Showing posts sorted by date for query Parag. Sort by relevance Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by date for query Parag. Sort by relevance Show all posts

Friday, August 5, 2022

Busing for schools in Boston and NYC, by Angrist, Gray-Lobe, Idoux & Pathak

 One of the spinoffs of the design of school choice systems in Boston, NYC and elsewhere is that it has opened up the empirical study of school effectiveness, by allowing economists to use some randomness in the assignments while controlling for family preferences to distinguish school effects from student selection.  It has turned out that it's hard to change test scores through school assignments, and neighborhoods remain important. But integration responds to voluntary choice, although the paper below doesn't find effects on college attendance after controlling for the selection of travel by students.

Still Worth the Trip? School Busing Effects in Boston and New York by Joshua Angrist, Guthrie Gray-Lobe, Clemence M. Idoux & Parag A. Pathak, NBER WORKING PAPER 30308  DOI 10.3386/w30308  July 2022

Abstract: "School assignment in Boston and New York City came to national attention in the 1970s as courts across the country tried to integrate schools. Today, district-wide choice allows Boston and New York students to enroll far from home, perhaps enhancing integration. Urban school transportation is increasingly costly, however, and has unclear integration and education consequences. We estimate the causal effects of non-neighborhood school enrollment and school travel on integration, achievement, and college enrollment using an identification strategy that exploits partly-random assignment in the Boston and New York school matches. Instrumental variables estimates suggest distance and travel boost integration for those who choose to travel, but have little or no effect on test scores and college attendance. We argue that small effects on educational outcomes reflect modest effects of distance and travel on school quality as measured by value-added."


"School transportation expenditures today are driven in part by the fact that many large urban school districts allow families to choose schools district-wide, lengthening school commutes for some. District-wide  choice  is  a  feature  of  school  assignment  in  Boston,  Chicago,  Denver,  Indianapolis,Newark,  New Orleans,  Tulsa,  and Washington,  DC, to name a few.  In choice districts,  seats at over-subscribed schools are typically allocated by algorithms that reflect family preferences in the form of a rank-order list and a limited set of school priorities.  ...  Choice in large urban districts is appealing because choice systems potentially decouple school assignment from underlying residential segregation.  Moreover, where school quality is unevenly distributed over neighborhoods, district-wide choice affords all students a shot at schoolsviewed as high-quality.

"This  paper  asks  whether  school  travel  in  the  modern  choice  paradigm  is  working  as  hoped, boosting integration and learning, especially for minority students.  Our investigation focuses on Boston and New York, two cities of special interest because of their high transportation costs and because they’ve long been battlegrounds in the fight over school integration.  We estimate the effects of non-neighborhood school enrollment for students for whom school travel is facilitated by school choice.  In both cities, students who opt for non-neighborhood schooling have higher test scores and are more likely to go to college than those who travel less.  But these estimates may reflect selection bias arising from the fact that more motivated or better-off families are more likely to travel. 

"We  solve  the  problem  of  selection  bias  using  the  conditional  random  assignment  to  schools embedded in Boston and New York’s school matching algorithms.  A given student may be offered a seat at a school in his or neighborhood, or a seat farther away.  Conditional on an applicant’s preferences  and  school  priorities,  modern  choice  algorithms  randomize  seat  assignment,  thereby manipulating distance and travel independently of potential outcomes.

...

" A parsimonious explanation for our findings, therefore, is that travel facilitates integration but does not translate into large enough changes in value-added to change education outcomes much."

Sunday, June 5, 2022

Econometric Society Summer School in Dynamic Structural Econometrics: Market Design

Market design isn't just about game theory these days:

Econometric Society Summer School in Dynamic Structural Econometrics: Market Design, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, August 15-20, 2022

Lecturers of the summer school and invited conference speakers include:

Nikhil Agarwal, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Irene Lo, Stanford University

Victoria Marone, University of Texas at Austin

Robert A. Miller, Carnegie Mellon University

Whitney Newey, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Advisory board: 

Ariel Pakes, Harvard University

Parag Pathak, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Paulo Somaini, Stanford Graduate School of Business

Daniel Waldinger, New York University

2022 organizers: 

Nikhil Agarwal, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Whitney Newey, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Monday, May 23, 2022

Gabe Carroll and Jamie Morgenstern win the Social Choice and Welfare Prize

Congratulations to Jamie Morgenstern and Gabe Carroll. Their joint prize is a sign of how economics and computer science are advancing both separately and together.

