Showing posts sorted by relevance for query school AND Francisco OR SF. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query school AND Francisco OR SF. Sort by date Show all posts

Friday, July 14, 2023

Harm reduction is not a panacea: drug use and drug policy in Portugal, and San Francisco

 The Washington Post has a story about Portugal, and the SF Chronicle has one as well. Both stories touch on the tensions between treating drug addicts with respect, and assuring that cities remain safe and livable.  

Here's the Washington Post:

Once hailed for decriminalizing drugs, Portugal is now having doubts  By Anthony Faiola and Catarina Fernandes Martins

"Portugal decriminalized all drug use, including marijuana, cocaine and heroin, in an experiment that inspired similar efforts elsewhere, but now police are blaming a spike in the number of people who use drugs for a rise in crime. In one neighborhood, state-issued paraphernalia — powder-blue syringe caps, packets of citric acid for diluting heroin — litters sidewalks outside an elementary school.

"Porto’s police have increased patrols to drug-plagued neighborhoods. But given existing laws, there’s only so much they can do. 

...

"Portugal became a model for progressive jurisdictions around the world embracing drug decriminalization, such as the state of Oregon, but now there is talk of fatigue. Police are less motivated to register people who misuse drugs and there are year-long waits for state-funded rehabilitation treatment even as the number of people seeking help has fallen dramatically. The return in force of visible urban drug use, meanwhile, is leading the mayor and others here to ask an explosive question: Is it time to reconsider this country’s globally hailed drug model?

“These days in Portugal, it is forbidden to smoke tobacco outside a school or a hospital. It is forbidden to advertise ice cream and sugar candies. And yet, it is allowed for [people] to be there, injecting drugs,” said Rui Moreira, Porto’s mayor. “We’ve normalized it.”

...

" In the United States alone, overdose deaths, fueled by opioids and deadly synthetic fentanyl, topped 100,000 in both 2021 and 2022 — or double what it was in 2015. According to the National Institutes of Health, 85 percent of the U.S. prison population has an active substance use disorder or was jailed for a crime involving drugs or drug use.

"Across the Atlantic in Europe, tiny Portugal appeared to harbor an answer. In 2001, it threw out years of punishment-driven policies in favor of harm reduction by decriminalizing consumption of all drugs for personal use, including the purchase and possession of 10-day supplies. Consumption remains technically against the law, but instead of jail, people who misuse drugs are registered by police and referred to “dissuasion commissions.” 

...Other countries have moved to channel drug offenses out of the penal system too. But none in Europe institutionalized that route more than Portugal. Within a few years, HIV transmission rates via syringes — one the biggest arguments for decriminalization — had plummeted. From 2000 to 2008, prison populations fell by 16.5 percent. Overdose rates dropped as public funds flowed from jails to rehabilitation. There was no evidence of a feared surge in use.

...

"But in the first substantial way since decriminalization passed, some Portuguese voices are now calling for a rethink of a policy that was long a proud point of national consensus. Urban visibility of the drug problem, police say, is at its worst point in decades

...

"A newly released national survey suggests the percent of adults who have used illicit drugs increased to 12.8 percent in 2022, up from 7.8 in 2001, though still below European averages.

...

"Porto’s mayor and other critics, including neighborhood activist groups, are not calling for a wholesale repeal of decriminalization — but rather, a limited re-criminalization in urban areas and near schools and hospitals to address rising numbers of people misusing drugs."

...

"After years of economic crisis, Portugal decentralized its drug oversight operation in 2012. A funding drop from 76 million euros ($82.7 million) to 16 million euros ($17.4 million) forced Portugal’s main institution to outsource work previously done by the state to nonprofit groups,

...

"Twenty years ago, “we were quite successful in dealing with the big problem, the epidemic of heroin use and all the related effects,” Goulão said in an interview with The Washington Post. “But we have had a kind of disinvestment, a freezing in our response … and we lost some efficacy.”

*******

And here are some related paragraphs about San Francisco, in a story in the San Francisco Chronicle about a concentration of drug dealers from Honduras:

THIS IS THE HOMETOWN OF SAN FRANCISCO’S DRUG DEALERS By Megan Cassidy and Gabrielle Lurie |  July 10, 2023

"Like many other U.S. cities, San Francisco shifted years ago to treating drug use more like a disease than a crime. The heavy policing approach of the War on Drugs era failed to slow dealers or decrease demand while overcrowding jails and disproportionately punishing people of color, studies show.

"Now one of the most progressive cities in the nation is fracturing over concerns that it has become too permissive. What to do about the Honduran dealers is a key political issue as a major citywide election approaches in 2024.

"On a weekday afternoon in June, a man in his early 30s lay motionless on a SoMa sidewalk outside the Federal Building. On his right, a dozen users smoked fentanyl and crack cocaine or hung bent at the waist, heads suspended at their knees. To his left, a handful of dealers, cloaked in black but for the space around their eyes, continued selling while a passerby revived the man with Narcan, the nasal-spray antidote to opioid overdoses, and as paramedics arrived to treat him a few minutes later.

