Growth pains for legal marijuana, in Germany and New York

Transitioning from a thriving black market for marijuana to a regulated legal market isn't so easy.

The Guardian has the story from Germany, where so far clubs, but not shops, have been legalized:

Cannabis legalisation hampered by most German of substances: red tape. Activists say the rollout of laws permitting recreational use of the drug has been hampered by a ‘bureaucratic monster’  by Deborah Cole

"Joints now mingle openly with pints among fans watching the European football championship in host nation Germany, which in the spring became the first big EU country to legally allow personal recreational use of cannabis.

"That is, provided the fan is over 18, only carrying a small amount of the narcotic, not smoking in the stands of a stadium and not in possession of more than three plants at their officially registered home.

...

"The hotly disputed law passed by Olaf Scholz’s three-party coalition, which took effect in April, legalised cultivating up to three plants for private consumption, the possession of 50g (1.75oz) of cannabis at one time at home and 25g in public.

...

"A key phase began on 1 July with the establishment of registered cannabis clubs, which proponents say are vital to assuring the smooth path towards legal weed and supplanting the underworld street trade.

...

"In order to thwart drug tourism, members must have lived in Germany for six months, sign up to a club for a minimum of three months and have a clean criminal record for narcotics.

"Clubs are dependent on fee-paying members to start operating but are not allowed to advertise, said Marten Knopke of the Cannabis Social Club Leipzig, thus robbing them of a key source of capital needed to rent offices and land for growing purposes. Consumption on club premises is also verboten.

“We are subject to more restrictions than any alcohol company,” Knopke said, echoing a frequent complaint from the cannabis scene about drinking, which kills more than 60,000 people in Germany each year. “The government has also made it really difficult for us to stand up to the hidden [narcotics] market.”

...

“There are no shops where you can buy, meaning they [foreign tourists]" will end up buying something on the underground market, which is very dangerous in Berlin,” because of contaminated drugs and the role of the mafia in the trade, he said."

********

And here's the New York Times on New York:

The Real Problem With Legal Weed, By Charles Fain Lehman

"When New York legalized recreational marijuana in 2021, the future seemed bright. ...

"Three years later, things are not going to plan. Gov. Kathy Hochul has called New York’s legalization rollout “a disaster.” Mayor Eric Adams has spent months demanding that Albany fix the current system. “What happened?” The New Yorker recently asked in a feature on the collapse of the state’s marijuana “revolution.”

...

"There are around 140 recreational dispensaries operating statewide — about one for every 148,000 New Yorkers. Instead of shopping legally, New Yorkers tend to get their weed from the illegal shops that now blanket the state. Estimates suggest that there are anywhere from 2,000 to 8,000 in New York City alone, with uncounted more from Ithaca to Oneonta. Recent crackdowns have temporarily sealed more than 400 stores — only a small fraction of the total in the city.

"These shops undercut the legal stores, offering the same high at a fraction of the price. And they attract crime: There were 736 robbery complaints at unlicensed shops last year, according to the New York Police Department. Shootings are not uncommon, including the killing of a 36-year-old man captured on video last April.

"They also sell to teenagers, as The Times has reported. Teachers, prevention experts and pediatricians have raised the alarm about high schoolers smoking or vaping marijuana at school."

"Discreteness is the better part of value" (Vince Crawford)

 One of the themes of the conference celebrating Vince Crawford (in anticipation of his 75th birthday) is how two of his early famous papers (Crawford and Knoer, 1981 and Kelso and Crawford, 1982)  helped unify matching theory and the theory of markets and competitive equilibria, and thus began to bring matching theory into mainstream economics.

Vince remarked that the unification of matching with the rest of economics also brought discrete (as opposed to continuous) mathematics into the mainstream of economic theory.

He said he had come to realize that "Discreteness is the better part of value."*

*This is of course a play on the common English language expression "Discretion is the better part of valor," which has an indirect and complicated Shakespearean connection, but in common usage is meant to give advice like "Look before you leap."

Great Market Hall in Budapest

 It's good to remember that before markets were digital, essentially all marketplaces were places.