JAMIE MORGENSTERN AND  GABRIEL CARROLL RECEIVE THE ELEVENTH SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE PRIZE

"A jury composed of Pietro Ortovela (Princeton University), Ariel Procaccia (Harvard University), Szilvia Papai (Concordia Universtiy),  Arunava Sen (President of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare) and Marc Fleurbaey (Chair, President-elect of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare)  has chosen to award the eleventh Social Choice and Welfare Prize jointly to Gabriel Carroll (University of Toronto) and  Jamie Morgenstern (University of Washington).

"The purpose of the Social Choice and Welfare Prize is to honour young scholars of excellent accomplishment in the area of social choice theory and welfare economics. The laureate should be 40 years or less as of January of the year when the International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare is scheduled to take place. During this meeting, the prize winner(s) will give a plenary lecture. For more information about the prize, please click here.

"The SCW prize medal "La Pensée" ("The Thought") is due to Raymond Delamarre (1890-1986), a rather well-known French sculptor associated with what has been called "Art Deco" (Chrysler Building and Empire State Building in New York, the architects Mallet-Stevens or Le Corbusier in France). He is in particular famous for his work at the entrance of the Suez Canal. A web site: www.atelier-raymond-delamarre.fr.

PAST LAUREATES :

2020 : PIETRO ORTOLEVA and  ARIEL PROCACCIA 

2018 : GEORGY EGOROV and DEBASIS MISHRA

2016 : FUHITO KOJIMA  and PARAG PATHAK

2014 : VINCENT CONITZER and TIM ROUGHGARDEN

2012 : LARS EHLERS and ADAM MEIROWITZ

2010 : FRANZ DIETRICH and CHRISTIAN LIST

2008 : TAYFUN SOMNEZ

2006 : JOHN DUGGAN

2004 : FRANCOIS MANIQUET

2002 : MATTHEW JACKSON


Gabriel Caroll




University of Toronto

Monday, April 18, 2022

NYC plugs a school choice leak (of random numbers)

 Some time ago, Esther Duflo likened market design to plumbing. I think she had in mind construction plumbing, making sure the pipes are all tight. But there's also maintenance (and home repair) plumbing, which involves plugging new leaks.  Parag Pathak alerts me to such an issue in New York City's school choice system.

The NY Post has the story:

Parents uncover major glitch in NYC school lottery system  By Susan Edelman 

"A Manhattan mom discovered an embarrassing glitch in the city Department of Education lottery system used to match students with middle and high schools.

"When NYC students filled out their online applications for 2022-23, each kid automatically received a long string of random numbers from 0 to 9 mixed with lower-case letters from a to f. 

"The random numbers are used to determine the order in which students are matched to programs.

"Lottery numbers starting with 0 are most likely to land students in a school at the top of their list – 8th graders can rank up to 12 preferred high schools. 

...

"But as one 8th-grader’s mom figured out, if students canceled and re-started their applications – as the DOE permitted – they received a different lottery number each time. The loophole allowed users to potentially game the system by simply re-applying until a favorable lottery number popped up.

"Parent leaders alerted the DOE’s Chief Enrollment Officer, Sarah Kleinhandler, who was unaware of the snafu and promised to look into it. She did.

...

"The DOE said it was able to identify 163 students who received new lottery numbers – less than 1 percent of applicants. They included 121 students out of 71,000 high-school applicants, and 42 students out of 58,000 middle school applicants, a spokesman said.

"Students who received new lottery numbers after restarting their applications will get their first lottery numbers back, a spokeswoman told The Post."