“I’m so mad at them for ruining my neighborhood,” said Kevin DeMattia, who owns Emperor Norton’s bar and has lived in the Tenderloin for the past 25 years. “Businesses are dying because people don’t want to come to the Tenderloin.  They’re ruining the neighborhood in so many ways. They’re poisoning people. … They’re this cancer, this aggressive, metastasizing cancer on the Tenderloin — the dealers and the addicts.”


Wednesday, November 10, 2010

School choice in San Francisco: a promise of transparency

San Francisco school board member Rachel Norton blogs about the most recent school board meeting this week, concerning the new SF school choice algorithm, which they are now implementing in house (see this earlier post, and a followup interview).

The latest news sounds good regarding plans for transparency. Norton writes:

"Staff did pledge to make the documentation of the algorithm requirements and process flows public by February; I will continue to push to make the assignment algorithm itself open source."

Wednesday, August 4, 2010

School choice in Darebin City, Victoria, Australia

It sounds like at least one school district in Australia has less bureaucracy than my colleagues and I have encountered in helping American cities reorganize their school assignment systems. Kwanghui Lim at CoRE Economics reports: Game Theory in Action: Sven Feldmann on Kindergarten Matching.

More on school choice here, and here. (And here is a video of Muriel Niederle presenting a new school choice algorithm to the San Francisco school board meeting that gave the go ahead for a redesign there.)

Monday, November 10, 2014

Matching and Market Design at INFORMS in San Francisco, Monday, Nov 10

More matching and market design today:

Cluster : Auctions

Session Information : Monday Nov 10, 13:30 - 15:00

Title: Analysis of Matching Markets
Chair: Thayer Morrill,NC State University, NC, thayer_morrill@ncsu.edu

Abstract Details

Title: New Algorithms for Fairness and Efficiency in Course Allocation
Presenting Author: Hoda Atef Yekta,PhD Candidate, University of Connecticut, School of Business, 2100 Hillside Road Unit 1041, Storrs CT 06269, United States of America, Hoda.AtefYekta@business.uconn.edu
Co-Author: Robert Day,University of Connecticut, 2100 Hillside Road, U-1041, Storrs CT, United States of America, Bob.Day@business.uconn.edu
Abstract: This research formulates the course allocation problem as a multi objective mathematical model considering both efficiency and measures of fairness. Results of four proposed heuristic algorithms are compared with existing mechanisms and we show that our new algorithms can improve both efficiency and fairness of the results.
Title: Internally Stable Matchings and Exchanges
Presenting Author: Yicheng Liu,liuyicheng1991@hotmail.com
Co-Author: Pingzhong Tang,Assistant Professor, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China, kenshinping@gmail.com
Abstract: We propose an alternative notion of stability for matchings and exchanges, coined internal stability, which only requires stability among matched agents. For internal stability, we analyze the social welfare bounds and computational complexity. Our results indicate that internal stability addresses both the social welfare and computational difficulties associated with traditional stability.
Title: The Secure Boston Mechanism
Presenting Author: Thayer Morrill,NC State University, NC, thayer_morrill@ncsu.edu
Co-Author: Umut Dur,umutdur@gmail.com
Robert Hammond,robert_hammond@ncsu.edu
Abstract: We introduce a new algorithm that is a hybrid between the Boston and Deferred Acceptance algorithm. While not strategy-proof, this ``secure’’ Boston algorithm significantly reduces the incentive for students to strategically manipulate their reported preferences while maintaining the desirable feature of the Boston mechanism of assigning as many students as feasible to their favorite school. We run an experiment in order to test the performance of our new assignment procedure.
Title: Two-sided Matching with Incomplete Information
Presenting Author: Sushil Bikhchandani,UCLA Anderson School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles CA, United States of America, sushil.bikhchandani@anderson.ucla.edu
Abstract: Stability in a two-sided matching model with non-transferrable utility (NTU), interdependent preferences, and one-sided incomplete information is investigated. The notion of incomplete-information stability used here is similar to that of Liu et al. (2014). With anonymous preferences, all strictly individually-rational matchings are incomplete-information stable. An ex post incentive-compatible mechanism exists for this model. Extensions to two-sided incomplete information are investigated.

Cluster : Applied Probability Society

Session Information : Monday Nov 10, 08:00 - 09:30

Title: Matching in Markets
Chair: Ciamac Moallemi,Barbara and Meyer Feldberg Associate Professor of Business, Columbia Business School, 3022 Broadway, Uris 416, New York NY 10027, United States of America, ciamac@gsb.columbia.edu
Co-Chair: Costis Maglaras,Columbia Business School, New York NY, United States of America, cm479@columbia.edu