Here I am trying to take in Budapest's Great Market Hall.

Child labor in soccer

Many laws seek to protect children from being exploited in the labor market, and there is widespread repugnance when it appears that such exploitation is taking place. (Think of the issues associated with children sewing soccer balls in Pakistan...)

But minors can also be professional athletes, and that turns out to be an issue in the Euro 2024 competitions, because star Spanish player Lamine Yamal is only 16 years old. (He was scouted at 6...)

Here's the story

Why Spain are Risking 30,000 Euro Fine by Playing Lamine Yamal at Euro 2024, by Robin Mumford 

"Yamal has started in each of Spain's group games so far, against Croatia and Italy, but a German law put Spain at risk of a €30,000 fine for his involvement in the game against Italy. That's because the German Youth Protection Act prohibits under-18s from working beyond a certain time - usually 8pm.

"Spain's first group game kicked off at 6pm local time, but their game against Italy started at 9pm. While there is an exceptional rule within the German law that authorises athletes to work until 11pm, the match finished very close to that time anyway, and post-match showers and interviews are also considered within the realms of labour, which means Spain may very well have met the conditions to be hit with a fine."

HT: Peter Biro

##########

The Centre for Sport and Human Rights has a White Paper called

CHILD LABOUR IN SPORT. Protecting the Rights of Child Athletes

Top-trading-cycles for multiple-type housing markets by Di Feng , Bettina Klaus , and Flip Klijn

 On it's 50th anniversary, top trading cycles (TTC) is still well worth studying. Here's the latest:

Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets by Di Feng a, Bettina Klaus b, Flip Klijn , Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 146, July 2024, Pages 234-254

Abstract

"We consider the generalization of the classical Shapley and Scarf housing market model (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) to so-called multiple-type housing markets (Moulin, 1995). Throughout the paper, we focus on strict preferences. When preferences are separable, the prominent solution for these markets is the typewise top-trading-cycles (tTTC) mechanism.

"We first show that for lexicographic preferences, a mechanism is unanimous (or onto), individually rational, strategy-proof, and non-bossy if and only if it is the tTTC mechanism. Second, we obtain a corresponding characterization for separable preferences. We obtain additional characterizations when replacing [strategy-proofness and non-bossiness] with self-enforcing group (or pairwise) strategy-proofness. Finally, we show that for strict preferences, there is no mechanism satisfying unanimity, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness.

"Our characterizations of the tTTC mechanism constitute the first characterizations of an extension of the prominent top-trading-cycles (TTC) mechanism to multiple-type housing markets."

Mechanism and Institution Design in Budapest, in honor of Vince Crawford's 75th birthday: July 8-12 at Corvinus University

 Here's the high level program, and here's the detailed program.

I plan to speak on Wednesday about Ethical Issues in Market Design.

And here's the guest of honor: VINCENT P. CRAWFORD

Morals and the limits of markets, WZB Berlin, 11 - 12 July 2024

 Here's a conference that looks interesting:

Morals and the limits of markets, WZB Berlin, 11 - 12 July 2024

Organizers:  Hande Erkut and Dorothea Kübler

"The workshop will focus on the limits of markets, the morality of decisions in markets, and paternalism. It will bring together scholars from different disciplines (mainly economics, political science, and philosophy) who are working on these topics. The workshop aims to foster discussions across disciplines on the ethical considerations surrounding market activities, repugnant markets, and the government’s role in regulating such markets."

Preliminary Program:Preliminary Program:

Thursday, July 11, 2024

9:00 – 9.30 Registration/ Workshop Opening

9:30 – 10.50 Sandro Ambühl (University of Zurich)  Interventionist Preferences and the Welfare State: The Case of In-Kind Nutrition Assistance

Tammy Harel Ben Shahar (University of Haifa), Lean Out: On the Morality of Participating in Positional Competitions

10:50 – 11:10 Coffee Break

11:10 – 12:30 Benjamin Sachs-Cobbe (University of St Andrews) Taking Jobs and Doing Harm