**********

Speaking of home repairs, here's an earlier post about some self inflicted problems:

Tuesday, May 12, 2020

Monday, February 7, 2022

Market design at the Econometric Society summer school in Dynamic Structural Econometrics

 Here's an announcement that came by email from the Econometric Society (which reflects the continued evolution of market design):

ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY SUMMER SCHOOL in DYNAMIC STRUCTURAL ECONOMETRICS

Theme: Market Design

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

August 15–20, 2022

APPLY AT http://dseconf.org

DEADLINE: FRIDAY APRIL 1

We are pleased to announce the next event in the sequence of Econometric Society summer schools in Dynamic Structural Econometrics.

The primary focus of DSE summer schools is to provide early-stage PhD students with the tools to carry out research in the rapidly developing area of empirical market design with a strong emphasis on closely integrating economic and econometric theory in empirical work. The school covers the theoretical and methodological foundations in market design, the state-of-the-art methods for estimating models that are fundamental in this literature and providing an overview of open questions. We will use a variety of empirical applications to illustrate how these tools and methods are combined to address important applied questions.

The 2022 Econometric Society DSE summer school consists of 4 days of lectures held in conjunction with the Dynamic Structural Econometrics Conference 2022 (August 19-20). The conference brings together top junior and senior researchers from the field to discuss recent advances in theoretical and applied work. The summer school and the conference are hosted by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Lecturers of the summer school and invited conference speakers include:

Nikhil Agarwal (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Fedor Iskhakov (Australian National University)

Irene Lo (Stanford University)

Victoria Marone (University of Texas at Austin)

Robert A. Miller (Carnegie Mellon University)

Whitney Newey (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Ariel Pakes (Harvard University)

Parag Pathak (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

John Rust (Georgetown University)

Bertel Schjerning (University of Copenhagen)

Paulo Somaini (Stanford Graduate School of Business)

Daniel Waldinger (New York University)

Interested students and presenters are invited to submit their applications via the website http://dseconf.org. Application deadline is April 1, 2022.

Wednesday, December 1, 2021

School choice using deferred acceptance algorithms increases competition for selective schools, by Terrier, Pathak and Ren

 Here's a working paper from the LSE which concludes that making it safe for parents to truthfully report their preferences increases the competition for selective schools (called grammar schools, which prioritize students based on admission tests), with the unintended consequence of disadvantaging poorer families in England. The paper contains a good description of past and present school assignment regimes in England.

From immediate acceptance to deferred acceptance: effects on school admissions and achievement in England by Camille Terrier Parag A. Pathak and Kevin Ren,  Centre for Economic Performance Discussion Paper No.1815, November 2021


"Abstract: Countries and cities around the world increasingly rely on centralized systems to assign students to schools. Two algorithms, deferred acceptance (DA) and immediate acceptance (IA), are widespread. The latter is often criticized for harming disadvantaged families who fail to get access to popular schools. This paper investigates the effect of the national ban of the IA mechanism in England in 2008. Before the ban, 49 English local authorities used DA and 16 used IA. All IA local authorities switched to DA afterwards, giving rise to a cross-market difference-in-differences research design. Our results show that the elimination of IA reduces measures of school quality for low-SES students more than high-SES students. After the ban, low-SES students attend schools with lower value-added and more disadvantaged and low-achieving peers. This effect is primarily driven by a decrease in low-SES admissions at selective schools. Our findings point to an unintended consequence of the IA to DA transition: by encouraging high-SES parents to report their preferences truthfully, DA increases competition for top schools, which crowds out low-SES students."


And here are the paper's concluding sentences:

" In England, selective schools pick students based on test scores, which favors high-SES parents. After the transition to DA, high-SES parents enroll at these schools at higher rates. Selective admissions are widespread throughout education, so our results provide an important caution to equity rationales for DA over IA in settings where selective schools have large market share."