Abstract Details

Title: Dynamic Matching Markets with an Application in Residential Real Estate
Presenting Author: Hua Zheng,Columbia Business School, 3022 Broadway, Uris 4S, New York NY 10027, United States of America, hzheng14@gsb.columbia.edu
Co-Author: Costis Maglaras,Columbia Business School, New York NY, United States of America, cm479@columbia.edu
Ciamac Moallemi,Barbara and Meyer Feldberg Associate Professor of Business, Columbia Business School, 3022 Broadway, Uris 416, New York NY 10027, United States of America, ciamac@gsb.columbia.edu
Abstract: We study a dynamic microstructure model of a dynamic market where buyers and sellers arrive stochastically over time, and are heterogeneous with respect to their product characteristics and preferences and their idiosyncratic financial information. We analyze its dynamics, market depth, and buyer/seller bidding strategies. The motivating application stems from residential real estate.
Title: Optimal Allocation without Money: An Engineering Approach
Presenting Author: Itai Ashlagi,MIT, 100 Main st., Cambridge MA, United States of America, iashlagi@mit.edu
Co-Author: Peng Shi,MIT, 70 Pacific St, Apt. 348C, Cambridge MA 02139, United States of America, pengshi@mit.edu
Abstract: We study the allocation of heterogeneous services to agents without monetary transfers under incomplete information. The social planner's goal is to maximize a possibly complex public objective. We take an ``engineering'' approach, in which we solve a large market approximation, and convert the solution into a feasible finite market mechanism that still yields good results. We apply this framework to real data from Boston to design a mechanism that assigns students to public schools.
Title: Managing Congestion in Dynamic Matching Markets
Presenting Author: Nick Arnosti,Stanford University, Stanford CA, United States of America, narnosti@stanford.edu
Co-Author: Ramesh Johari,Stanford University, Huang 311, Stanford CA, United States of America, ramesh.johari@stanford.edu
Yash Kanoria,Columbia Business School, 404 Uris Hall, New York NY 10027, United States of America, ykanoria@columbia.edu
Abstract: It is often costly for agents in matching markets to determine whether potential partners are interested in forming a match. This creates friction in the marketplace, lowering welfare for all participants. We use a dynamic model to quantitatively study this effect. We demonstrate that by reducing visibility, the market operator may benefit both sides of the market. Somewhat counter-intuitively, benefits of showing fewer sellers to each buyer are greatest when there is a shortage of sellers.


Cluster :
 Auctions

Session Information : Monday Nov 10, 16:30 - 18:00

Title: Dynamic Matching Markets
Chair: John Dickerson,CMU, 9219 Gates-Hillman Center, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh PA 15213, United States of America, dickerson@cs.cmu.edu

Abstract Details

Title: Dynamic Matching Using Approximate Dynamic Programming
 Presenting Author: Nikhil Bhat,Columbia University, nbhat15@gsb.columbia.edu
 Co-Author: Ciamac Moallemi,Barbara and Meyer Feldberg Associate Professor of Business, Columbia Business School, 3022 Broadway, Uris 416, New York NY 10027, United States of America, ciamac@gsb.columbia.edu
 
Abstract: We provide tractable algorithms for a large number of challenging dynamic decision making problems such as 1) Allocation of cadaveric kidneys to patients, 2) Matching ads with impressions, 3) Cyclic paired transfer of kidneys, by analyzing them using a general model. Our policies are easy to compute and interpret, and further come with approximation guarantees. With simulation experiments on kidney allocation, we show that we obtain gain over existing algorithms in literature.
  
Title: Dynamic Matching Market Design
 Presenting Author: Mohammad Akbarpour,Stanford University, 579 Serra Mall, 265F, Stanford CA 94305, United States of America, mohamwad@stanford.edu
 Co-Author: Shengwu Li,Stanford University, 579 Serra Mall, 265B, Stanford CA 94305, United States of America, shengwu@stanford.edu
 Shayan Oveis Gharan,UC Berkeley, Berkeley Ca 94105, United States of America, oveisgharan@berkeley.edu
 
Abstract: We show that, in dynamic matching markets, waiting to thicken the market can be substantially more important than increasing the speed of transactions. In particular, simple local algorithms that wait to thicken the market can perform very close to optimal algorithms. We prove our claims by analyzing a simple but illuminating model of dynamic matching in networked markets where agents arrive and depart stochastically.
  
Title: The Roles of Common and Private Information in Two-Sided Matching with Interviews
 Presenting Author: Sanmay Das,Associate Professor, Washington University in St. Louis, sanmay@seas.wustl.edu
 Co-Author: Zhuoshu Li,Washington Univ. in St. Louis, One Brookings Dr, CB 1045, Saint Louis MO 63130, United States of America, zhuoshuli@wustl.edu
 
Abstract: We consider two sided matching markets where employers have a fixed budget for the number of applicants they may interview. Employers receive noisy signals of how good each applicant is, and these signals include common and private components. We analyze how the strengths of these two components affect matching outcomes (both differentially across different quality candidates, and in the aggregate number of matches) when decisions about whom to interview are strategic.
  