Colin Sullivan (Purdue University) Paternalistic Discrimination

12.30 – 13:20 Lunch

13:20 – 15:20 Hande Erkut (WZB), Repugnant Transactions: The Role of Agency and Severe Consequences

Erik Malmqvist (Univeristy of Gothenburg)  How Exploitation Harms

Constanze Binder (Erasmus University Rotterdam) Universities and Markets: New Challenges to Academic Freedom

15:20 – 15:50 Coffee Break

15.50 – 17:10 Robert Stüber (NYU Abu Dhabi) Why High Incentives Cause Repugnance: A Framed Field Experiment + Do Prices Erode Values

Aksel Sterri (Oslo Metropolitan University)  Bodily Justice

17:30 Visit to Neue Nationalgalerie

19:00 Conference Dinner

Friday, July 12, 2024

9.30 – 10:50 Axel Ockenfels (University of Cologne)  The Demand and Supply of Paternalism

Søren Flinch Midtgaard (Aarhus University) Reaction Qualifications and Paternalism

10:50 – 11.10 Coffee Break

11:10 – 12:30 Roberto Weber (University of Zurich) What Money Shouldn’t Buy: Aversion to Monetary Incentives for Health Behaviors

Amy Thompson (Oxford University) Defending a Moral Limit to Markets: Beyond a Singular Asymmetry Thesis

12.30 – 13:30 Lunch

13:30 – 15:30 Sili Zhang (LMU Munich)  What Money Can Buy: How Market Exchange Promotes Values

Peter Dietsch (University of Victoria)  The Centrifugal Nature of the Labour Market, Justice, and Public  Policy

Rahel Jaeggi (Humboldt University Berlin)  TBA

15:30 – 16:40 Coffee Break / Poster Session

Miguel Abellán (University Lüneburg) Timo Heinrich (TU Hamburg)

Victor Chung (University of Toronto) Iliana Melero (University of Zaragoza)

Denise Feigl (University of Regensburg) Brandon Long (University at Buffalo)

Ben Grodeck (University of Exeter) Reha Tuncer (LISER)

16:40 – 18:00 Nicola Lacetera (University of Toronto) Save and Let Die? Economic Factors and the Support of Medically Assisted Death

Stefan Gosepath (Frei University Berlin) Containment of the Market

19:00 Farewell Dinner

The Morality of Markets, by Mathias Dewatripont and Jean Tirole, in the JPE

 Are markets moral, immoral, or amoral?  Here's a new entry to that argument.

The Morality of Markets, by Mathias Dewatripont and Jean Tirole, Journal of Political Economy, online ahead of print.

Abstract: "Scholars and civil society have argued that competition erodes supplier morality. This paper establishes a robust irrelevance result, whereby intense market competition does not crowd out consequentialist ethics; it thereby issues a strong warning against the wholesale moral condemnation of markets and procompetitive institutions. Intense competition, while not altering the behavior of profitable suppliers, may, however, reduce the standards of highly ethical suppliers or not-for-profits, raising the potential need to protect the latter in the marketplace."

"The irrelevance result.—We ask: does the combination of unethical (or, more generally, UPI [unethical/present biased/influenceable]) consumers and of suppliers with consequentialist social preferences imply that moral behavior deteriorates under more intense competition? Our answer to this question is no. Indeed, under weak assumptions, the degree of competitive pressure is irrelevant to ethical behavior (moral choices are independent of demand functions) if prices are flexible.

"The intuition behind the irrelevance result goes as follows: when a supplier faces more intense competition (a more elastic demand), raising ethical behavior has a bigger negative impact on the supplier’s market share and is therefore costlier for the supplier; ceteris paribus, this makes suppliers cut ethical corners in reaction to the increase in competition, as indicated in the conventional wisdom. However, next to this first market share effect, there is a second reduced-stakes effect: a more intense competition reduces prices and markups, making supplier ethical concerns loom larger relative to material ones. We show that a sufficient condition for these two effects to exactly offset each other is that suppliers have consequentialist preferences and returns to scale are constant.

