Thursday, November 10, 2022

Challenge trials for future Covid vaccines are still needed, by Stanley Plotkin and Josh Morrison

 Covid is still with us, new vaccines are needed and will likely continue to be needed into the forseeable future, and the case for human challenge trials to speed selection among promising candidates is stronger than ever.  Two veteran advocates make the case:

Human Challenge Trials Hold Promise for Next-Generation COVID Vaccines— These investigations could accelerate effective development of a pan-coronavirus vaccine as well by Stanley Plotkin, MD, and Josh Morrison, JD November 7, 2022

"Two years ago, the prospect of deliberately infecting fully informed volunteers with COVID-19 to aid in vaccine research and development was controversial. We and many others argued that the risks were justifiable, and the reservations of some bioethicists did not deter nearly 40,000 people from over 160 countries from expressing interest in volunteering for these investigations, called human challenge trials. Yet in the end, while they have been extensively pursued in the U.K.*, there were no such studies in the U.S.

"We have made great strides against COVID-19 illness in the form of vaccination and treatments, but there are still thousands of deaths in the U.S. every week.

...

"The White House hosted a summit on the issue in July, showcasing the myriad ways researchers are going about developing new vaccines. There are hundreds of candidates in early stages around the world, but the resources devoted to COVID-19 vaccine research are a fraction of what they were 2 years ago. Human challenge trials can greatly speed the selection of the most promising in this field of candidates, providing scientific and economic benefits over uniform reliance on large field studies.

...

"The use of human challenge trials offers the greatest promise for testing intranasal vaccines for their ability to reduce infection and transmission. In the case of a live attenuated vaccine, something as simple as regular nasal swabbing can reveal just how much of the live virus is present in the nose over time -- and how much would spread when a patient sneezes, for example.

...

"There are obviously risks to COVID-19 challenge studies, and it was on these grounds that initial proposals for such research faced opposition. However, the risk of death is now lower than it was early on in the pandemic given better immune protection garnered from both vaccination and natural exposure, and various treatments options further reduce the risk.

Of course, long-COVID still looms large, but this risk can also be managed by selecting trial participants at lower risk of serious illness, as more severe COVID-19 illness is correlated with lingering post-COVID symptoms. Ultimately, if COVID-19 becomes endemic, long-COVID may well be a threat to everyone, whether or not they sign up for a challenge trial -- all the more reason we must act quickly to develop vaccines that stop transmission.

"We believe that volunteers are perfectly capable of considering these risks rationally. Those who decide to make a potential sacrifice for the good of humanity should be lauded, not dismissed as naive. (Notably, a study of the nearly 40,000-strong prospective volunteers organized by 1Day Sooner showed that their risk tolerance was the same as a control group, and they were driven primarily by altruistic motivations.)"


"Stanley Plotkin, MD, is professor emeritus in pediatrics at the University of Pennsylvania, a veteran vaccinologist, and a board member of 1Day Sooner, an organization that advocates on behalf of challenge trial volunteers. Josh Morrison, JD, is co-founder and president of 1Day Sooner, and a founder of Waitlist Zero and the Rikers Debate Project."

********

Earlier:

Monday, June 20, 2022

Report of a SARS-CoV-2 human challenge trial. In Britain.


* Josh Morrison writes:

there are four COVID challenge studies announced or underway in the UK, though only imperial [the study above] has published results. Besides the imperial one, there’s an Oxford reinfection study, 

https://www.ox.ac.uk/news/2021-04-19-human-challenge-trial-launches-study-immune-response-covid-19 (interestingly the talk one of our staff saw indicated they were having a difficult time getting any infections in previously infected people even when using doses 1,000 times higher than the infectious imperial dose).

 

There has also been an Imperial delta study that’s recruiting now — 

https://www.imperial.ac.uk/infectious-disease/research/human-challenge/covhic002/register-your-interest/

 

And HVIVO has announced an omicron challenge study, though I’m not sure that will happen. 

https://investors.vaxart.com/news-releases/news-release-details/vaxart-announces-agreement-hvivo-develop-worlds-first-human


Wednesday, November 9, 2022

Market design coffee m&ms

 Here's an inside joke, for market design coffee (and candy) fans, particularly for regulars at our market design coffees at Stanford.