Title: FutureMatch: Learning to Match in Dynamic Environments
 Presenting Author: John Dickerson,CMU, 9219 Gates-Hillman Center, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh PA 15213, United States of America, dickerson@cs.cmu.edu
 Co-Author: Tuomas Sandholm,Carnegie Mellon University, 5000 Forbes Ave., Pittsburgh PA 15213, United States of America, sandholm@cs.cmu.edu
 
Abstract: Kidney exchange, an innovation where willing but incompatible donor-patient pairs can exchange organs, is inherently dynamic. We present FutureMatch, an empirical framework for learning to match in a general dynamic model. We validate it on real data. Not only does dynamic matching result in more expected transplants than myopic, but even dynamic matching under economically inefficient (equitable) objectives can result in significant increases in social welfare over efficient myopic matching.
  

Friday, January 3, 2020

ASSA meetings in San Diego--Market design on Friday

The ASSA meetings are a cornucopia.  Here are some sessions related to market design that caught my eye in the preliminary program for the first day of conferencing, Friday January 3. No one can go to all of them, aside from interviewing junior market candidates, some of these sessions conflict with each other...:-(

Frontiers in Market Design
Paper Session
 Friday, Jan. 3, 2020   8:00 AM - 10:00 AM
 Marriott Marquis San Diego, Catalina
Hosted By: ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY
Chair: Eric Budish, University of Chicago
Targeting In-Kind Transfers through Market Design: A Revealed Preference Analysis of Public Housing Allocation
Daniel Waldinger, New York University

Approximating the Equilibrium Effects of Informed School Choice
Claudia Allende, Columbia University and Princeton University
Francisco Gallego, Pontifical Catholic University of Chile
Christopher Neilson, Princeton University

The Efficiency of A Dynamic Decentralized Two-Sided Matching Market
Tracy Liu, Tsinghua University
Zhixi Wan, Didi Chuxing
Chenyu Yang, University of Rochester

Will the Market Fix the Market? A Theory of Stock Exchange Competition and Innovation
Eric Budish, University of Chicago
Robin Lee, Harvard University
John Shim, University of Chicago

When Do Cardinal Mechanisms Outperform Ordinal Mechanisms?: Operationalizing Pseudomarkets
Hulya Eraslan, Rice University
Jeremy Fox, Rice University
Yinghua He, Rice University
Yakym Pirozhenko, Rice University
*********
Search and Matching in Education Markets
Paper Session
 Friday, Jan. 3, 2020   10:15 AM - 12:15 PM (PST)
 Marriott Marquis San Diego, Rancho Santa Fe 2
Hosted By: AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
Chair: Eric Budish, University of Chicago

Simultaneous Search: Beyond Independent Successes
Ran Shorrer, Pennsylvania State University

Search Costs, Biased Beliefs and School Choice under Endogenous Consideration Sets
Christopher Neilson, Princeton University
Claudia Allende, Columbia University
Patrick Agte, Princeton University
Adam Kapor, Princeton University

Facilitating Student Information Acquisition in Matching Markets
Nicole Immorlica, Microsoft Research
Jacob Leshno, University of Chicago
Irene Lo, Stanford University
Brendan Lucier, Microsoft Research

Why Are Schools Segregated? Evidence from the Secondary-School Match in Amsterdam
Hessel Oosterbeek, University of Amsterdam
Sandor Sovago, University of Groningen
Bas van der Klaauw, VU University Amsterdam

***********
Market Design
Paper Session
 Friday, Jan. 3, 2020   10:15 AM - 12:15 PM
 Marriott Marquis San Diego, Del Mar
Hosted By: ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY
Chair: Sergei Severinov, University of British Columbia

Market Design and Walrasian Equilibrium
Faruk Gul, Princeton University
Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Princeton University
Mu Zhang, Princeton University

Repeat Applications in College Admissions
Yeon-Koo Che, Columbia University
Jinwoo Kim, Seoul National University
Youngwoo Koh, Hanyang University

Entry-Proofness and Market Breakdown under Adverse Selection
Thomas Mariotti, Toulouse School of Economics

Who Wants to Be an Auctioneer?
Sergei Severinov, University of British Columbia
Gabor Virag, University of Toronto
**********
Transportation Economics
Paper Session
 Friday, Jan. 3, 2020   10:15 AM - 12:15 PM (PST)
 Marriott Marquis San Diego, La Costa
Hosted By: ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY
Chair: Tobias Salz, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

The Selection of Prices and Commissions in a Spatial Model of Ride-Hailing
Cemil Selcuk, Cardiff University

The Welfare Effect of Road Congestion Pricing: Experimental Evidence and Equilibrium Implications
Gabriel Kreindler, University of Chicago

Customer Preference and Station Network in the London Bike Share System
Elena Belavina, Cornell University
Karan Girotra, Cornell University
Pu He, Columbia University
Fanyin Zheng, Columbia University

Platform Design in Ride Hail: An Empirical Investigation
Nicholas Buchholz, Princeton University
Laura Doval, California Institute of Technology
Jakub Kastl, Princeton University
Filip Matejka, Charles University and Academy of Science
Tobias Salz, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
**********

Information (Design), Black Markets, and Congestion
Paper Session
 Friday, Jan. 3, 2020   2:30 PM - 4:30 PM
 Manchester Grand Hyatt San Diego, Torrey Hills AB
Hosted By: ECONOMIC SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
Chair: Dorothea Kuebler, WZB Berlin Social Science Center
An Experimental Study of Matching Markets with Incomplete Information
Marina Agranov, California Institute of Technology
Ahrash Dianat, University of Essex
Larry Samuelson, Yale University
Leeat Yariv, Princeton University

Information Design in Dynamic Contests: An Experimental Study
Yan Chen, University of Michigan
Mohamed Mostagir, University of Michigan
Iman Yeckehzaare, University of Michigan

How to Avoid Black Markets for Appointments with Online Booking Systems
Rustamdjan Hakimov, University of Lausanne
C.-Philipp Heller, NERA Economic Consulting
Dorothea Kuebler, WZB Berlin Social Science Center
Morimitsu Kurino, Keio University

Application Costs and Congestion in Matching Markets
Yinghua He, Rice University
Thierry Magnac, Toulouse School of Economics

Discussant(s)
Christian Basteck, ECARES Brussels
Lionel Page, University of Technology Sydney
Robert Hammond, University of Alabama
Ahrash Dianat, University of Essex
*******

Tech Economics
Paper Session
 Friday, Jan. 3, 2020   2:30 PM - 4:30 PM
 Marriott Marquis San Diego, San Diego Ballroom A
Hosted By: NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR BUSINESS ECONOMICS
Chair: Michael Luca, Harvard Business School

GDPR and the Home Bias of Venture Investment
Jian Jia, Illinois Institute of Technology
Ginger Jin, University of Maryland
Liad Wagman, Illinois Institute of Technology

New Goods, Productivity and the Measurement of Inflation: Using Machine Learning to Improve Quality Adjustments
Victor Chernozhukov, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Patrick Bajari, Amazon

Double Randomized Online Experiments
Guido Imbens, Stanford University
Patrick Bajari, Amazon


Tuesday, February 23, 2010

Choosing schools (in NYC and SF)

I've written elswhere about the school choice process for public schools in San Francisco and for high schools in New York City. But, regardless of whether the process is a good one or not, the problem facing parents who have to decide how much they like each school can be a tough one, especially if there are a lot of schools.

Two articles help you feel the pain:

New Plan on School Selection, but Still Discontent discusses San Francisco, and
It’s a nightmare to apply for high schools in city discusses New York.

Some more background information here.

HT: Parag Pathak

Sunday, November 21, 2010

Strategy-proofness and strategy sets: residency fraud in school choice

When we speak of strategy-proofness in the context of school choice, we are most often speaking about whether it is safe for parents to reveal their true preferences when asked to submit a rank ordering of possible school assignments. Of course, parents have other private information as well, and they may have incentives to misprepresent that also.

I'm reminded of this by the fact that the San Francisco Unified School District has recently sent a letter to the address of record to each student regarding an Amnesty Period for Residency Fraud.
(It includes the line "This letter is directed to families that have committed residency fraud. Parents/Guardians who have never submitted false residency information to the District may disregard this letter.")

Monday, March 26, 2012

Joel Klein on school choice

Joel Klein, who was Chancellor of NYC schools when school choice was introduced in New York City high schools, writes in the Daily News: Harness the power of school choice: Competition works in education, too


Of course, details matter: see yesterday's post on an effort that didn't quite work out as planned, in San Francisco. Yesterday's post also has links to some school choice efforts that seem quite promising, however.

Monday, April 30, 2018

Deferred rejection: longer college admission wait lists

College waiting lists are a bit of a misnomer--they aren't ordered lists, they are more like waiting pools from which candidates can be drawn if the yield from regular admissions falls short.

The WSJ has the story:
College Wait Lists Are Ballooning as Schools Struggle to Predict Enrollment
The chance of getting off the wait list has plummeted at many schools as the pool has expanded

"As hundreds of thousands of high-school seniors face a May 1 deadline to put down deposits at their college of choice, many still face uncertainty over where they will end up. Their futures are clouded by the schools’ use of wait lists to make sure they have the right number, and type, of students come fall.

"The University of Virginia increased the number of applicants invited onto wait lists by 68% between 2015 and 2017. At Lehigh University, that figure rose by 54%. And at Ohio State University, it more than tripled.
...
"[Carnegie Mellon University], with a target of 1,550 freshmen, offered wait-list spots to just over 5,000 applicants this year.

"“You can take stock and ‘fix’ or refine the class by gender, income, geography, major or other variables,” said Jon Reider, director of college counseling at San Francisco University High School. “A large waiting list gives you greater flexibility in filling these gaps.”

"This year, applications to Carnegie Mellon rose 19%. With more students accepting its offers of admission, it couldn’t risk over-enrolling. The school admitted 500 fewer students and expects to go to some of its wait lists to make sure each undergraduate program meets enrollment goals, and that there is a good mix of students, including enough aspiring English majors or kids from South Dakota. The school can also take into account the financial situations of wait-listed candidates."

Monday, March 22, 2021

Elite public schools move away from exams

 Covid cancelled exams for many exam schools: will they stay exam free in the future?  Several cities are moving in that direction.