"The irrelevance result, which applies as well to ethical or indifferent consumers, is important not only because it sheds light on the validity of the widespread concern about markets expressed by the public opinion, social scientists, politicians, and religious leaders but also because it affects our stance vis-à-vis key competition-enhancing public policies, such as the opening of borders to free trade, competition policy, and the deregulation of industries. The irrelevance result is also in stark contrast with earlier theoretical results on the irrelevance of social preferences in highly competitive environments, in particular, with Dufwenberg et al. (2011) and Sobel (2015): in our case, the social preferences of suppliers and of consumers matter regardless of the competitive pressure, and it is the intensity of competition that is irrelevant. The difference is driven in particular by the fact that in their settings, one can affect others’ utilities only through one’s impact on their quantities traded or the market price, an impact that vanishes under perfect competition. In our setting, an individual may want to change her action just because it is objectionable to herself or others, even if this does not affect their ability to trade, a feature that is widespread in the real world. See the literature review for a detailed comparison."

YingHua He 何 英华 has died.

 Yan Chen passes on the devastating news that YingHua He 何 英华 passed away on Tuesday night, after struggling with kidney cancer.

May his memory be a blessing.

He graduated from college in China in 2001, got an MA at Peking University, received his Ph.D. at Columbia in 2011, taught in Toulouse, and was an associate professor at Rice University when he died.

Here's his CV, and here is his Google Scholar page.  He did important work on market design, including on school choice and kidney exchange.

He was one of the pioneers of empirical market design, combining econometrics with matching theory. 

He had many friends, and I was lucky to be among them. Here's a photo I took of him giving a seminar at Stanford, when he was a visiting scholar in 2014-15

Yinghua He at Stanford, January 2015

Here are some of my blog posts on his work:

Tuesday, January 25, 2022

Multiple offer mechanisms in school choice, when information gathering is costly

Sunday, November 6, 2022

Limiting congestion by limiting applications, or making them costly

Sunday, September 13, 2020

A proposal for non-simultaneous kidney exchange in pairs and chains and with deceased donors...

Friday, May 24, 2019

Matching early when information is costly, by Grenet, He, and Kübler

Kidney Exchange in KSA

 Here's a press release from King Faisal Specialist Hospital and Research Centre in Saudi Arabia:

KFSHRC Performs Over 5,000 Successful Kidney Transplants

Published: Jul 01, 2024

RIYADH, Saudi Arabia, July 01, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- King Faisal Specialist Hospital and Research Centre (KFSHRC) has successfully performed 5,000 kidney transplants since the inception of its Transplant Program in 1981...

...

"Over the past decade, the program has experienced significant growth, with more than 3,000 transplants performed since 2010 and approximately 1,250 transplants in the last three years alone.

"Moreover, the establishment of the Kidney Paired Donation (KPD) program has significantly revolutionised the transplantation landscape by addressing the challenge of compatibility between patients and their donors. This program has helped patients who would otherwise face considerable obstacles in finding suitable matches. :

A proposal to assess public opinion in Europe on compensation for organ donors

 Here's a paper that proposes doing an experiment. Concerning compensation for organ donors. In Europe.  With the hope of influencing policy and reducing the shortage of transplants.  (A very worthy cause, that brings to mind Titian's painting of Sisyphus...)

Ambagtsheer, Frederike, Eline Bunnik, Liset HM Pengel, Marlies EJ Reinders, Julio J. Elias, Nicola Lacetera, and Mario Macis. "Public Opinions on Removing Disincentives and Introducing Incentives for Organ Donation: Proposing a European Research Agenda." Transplant International 37 (2024): 12483.

Abstract: The shortage of organs for transplantations is increasing in Europe as well as globally. Many initiatives to the organ shortage, such as opt-out systems for deceased donation and expanding living donation, have been insufficient to meet the rising demand for organs. In recurrent discussions on how to reduce organ shortage, financial incentives and removal of disincentives, have been proposed to stimulate living organ donation and increase the pool of available donor organs. It is important to understand not only the ethical acceptability of (dis)incentives for organ donation, but also its societal acceptance. In this review, we propose a research agenda to help guide future empirical studies on public preferences in Europe towards the removal of disincentives and introduction of incentives for organ donation. We first present a systematic literature review on public opinions concerning (financial) (dis)incentives for organ donation in European countries. Next, we describe the results of a randomized survey experiment conducted in the United States. This experiment is crucial because it suggests that societal support for incentivizing organ donation depends on the specific features and institutional design of the proposed incentive scheme. We conclude by proposing this experiment’s framework as a blueprint for European research on this topic.

