how the resulting dynamics could lead to segregation that nobody wanted. Harford's video dramatizes this with brown and white eggs.
(The title of this blog post comes from Micromotives and Macrobehavior, Schelling's wonderful book on the subject, originally published in 1978.)
Schelling's demo had to do with a residential real estate market in which everyone preferred to live in a racially integrated neighborhood in which people of their own race were in a slight majority, and how the resulting dynamics could lead to segregation that nobody wanted. Harford's video dramatizes this with brown and white eggs.
(The title of this blog post comes from Micromotives and Macrobehavior, Schelling's wonderful book on the subject, originally published in 1978.)
School choice in Europe
I've frequently blogged about the design of school choice systems, and that is in part because the problems of school choice are so widespread, and difficult.
In Flanders, where there is a first-come-first-served allocation system, parents have been camped out for a week in winter weather to secure places for their children (here is a story, in Flemish, with a picture).
In England, where lotteries decide many school allocations, the costs of randomness are being felt: Identical twins go to schools 18 miles apart.
We now do better than that in NYC and Boston.
In Flanders, where there is a first-come-first-served allocation system, parents have been camped out for a week in winter weather to secure places for their children (here is a story, in Flemish, with a picture).
In England, where lotteries decide many school allocations, the costs of randomness are being felt: Identical twins go to schools 18 miles apart.
We now do better than that in NYC and Boston.
Friday, March 6, 2009
Another contested auction, and some precautions
In an earlier post, Auction disruption by fake bids, I followed an auction of Chinese artifacts that was opposed by the Chinese government, and was ultimately disrupted when the high bidder indicated that his bid was fraudulent. Today's news is of an auction in Manhattan of Gandhi memorabilia (a watch and some other personal property) opposed by the Indian government (which had offered a pre-emptive bid of $20,000 for the items in an attempt to halt the sale, and had obtained an injunction in an Indian court when this was refused): Gandhi Items Sold for $1.8 Million.
The high bidder was an Indian national who may or may not be planning to donate the items to the Indian government. The auction house took some steps intended to protect themselves against the kind of disruption by false bid that occurred in the auction of Chinese artifacts.
"For the first time, Antiquorum Auctioneers, which focuses on watches, is requiring banking references, said Mr. Maron, the chairman.
Recently, Cai Mingchao, a collector and auctioneer, raised an uproar after he submitted two winning bids for bronze sculptures from China’s Qing Dynasty at a Christie’s auction in Paris. Mr. Cai later refused to pay for the items, saying he had deliberately sabotaged the auction because the sculptures had been illegally looted in the 19th century from an imperial palace outside Beijing.
“We are concerned about what happened at Christie’s,” Mr. Maron said in a phone interview. "
The high bidder was an Indian national who may or may not be planning to donate the items to the Indian government. The auction house took some steps intended to protect themselves against the kind of disruption by false bid that occurred in the auction of Chinese artifacts.
"For the first time, Antiquorum Auctioneers, which focuses on watches, is requiring banking references, said Mr. Maron, the chairman.
Recently, Cai Mingchao, a collector and auctioneer, raised an uproar after he submitted two winning bids for bronze sculptures from China’s Qing Dynasty at a Christie’s auction in Paris. Mr. Cai later refused to pay for the items, saying he had deliberately sabotaged the auction because the sculptures had been illegally looted in the 19th century from an imperial palace outside Beijing.
“We are concerned about what happened at Christie’s,” Mr. Maron said in a phone interview. "
Thursday, March 5, 2009
Trust and trustworthiness: promoting and maintaining it
Trust is essential for all sorts of transactions, and how to set up institutions to promote trust and trustworthiness in the marketplace is a big concern of market design.
It is even a big concern of armies trying to win the hearts and minds of a population in the face of a guerrilla insurgency. There's a very interesting essay in the Washington Post about earning, maintaining and restoring trust, by Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Building Our Best Weapon.
On a more technical note, I'm reading Community Structure and Market Outcomes: Towards a Theory of Repeated Games in Networks by Itay Fainmesser (who you can try to hire next year). He is interested how patterns of connections between buyers and sellers can promote trustworthy behavior through repeated play, and how the effort to achieve trust in the marketplace by engaging in long term relationships may exclude some parties from the market. In this connection he writes "...repeated interactions cannot perfectly substitute for institutions..."