Here's NBC, on Boston Latin:

A golden ticket: Efforts to diversify Boston's elite high schools spur hope and outrage. Exam schools loom large as symbols of opportunity and inequality in American public schools. Now, the nation's twin crises are shaking them to their core.  By Melissa Bailey, The Hechinger Report


Here's SF Chronicle on Lowell High School:

S.F. school board strips Lowell High of its merit-based admissions system  by Jill Tucker

"the San Francisco Board of Education voted 5-2 to use the same lottery-based system to assign students to Lowell High as other district high schools instead of maintaining the previous system that used test scores and grades."


Here's the NY Times on gifted programs for the youngest children:

N.Y.C. schools will replace the gifted and talented admissions exam with a lottery this year. By Eliza Shapiro

Friday, March 20, 2015

The residency match in Otolaryngology

A recent paper looks at the resident match in Otolarygology, in the context of the overall resident match.

State of Otolaryngology Match: Has Competition Increased since the ‘‘Early’’
Match?  by Cristina Cabrera-Muffly, Jeanelle Sheeder, and Mona Abaza, in the journal Otolaryngology--Head Neck Surgert 2015 Feb 24

"Over the past 60 years, the United States residency match process and characteristics of medical students applying to the match have changed considerably. Centralized matching of postgraduate training positions was successfully implemented nationwide in 1952.1 At that time, just over 10,000 positions were offered through the match. In the 2013 match cycle, there were almost 50 different specialties that offer PGY-1 positions through the National Residency Matching Program (NRMP) match and a total of 26,392 positions offered.2
In 2006, in response to concerns about physician shortages, the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) recommended an increase in the number of medical student postions.3 There was an overwhelming response among allopathic programs in both new schools (13 have matriculated their first class since 2006) and larger class sizes in established schools, with rosters expanding 15% to 18%.3,4 Meanwhile, osteopathic medical schools have doubled in number from 15 to 30 over the past 20 years.3 Therefore, the overall number of graduating medical students has increased considerably, reaching an all-time high in 2013.5 This has a direct effect on the quantity of medical students seeking any residency position, including otolaryngology.
The otolaryngology match has also undergone several iterations since its beginnings. In late 1977, otolaryngology and ophthalmology specialties officially separated.6 In 2006, the otolaryngology match transitioned from coordination by the San Francisco match (SF match) to become part of the NRMP. This transition altered the timeline of the application process in otolaryngology and potentially affected the applicant pool. Prior to 2006, the interview season for early match was generally from October to December, with the rank list submission deadline in early January. Match notification occurred in mid-January.7 This allowed applicants who did not match to complete a separate application for other specialties, although interview periods often overlapped. Once the NRMP began coordinating the otolaryngology match in 2006, the interview season was delayed to November through January, with the rank list submission deadline at the end of February. Match notification now occurs in mid-March.8
The change from the SF match to the NRMP match occurred as the required general surgery intern year became integrated with otolaryngology residencies, eliminating the need to separately interview for a preliminary general surgery position.9 Since 2006, otolaryngology programs have an integrated intern year, eliminating the need for a separate match. The early timing of the otolaryngology match allowed for applicants who did not match into otolaryngology to apply for a different specialty during the regular match of the same year through the NRMP. Applicants participating in the couples match during the early match likely found it more difficult to coordinate match cities when one partner applied to otolaryngology and the other to a regular match specialty. It is unclear whether the competitive nature or the couples match situation was considered when the match timing was changed.
...
"Over the past 16 years, we have seen an increase in the number of US seniors applying to residency. Fortunately, during the same time period, the number of first-year residency positions in all NRMP specialties increased as well. This rate of growth of residency positions appears to be consistent with the recommendation by the Council on Graduate Medical Education, who recommended increasing the number of first-year residents to 27,000 per year by 2015.4 In the same time frame, the number of unfilled NRMP residency positions has decreased by 55.8%. These positions are being filled by non–US seniors since the overall rate of applications and matches increased while the rate of US senior applications and matches stayed constant. Non–US seniors include prior US medical school graduates and IMG. IMG includes both US citizens attending medical school outside the United States and citizens of other countries attending international medical schools. Data suggest that the IMG portion of this group is filling the additional residency positions. In 2002, 18.6% of all NRMP positions were filled by IMG, while in 2013, IMG matched into 24.8% of NRMP positions. Meanwhile, the percentage of NRMP positions filled by prior US graduates has remained stable (between 2% and 3%). The decrease in percentage of unfilled positions is also due to increased IMG matching.
...
"The advantages of the otolaryngology conventional match are the elimination of one of the interview processes (since the preliminary general surgery intern year is now included), as well as improved ability for couples to match together."