Here's a clue:

D4Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
D40General
D41Perfect Competition
D42Monopoly
D43Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
D44Auctions
D45Rationing • Licensing
D46Value Theory
D47Market Design
D49Other

HT: Carmen Wang


Tuesday, November 8, 2022

Mathematics and Computer Science of Market and Mechanism Design, at Berkeley MSRI, August 21-December 20, 2023 (applications open)

 Apply now to join a semester of interdisciplinary workshops on market and mechanism design, from the point of view of mathematicians, computer scientists, and economists.

Mathematicsand Computer Science of Market and Mechanism Design at the Mathematical Sciences Research Institute in Berkeley, California, August 21, 2023 to December 20, 2023

 Seeking applications for Research Members and Postdoctoral Fellows:

  • Research Members are scholars in economics, computer science, operations research, mathematics, or related fields who have a PhD at the time of application and will be in residence for at least 30 consecutive days of the program.
  • Postdoctoral Fellows are scholars in those fields who received their PhD on or after August 31, 2018, and will be in residence for the entire program.

Apply here by December 1, 2022https://www.msri.org/web/msri/scientific/member-application

 Program Summary:

In recent years, economists and computer scientists have collaborated with mathematicians, operations research experts, and practitioners to improve the design and operations of real-world marketplaces. Such work relies on robust feedback between theory and practice, inspiring new mathematics closely linked – and directly applicable – to market and mechanism design questions. This cross-disciplinary program seeks to expand the domains in which existing market design solutions can be applied; address foundational questions regarding our ways of developing and evaluating mechanisms; and build useful analytic frameworks for applying theory to practical marketplace design.

 https://www.msri.org/programs/333

 Program Organizers:

Michal Feldman (Tel-Aviv University); Nicole Immorlica (Microsoft Research); Scott Kominers (Harvard Business School); Shengwu Li (Harvard University); Paul Milgrom (Stanford University); Alvin Roth (Stanford University); Tim Roughgarden (Columbia University); Eva Tardos (Cornell University)

 About MSRI:

Acknowledged as the premier center for collaborative mathematical research, MSRI  organizes and hosts semester-length programs that become the leading edge in that field of study. Mathematicians worldwide come to the Institute to engage in the research of classical fundamental mathematics, modern applied mathematics, statistics, computer science and other mathematical sciences.

 Questions? See attached flyer, or reach out to mcsorgs@msri.org

**********

This could be a nice way to spend a semester--apply now (MSRI loves company:)


Monday, November 7, 2022

Stanford Economics Ph.D. Job Market Candidates for the 2022-23 Economics Job Market.

 22 candidates for the 2022-23 Economics Job Market, from B to Z.

Stanford, Department of Economics Job Market Candidates

Available November 2022 for positions in Summer/Fall 2023

Placement Officers: Pete Klenow 650-725-2620 klenow@stanford.edu and Liran Einav 650-723-3704  leinav@stanford.edu

Trevor Bakker

Aniket Baksy

Lukas Bolte

Yue Cao

Daniele Caratelli

Alex Chan

Fulya Ersoy

Tony Fan

Robin Han

Brian Higgins

Tingyan Jia

Matteo Leombroni

Gina Li

Negar Matoorian Pour

Agathe Pernoud

Beatriz Pousada

Maxwell Rong

Rachel Schuh

Martin Souchier

Reka Zempleni

Adam Zhang

Sally Zhang

Sunday, November 6, 2022

Limiting congestion by limiting applications, or making them costly

 Here's a paper that investigates two alternatives to limiting congestion in college admissions: one is to limit applications, and the other is to add a small cost for each additional application. (This is a current topic of discussion in a number of other applications, including matching of new doctors to residencies.)

Application Costs and Congestion in Matching Markets by YingHua He and Thierry Magnac, The Economic Journal,  https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueac038 (online early)

Abstract: "A matching market often requires recruiting agents, or ‘programmes’, to costly screen ‘applicants’, and congestion increases with the number of applicants to be screened. We investigate the role of application costs: higher costs reduce congestion by discouraging applicants from applying to certain programmes; however, they may harm match quality. In a multiple-elicitation experiment conducted in a real-life matching market, we implement variants of the Gale-Shapley deferred-acceptance mechanism with different application costs. Our experimental and structural estimates show that a (low) application cost effectively reduces congestion without harming match quality."

