NBER Market Design Conference at Stanford, October 19-20

Here's the program and participant list:

Friday, October 19
8:30 am	Continental Breakfast
9:00 am	Olivier Terceiux, Top Trading Cycles in Prioritized Markets, a synthesis of:
	Yeon-Koo Che, Columbia University Olivier Tercieux, Paris School of Economics Top Trading Cycles in Prioritized Matching: An Irrelevance of Priorities in Large Markets
	Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Duke University and NBER Yeon-Koo Che, Columbia University Parag A. Pathak, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER Alvin E. Roth, Stanford University and NBER Olivier Tercieux, Paris School of Economics Minimizing Justified Envy in School Choice: The Design of New Orleans’ OneApp
9:45 am	Surender Baswana, IIT Kanpur Partha Pratim Chakrabarti, IIT Kharagpur Sharat Chandran, IIT Bombay Yash Kanoria, Columbia University Utkarsh Patange, Columbia University Centralized Admissions for Engineering Colleges in India
10:30 am	Break
11:00 am	Onur Kesten, Carnegie Mellon University Selcuk Ozyurt, Sabanci University Efficient and Incentive Compatible Mediation: An Ordinal Market Design Approach
11:45 am	Dirk Bergemann, Yale University Benjamin A. Brooks, University of Chicago Stephen Morris, Princeton University Revenue Guarantee Equivalence
12:30 pm	Lunch Talk Michael Schwarz, Microsoft Market Design, Reputation Systems, UX, and the Cost of User Time
2:00 pm	Xiao Liu, Tsinghua University Zhixi Wan, Didi Chuxing Technology Co. Chenyu Yang, University of Rochester The Efficiency of A Dynamic Decentralized Two-Sided Matching Market
2:45 pm	Hongyao Ma, Harvard University Fei Fang, Carnegie Mellon University David Parkes, Harvard University Spatio-Temporal Pricing for Ridesharing Platforms
3:30 pm	Break
4:00 pm	Mohammad Akbarpour, Stanford University Farshad Fatemi, Sharif University of Technology Negar Matoorian, Stanford University A Monetary Market for Kidneys
4:45 pm	Alvin E. Roth, Stanford University and NBER Recent Developments in Kidney Exchange: Market Design in a Large World
5:30 pm	Adjourn
6:30 pm	Dinner Joya Restaurant 339 University Avenue Palo Alto, CA
Saturday, October 20
8:30 am	Continental Breakfast
9:00 am	Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Duke University and NBER Joshua Angrist, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER Yusuke Narita, Yale University Parag A. Pathak, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER Impact Evaluation in Matching Markets with General Tie-Breaking
9:45 am	Yuichiro Kamada, Harvard University Fuhito Kojima, Stanford University Fair Matching under Constraints: Theory and Applications (slides)
10:30 am	Break
11:00 am	Tamas Fleiner, Budapest University of Technology and Economics Ravi Jagadeesan, Harvard University Zsuzsanna Jankó, Corvinus University Alexander Teytelboym, University of Oxford Trading Networks with Frictions
11:45 am	Piotr Dworczak, Northwestern University Scott Duke Kominers, Harvard University Mohammad Akbarpour, Stanford University Redistribution through Markets
12:30 pm	Adjourn