Thursday, February 18, 2016

Congratulations to the winners of the Presidential Early Career Award for Scientists and Engineers (PECASE)

Here's the announcement from the NSF:

Twenty-one researchers nominated by the National Science Foundation receive awards for innovation, outreach in scientific community

and here's the list (one of which has "economics" in the citation...):

February 18, 2016
President Barack Obama today named 106 researchers as recipients of the Presidential Early Career Award for Scientists and Engineers (PECASE), granting them the U.S. government's highest award for scientists and engineers in the early stages of their independent research careers. The National Science Foundation (NSF) nominated 21 of the awardees.
PECASE recognizes scientists and engineers who show exceptional potential for leadership at the frontiers of scientific knowledge. Winners demonstrate the ability to broadly advance fundamental research and help the United States maintain its position as a leading producer of scientists and engineers.
"The awardees are outstanding scientists and engineers," said NSF Director France Córdova. "They are teacher-scholars who are developing new generations of outstanding scientists and engineers and ensuring this nation is a leading innovator. I applaud these recipients for their leadership, distinguished teaching and commitment to public outreach."
The NSF-nominated awardees come from universities around the country and excel in areas of science represented by NSF directorates: biology, computer and information science, education and human resources, engineering, geosciences, mathematics and physical sciences and social and behavioral sciences.
NSF vetted the research of its nominees through its rigorous peer review process. All of the NSF nominees have received five-year grants from the Faculty Early Career Development (CAREER) program. CAREER awardees have proven themselves exemplary in integrating research and education. Selection is highly competitive: in 2012, NSF funded fewer than 20 percent of the 2,612 CAREER award applicants.
The Office of Science and Technology Policy within the Executive Office of the President coordinated the PECASE awards, which were established by President Clinton in 1996. Awardees are selected on the basis of two criteria: pursuit of innovative research at the frontiers of science and technology and a commitment to community service as demonstrated through scientific leadership, public education or community outreach.
This year's NSF recipients are:
Adam Abate, University of California, San Francisco
For his development of microfluidic approaches for creating single-cell bioreactors that may be applied to massively parallel approaches in single-cell genomics and transcriptomics and that can be implemented across a variety of disciplines including evolutionary biology, immunology, and cancer biology and for his outreach to underrepresented groups and veterans.
Marcel Agüeros, Columbia University
For his groundbreaking research in stellar astrophysics, and for his restless desire to ensure that minority students in sciences become tomorrow's leaders.
Arezoo Ardekani, University of Notre Dame
For research aimed to fundamentally understand, model and control bacterial biofilm formation through imaginative computations and elegant experiments, and for demonstrated commitment to increase underrepresented minority participation in STEM-related research.
Cullen Buie, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
For research to create highly sensitive systems that probe microbial physiology and thereby illustrate the coupling of cell phenotypes with virulence, and to train a new generation of underreprented minority scientists who become faculty.
Erin Carlson, Indiana University
For discovery of chemistry underlying a new approach to treat antibiotic-resistant infections, for leadership in the chemistry and women-chemists communities, and for developing new hands-on laboratory activities to engage K-12 students in natural product chemistry.
Antonius Dieker, Georgia Tech Research Corporation
For outstanding research on the stochastic behavior in engineered and physical systems; and for educational activities involving high school, undergraduate and graduate students.
Erika Edwards, Brown University
For innovative research leading to exciting breakthroughs in understanding the drivers of plant evolutionary innovation, and particularly the evolution of plant form and photosynthesis systems, and for engaging public outreach on plant biology.
Julia Grigsby, Boston College
For her work on the invariants of 3-manifolds, running advanced workshops, training graduate and undergraduate students, contributions to increasing participation of women in mathematical sciences and introducing talented middle-school girls to research mathematics.
Todd Gureckis, New York University
For his innovative work at the boundary of cognitive science, learning science and machine learning; for his work with museums to enhance the learning potential for children; and for creating an integrated, multidisciplinary curriculum for computational cognitive science for the workforce of the 21st century.
Tessa Hill, University of California, Davis
For her transdisciplinary research that places modern ocean acidification and ocean oxygenation into a long-term Earth-system context, and for training and outreach to K-12 teachers and students that offers them a better understanding of ocean science and climate change through inquiry-based learning.
Daniel Krashen, University of Georgia
For his work on local-to-global principles, organizing conferences and workshops, training graduate students and serving as a role model to underrepresented minorities in mathematics.
Daniel McCloskey, College of Staten Island, City University of New York
For research combining modeling, neurophysiology and systems biology/network science that will transform the field of social neuroscience by providing a comprehensive approach towards understanding the role of neuropetides in complex behavioral systems.
Rahul Mangharam, University of Pennsylvania
For inventing a new formal methodology to test and verify the correct operation of medical device software, saving lives and reducing care costs.
David Masiello, University of Washington
For his cutting-edge research in the emerging field of theoretical molecular nanophotonics, and for his comprehensive educational and outreach programs including an exemplary focus on enhancing the scientific communication abilities of young researchers.
Shwetak Patel, University of Washington
For inventing low-cost, easy-to-deploy sensor systems that leverage existing infrastructures to enable users to track household energy consumption and make the buildings we live in more responsive to our needs.
Aaron Roth, University of Pennsylvania
For visionary research on protecting personal data via differential privacy, and outstanding outreach that fosters interaction between the many communities that study data privacy from theoretical computer science to economics.
Sayeef Salahuddin, University of California, Berkeley
For pioneering research on the foundations of nanostructures as new, low-power electronics with potential influence on energy efficient systems, and for impact on industry, education and mentoring future scientists.
Jakita Thomas, Spelman College
For her research on how African-American middle-school girls develop computational algorithmic thinking within the context of designing games, a research project that explores the challenges African-American girls face and their self-perceptions as problem-solvers while at the same time educating them in mathematics, programming and reasoning.
Joachim Walther, University of Georgia
For building research capacity in engineering education by defining quality in qualitative research methods and leading communities of practice in this research, germane to and commonly used in broadening participation efforts.
Kristen Wendell, University of Massachusetts Boston
For her outstanding research work on how to integrate a community-based engineering design model into pre-service science elementary school teachers focused on crosscutting concepts, disciplinary core ideas and scientific and engineering practices.
Benjamin Williams, University of CaliforniaLos Angeles
For a comprehensive vision to advance Terahertz quantum-cascade lasers and devices for communications, sensing and imaging, and for leadership in enhancing undergraduate and graduate student learning experiences.

