Monday, March 3, 2014

Paul Klemperer on the product mix auction, and market design (video)

How geometry came to the rescue during the banking crisis - video

"Economist Paul Klemperer of Oxford University describes how he invented an auction based on a new kind of geometry to help the Bank of England as the financial crisis took hold in 2007. The auction got money to the banks and building societies that needed it most urgently. The then governor Mervyn King later called it 'a marvelous application of theoretical economics to a practical problem of vital importance'. Klemperer describes how similar auctions can help other government departments allocate resources.  The video featured as the Editor's Choice on the Guardian on 12th July 2013."

Sunday, March 2, 2014

Organize: to end the organ shortage

I don't know much about this (relatively new) organization, Organize.org,  but I like their slogan: It's hard enough to survive a transplant, people shouldn't have to survive the waiting list too.

And Judd Kessler is their resident economist, so they're off to a good start.

They say: "Organize and its partners are doing whatever we can to register more donors, and are trying to build a system that makes it as easy as possible to do so."

"Organize is committing to fix this.  Here’s how:

  • Streamlining the registration process to make it easier to enroll as a donor.
  • Creating more entry points to enroll as a donor.
  • Building tech solutions for state-registries to share information more easily.
  •  Supporting academic research around the registration process, and learning best practices for different audiences.
  • Empowering patients and their families to take part of the registration process."

Saturday, March 1, 2014

Abdulkadiroglu, Angrist and Pathak on exam schools

In Econometrica;

January 2014 - Volume 82 Issue 1 Page 137 - 196

p.137

The Elite Illusion: Achievement Effects at Boston and New York Exam Schools

Atila Abdulkadiroğlu
Joshua Angrist
Parag Pathak

Abstract


Parents gauge school quality in part by the level of student achievement and a school's racial and socioeconomic mix. The importance of school characteristics in the housing market can be seen in the jump in house prices at school district boundaries where peer characteristics change. The question of whether schools with more attractive peers are really better in a value-added sense remains open, however. This paper uses a fuzzy regression-discontinuity design to evaluate the causal effects of peer characteristics. Our design exploits admissions cutoffs at Boston and New York City's heavily over-subscribed exam schools. Successful applicants near admissions cutoffs for the least selective of these schools move from schools with scores near the bottom of the state SAT score distribution to schools with scores near the median. Successful applicants near admissions cutoffs for the most selective of these schools move from above-average schools to schools with students whose scores fall in the extreme upper tail. Exam school students can also expect to study with fewer nonwhite classmates than unsuccessful applicants. Our estimates suggest that the marked changes in peer characteristics at exam school admissions cutoffs have little causal effect on test scores or college quality.

Friday, February 28, 2014

Honors flow both ways at Pitt

I'm going to applaud and be applauded at one of my favorite universities, where I taught from 1982-1998.

Nobel Laureate Alvin E. Roth to Address Pitt’s Honors Convocation

Economist conducted much of his Nobel-lauded research on matching theory at Pitt

PITTSBURGH—Alvin E. Roth, co-winner of the 2012 Nobel Prize in economics, will be the keynote speaker at the University of Pittsburgh’s 38th annual Honors Convocation, to be held at 3 p.m. Feb. 28 in Carnegie Music Hall, 4400 Forbes Ave., Oakland. All members of the University community are invited to attend.
Honors Convocation recognizes the accomplishments and contributions of Pitt alumni, faculty, staff, and students. Chancellor Mark A. Nordenberg will preside over the celebratory event. He will bestow an honorary doctoral degree on Roth, who began and completed much of the economics research for which he won the Nobel Prize while serving as Pitt’s first Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Economics from 1982 to 1998. Roth is now the Craig and Susan McCaw Professor of Economics at Stanford University and the George Gund Professor of Economics and Business Administration Emeritus at Harvard University.
“The University’s Honors Convocation recognizes the significant achievements of Pitt people who are pursuing academic, scholarly, and professional excellence in their fields,” said Chancellor Mark A. Nordenberg. “Our friend and former colleague Nobel Laureate Alvin Roth is an exemplary representative of the legacy of excellence that the University of Pittsburgh has established and upon which it continues to build. It will be a special pleasure to welcome him back to Pitt.”
Roth won the Nobel Prize along with Lloyd S. Shapley, professor emeritus of economics and mathematics at UCLA, for solving a key economic problem—how to match players in a market in the best possible way.
Beginning in the 1960s, Shapley developed a body of theoretical work in which he used Cooperative Game Theory to study matching. He found that it is important to find a “stable match,” meaning a match in which there are no two agents who would prefer one another over their current counterparts.
When Roth was a Pitt faculty member in the 1980s, he began using Shapley’s theoretical results to explain how matching happens in practice. He studied the medical job market and eventually began to implement his findings in existing programs like the National Resident Matching Program that matches newly minted doctors with residency positions at hospitals. In another case, he worked with Pitt economics alumnus M. Utku Ünver (A&S ’97G, ’00G) on a study that led to improvements in the design of a program to match kidney donors with compatible kidney recipients. He also has assisted with developing a system for matching students with schools.
When announcing the prize in 2012, the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences said of Roth and Shapley: “Even though these two researchers worked independently of one another, the combination of Shapley’s basic theory and Roth’s empirical investigations, experiments, and practical design has generated a flourishing field of research and improved the performance of many markets. This year’s prize is awarded for an outstanding example of economic engineering.”
While at Pitt, Roth was the recipient of the 1992 Chancellor’s Distinguished Research Award. He also served as a Fellow in the Center for Philosophy of Science and a professor of business administration in the Joseph M. Katz Graduate School of Business. His work was also influential in developing the field of experimental economics at the University.
“Central to Prof. Roth’s work on market design has been the use of theory and laboratory experiments. Under his leadership, the Department of Economics at Pitt became, and is still regarded as being, one of the leaders in experimental economics,” said Lise Vesterlund, Pitt’s current Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Economics.