Wednesday, October 20, 2021

NBER Market Design Working Group Meeting, Fall 2021

DATE October 21-23, 2021 (Times in EDT)

ORGANIZERS Michael Ostrovsky and Parag A. Pathak
NBER conferences are by invitation. All participants are expected to comply with the NBER's Conference Code of Conduct.

Thursday, October 21

12:00 pm
12:45 pm
1:30 pm
2:00 pm
2:45 pm
3:30 pm

Friday, October 22

12:00 pm
12:45 pm
1:30 pm
2:00 pm
2:45 pm
3:30 pm

Saturday, October 23

12:00 pm
12:45 pm
1:30 pm
2:00 pm
2:45 pm
3:30 pm

Saturday, August 14, 2021

A lottery for antibody treatment, with slots reserved for vulnerable patients

 It's always good to see a collaboration between physicians and economists on allocating scarce resources, and here's a case report of allocating monoclonal antibodies in Boston (with some resemblance to school choice), forthcoming in the journal CHEST.

A novel approach to equitable distribution of scarce therapeutics: institutional experience implementing a reserve system for allocation of Covid-19 monoclonal antibodies  Emily Rubin, MD JD MSHP, Scott L. Dryden-Peterson, MD, Sarah P. Hammond, MD, Inga Lennes, MD MBA MPH, Alyssa R. Letourneau, MD MPH, Parag Pathak, PhD, Tayfun Sonmez, PhD, M. Utku Ãœnver, PhD.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chest.2021.08.003, To appear in: CHEST

"Background. In fall 2020, the Food and Drug Administration issued emergency use authorization for monoclonal antibody therapies (mAbs) for outpatients with Covid-19.  The Commonwealth of Massachusetts issued guidance outlining the use of a reserve system with a lottery for allocation of mAbs in the event of scarcity that would prioritize socially vulnerable patients for 20% of the infusion slots. The Mass General Brigham (“MGB”) health system subsequently implemented such a reserve system.

"Research Question. Can a reserve system be successfully deployed in a large health system in a way that promotes equitable access to mAb therapy among socially vulnerable patients with Covid-19?

...

"ResultsNotwithstanding multiple operational challenges, the reserve system for allocation of mAb therapy worked as intended to enhance the number of socially vulnerable patients who were offered and received mAb therapy. A significantly higher proportion of patients offered mAb therapy were socially vulnerable (27.0%) than would have been the case if the infusion appointments had been allocated using a pure lottery system without a vulnerable reserve (19.8%) and a significantly higher proportion of patient who received infusions were socially vulnerable (25.3%) than would have been the case if the infusion appointments had been allocated using a pure lottery system (17.6%)

...

"The reserve for vulnerable patients was a “soft” reserve, meaning that if there were not enough patients in either the high SVI or high incidence town categories to fill the vulnerable slots, those slots were allocated to patients who were next in line by overall lottery number. This was done in order to avoid unused capacity for a therapy that is time sensitive and requires significant infrastructure to provide. Once the lottery had been run, dedicated, primarily multilingual clinicians who had been trained to discuss the therapies with patients called patients to verify eligibility and engage in a shared-decision making conversation to determine whether the patient would like to receive an infusion.

Early experience with running the lottery prior to patient engagement revealed that a large number of patients declined the therapy once offered, were deemed ineligible once contacted, or wished to discuss the therapy with a trusted clinician. The process subsequently was changed to allow clinicians to enter referrals for their own patients once they established patient interest (“manual referrals”). 

...

"All of the 274 patients who were guaranteed slots and 206 of 368 patients on the wait list were called, for a total of 480 patients called. The number of wait list patients called on a given day was a function of both how many of the guaranteed slots were not filled and how much capacity there was in the system to make phone calls on any given day. Of those patients who were called, 132 (27.5%) declined, 33 (6.9%) were deemed ineligible by virtue of being asymptomatic, 19 (4.0%) were deemed ineligible by virtue of having severe symptoms, 11 (2.3%) had been or were planning to be infused elsewhere, 61 (12.7%) could not be reached, and 191 were infused (39.8% of those called and 9.7% of total referred patients).