Participant List

Atila Abdulkadiroglu Duke University and NBER

Nikhil Agarwal Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER

Mohammad Akbarpour Stanford University

Nick Arnosti Columbia University

Susan Athey Stanford University and NBER

Lawrence Ausubel University of Maryland

Moshe Babaioff Microsoft Research

Aaron L. Bodoh-Creed University of California at Berkeley

Eric Budish University of Chicago and NBER

Jeremy I. Bulow Stanford University and NBER

Gabriel Carroll Stanford University

Yeon-Koo Che Columbia University

Laura Doval California Institute of Technology

Jeremy T. Fox Rice University and NBER

Guillaume Haeringer Baruch College

Jonathan Hall Uber Technologies

John W. Hatfield University of Texas, Austin

Yinghua He Rice University

Ravi Jagadeesan Harvard University

Yuichiro Kamada Harvard University

Yash Kanoria Columbia University

Adam Kapor Princeton University and NBER

Jakub Kastl Princeton University and NBER

Onur Kesten Carnegie Mellon University

Fuhito Kojima Stanford University

Scott Duke Kominers Harvard University

Nicolas S. Lambert Stanford University

Shengwu Li Harvard University

Shuya Li Carnegie Mellon University

Hongyao Ma Harvard University

Mohammad Mahdian Google Research

Negar Matoorian Stanford University

Stephen Morris Princeton University

Yusuke Narita Yale University

Hamid Nazerzadeh University of Southern California

Afshin Nikzad Stanford University

Michael Ostrovsky Stanford University and NBER

Selcuk Ozyurt Sabanci University

Utkarsh Patange Columbia University

Parag A. Pathak Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER

Ali O. Polat Carnegie Mellon University

Daniel Quint University of Wisconsin

David H. Reiley Jr. Pandora Media, Inc

Alvin E. Roth Stanford University and NBER

Daniela Saban Stanford University

Michael Schwarz Microsoft

Ilya Segal Stanford University

Sven Seuken University of Zurich

Kane Sweeney eBay Research Labs

Steven Tadelis University of California at Berkeley and NBER

Olivier Tercieux Paris School of Economics

Zhixi Wan Didi Chuxing Technology Co.

Robert Wilson Stanford University

Xingye Wu Tsinghua University

Chenyu Yang University of Rochester

Haoxiang Zhu Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER

MIT celebrates Parag Pathak

Game theory, in the real world: MIT economist Parag Pathak engineers practical solutions to complicated education problems

...
In 2003, New York City schools chancellor Joel Klein, who wanted to revamp the school-choice system, approached a Harvard University professor named Alvin Roth about the problem. Roth had studied the method for matching medical students to their residencies; New York officials hoped something similar would work for their school system.

In turn, Roth asked Pathak, then a first-year PhD student in economics, to look into New York’s school-choice system: Was it a substantive and interesting problem? Pathak decided it was. A decade later, he is still producing new research on the topic, and in 2011 received tenure at MIT, in part because of his work in the area.

Moreover, that work has produced real-world results. Based on the research of Roth and his collaborators, New York City soon adopted what is known as a “deferred-acceptance algorithm” to assign places. Then, Roth’s group, now including economist Tayfun Sonmez, helped Boston review its choice system, leading the city to adopt a new method in 2005.

Using this method, schools first weigh all the students listing those schools as first-choice venues; then, the students who are rejected are essentially allowed to revise their lists, and the process repeats until every student has been matched with a school selection. The crucial difference is that students and families can simply pick the schools they most want to attend, in order.

“Our whole agenda is to try to make these systems strategy-proof,” says Pathak, now an associate professor of economics at MIT. “All these methods move in the direction of simplifying the system for students.” Complicated tactical guesses about popularity are moot; the entire process is based on the substantive merits of schools.

This positive outcome, Pathak says, is the fruit of “trying to think of economics as an engineering discipline,” in order to construct practical solutions to real-world problems.

Within economics, his growing area of specialization is known as “market design.” Beyond schools, market-design problems can be found in health care, financial markets, even the process of keyword searching on the Internet. “These allocation problems are everywhere,” says Pathak, who now also studies school-performance questions and has produced papers examining the quirks of housing markets.

What makes schools good?


"Pathak is the son of Nepalese parents who immigrated to the United States in the 1970s. He grew up in Corning, N.Y., where his father is a doctor and his mother a writer, before attending Harvard as an undergraduate. A direct line can be drawn between Pathak’s career and a class he took during his senior year at Harvard in the spring of 2002, team-taught by Roth and Paul Milgrom, two leaders in market design; Milgrom advised the Federal Communications Commission on the design of their broadcasting-spectrum auctions.

Pathak, an applied mathematics major who graduated summa cum laude from Harvard, says that class allowed him to recognize the possibility of linking game theory with practical problems. He soon enrolled in graduate school in economics at Harvard, received his PhD in 2007 and joined MIT in 2008.

Since then, Pathak’s research on school-choice issues has expanded in part because other places, including Chicago and much of England, have adopted systems similar to the ones he endorses — but due to their own initiative. “It’s as if they followed the discussion in Boston, although there is no evidence of it,” Pathak says. “It’s a great story of how markets evolve.” 

Although strategy-proof systems are gaining in popularity, many cities do not employ them. And yet Pathak believes that in addition to making the selection process simpler, the new systems can lead to a virtuous circle in assessing school quality: If administrators know what students’ real preferences are — as opposed to their tactics-based selections — they can examine what makes certain schools popular and try to institute those elements of good schools in other places, too.

“If we have programs that are oversubscribed, we should figure out why and consider replicating them,” Pathak says.

To be sure, it can be very difficult for people to assess whether or not schools are good in the first place, and for what reasons. In part because of this, Pathak’s interests have developed to include measuring school performance. Along with MIT economists Joshua Angrist and David Autor, he is a founding director of the School Effectiveness &; Inequality Institute at MIT, a new center that launched this year.

Angrist, Pathak and a variety of co-authors have published multiple studies about the performance of charter schools in Massachusetts, for instance, using random samples of students from schools’ admissions lotteries. While recognizing that this can be a “politically charged” issue, Pathak says their aim is simply to shine some empirical light on the matter. So far, the results they have found are nuanced: Some charter schools in urban areas such as Boston have dramatically improved student performance, but charter schools in other parts of Massachusetts have generally performed worse than their non-charter public counterparts.

The researchers are still trying to determine exactly why this is, and aim to expand their studies geographically. But the technical expertise of Pathak and Angrist — a pioneer in developing and refining “natural experiments” in economics — makes them confident they can rigorously equitably assess thorny questions about student performance.

“Through school assignment, we have an engine to measure a lot of things about education production,” Pathak says. And now, students have a vehicle for choosing schools on their merits.
********

Let me add that, along with Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Neil Dorosin and yours truly, Parag continues to assist school districts in the design and implementation of school choice systems via the Institute for Innovation in Public School Choice (IIPSC).

The effect of charter schools in New Orleans and Boston: Abdulkadiroglu, Angrist, Hull and Pathak

Two of the pioneers of market design for school choice, Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Parag Pathak, have teamed up with colleagues to analyse the effects of charter schools, using data from the school choice programs they helped design in Boston and New Orleans.


CHARTERS WITHOUT LOTTERIES: TESTING TAKEOVERS IN NEW ORLEANS AND BOSTON
Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Joshua D. Angrist, Peter D. Hull, and Parag A. Pathak
Working Paper 20792
http://www.nber.org/papers/w20792

ABSTRACT
Lottery estimates suggest oversubscribed urban charter schools boost student achievement markedly. But these estimates needn’t capture treatment effects for students who haven’t applied to charter schools or for students attending charters for which demand is weak. This paper reports estimates of the effect of charter school attendance on middle-schoolers in charter takeovers in New Orleans and Boston. Takeovers are traditional public schools that close and then re-open as charter schools. Students enrolled in the schools designated for closure are eligible for “grandfathering” into the new schools; that is, they are guaranteed seats. We use this fact to construct instrumental variables estimates of the effects of passive charter attendance: the grandfathering instrument compares students at schools designated for takeover with students who appear similar at baseline and who were attending similar schools not yet closed, while adjusting for possible violations of the exclusion restriction in such comparisons. Estimates for a large sample of takeover schools in the New Orleans Recovery School District show substantial gains from takeover enrollment. In Boston, where we can compare grandfathering and lottery estimates for a middle school, grandfathered students see achievement gains at least as large as the gains for students assigned seats in lotteries. Larger reading gains for grandfathering compliers are explained by a worse non-charter fallback.
*************

School choice in New Orleans is one of the design projects undertaken by the Institute for Innovation in Public School Choice (IIPSC).

The design of Boston's school choice system predated IIPSC; here's an early paper on that: The Boston Public School Match.

The NBER market design lectures from the 2016 Summer Institute (Videos)

This summer the "methods lectures" at the NBER summer institute were on market design. Videos of the five lectures (each about 45 minutes long) are here.

Summer Institute 2016 Methods Lectures

July 26, 2015
Lecturers: Al Roth, Parag Pathak, Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Nikhil Agarwal, Itai Ashlagi

Reading List

Al Roth
Game Theory and Market Design

You can download this video from here

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Parag Pathak
Design of Matching Markets

You can download this video from here

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Atila Abdulkadiroglu
Research Design meets Market Design

You can download this video from here

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Nikhil Agarwal
Revealed Preference Analysis in Matching Markets

You can download this video from here

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Itai Ashlagi
Matching Dynamics and Computation

You can download this video from here 


And you can see a short introductory video in which I am interviewed about market design here (and for the time being on the NBER home page, http://nber.org/). 

School choice in NYC, a problem facing large school systems

The most demanded schools are very hard to get into, even for very well qualified students, some of whom can have trouble matching: For Many, High School Match Game Continues.

"Although most of the city's 86,000 eighth graders were matched with a high school this year, every year thousands of students don't get in anywhere and it doesn't matter whether they have good grades, test scores and attendance records. They have to apply all over again, with a much more limited list of schools to choose from."

The full process in NYC, in which in the initial round students can list no more than 12 programs to apply to, is described in this paper: Abdulkadiroglu, Atila, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth, "Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match,'' American Economic Review, 99, 5, Dec. 2009, pp1954-1978.

And the following paper uses the fact that the proportion of unmatched students doesn't go to zero as the school system gets large, so in a very large school system like NYC, the number of initially unmatched students won't be tiny. (That doesn't mean that allowing longer lists wouldn't help.)

Kojima, Fuhito, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth, " Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets," working paper, April 28, 2010.

NBER market design conference Oct 19-20, 2012: preliminary program

NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, INC.

Market Design Working Group Meeting

Susan Athey and Parag Pathak, Organizers

October 19-20, 2012

NBER
2^nd Floor Conference Room1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA
PROGRAM

Friday, October 19:
8:30 am	Continental Breakfast
9:00 am	Mechanism Design and Congestion William Fuchs, University of California at Berkeley Andrzej Skrzypacz, Stanford University Costs and Benefits of Dynamic Trading in a Lemons Market
	Jacob Leshno, Columbia University Dynamic Matching in Overloaded Systems
10:20 am	Break
10:35 am	Auctions Kenneth Hendricks, University of Wisconsin and NBER Daniel Quint, University of Wisconsin Indicative Bids as Cheap Talk Sergiu Hart, Hebrew University Noam Nisan, Hebrew University The Menu-Size Complexity of Auctions
	Yeon-Koo Che, Columbia University Jinwoo Kim, Yonsei University Fuhito Kojima, Stanford University Efficient Assignment with Interdependent Values
12:35 pm	Lunch
1:15 pm	Organ Exchange
	Itai Ashlagi, MIT Alvin Roth, Stanford University and NBER Kidney Exchange in Time and Space
	Tayfun Sonmez, Boston College M. Utku Unver, Boston College Welfare Consequences of Transplant Organ Allocation Policies
2:40 pm	Break
3:00 pm	FCC Incentive AuctionLawrence Ausubel, University of Maryland Paul Milgrom, Stanford University Ilya Segal, Stanford UniversityThe 'Incentive Auctions' and Mechanism Design Peter Cramton, University of Maryland Title to be announced
5:15 pm	Adjourn Saturday, October 20: 8:30 am Continental Breakfast 9:00 am Empirical Market Design Aditya Bhave, University of Chicago Eric Budish, University of Chicago Primary-Market Auctions for Event Tickets: Eliminating the Rents of "Bob the Broker" Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Duke University Nikhil Agarwal, Harvard University Parag Pathak, MIT and NBER Centralized vs. Decentralized School Assignment: Evidence from NY 10:20 am Break 10:40 am Matching Markets Qingmin Liu, Columbia University Marek Pycia, University of California at Los Angeles Ordinal Efficiency, Fairness and Incentives in Large Markets Scott Duke Kominers, University of Chicago Tayfun Sonmez, Boston College Designing for Diversity in Matching 12:00 pm Lunch 1:00 pm New Frontiers Elisa Celis, University of Washington Gregory Lewis, Harvard University and NBER Markus Mobius, Iowa State University and NBER Hamid Nazerzadeh, University of Southern California Buy-it-Now or Take-a-Chance: Price Discrimination through Randomized Auctions Michael Kearns, University of Pennsylvania Mallesh Pai, University of Pennsylvania Aaron Roth, University of Pennsylvania Jonathan Ullman, Harvard University Mechanism Design in Large Games: Incentives and Privacy David Rothschild, Microsoft Research David Pennock, Microsoft Research The Extent of Price Misalignment in Prediction Markets 3:00 pm Adjourn

Information, school quality and school choice

Here's a recent article by Gail Cornwall in The Atlantic, summarizing some of the work on school choice which points out that it is easier for parents to judge the test scores of graduates than the value-added by the school.

Why Parents Make Flawed Choices About Their Kids' Schooling
A new study shows that families act on insufficient information when it comes to figuring out where to enroll their children.

It covers (among other things) work by Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Parag Pathak and various colleagues, including the recent NBER working paper

Do Parents Value School Effectiveness?

Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag A. Pathak, Jonathan Schellenberg, Christopher R. Walters

NBER Working Paper No. 23912
Issued in October 2017
NBER Program(s):   ED   LS 

School choice may lead to improvements in school productivity if parents' choices reward effective schools and punish ineffective ones. This mechanism requires parents to choose schools based on causal effectiveness rather than peer characteristics. We study relationships among parent preferences, peer quality, and causal effects on outcomes for applicants to New York City's centralized high school assignment mechanism. We use applicants' rank-ordered choice lists to measure preferences and to construct selection-corrected estimates of treatment effects on test scores and high school graduation. We also estimate impacts on college attendance and college quality. Parents prefer schools that enroll high-achieving peers, and these schools generate larger improvements in short- and long-run student outcomes. We find no relationship between preferences and school effectiveness after controlling for peer quality.

NBER Market Design Working Group Meeting tomorrow and Saturday

The market design meeting starting tomorrow in Boston includes two "New Directions" sessions, one on Transportation and Market Design and one on Development Economics and Market Design.

Here's the program: Market Design Working Group Meeting

Michael Ostrovsky and Parag A. Pathak, Organizers

October 20-21, 2017

NBER
Feldstein Conference Room, 2nd Floor
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA

Friday, October 20
9:00 am	Haluk Ergin, University of California at Berkeley Tayfun Sönmez, Boston College Utku Unver, Boston College Efficient and Incentive Compatible Liver Exchange
9:45 am	Nikhil Agarwal, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER Itai Ashlagi, Stanford University Michael A. Rees, University of Toledo Medical Center Paulo J. Somaini, Stanford University and NBER Daniel C. Waldinger, Massachusetts Institute of Technology An Empirical Framework for Sequential Assignments: The Allocation of Deceased Donor Kidneys
10:30 am	Break
11:00 am	Eric Budish, University of Chicago and NBER Robin S. Lee, Harvard University and NBER Will the Market Fix the Market? A Theory of Stock Market Competition and Innovation
11:45 am	Albert "Pete" Kyle, University of Maryland Jeongmin Lee, Washington University in St. Louis Toward a Fully Continuous Exchange
12:30 pm	Lunch
2:00 pm	Paul Milgrom, Stanford University Ilya Segal, Stanford University Deferred-Acceptance Clock Auctions and Radio Spectrum Reallocation
2:45 pm	Lawrence Ausubel, University of Maryland Christina Aperjis, Power Auctions LLC Oleg V. Baranov, University of Colorado Boulder Market Design and the FCC Incentive Auction
3:30 pm	Ulrich Doraszelski, University of Pennsylvania and NBER Katja Seim, University of Pennsylvania and NBER Michael Sinkinson, Yale University and NBER Peichun Wang, University of Pennsylvania Ownership Concentration and Strategic Supply Reduction
4:15 pm	Break
	New Directions: Transportation and Market Design
4:30 pm	Michael Ostrovsky, Stanford University and NBER Michael Schwarz, Google Research To Be Announced
5:00 pm	Peter Cramton, University of Maryland Richard Geddes, Cornell University Axel Ockenfels, University of Cologne Markets for Road Use: Eliminating Congestion through Scheduling, Routing, and Real-Time Road Pricing
5:30 pm	Juan Camilo Castillo, Stanford University Dan Knoepfle, Uber Technologies Glen Weyl, Microsoft Research Surge Pricing Solves the Wild Goose Chase (slides)
6:00 pm	Adjourn
Saturday, October 21
8:15 am	Coach Bus leaves Royal Sonesta Hotel for NBER
8:30 am	Continental Breakfast
9:00 am	Parag A. Pathak, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER Peng Shi, Massachusetts Institute of Technology How Well Do Structural Demand Models Work? Counterfactual Predictions in School Choice
9:45 am	Georgy Artemov, University of Melbourne Yeon-Koo Che, Columbia University Yinghua He, Rice University Strategic `Mistakes': Implications for Market Design Research
10:30 am	Break
11:00 am	Jacob D. Leshno, Columbia University Irene Y. Lo, Columbia University The Cutoff Structure of Top Trading Cycles in School Choice
11:45 am	Esen Onur, CFTC David Reiffen, CFTC Lynn Riggs, CFTC Haoxiang Zhu, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER Mechanism Selection and Trade Formation on Swap Execution Facilities: Evidence from Index CDS
12:30 pm	Lunch
2:00 pm	Constantinos Daskalakis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Christos H. Papadimitriou, University of California at Berkeley Christos Tzamos, Microsoft Research Does Information Revelation Improve Revenue?
2:45 pm	Dirk Bergemann, Yale University Tibor Heumann, HEC - Montreal Stephen Morris, Princeton University Information and Market Power
3:30 pm	Break
	New Directions: Development Economics and Market Design
4:00 pm	Jean-François Houde, Cornell University and NBER Terence R. Johnson, University of Notre Dame Molly Lipscomb, University of Virginia Laura A. Schechter, University of Wisconsin, Madison Using Market Mechanisms to Increase the Take-up of Improved Sanitation in Senegal
4:30 pm	Reshmaan N. Hussam, Yale University Natalia Rigol, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Benjamin N. Roth, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Targeting High Ability Entrepreneurs Using Community Information: Mechanism Design in the Field
5:00 pm	Yusuke Narita, Yale University Experimental Design as Market Design: Billions of Dollars Worth of Treatment Assignments
5:30 pm	Adjourn