Fairness, efficiency and strategy proofness in assigning indivisible objects: two new papers

 Here are two new papers on the burgeoning literature of matching people to scarce indivisible resources.

First, an experiment by Claudia Cerrone, Yoan Hermstrüwer,  and Onur Kesten.

Claudia Cerrone, Yoan Hermstrüwer, Onur Kesten, School Choice with Consent: an Experiment, The Economic Journal, Volume 134, Issue 661, July 2024, Pages 1760–1805,   https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uead120

Abstract: Public school choice often yields student assignments that are neither fair nor efficient. The efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism allows students to consent to waive priorities that have no effect on their assignments. A burgeoning recent literature places the efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism at the centre of the trade-off between efficiency and fairness in school choice. Meanwhile, the Flemish Ministry of Education has taken the first steps to implement this algorithm in Belgium. We provide the first experimental evidence on the performance of the efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism against the celebrated deferred acceptance mechanism. We find that both efficiency and truth-telling rates are higher under the efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism than under the deferred acceptance mechanism, even though the efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism is not strategy proof. When the priority waiver is enforced, efficiency further increases, while truth-telling rates decrease relative to variants of the efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism where students can dodge the waiver. Our results challenge the importance of strategy proofness as a prerequisite for truth telling and portend a new trade-off between efficiency and vulnerability to preference manipulation.

##########

And here's a theoretical paper by Xiang Han (韩翔)

Xiang Han, On the efficiency and fairness of deferred acceptance with single tie-breaking, Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 218, 2024, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2024.105842. (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053124000486)

Abstract: As a random allocation rule for indivisible object allocation under weak priorities, deferred acceptance with single tie-breaking (DA-STB) is not ex-post constrained efficient. We first observe that it also fails to satisfy equal-top fairness, which requires that two agents be assigned their common top choice with equal probability if they have equal priority for it. Then, it is shown that DA-STB is ex-post constrained efficient, if and only if it is equal-top fair, if and only if the priority structure satisfies a certain acyclic condition. We further characterize the priority structures under which DA-STB is ex-post stable-and-efficient. Based on the characterized priority domains, and using a weak fairness notion called local envy-freeness, new theoretical support is provided for the use of this rule: for any priority structure, among the class of strategy-proof, ex-post stable, symmetric, and locally envy-free rules, each of the above desiderata—ex-post constrained efficiency, ex-post stability-and-efficiency, and equal-top fairness—can be achieved if and only if it can be achieved by DA-STB.

Stanford SITE, summer 2024 schedule

 SITE 2024

Stanford Economics is proud to host its annual Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics (SITE) conference from July 1 to September 11, 2024, on the Stanford campus with sessions on a broad range of economic topics – bringing together established and emerging scholars to present leading-edge economic research, to educate, and to collaborate. 

Program Overview:

• Session 1: Gender (July 1-July 2, 2024)
• Session 2: Empirical Implementation of Theoretical Models of Strategic Interaction and Dynamic Behavior (July 11-July 12, 2024)
• Session 3: Trade and Finance (July 25-July 26, 2024)
• Session 4: Fiscal Sustainability (August 1-August 2, 2024)
• Session 5: Dynamic Games, Contracts, and Markets (August 5-August 7, 2024)
• Session 6: The Micro and Macro of Labor Markets (August 6-August 7, 2024)
• Session 7: Political Economic Theory (August 8-August 9, 2024)
• Session 8: Market Design (August 8-August 9, 2024)
• Session 9: Market Failures and Public Policy (August 14-August 15, 2024)
• Session 10: Empirical Market Design (August 15-August 16, 2024)
• Session 11: Climate Finance and Banking (August 19-August 20, 2024)
• Session 12: Frontiers of Macroeconomic Research (August 21-August 23, 2024)
• Session 13: Experimental Economics (August 22-August 23, 2024)
• Session 14: Psychology and Economics (August 26-August 27, 2024)
• Session 15: The Labor Market Experience of Vulnerable Populations of Workers (August 26-August 26, 2024)
• Session 16: Housing and Urban Economics (August 28-August 30, 2024)
• Session 17: The Macroeconomics of Uncertainty and Volatility (September 4-September 6, 2024)
• Session 18: New Research in Asset Pricing (September 4-September 6, 2024)
• Session 19: The Economics of Transparency (September 5-September 6, 2024)
• Session 20: Financial Regulation (September 9-September 11, 2024)

