Auction design by Paul Klemperer

Paul Klemperer alerts me to two new market design papers. He writes "here is the paper about the Product-Mix Auction, the new auction design for differentiated goods that I developed for the Bank of England from 2007,
forthcoming in the Journal of the European Economic Association. It is similar to Paul Milgrom's recent work on assignment auctions (we discovered this when we talked last year) -- No exciting theorems, but I paid a lot of attention to how to present simply, so bidders are comfortable participataing (and auctioneers are willing to use). I'm working on how to extend to some degree of complements, so maybe better theorems soon. The Product-Mix Auction: a New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods

"And here is a small enhancement of core-selecting package auctions (with Aytek who is taking up a lectureship (i.e. assistant professorship) at Cambridge University next year) -- we are working on the wider question of whether/when they are a good idea -- we currently take no position on that: A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions by Aytek Erdil and Paul Klemperer