If you are still on the market for new economics Ph.D.s, now is the time to register for the 2010 Job Market Scramble
Registration is open now, and remains open only until March 30, this coming Tuesday. Don't wait until the last day to do it; not only does that make it more likely that you will forget, but I'm not sure when on Tuesday the signup might go away. If you aren't currently holding an offer you might accept this weekend, or expecting one imminently, and if you are still looking for a job this year, I would recommend signing up now.
The scramble site will be open for viewing (candidates can view jobs, and employers can view candidates) from April 1-12.
The Scramble is discussed on pages 13-15 of our recently revised paper
Peter Coles, John Cawley, Phillip B. Levine, Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth, and John J. Siegfried , " The Job Market for New Economists: A Market Design Perspective," revised March 19, 2010, forthcoming in Journal of Economic Perspectives, Summer 2010.
The current version of that paper can be found here (and I'll update this link when the final version becomes available, which should have some ex-post description of this year's scramble numbers).
Thursday, March 25, 2010
Wednesday, March 24, 2010
Random matchings
Random matchings are the subject of two new papers.
The first (not in chronological order:) IMPLEMENTING RANDOM ASSIGNMENTS: A GENERALIZATION OF THE BIRKHOFF-VON NEUMANN THEOREM by ERIC BUDISH, YEON-KOO CHE, FUHITO KOJIMA, AND PAUL MILGROM
Abstract. "The literature on random mechanisms often describes outcomes incompletely as "random assignments" expressing the expected number of objects of each type assigned to different agents and a set of feasibility constraints that a pure assignment must satisfy. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition (the "bihierarchy" condition) for the set of constraints to have the property that if the random assignment satisfies them, then it is implementable by a lottery over feasible pure assignments. Our theorem maximally generalizes the celebrated Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem. We also provide an algorithm to implement any such random assignment. Several applications are described, including (i) single-unit random assignment, such as school choice; (ii) multi-unit random assignment, such as course allocation and fair division; and (iii) twosided matching problems, such as the scheduling of inter-league sports matchups. The same method also finds applications outside economics, generalizing previous results on the minimize makespan problem in the computer science literature."
The second (no significance to the ordering aside from when I read them) is "An Equivalence result in School Choice" by Jay Sethuraman
ABSTRACT: "The main result of the paper is a proof of the equivalence of single and multiple lottery mechanisms for the problem of allocating students to schools in which students have strict preferences and the schools are indifferent. This solves a recent open problem proposed by Pathak, who was motivated by the practical problem of assigning students to high schools in New York City. In proving this result, a new approach is introduced, that simplifies and unifies all the known equivalence results in the house allocation literature. Along the way, two new mechanisms—Partitioned Random Priority and Partitioned Random Endowment—are introduced for the house allocation problem. These mechanisms generalize several known and well-studied mechanisms for the house allocation problem and are particularly appropriate for many-to-one versions of the problem, the school choice problem being the most prominent."
(And here's a link to the earlier paper by Parag Pathak: Lotteries in Student Assignment: The Equivalence of Queueing and a Market-Based Approach)
The first (not in chronological order:) IMPLEMENTING RANDOM ASSIGNMENTS: A GENERALIZATION OF THE BIRKHOFF-VON NEUMANN THEOREM by ERIC BUDISH, YEON-KOO CHE, FUHITO KOJIMA, AND PAUL MILGROM
Abstract. "The literature on random mechanisms often describes outcomes incompletely as "random assignments" expressing the expected number of objects of each type assigned to different agents and a set of feasibility constraints that a pure assignment must satisfy. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition (the "bihierarchy" condition) for the set of constraints to have the property that if the random assignment satisfies them, then it is implementable by a lottery over feasible pure assignments. Our theorem maximally generalizes the celebrated Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem. We also provide an algorithm to implement any such random assignment. Several applications are described, including (i) single-unit random assignment, such as school choice; (ii) multi-unit random assignment, such as course allocation and fair division; and (iii) twosided matching problems, such as the scheduling of inter-league sports matchups. The same method also finds applications outside economics, generalizing previous results on the minimize makespan problem in the computer science literature."