 

Do Americans Drink Too Much? Politics and science in the debate over guidelines

 The WSJ has the story:

 Do Americans Drink Too Much? Alcohol Is Driving a Debate in Washington. Agencies, lobbyists and lawmakers are fighting over alcohol guidelines due to be updated next year By Kristina Peterson  and Julie Wernau 

"For nearly three decades, federal dietary guidelines have said it is safe for men to have two or fewer drinks a day, and for women to have one. That could change next year when the Agriculture and Health and Human Services departments update recommendations that are part of federal dietary guidelines.

...

"Alcohol-industry officials and lobbyists have sent materials to government officials questioning the research methods of scientists drafting the recommendations. Alcohol companies have spent millions of dollars lobbying lawmakers, more than a dozen of whom wrote to HHS and USDA on May 30 demanding more information on the process. 

“We don’t want arbitrary decision-making by these agencies that’s not rooted in real science,” said Rep. Andy Barr (R., Ky.), who is co-chair of the Bourbon Caucus, a bipartisan group of lawmakers. The group was founded in 2009 by a lawmaker from Kentucky, which considers itself the birthplace of bourbon, and now has around 40 members. 

...

"Guiding Americans to drink less would be a blow to an industry that is already losing some customers. Younger generations have moved away from alcohol over health concerns. For the first time, the U.S. has more daily cannabis users than alcohol users. 

“If they want us to drink two beers a week, frankly they can kiss my ass,” Sen. Ted Cruz (R., Texas) said on Newsmax in August of the potential for lower alcohol-consumption guidelines. 

...

The six-member HHS panel includes three researchers whose studies have demonstrated that any amount of alcohol can be harmful: Tim Naimi, director of the Canadian Institute for Substance Use Research; Jürgen Rehm, senior scientist at the Center for Addiction and Mental Health; and Kevin Shield, an independent scientist who runs a World Health Organization center on addiction."

Getting a Federal judicial clerkship, and then clerking

 If all has gone according to plan, law students who will graduate next June have just matched with a federal clerkship, if they are going to have one.  That plan, meant to bring some order to what has at times been recruiting that unraveled into the first year of law school, is the

FEDERAL LAW CLERK HIRING PLAN, Updated April 1, 2024

"Participation in the Federal Law Clerk Hiring Plan pertains to the hiring of law school students with two full years of grades in accordance with the timeline set forth below. Students who attend law school part-time or who seek a dual degree may have a later law school graduation date but meet the requirement of having two full years of grades. The dates set forth below do not apply to law school graduates; judges can accept applications, interview, and hire graduates on their own schedule.

"Graduating Class of 2025  For students who entered law school in 2022:

"Judges will not accept formal or informal clerkship applications, or seek or accept formal or informal recommendations, before 12:00 pm EDT on June 10, 2024. Judges also will not directly or indirectly contact applicants, or schedule or conduct formal or informal interviews, or make formal or informal offers, before 12:00 pm EDT on June 11, 2024.

"A judge who makes a clerkship offer will keep it open for at least 24 hours, during which time the applicant will be free to interview with other judges."

########

The plan goes on to schedule clerkship applications and offers for subsequent years in the same way: everyone should wait for the end of students' second year, and then things will move fast (but fast as in 24 hours as opposed to instantly).

If history is any guide, some judges will cheat, but maybe there won't be too much cheating too soon.

But what happens during the clerkship? Will judges who were bad apples during recruiting turn into supportive mentors?

There's a growing movement among former clerks to recognize that not every clerkship is a cakewalk, and to offer support for clerks who face varying degrees of abuse.

The blog Above the Law takes note of this with a recent post:

Judicial Clerkships Are Not An Unadulterated Good. Clerkships are not all unicorns and fairy dust.  bBy ALIZA SHATZMAN

She notes " A judge who will not afford you time to consider the offer — before you commit several years down the road for a particularly consequential year or two of your life — is probably not someone you want to work for."

And she is the founder of The Legal Accountability Project, which proposes to provide a platform for sharing information about clerkships:

"The Legal Accountability Project’s mission is to ensure that law clerks have positive clerkship experiences, while extending support and resources to those who do not. " 

Freakonomics interviews John Cawley about celebrity advertisements and repugnance (when the celebrity goes bad)

 My email this morning included this announcement:

"Thank you for sitting down with Freakonomics Radio to discuss your work. The episode "Your Brand’s Spokesperson Just Got Arrested — Now What?" includes your interview and has just been released. You can listen and find the transcript on our website here, or download on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts. We will be posting the episode on our Twitter, Facebook, and LinkedIn pages and would love it if you could share it on your social media as well."

The episode interviews John Cawley about this paper:

The Role of Repugnance in Markets: How the Jared Fogle Scandal Affected Patronage of Subway  by John Cawley, Julia Eddelbuettel, Scott Cunningham, Matthew D. Eisenberg, Alan D. Mathios & Rosemary J. Avery NBER WORKING PAPER 31782 DOI 10.3386/w31782  October 2023

And they chat with me a bit about repugnance.

I had blogged about that paper here:

Saturday, October 21, 2023

Repugnance is hard to predict

 

Feedback (from Trump campaign) on open letter by economists

 I get asked to sign many letters, and  while I'm generally reluctant to venture beyond my own specific areas of expertise into areas in which others are more expert, I recently signed one circulated by Joe Stiglitz, aimed to respond to some egregious campaign disinformation. 

Sixteen Nobel Prize-winning economists warn a second Trump term would ‘reignite' inflation By Rebecca Picciotto,CNBC   https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/business/money-report/sixteen-nobel-prize-winning-economists-warn-a-second-trump-term-would-reignite-inflation/5538998/

The letter got this reaction from the campaign in question:

"The American people don't need worthless out of touch Nobel peace prize winners to tell them which president put more money in their pockets," Trump campaign spokesperson Karoline Leavitt said in a statement to CNBC." (emphasis added)

I'll listen for that line in tomorrow night's debate.

Update: here's a link that contains the whole letter   https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-economy-nobel-prize-winners-letter-inflation-warning/ 

It begins this way:

"We the undersigned are deeply concerned about the risks of a second Trump administration for the U.S. economy. 

"Among the most important determinants of economic success are the rule of law and economic and political certainty. For a country like the U.S., which is embedded in deep relationships with other countries, conforming to international norms and having normal and stable relationships with other countries is also an imperative. Donald Trump and the vagaries of his actions and policies threaten this stability and the U.S.'s standing in the world. "

Participating in the Haj through the black market

 Saudi Arabia is a bit more open to tourism than it used to be, and that may be making it easier for black market operators to bring pilgrims on the Haj to Mecca without paying the required fees and getting the customary accomodations.

The NYT has the story:

Pilgrim Deaths in Mecca Put Spotlight on Underworld Hajj Industry  Most of the more than 1,300 people who died making the Islamic pilgrimage were not formally registered, a Saudi official said. That left them with little access to protection from the brutal heat.  By Emad Mekay and Vivian Nereim

"The deaths of more than a thousand pilgrims in Saudi Arabia for the hajj have put a spotlight on an underworld of illicit tour operators, smugglers and swindlers who profit off Muslims desperate to meet their religious duty to travel to Mecca.

"While registered pilgrims are transported around the shrines in air-conditioned buses and rest in air-conditioned tents, undocumented ones are often exposed to the elements, making them more vulnerable to extreme heat. 

