Wednesday, September 12, 2012

NBER market design conference Oct 19-20, 2012: preliminary program


Market Design Working Group Meeting

Susan Athey and Parag Pathak, Organizers

October 19-20, 2012

2nd Floor Conference Room
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA


Friday, October 19:

8:30 am
Continental Breakfast

9:00 am

Mechanism Design and Congestion

William Fuchs, University of California at Berkeley
Andrzej Skrzypacz, Stanford University
Costs and Benefits of Dynamic Trading in a Lemons Market

Jacob Leshno, Columbia University
Dynamic Matching in Overloaded Systems

10:20 am

10:35 am


Kenneth Hendricks, University of Wisconsin and NBER
Daniel Quint, University of Wisconsin
Indicative Bids as Cheap Talk

Sergiu Hart, Hebrew University
Noam Nisan, Hebrew University
The Menu-Size Complexity of Auctions

Yeon-Koo Che, Columbia University
Jinwoo Kim, Yonsei University
Fuhito Kojima, Stanford University
Efficient Assignment with Interdependent Values

12:35 pm


1:15 pm
Organ Exchange

Itai Ashlagi, MIT
Alvin Roth, Stanford University and NBER
Kidney Exchange in Time and Space

Tayfun Sonmez, Boston College
M. Utku Unver, Boston College
Welfare Consequences of Transplant Organ Allocation Policies

2:40 pm

3:00 pm
FCC Incentive AuctionLawrence Ausubel, University of Maryland
Paul Milgrom, Stanford University
Ilya Segal, Stanford University
The 'Incentive Auctions' and Mechanism Design

Peter Cramton, University of Maryland
Title to be announced

5:15 pm

Saturday, October 20:

8:30 am
Continental Breakfast

9:00 am

Empirical Market Design

Aditya Bhave, University of Chicago
Eric Budish, University of Chicago
Primary-Market Auctions for Event Tickets: Eliminating the Rents of "Bob the Broker"

Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Duke University
Nikhil Agarwal, Harvard University
Parag Pathak, MIT and NBER
Centralized vs. Decentralized School Assignment: Evidence from NY

10:20 am

10:40 am

Matching Markets

Qingmin Liu, Columbia University
Marek Pycia, University of California at Los Angeles
Ordinal Efficiency, Fairness and Incentives in Large Markets

Scott Duke Kominers, University of Chicago
Tayfun Sonmez, Boston College
Designing for Diversity in Matching

12:00 pm

1:00 pm

New Frontiers

Elisa Celis, University of Washington
Gregory Lewis, Harvard University and NBER
Markus Mobius, Iowa State University and NBER
Hamid Nazerzadeh, University of Southern California
Buy-it-Now or Take-a-Chance: Price Discrimination through Randomized Auctions

Michael Kearns, University of Pennsylvania
Mallesh Pai, University of Pennsylvania
Aaron Roth, University of Pennsylvania
Jonathan Ullman, Harvard University
Mechanism Design in Large Games: Incentives and Privacy

David Rothschild, Microsoft Research
David Pennock, Microsoft Research
The Extent of Price Misalignment in Prediction Markets

3:00 pm

No comments: