Wednesday, May 18, 2016

First annual Aumann Lecture, May 19, at National Game Theory Conference at Tel Aviv University

I'll be giving the 2016 Aumann Lecture tomorrow at the (Israel) National Game Theory Conference at Tel Aviv University, 19-May-2016:  :

Here's the whole conference program:

 Main Lecture Hall: Trubovits Building, Ben Shemesh Hall (Room 308)
Additional Lecture Hall: Room 206
Aumann Lecture will take place at Lev Auditorium at 16:30.

9:00 – 9:30: Refreshments
9:30 – 9:35: Opening Words.
9:35 – 10:10: Plenary Talk: Ben Shemesh Hall
Ehud Lehrer (Tel Aviv University): Reward Schemes (with Dudu Lagziel)
10:10 – 10:25: Refreshments
10:25 – 11:25: Parallel Sessions
Session 1: Ben Shemesh Hall. Mechanism Design: organized by Assaf Romm and Avinatan Hassidim
 Moshe Babaioff (Microsoft Research): Networks of Complements (with Liad Blumrosen and Noam Nisan)
 Erel Segal Halevy (Bar-Ilan): A Random-Sampling Double-Auction Mechanism (with Avinatan Hassidim and Yonatan Aumann)
 Yannai Gonczarowski (HUJI and Microsoft Research): No Stable Matching Mechanism is Obviously Strategy-Proof (with Itai Ashlagi)
Session 2: Room 206.
 Dhruva Bhaskar (NYU): Tempting and Testing through Costly Monitoring
 Galit Ashkenazi-Golan (Tel Aviv University and Seminar Hakibutzim): What You Get is What You See: Repeated Games with Observable Payoffs (with Ehud Lehrer)
 Eilon Solan (Tel Aviv University): Acceptable Strategy Profiles in Stochastic Games.
11:25 – 11:40: Refreshments
11:40 – 12:40: Parallel Sessions
Session 3: Ben Shemesh Hall.
 Gaetan Fournier (Tel Aviv University): General distribution of consumers in pure Hotelling games
 Mehmet Ismail (University of Maastricht): Maximin Equilibrium: A Minimal Extension of Maximin Strategies
 Reshef Meir (Technion): Playing the Wrong Game: Smoothness Bounds for Congestion Games with Behavioral Biases (with David Parkes)
Session 4: Room 206.
 Avishay Aiche (University of Haifa): The Asymptotic Kernel in Smooth
Symmetric (with Benyamin Shitovitz)
 Ilan Nehama (HUJI): Analyzing Games with Ambiguous Player Types using the
MINthenMAX Decision Model
 Sophie Bade (Universiy of London and Max Planck Institute for Research on
Collective Goods, Bonn): Weak Dynamic Consistency
12:40 – 14:10: Lunch at Gan Hadkalim.
14:10 – 14:45: Plenary Talk: Ben Shemesh Hall.
Elchanan Ben-Porath (HUJI), Mechanism Design with Evidence
14:45 – 15:00: Refreshments
15:00 – 16:00: Parallel Sessions
Session 5: Ben Shemesh Hall
 İbrahim İnal (University of Edinburgh): Purification without Common Knowledge of
 Gilad Bavly (Bar Ilan University): Differentiation Games (with Amnon Schreiber)
 Sidartha Gordon (Siences Po): Information Choice and Diversity: The Role of
Strategic Complementarities (with Catherine Gendron-Saulnier)
Session 6: Room 206.
 Ram Orzach (Oakland University): Supersizing: The Illusion of a Bargain and the
Right-to-Split (with Miron Stano)
 Moran Koren (Technion): Bayesian Learning in Markets with Common Value (with
Itai Arieli and Rann Smorodinsky)
 Yaron Azriely (Ohio State University): Symmetric Mechanism Design (with Ritesh
16:00 – 16:30: Refreshments
16:30 – 17:30: Aumann Talk, Lev Auditorium.
Alvin Roth (Stanford): Economists as Engineers: Game Theory and Market

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