...

"the Saudi health minister, Fahd al-Jalajel, said that 83 percent of the more than 1,300 deaths occurred among pilgrims who had not had official permits.

“The rise in temperatures during the hajj season represented a big challenge this year,” he said. “Unfortunately — and this is painful for all of us — those who didn’t have hajj permits walked long distances under the sun.”

...

"because so many of the pilgrims who died this year were performing the pilgrimage without official documentation, their deaths exposed the underworld of unlicensed tour operators, smugglers and swindlers who take advantage of pilgrims desperate to perform the hajj, helping them evade the regulations.

...

"In interviews with The New York Times, hajj tour operators, pilgrims and relatives of the dead said the number of undocumented pilgrims appeared to have been driven up by rising economic desperation in countries like Egypt and Jordan. An official hajj package can cost more than $5,000 or $10,000, depending on a pilgrim’s country of origin — far beyond the means of many hoping to make the trip.

"But they also described easily exploited loopholes in Saudi Arabia’s regulations that allowed undocumented pilgrims to travel to the kingdom with a tourist or visitor visa several weeks ahead of hajj. Once they arrive, they find a network of illegal brokers and smugglers who offer their services, take their money and sometimes abandon them to fend for themselves, they said."

Buying exit from Gaza

 It's hard to leave Gaza.

The NYT has the story:

When the Only Escape From War in Gaza Is to Buy a Way Out . For many Palestinians, securing approval to exit the territory is possible only after raising thousands of dollars to pay middlemen or an Egyptian company.  By Adam Rasgon

"The only way for almost all people in Gaza to escape the horrors of the war between Israel and Hamas is by leaving through neighboring Egypt.

"And that is usually a complicated and expensive ordeal, involving the payment of thousands of dollars to an Egyptian company that can get Palestinians on an approved travel list to cross the border.

...Over the past eight months, an estimated 100,000 people have left Gaza, Diab al-Louh, the Palestinian ambassador to Egypt, said in an interview. Though some managed to get out through connections to foreign organizations or governments, for many Gazans, exiting the territory is possible only by way of Hala, a firm that appears to be closely connected to the Egyptian government.

...

"Other pathways out of Gaza exist, but many of them require large payments, too. One route is to pay unofficial middlemen in the enclave or in Egypt, who demand $8,000 to $15,000 per person in exchange for arranging their departure within days, according to four Palestinians who either made the payments or tried to.

...

"Hala charges $5,000 to coordinate the exits of most people 16 and older and $2,500 for most who are below that age, according to seven people who have gone through this process or tried to do so."

Black markets for cigarettes in Gaza

 The WSJ has the story:

At $25 Each, Cigarettes Are Turning Gaza Aid Trucks Into Targets  By Stephen Kalin, Dov Lieber and Fatima AbdulKarim

"A group of Palestinian men approached a United Nations warehouse in central Gaza last week and demanded access to aid stored inside. The gang wasn’t interested in food, fuel or medicine. It wanted something it considered far more valuable: contraband cigarettes hidden in the humanitarian cargo.

"The incident, described by a U.N. official, is emblematic of a significant new impediment to aid deliveries in the enclave. Rampant cigarette smuggling—fueled by high prices for tobacco—has become the latest manifestation of a breakdown in law and order that is slowing the delivery of lifesaving assistance.

"Aid trucks and storage depots have become targets for Palestinian smugglers seeking to retrieve illicit smokes stashed inside shipments by their accomplices, say U.N. and Israeli officials. Other local criminals are also attacking vehicles they suspect have cigarettes hidden somewhere on board, they say.

"Cigarettes sell for as much as $25 apiece in isolated Gaza, so getting hold of even a pack can be enormously profitable.

...

"A second U.N. official said that on Tuesday, three armed men arrived at another U.N. warehouse in central Gaza, demanding to search through the aid. They found the cigarettes they were looking for in a box of aid. The Wall Street Journal viewed a picture of the box with a U.N. logo ripped open, exposing cartons of Karelia cigarettes inside.

“Cigarettes have become like the new gold in Gaza,” the official said."