...

"Had we operated a pure lottery with no reserve for socially vulnerable patients, and all other factors had remained constant, 19.8% of patients offered therapy (88) would have been in the top SVI quartile as opposed to 27.0% (120) in our actual population, and 17.6% of infused patients (32) would have been in the top SVI quartile as opposed to 25.3% (46) in our actual population.

...

"The system we describe is to our knowledge the first instance of a reserve system being used to allocate scarce resources at the individual level during a pandemic.

"A reserve system with lottery for tiebreaking within categories can be straightforward to operate if there are few or no steps between the assignment of lottery spots and the distribution of the good. This could be true, for example, of allocation of antiviral medications to inpatients with Covid-19. In the case of monoclonal antibody therapies, there were multiple factors that could and often did interrupt the trajectory between allocation and distribution. These included the complexity of administering infusion therapy, the time sensitive nature of the therapy, the relative paucity of evidence for the therapy at the time the mAb program started, and the dynamic nature of Covid-19. The conversations with patients about a therapy that held promise but did not yet have strong evidence to support its efficacy and had not been formally FDA approved were often challenging and time consuming. Many patients identified for allocation were difficult or impossible to reach. Others declined therapy once it was offered and discussed, or had become either too well or too sick to be candidates for the therapy once they were reached.

...

"Notwithstanding significant challenges, the reserve system implemented in our health system for allocation of mAb therapy worked as intended to enhance the number of socially vulnerable patients who were offered the therapy. A significantly higher proportion of socially vulnerable patients were offered mAb therapy than would have been if the infusion appointments had been allocated using a pure lottery system without a vulnerable reserve. The intended enhancement of the pool of vulnerable patients who actually received monoclonal antibody therapy was counterbalanced to some extent by the disproportionate number of vulnerable patients who declined therapy, but even fewer socially vulnerable patients would have received the therapy if the lottery system had not included a vulnerable reserve. 

Sunday, August 1, 2021

Market design, redesigned (in startups and university labs)

Market design is evolving, and new ways of organizing it are being explored. 

In my post yesterday, I talked about the early work on school choice that Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag Pathak, Tayfun Sonmez and I did under the auspices of Boston schools Superintendent Tom Payzant. The market design by economists in Boston, as with the earlier successful effort in New York City, was conducted as part of our research work as professors.  Not a penny changed hands, and we all felt good about that.

But if there was a flaw in that working arrangement, it was that no contracts were signed, and so as staff turnover took place in school districts, and the individuals we had dealt with departed, the district's institutional memory eroded, and they didn't always remember to turn to us when difficulties arose that we could have helped them with. Partly to address that, and to have at least one person able to devote time to approaching school districts, Parag and Atila and I supported Neil Dorosin in founding the non-profit  Institute for Innovation in Public School Choice, which during its lifetime helped school choice in a number of American cities, including Denver, New Orleans, and Washington D.C.

Parag and Atila went on to be founding members of MIT's School Effectiveness and Inequality Intiative, which just this week was "relaunched" with a different team as MIT Blueprint Labs, which aims to build on MIT's strengths not just in school choice but in a much wider area of market design and policy analysis, and to be a lab with a large staff and extensive fundraising:

Launch announcement of MIT Blueprint Labs


Featuring



 
Professor Parag Pathak
Faculty Director
MIT SEII / Blueprint Labs
Research spotlight: K-12 education

 


 
Professor Joshua Angrist
Faculty Director
MIT SEII / Blueprint Labs
Research spotlight: Higher education and the workforce

 


 
Professor Nikhil Agarwal
Faculty Director, Health Care
MIT SEII / Blueprint Labs
Research spotlight: Health care




 
Eryn Heying
Executive Director
MIT SEII / Blueprint Labs

 

****************

Update: and here's the Blueprint Labs new (announced Aug. 11) website: https://blueprintlabs.mit.edu/

***************

In a related development, Parag has cofounded a new for-profit Ed-tech startup called Avela, that plans to spread the technologies he's helped pioneer.  A for-profit firm has some funding, employment and investing opportunities that aren't available to non-profits or university labs, let alone to teams of professors organized informally. And as in the Blueprint Lab, they hope that the tools they will develop will be readily applicable to quite a broad range of matching markets and market designs.