Thursday, February 27, 2014

McKay lecture at Pitt on Market Design

If you're in Pittsburgh, I'll be giving the McKay Lecture at my old home, the Department of Economics at Pitt.

Market Design: The Economist as Engineer




February 27, 2014 - 3:30pm to 5:00pm
The University of Pittsburgh Department of Economics proudly presents the 2014 McKay Lecture "Market Design: The Economist as Engineer" by Alvin Roth, Nobel Laureate in Economics.
Market design is an ancient human activity but a relatively new part of economics.  It seeks to understand how the design of markets and marketplaces influences their performance, to use this growing understanding to fix markets when they're broken, and to help to establish markets where they are missing. 
Mr. Roth is the Craig and Susan McCaw Professor of Economics at Standord University and the George Gund Professor of Economics and Business Administration Emeritus at Harvard University.  From 1982 to 1998, he was the Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Economics at Pitt.  He shared the 2012 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel.
Roth directed the redesign of the National Resident Matching Program, through which 23.000+ doctors a year find their first employment.  He also has helped to reorganize the market for more senior physicians as they pursue subspecialty training. He helped to design the matching systems for students in several large American cities.   He is among the founders and designers of kidney exchange in the United States (along with a number of colleagues with Pittsbugh connections), which helps incompatible patient-donor pairs to find lifesaving compatible kidneys for transplantation.

Location and Address

University of Pittsburgh
Frick Fine Arts Building
650 Schenley Drive
Pittsburgh, PA  15260

Directions and Parking Information

on street parking and Soldiers & Sailors Garage

Wednesday, February 26, 2014

Boston Globe on 2010 death of live liver donor

The Boston Globe had a story earlier this month recounting the events surrounding the 2010 death of a liver donor (about which they wrote and I blogged at the time: Live Liver donation tragedy).

Donor’s death shatters family, stuns surgeons: Pure generosity drove Paul Hawks to donate part of his liver to his desperately ill brother-in-law. Then disaster struck, and transplant medicine has had to rethink its rules.
By Liz Kowalczyk    FEBRUARY 02, 2014

Tuesday, February 25, 2014

Pros and cons of paying for kidneys, in the Journal of Medical Ethics

Some pros and cons on paying for kidneys in the Journal of Medical Ethics, March 2014, Volume 40, Issue 3

From the editors' summary in the first article ("The concise argument")"

"For over half a century the subject of organ transplantation has attracted ethical debate. One such ongoing debate, provoked by the severe scarcity of organs for transplantation and a concern to increase their supply, has been about why willing live donors should continue to be prohibited from offering their own organs for sale. Against allowing this, it has often been argued that prohibition protects people in poverty from being driven to, and then harmed by, this desperate last resort. But is that how such people in poverty themselves see it? From their point of view, it has been suggested, wouldn't it be reasonable to see prohibition as depriving them of their best option, leaving them worse off than if they had been able to exercise it? Isn't the claim to protect people in poverty therefore ‘misplaced paternalism’, providing no ethical justification for prohibition?

"In this month's feature article, Simon Rippon (see page 145, Editor's choice) mounts a serious and sustained challenge to that conclusion. He argues that while it would be reasonable for people in poverty to sell their organs if given the option, it would be equally reasonable, given the ‘significant and unavoidable’ harms of a live organ donor market, for them to prefer not to have this option at all. In her commentary on Rippon's paper, Janet Radcliffe-Richards (see page 152) acknowledges that ‘a plausible case for prohibition would probably take this form’, but goes on to argue that ‘although in principle prohibition need not be paternalistic, in practice it is’, since it ‘has been imposed on everyone irrespective of any consultation’. To this, and two further commentaries, by Gerald Dworkin (see page 151) and by Adrian Walsh (see page 153), Rippon responds (see page 155) in a significant contribution to a debate that nevertheless seems likely to continue unabated as long as the need for whole organs continues so greatly to exceed their supply."

The concise argument

Feature article

  • Editor's ChoiceFREE

Commentaries

Clinical ethics