Monday, November 7, 2011

What do policy makers want from a market design? And what would be the consequences of giving it to them? Clayton Featherstone on rank efficiency.

A surprising variety of allocation mechanisms, such as those used for school choice, ask participants to rank-order the alternatives; i.e. to indicate their first choice, second, third, and so forth. Not surprisingly, one thing that policy makers want to know about any proposed mechanism is how many people will receive their first choice, second, third, and so on.

Clayton Featherstone is a market designer who already has an unusual amount of experience in designing and implementing choice mechanisms. (If you recently got an assignment from Teach for America, or were assigned to a country for your global immersion requirement at HBS, you've benefited from his work.) His job market paper is an investigation of the properties of "rank efficient" mechanisms, which are designed to produce outcomes whose distribution of ranks can't be stochastically dominated:
Rank Efficiency: Investigating a Widespread Ordinal Welfare Criterion 

 Here's the Abstract: "Many institutions that allocate scarce goods based on rank-order preferences gauge the success of their assignments by looking at rank distributions, that is, at how many participants get their first choice, how many get their second choice, and so on. For example, San Francisco Unified School District, Teach for America, and Harvard Business School all evaluate assignments in this way. Preferences over rank distributions capture the practical (but non-Paretian) intuition that hurting one agent to help ten might be desirable. Motivated by this, call an assignment rank efficient if its rank distribution cannot feasibly be stochastically dominated. Rank efficient mechanisms are simple linear programs that can be solved either by a computer or through a sequential improvement process where at each step, the policy-maker executes a potentially non-Pareto-improving trade cycle. Both methods are used in the field. Preference data from Featherstone and Roth (2011)'s study of a strategy-proof match shows that if agents were to truthfully reveal their preferences, a rank efficient mechanism could significantly outperform alternatives like random serial dictatorship and the probabilistic serial mechanism. Rank efficiency also dovetails nicely with previous literature: it is a refinement of ordinal efficiency (and hence of ex post efficiency). Although rank efficiency is theoretically incompatible with strategy-proofness, rank efficient mechanisms can admit a truth-telling equilibrium in low information environments. Finally, a competitive equilibrium mechanism like that of Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) generates a straightforward generalization of rank efficiency and sheds light on how rank efficiency interfaces with fairness considerations."


Clayton’s paper also solves an empirical puzzle about those matching mechanisms that we see “in the wild”. The theory literature has paid a good deal of attention to ordinally efficient mechanisms, as first described by Bogomolnaia and Moulin, who showed that ordinal efficiency can be obtained through a class of “simultaneous eating” mechanisms. But, despite the appeal of ordinal efficiency, no one has ever reported that such mechanisms have been observed in use. Clayton shows that a class of linear programming mechanisms  and an equivalent class of incremental improvement mechanisms that we do observe in practice produce rank efficient outcomes. So, he shows, there are ordinally efficient mechanisms in use; just not those that were previously known to produce ordinally efficient outcomes before he showed that they produced rank efficient outcomes and that rank efficiency implies ordinal efficiency.

Clayton is an unusually experienced market designer whose field experience motivates novel theoretical insights. He's also a talented experimenter who studies market design issues in the lab. He's a Stanford Ph.D. who is finishing up a two-year postdoc with me at Harvard. His other papers are on his Stanford job market page; you could hire him this year.

Wednesday, October 20, 2021

NBER Market Design Working Group Meeting, Fall 2021

DATE October 21-23, 2021 (Times in EDT)

ORGANIZERS Michael Ostrovsky and Parag A. Pathak
NBER conferences are by invitation. All participants are expected to comply with the NBER's Conference Code of Conduct.

Thursday, October 21

12:00 pm
12:45 pm
1:30 pm
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3:30 pm

Friday, October 22

12:00 pm
12:45 pm
1:30 pm
2:00 pm
2:45 pm
3:30 pm

Saturday, October 23

12:00 pm
12:45 pm
1:30 pm
2:00 pm
2:45 pm
3:30 pm