"Our empirical strategy is novel. It begins with a multiple-elicitation field experiment that enables us to directly evaluate the effects of application costs. The experiment involves the real-life matching of 129 applicants to the seven master’s programmes at the Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), and was conducted in May 2013 for admission in the 2013–4 academic year. The experimental market designs are three variants of the Gale-Shapley deferred-acceptance (DA) mechanism encountered in practice: the traditional DA mechanism, under which applicants can apply to all programmes without any cost; the DA mechanism with truncation (DA-T), under which applicants can apply to no more than four programmes (hence, DA-T-4); and the DA mechanism with cost (DA-C), under which applicants must write a motivation letter for each additional application beyond the first three applications. Under each mechanism, every applicant is required to submit a rank-ordered list of programmes (ROL). As applicants are informed that one of the mechanisms will be implemented, they have incentives to behave optimally under each mechanism.

"To evaluate the performance of a matching procedure, we focus on two dimensions of a matching outcome: the congestion and match quality. The former is measured by screening costs and approximated by the number of applicants to screen; the latter is measured by the welfare of both sides, the number of unmatched applicants, as well as the number of blocking pairs. A pair comprising applicant and programme blocks a matching if both would be better off by being matched together after leaving their current matches. The stability of a matching, defined as the absence of any blocking pair, is the key to the success of matching markets (Roth, 1991). Importantly, stability implies Pareto efficiency when both sides are endowed with strict preferences (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2013)."



Saturday, November 5, 2022

Liver exchange--a review by Agrawal, Gupta and Saigal

 

 Here's a review of liver exchange in the transplant literature, with some comparisons to kidney exchange.

Paired exchange Living donor Liver Transplantation: Indications, stumbling blocks, and future considerations by Dhiraj Agrawal, Subhash Gupta,  and Sanjiv Saigal, Journal of Hepatology, In Press,  Pre-proof https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhep.2022.10.019 

Abstract: "The last decade has seen Liver Paired exchange (LPE) as an increasingly used modality across the transplant community by which pairs of incompatible living Liver donors and their intended recipients swap Livers resulting in compatible transplants. The feasibility and benefit of LPE in providing excellent recipient outcomes and robust donor safety have been proven in uncomplicated swaps. Began initially as single-centre two-way or three-way exchanges, LPE has tremendous potential to grow into more complicated chains over days and over multiple centres. Also, LPE is associated with unique technical, logistical, ethical and legislative challenges. This review discusses the indications, potential types of LPE, unique solutions to stumbling blocks in performing LPE, and future considerations on how LPE can expand the living donor liver pool and the armamentarium of living donor liver transplantation (LDLT)".


"
The published literature on LPE has nine reports (5 original articles and 4 case reports), including 74 LPEs from Asia and North America.1), 2), 3), 4), 5), 6), 7), 8), 9) LPE constitutes approximately 1.2 to 8.3 % of the total LDLTs performed at the individual centre1), 2), 3), 4), signifying a substantial potential of this form of LDLT to mitigate the liver allograft shortage."

...