New Directions in Market Design, NBER conference May 11-12, 2023 in Washington DC (and on YouTube)

 I'm on my way to this conference, celebrating a quarter of a century of practical market design by economists.

New Directions in Market Design, NBER conference May 11-12, 2023 (US Eastern Time)

LOCATION Convene, 600 14th St NW in Washington, DC. and livestreamed on YouTube 

ORGANIZERS Irene Y. Lo, Michael Ostrovsky, and Parag A. Pathak

 NBER conferences are by invitation. All participants are expected to comply with the NBER's Conference Code of Conduct.

Supported by Schmidt Futures

 Thursday, May 11

8:30 am Continental Breakfast

9:00 am Opening Talk: Alvin Roth, Stanford University and NBER ("Market Design and Maintenance") 

9:30 am Break

9:45 am Electricity and Renewable Energy Market Design

Overview: Mar Reguant, Northwestern University and NBER

Viewpoint 1: Martin Bichler, Technical University of Munich

Viewpoint 2: Richard O’Neill, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

11:05 am Market Design for the Environment

Overview: Estelle Cantillon, ULB

Viewpoint 1: Rachel Glennerster, University of Chicago and NBER

Viewpoint 2: Nathan Keohane, Environmental Defense Fund

12:25 pm Lunch discussions

2:00 pm Market Design in Healthcare

Overview: Benjamin Handel, University of California at Berkeley and NBER

Viewpoint 1: Mark Miller, Arnold Ventures

Viewpoint 2: Fanyin Zheng, Columbia University

3:20 pm Market Design for Organ Transplantation

Overview: Tayfun Sonmez, Boston College

Viewpoint 1: Nikhil Agarwal, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER

Viewpoint 2: Jennifer Erickson, Organize

4:40 pm Break

5:00 pm Market Design for Education

Overview: Parag Pathak, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER

Viewpoint 1: Derek Neal, University of Chicago and NBER

Viewpoint 2: Irene Lo, Stanford University

6:20 pm Adjourn

6:45 pm Group Dinner - JW Marriott

Friday, May 12

8:00 am Continental Breakfast

8:30 am Market Design for Public Housing

Overview: Nathan Hendren, Harvard University and NBER

Viewpoint 1: Winnie van Dijk, Harvard University and NBER

Viewpoint 2: Mary Cunningham, Urban Institute

9:50 am Market Design in Transportation

Overview: Michael Ostrovsky, Stanford University and NBER

Viewpoint 1: David Shmoys, Cornell University

Viewpoint 2: Wai Yan Leong, Singapore Land Transport Authority

11:10 am Break

11:30 am Market Design in Financial Markets

Overview: Haoxiang Zhu, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER

Viewpoint 1: Eric Budish, University of Chicago and NBER

Viewpoint 2: Scott Mixon, CFTC

12:50 pm

Lunch discussions

2:20 pm Market Design Tools in the Regulation of Online Marketplaces

Overview: Susan Athey, Stanford University and NBER

Viewpoint 1: Preston McAfee, Google

Viewpoint 2: Michael Schwarz, Microsoft

3:40 pm Artificial Intelligence and Market Design

Overview: Kevin Leyton-Brown, University of British Columbia

Viewpoint 1: Hal Varian, Google

Viewpoint 2: Nikhil Devanur, Amazon

5:00 pm Break

5:20 pm Closing Talk: Paul Milgrom, Stanford University

5:50 pm Adjourn

6:30 pm Group Dinner - JW Marriott