Here's the whole conference program:
Main Lecture Hall: Trubovits Building, Ben Shemesh Hall (Room 308)
Additional Lecture Hall: Room 206
Aumann Lecture will take place at Lev Auditorium at 16:30.
9:00 – 9:30: Refreshments
9:30 – 9:35: Opening Words.
9:35 – 10:10: Plenary Talk: Ben Shemesh Hall
Ehud Lehrer (Tel Aviv University): Reward Schemes (with Dudu Lagziel)
10:10 – 10:25: Refreshments
10:25 – 11:25: Parallel Sessions
Session 1: Ben Shemesh Hall. Mechanism Design: organized by Assaf Romm and Avinatan Hassidim
Moshe Babaioff (Microsoft Research): Networks of Complements (with Liad Blumrosen and Noam Nisan)
Erel Segal Halevy (Bar-Ilan): A Random-Sampling Double-Auction Mechanism (with Avinatan Hassidim and Yonatan Aumann)
Yannai Gonczarowski (HUJI and Microsoft Research): No Stable Matching Mechanism is Obviously Strategy-Proof (with Itai Ashlagi)
Session 2: Room 206.
Dhruva Bhaskar (NYU): Tempting and Testing through Costly Monitoring
Galit Ashkenazi-Golan (Tel Aviv University and Seminar Hakibutzim): What You Get is What You See: Repeated Games with Observable Payoffs (with Ehud Lehrer)
Eilon Solan (Tel Aviv University): Acceptable Strategy Profiles in Stochastic Games.
11:25 – 11:40: Refreshments
11:40 – 12:40: Parallel Sessions
Session 3: Ben Shemesh Hall.
Gaetan Fournier (Tel Aviv University): General distribution of consumers in pure Hotelling games
Mehmet Ismail (University of Maastricht): Maximin Equilibrium: A Minimal Extension of Maximin Strategies
Reshef Meir (Technion): Playing the Wrong Game: Smoothness Bounds for Congestion Games with Behavioral Biases (with David Parkes)
Session 4: Room 206.
Avishay Aiche (University of Haifa): The Asymptotic Kernel in Smooth
Symmetric (with Benyamin Shitovitz)
Ilan Nehama (HUJI): Analyzing Games with Ambiguous Player Types using the
MINthenMAX Decision Model
Sophie Bade (Universiy of London and Max Planck Institute for Research on
Collective Goods, Bonn): Weak Dynamic Consistency
12:40 – 14:10: Lunch at Gan Hadkalim.
14:10 – 14:45: Plenary Talk: Ben Shemesh Hall.
Elchanan Ben-Porath (HUJI), Mechanism Design with Evidence
14:45 – 15:00: Refreshments
15:00 – 16:00: Parallel Sessions
Session 5: Ben Shemesh Hall
İbrahim İnal (University of Edinburgh): Purification without Common Knowledge of
Gilad Bavly (Bar Ilan University): Differentiation Games (with Amnon Schreiber)
Sidartha Gordon (Siences Po): Information Choice and Diversity: The Role of
Strategic Complementarities (with Catherine Gendron-Saulnier)
Session 6: Room 206.
Ram Orzach (Oakland University): Supersizing: The Illusion of a Bargain and the
Right-to-Split (with Miron Stano)
Moran Koren (Technion): Bayesian Learning in Markets with Common Value (with
Itai Arieli and Rann Smorodinsky)
Yaron Azriely (Ohio State University): Symmetric Mechanism Design (with Ritesh
16:00 – 16:30: Refreshments
16:30 – 17:30: Aumann Talk, Lev Auditorium.
Alvin Roth (Stanford): Economists as Engineers: Game Theory and Market