1. D. Agrawal, S. Saigal, S.S. Jadaun, S.A. Singh, S. Agrawal, S. Gupta
Paired Exchange Living Donor Liver Transplantation: A Nine-year Experience From North India
Transplantation (2022 Jun 30), 10.1097/TP.0000000000004210
Epub ahead of print. PMID: 35777310
2)
S. Hwang, S.G. Lee, D.B. Moon, G.W. Song, C.S. Ahn, K.H. Kim, et al.
Exchange living donor liver transplantation to overcome ABO incompatibility in adult patients
Liver Transpl, 16 (4) (2010 Apr), pp. 482-490, 10.1002/lt.22017
PMID: 20222052
3)
D.H. Jung, S. Hwang, C.S. Ahn, K.H. Kim, D.B. Moon, S.G. Lee, et al.
Section 16. Update on experience in paired-exchange donors in living donor liver transplantation for adult patients at ASAN Medical Center
Transplantation, 97 (Suppl 8) (2014 Apr 27), pp. S66-S69, 10.1097/01.tp.0000446280.81922.bb
PMID: 24849838
4)
V. Gunabushanam, S. Ganesh, K. Soltys, G. Mazariegos, A. Ganoza, M. Molinari, et al.
Increasing Living Donor Liver Transplantation Using Liver Paired Exchange
J Am Coll Surg, 234 (2) (2022 Feb 1), pp. 115-120, 10.1097/XCS.0000000000000036
PMID: 35213430
5)
A. Kaplan, R. Rosenblatt, W. Jackson, B. Samstein, R.S. Brown Jr.
Practices and Perceptions of Living Donor Liver Transplantation, Non-directed Donation, and Liver Paired Exchange: A National Survey
Liver Transpl, 28 (5) (2022 May), pp. 774-781, 10.1002/lt.26384
Epub 2021 Dec 26. PMID: 34862704; PMCID: PMC9018478
6)
H.J. Braun, A.M. Torres, F. Louie, S.D. Weinberg, S.M. Kang, N.L. Ascher, et al.
Expanding living donor liver transplantation: Report of first US living donor liver transplant chain
Am J Transplant, 21 (4) (2021 Apr), pp. 1633-1636, 10.1111/ajt.16396
Epub 2020 Dec 8. PMID: 33171017; PMCID: PMC8016700
7)
M.S. Patel, Z. Mohamed, A. Ghanekar, G. Sapisochin, I. McGilvray, N. Selzner, et al.
Living donor liver paired exchange: A North American first
Am J Transplant, 21 (1) (2021 Jan), pp. 400-404, 10.1111/ajt.16137
Epub 2020 Jul 10. PMID: 32524750
8)
S.C. Chan, C.M. Lo, B.H. Yong, W.J. Tsui, K.K. Ng, S.T. Fan
Paired donor interchange to avoid ABO-incompatible living donor liver transplantation
Liver Transpl, 16 (4) (2010 Apr), pp. 478-481, 10.1002/lt.21970
PMID: 20373459
9)
S.C. Chan, Chok KSh, W.W. Sharr, A.C. Chan, S.H. Tsang, W.C. Dai, et al.
Samaritan donor interchange in living donor liver transplantation
Hepatobiliary Pancreat Dis Int, 13 (1) (2014 Feb), pp. 105-109, 10.1016/s1499-3872(14)60016-3
PMID: 24463089

Friday, November 4, 2022

NBER Market Design Working Group Meeting, Fall 2022, at Stanford, today and tomorrow

 While I'm away, the NBER Market Design meeting will convene at Stanford today and tomorrow.  The first paper is presented by Alex Chan (who you could hire, he's on the market).

Market Design Working Group Meeting, Fall 2022  November 4-5, 2022 (US Pacific Time) (more papers are linked at the above link and all presentations will be livestreamed on YouTube at https://www.youtube.com/nbervideos)

LOCATION Stanford University Graduate School of Business, Vidalakis Dining Hall, Schwab Residential Center, 680 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA and YouTube 

ORGANIZERS Eric Budish, Jakub Kastl, and Marzena Rostek

 NBER conferences are by invitation. All participants are expected to comply with the NBER's Conference Code of Conduct.

Friday, November 4

Session 1. Matching Markets

9:00 am

Regulation of Organ Transplantation and Procurement: A Market Design Lab Experiment by Alex Chan, Stanford University and Alvin E. Roth, Stanford University and NBER

Measuring the Welfare Gains from Cardinal-Preference Mechanisms in School Choice(slides)  by Hulya Eraslan, Rice University and NBER by Jeremy T. Fox, Rice University and NBER, YingHua He, Rice University, Yakym Pirozhenko, Rice University

10:20 am Coffee Break

Session 2. Markets and Algorithms

11:00 am Market Opacity and Fragility by Giovanni Cespa, City University London, Xavier Vives, IESE Business School

Artificial Intelligence and Pricing: The Impact of Algorithm Design by John Asker, University of California, Los Angeles and NBER Chaim Fershtman, Tel Aviv University, Ariel Pakes, Harvard University and NBER