***************
These various efforts look to me like design experiments themselves, in the search for sustainable ways of making market design a permanent part of not only the research that economists do, but of the practical effects we hope to foster.

Observing all this from the West Coast, and over several decades, I can't help noticing that these institutional changes have been accompanied by team changes, and shifting collaborations among market designers.  

There are also a growing number of different kinds of economists (and computer scientists, operations researchers and businesses) involved in designing and assessing markets, and market design has not only changed markets, but changed the way economists work, in many small and large ways.  Econometricians and development economists have led the way in organizing large labs, and market design may be heading in that direction as well. Big and small tech firms have also started to think of market design as among their core competencies, and as a discipline they should be hiring.
********************
Here in California, I'd be remiss if I didn't mention that my colleague Paul Milgrom has for a long time engaged in auction design through his for-profit company Auctionomics.
And Susan Athey is the faculty director of a big lab at Stanford using different technologies in other areas of market design:  the Golub Capital Social Impact Lab, which describes itself this way:

"We use digital technology and social science research to improve the effectiveness of leading social sector organizations.

"Based out of Stanford GSB, the lab is a research initiative of affiliated academics and staff, as well as researchers and students, who are passionate about conducting research that guides and improves the process of innovation.

"Research Approach

We collaborate with a wide range of organizations, from large firms to smaller startups, for-profits to nonprofits, and NGOs to governments, to conduct research. Then, we apply and disseminate our insights to achieve social impact at large scale."

Saturday, July 31, 2021

Tom Payzant, Boston schools superintendent who reformed school choice, dies at 80

 Tom Payzant played a critical role in transforming Boston's school choice from an immediate acceptance algorithm that exposed students and families to complex strategic risk when navigating the system, to a deferred acceptance algorithm that simplified their participation. As Superintendent of Boston Public Schools, Tom came to understand those issues well, and acted on them.

Here's his obit in the Boston Globe.

Thomas Payzant, whose education vision lifted Boston’s schools, dies at 80, By Bryan Marquard

and here's the statement from Boston Public Schools:

SUPERINTENDENT'S STATEMENT ON THE PASSING OF TOM PAYZANT


Here's a pic I took of Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag Pathak, and Tayfun Sonmez when we met with Payzant and his colleagues at Boston Public School headquarters, during the years we worked with BPS, starting around 2003.

Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag Pathak and Tayfun Sonmez at Boston Public School headquarters

Here's a paper that came out of those meetings, describing the deliberations that ultimately led BPS to adopt a deferred acceptance algorithm design for it's school choice system.


Over the course of those years, I was privileged to watch Parag evolve from a super smart young grad student to being a leader in the design of school choice.

I'll post tomorrow about some of Parag's latest efforts to bring the work associated with the design and evaluation of school choice, and market design more generally, into the world of startup companies and big university labs.

Sunday, June 20, 2021

The Economics of Covid: The 31st Jerusalem Advanced School in Economic Theory (June 28-30)

This year's event doesn't involve travel. (Next year in Jerusalem!)

The 31st Jerusalem Advanced School in Economic Theory: The Economics of COVID-19 (Online event)

conference
Mon, 28/06/2021 to Wed, 30/06/2021

 


General Director: Eric Maskin (Harvard University)

Co-directorElchanan Ben-Porath (The Hebrew University)

 

List of lecturers and topics:

Glenn Ellison, MIT: Epidemiological models
Ben Golub, Northwestern University: Supply Chains
Michael Kremer, University of Chicago: Vaccines
Eric Maskin, Harvard University: Mechanism Design for Pandemics
Emily Oster, Brown University: Schools

Parag Pathak, MIT: Priority Schemes