The kinds of institutions he is thinking of are both legal (if you can sue me for non-performance, this makes it easier to trust me), and reputational (if you can give me a credible negative review that will impede my ability to transact in the future, this also makes it easier to trust me).
As it happens, I've also been reading about the recent redesign of eBay's reputational system: "ENGINEERING TRUST - RECIPROCITY IN THE PRODUCTION OF REPUTATION INFORMATION," - by Gary Bolton, Ben Greiner, and Axel Ockenfels. It is a very nice market design paper.
They describe some of the design concerns behind eBay's 2007 rollout of its new, more detailed feedback system, in which buyers are able to give some feedback on sellers anonymously. In particular, they describe how they and eBay became concerned that the old reputation system became less informative than it might have been, because the pattern of reciprocally positive feedback concealed underlying dissatisfactions. They describe how (both prospectively and retrospectively) they compared the relevant field data, and how laboratory experiments helped verify the intuitions gained in that way, and allowed them to see the efficiency effects of an improved reputation system.
It is even a big concern of armies trying to win the hearts and minds of a population in the face of a guerrilla insurgency. There's a very interesting essay in the Washington Post about earning, maintaining and restoring trust, by Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Building Our Best Weapon.
On a more technical note, I'm reading Community Structure and Market Outcomes: Towards a Theory of Repeated Games in Networks by Itay Fainmesser (who you can try to hire next year). He is interested how patterns of connections between buyers and sellers can promote trustworthy behavior through repeated play, and how the effort to achieve trust in the marketplace by engaging in long term relationships may exclude some parties from the market. In this connection he writes "...repeated interactions cannot perfectly substitute for institutions..."
The kinds of institutions he is thinking of are both legal (if you can sue me for non-performance, this makes it easier to trust me), and reputational (if you can give me a credible negative review that will impede my ability to transact in the future, this also makes it easier to trust me).
As it happens, I've also been reading about the recent redesign of eBay's reputational system: "ENGINEERING TRUST - RECIPROCITY IN THE PRODUCTION OF REPUTATION INFORMATION," - by Gary Bolton, Ben Greiner, and Axel Ockenfels. It is a very nice market design paper.
They describe some of the design concerns behind eBay's 2007 rollout of its new, more detailed feedback system, in which buyers are able to give some feedback on sellers anonymously. In particular, they describe how they and eBay became concerned that the old reputation system became less informative than it might have been, because the pattern of reciprocally positive feedback concealed underlying dissatisfactions. They describe how (both prospectively and retrospectively) they compared the relevant field data, and how laboratory experiments helped verify the intuitions gained in that way, and allowed them to see the efficiency effects of an improved reputation system.
Wednesday, March 4, 2009
Student loans
"If Congress approves the plan, there will be no need to set subsidies because there will be no banks to subsidize. "
No no, not the current bank bailout (although it's easy to see how that sentence could be misinterpreted). In this case it refers to an auction the federal government is planning to hold to determine which lenders will be authorized to issue federally subsidized student loans: Education Dept. Forges Ahead With Student-Loan Auction. The idea is that banks would submit bids indicating how much federal subsidy they would require to issue student loans on agreed terms, and the lowest subsidies would win.
But "...by the time the auction process is complete, it could be moot. President Obama has called for abolishing the guaranteed-loan program altogether. If Congress approves the plan, there will be no need to set subsidies because there will be no banks to subsidize. "
No no, not the current bank bailout (although it's easy to see how that sentence could be misinterpreted). In this case it refers to an auction the federal government is planning to hold to determine which lenders will be authorized to issue federally subsidized student loans: Education Dept. Forges Ahead With Student-Loan Auction. The idea is that banks would submit bids indicating how much federal subsidy they would require to issue student loans on agreed terms, and the lowest subsidies would win.
But "...by the time the auction process is complete, it could be moot. President Obama has called for abolishing the guaranteed-loan program altogether. If Congress approves the plan, there will be no need to set subsidies because there will be no banks to subsidize. "
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