12:20 pm  Lunch - Vidalakis Courtyard

Session 3: Young Scholars Session I: Financial Market Design

2:00 pm Intermediary Asset Pricing: Capital Constraints and Market Power(slides), Jason Allen, Bank of Canada, Milena Wittwer, Boston College

Endogenous Market Structure: Over-the-Counter versus Exchange Trading by Ji Hee Yoon, University College London

3:20 pm Coffee Break

Session 4: Young Scholars Session II: Market Design Theory

4:00 pm Strategyproofness-Exposing Mechanism Descriptions, by Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Harvard University, Ori Heffetz, Cornell University and NBER, and Clayton Thomas, Princeton University

Matching and Prices by Ravi Jagadeesan, Stanford University, Alexander Teytelboym, University of Oxford

Saturday, November 5


Session 5. Non-Market Allocation Mechanisms

9:00 am Optimal Queue Design by Yeon-Koo Che, Columbia University, Olivier Tercieux, Paris School of Economics

Fraud-proof Non-market Allocation Mechanisms by Eduardo Perez-Richet, Sciences Po, Vasiliki Skreta, UT Austin & UCL

10:20 am Coffee Break

Session 6. Environment and Transportation

11:00 am Pollution Permits: Efficiency by Design by Marek Pycia, University of Zurich, Kyle Woodward, University of North Carolina

Optimal Urban Transportation Policy: Evidence from Chicago(slides) by Milena Almagro, University of Chicago, Felipe Barbieri, University of Pennsylvania, Juan Camilo Castillo, University of Pennsylvania, Nathaniel G. Hickok, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Tobias Salz, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER

12:20 pm Lunch - Vidalakis Courtyard

Session 7. Auctions and Mechanism Design

This session: 25 minutes presenter, 5 minutes Q&A.

1:30 pm Screening with Persuasion by Dirk Bergemann, Yale University, , Tibor Heumann, PUC Chile, Stephen Morris, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Auctions with Frictions by Stephan Lauermann, University of Bonn, Asher Wolinsky, Northwestern University

Pure-Strategy Equilibrium in the Generalized First-Price Auction, by Michael Ostrovsky, Stanford University and NBER, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Stanford University

Thursday, November 3, 2022

Hervé Moulin is celebrated in Paris

 I'm in Paris to speak tomorrow at a ceremony and conference in honor of Hervé Moulin.  

A focus of the talks will be Moulin's work on fairness, and my talk (on controversial markets) will focus in part on how concern for possible unfairness of market outcomes may lead to attempts to ban certain markets.

Here's the announcement of the Friday session:

Cérémonie de clôture de la chaire d’excellence internationale Blaise Bascal [Closing ceremony of the Blaise Bascal Chair of International Excellence]

Vendredi 4 novembre 2022, amphithéâtre Liard en Sorbonne – 14 h à 19 h 30 17 rue de la Sorbonne

Programme

13 h 30 – 14 h : Accueil du public au 17, rue de la Sorbonne – 75005 Paris 

14 h – 14 h 05 : Ouverture de la cérémonie de clôture de la Chaire d’excellence internationale Blaise Bascal par Christine Neau-Leduc, présidente de l’université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne 

14 h 05 – 14 h 10 : Remerciements de Hervé Moulin, professeur à l’université de Glasgow 

14 h 10 – 15 h : Can we define Fairness? par Hervé Moulin 

15 h – 15 h 45 :  Repugnant Transactions and Controversial Markets par Alvin Roth 

15 h 45 – 16 h 45 : Pause  

16 h 15 –  17 h :  Democracy and the Pursuit of Randomness par Ariel Procaccia 

17 h – 17 h 45 : Fair Social Choice par Marc Fleurbaey 

17 h 45 – 17 h 55 : Discours de clôture par : 

Un représentant de la Région Ile-de-France 

Michel Grabisch, professeur à l’université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne 

Agnieszka Rusinowska, professeur à l’université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne 

*********

The following day (Saturday) will be a conference on 

Recent Advances in Fair Division November 5th, 2022, Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne, Centre Panthéon, Salle 1

