Here's the first question and answer:
At the Author Spotlight page they also link to the several papers I published in MOR:
Since becoming a notorious economist, I've had a number of conversations with operations researchers that begin with a question like "Why did you switch from OR to Economics?"
My usual answer is that I got my Ph.D. in OR in 1974 with a dissertation in game theory, and it looked at that time as if OR would be a natural place for game theory to flourish, particularly since Bob Aumann was the founding game theory editor of MOR. But, as it turned out, game theory grew first and fastest in Economics. So I just stood my ground, while the disciplinary boundaries shifted around me. Today, market design has become the engineering part of game theory, and it's time for OR and Economics to reconnect around market design. And indeed at Stanford, many of the Ph.D. students in our market design classes in the econ department are OR students from our MS&E department or from our Business school, both of which in turn have market designers on their faculty. So I'm optimistic that my dual identities as an economist and operations researcher may soon seem seamless.
*Beware, my 1985 paper contains an error about the lattice structure of stable matchings, that was noted and corrected by
Charles Blair (1988), "The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners," Mathematics of Operations Research 13(4):619-628. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.13.4.619
and also by
Jianrong Li, (2013) A Note on Roth's Consensus Property of Many-to-One Matching. Mathematics of Operations Research 38(2):389-392. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.1120.0576