8:45-9:00 Welcome to participantso

9:00-9:45 :Haris Aziz, Best of Both Worlds Fairness

9:45-10:30 :Edith Elkind, Mind the Gap: Fair Division with Separation Constraints

10:30-11:00 Coffee 

11:30-12:15 :Juan D Moreno Ternero, The Costs and Benefits of multilingualism

12:15-13:00 :Jean-Jacques Herings, An Axiomatization of the Pairwise Netting Proportional Rule in Financial Networks

13:00-14:00 Lunch

14:00-14:45 :Dominik Peters, Voting in Participatory Budgeting

14:45-15:30 :Rupert Freeman, )A New Fairness Criterion for Assignment Mechanisms

15:30-16:00 Coffee break

16:00-16:45 :Utku Unver, Balancing Affirmative Action with Other Societal Interests:  a generalized theory on India’s reservation system

16:45-17:30 :Jean-Francois Laslier, Universalization and Altruism


Wednesday, November 2, 2022

Managing inter-district school choice, by Yuchiro Kamada and Fuhito Kojima

 Here's a paper that considers inter-district school choice, motivated by Tokyo day care centers.  I think  a similar problem arises in the EU in allocating foreign study opportunities for college students.

 Ekkyo Matching: How To Connect Separate Matching Markets For Welfare Improvement  By Yuichiro Kamada And Fuhito Kojima

Abstract. "We consider a school-choice matching model that allows for inter-district transfer of students, with the “balancedness” constraint: each student and school belongs to a region, and a matching is said to be balanced if, for each region, the outflow of students from that region to other regions is equal to the inflow of students from the latter to the former. Using a directed bipartite graph defined on students and schools, we characterize the set of Pareto efficient matchings among those that are individually rational, balanced and fair. We also provide a polynomial-time algorithm to compute such matchings. The outcome of this algorithm weakly improves student welfare upon the one induced when each region independently organizes a standard matching mechanism"

" In Japan ... allocation of slots at accredited daycares are conducted by individual municipal governments and, with few exceptions, a child can only attend a daycare in the municipality of their residence. The City of Tokyo, for example, is divided into 23 small municipalities ... and each conducts a matching independently. Due to the small sizes of the regions, many families would find inter-district admissions—which is called the ekkyo admission ... to be a viable option. Moreover, as a large metropolitan area, many people cross a city boundary to commute, making it potentially more convenient to put their children to a daycare center close to their workplace"


Tuesday, November 1, 2022

Affirmative action at Harvard and elsewhere, by Roland Fryer

 As the Supreme Court starts to hear arguments about affirmative action in college admissions, at Harvard and the University of North Carolina, Roland Fryer, a Black professor of Economics at Harvard, shares some thoughts--including stories from his own experience--about how affirmative action might be reformed.

Affirmative action in college admissions doesn’t work — but it could, By Roland G. Fryer Jr.,  Washington Post.

"On Monday, the Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in an affirmative action case involving Harvard, where I am a professor. Many people who are concerned about racial representation at elite institutions fear that the justices will end the practice as we know it. But if they do, they could provide an opportunity to create a new, data-based system that would truly help level the playing field for disadvantaged kids.

"I was raised, in part, by my father, who was sentenced to eight years in prison when I was in my teens. 

...

"But for my college professors’ willingness to look beyond my past performance — but for affirmative action — I would not have benefited from twice-weekly 7 a.m. meetings with the economics professor who showed me how science could be used to help people. Or the statistics professor who marveled at my stories of my favorite uncle — a wino with sophisticated strategies of betting on Greyhound races — and helped me use formal models to explain his behavior. Or a spot at the American Economic Association’s summer school for minority students.

"But affirmative action is very often not targeted at individuals who, because of disadvantage, are achieving below their potential. Seventy-one percent of Harvard’s Black and Hispanic students come from wealthy backgrounds. A tiny fraction attended underperforming public high schools. First- and second-generation African immigrants, despite constituting only about 10 percent of the U.S. Black population, make up about 41 percent of all Black students in the Ivy League, and Black immigrants are wealthier and better educated than many native-born Black Americans.

...

"The Supreme Court seems poised to strike down the explicit use of race in university admissions. My hope is that it will still leave room for data-driven approaches to affirmative action that ensure real meritocracy."