The second (no significance to the ordering aside from when I read them) is "An Equivalence result in School Choice" by Jay Sethuraman
ABSTRACT: "The main result of the paper is a proof of the equivalence of single and multiple lottery mechanisms for the problem of allocating students to schools in which students have strict preferences and the schools are indifferent. This solves a recent open problem proposed by Pathak, who was motivated by the practical problem of assigning students to high schools in New York City. In proving this result, a new approach is introduced, that simplifies and unifies all the known equivalence results in the house allocation literature. Along the way, two new mechanisms—Partitioned Random Priority and Partitioned Random Endowment—are introduced for the house allocation problem. These mechanisms generalize several known and well-studied mechanisms for the house allocation problem and are particularly appropriate for many-to-one versions of the problem, the school choice problem being the most prominent."
(And here's a link to the earlier paper by Parag Pathak: Lotteries in Student Assignment: The Equivalence of Queueing and a Market-Based Approach)
Tuesday, March 23, 2010
Misc. kidney exchange links
The growth of kidney exchange is reflected in the following miscellany of stories.
Trading for the Perfect Match: MassGeneral Hospital for Children patient receives kidney through a four-way kidney swap arranged by the New England Program for Kidney Exchange.
At the University of Maryland: Paired Kidney Exchange: A Major Breakthrough in Kidney Transplantation
Doctor: ‘Living my dream’ Kidney surgeon Dr. J. Keith Melancon returns to speak at his alma mater, the U. of Louisiana.
"Melancon was in town as the featured speaker of the university’s Black History Month kick-off celebration Monday evening. Before the event, Melancon visited with students at Comeaux High, South Louisiana Community College and ULL.
Melancon now has a role in African American history. He said he recognizes that his story is an “American story.”
“This little black boy from Lafayette, Louisiana, overcoming the obstacle of growing up young and black in America,” he said. “I am proud of my heritage of coming from here.”
Now, at 41, Melancon is director of the kidney and pancreas transplant program at Georgetown University Hospital. He said he made the move from Baltimore to make a difference in metropolitan Washington, D.C., where there’s a large minority population and a high incidence rate of kidney disease.
“If you’re African-American in this country, you’re four times more likely to have kidney disease,” Melancon said."
see here for a chart on the 13-way set of three kidney exchange chains each started by an altruistic donor,
And this comment by Sally Satel and Mark Perry on how many more donors might be available if they could be legally compensated: More kidney donors are needed to meet a rising demand
Kidney exchange in Pittsburgh
"McGowan Institute for Regenerative Medicine faculty member Ron Shapiro, MD, is director of the kidney, pancreas, and islet transplant program at the UPMC Thomas E. Starzl Transplantation Institute and professor of surgery and Robert J. Corry Chair in Transplantation Surgery at the University of Pittsburgh School of Medicine. On December 10, Dr. Shapiro and a team of UPMC doctors participated in UPMC’s first kidney paired donation in collaboration with Temple University Hospital and the Paired Donation Network. The couples, a husband and wife from Pittsburgh and two sisters from Philadelphia, donated kidneys to each others’ loved ones in a two-way surgical swap. Such paired exchanges are still uncommon. All donors and recipients are recovering well.
...This exchange was facilitated by the Center for Organ Recovery and Education (CORE) and the Gift of Life".
and in CA: UC Davis Medical Center completes four kidney transplants in two days using paired exchange
"(SACRAMENTO, Calif.) — Using the revolutionary new approach to kidney transplants known as paired exchange, four patients have received live-donor kidney transplants through the UC Davis Kidney Transplant Program."
and in Philadelphia: Her one kidney changed four lives
meanwhile, mixed news from Europe:
EU want to impose ban on altruistic, pooled and paired kidney donations.
while in Spain things seem to be going the other way:
Donar órganos en vida a desconocidos será legal (ht Flip Klijn)
Here's a summary.
Trading for the Perfect Match: MassGeneral Hospital for Children patient receives kidney through a four-way kidney swap arranged by the New England Program for Kidney Exchange.
At the University of Maryland: Paired Kidney Exchange: A Major Breakthrough in Kidney Transplantation
Doctor: ‘Living my dream’ Kidney surgeon Dr. J. Keith Melancon returns to speak at his alma mater, the U. of Louisiana.
"Melancon was in town as the featured speaker of the university’s Black History Month kick-off celebration Monday evening. Before the event, Melancon visited with students at Comeaux High, South Louisiana Community College and ULL.
Melancon now has a role in African American history. He said he recognizes that his story is an “American story.”
“This little black boy from Lafayette, Louisiana, overcoming the obstacle of growing up young and black in America,” he said. “I am proud of my heritage of coming from here.”
Now, at 41, Melancon is director of the kidney and pancreas transplant program at Georgetown University Hospital. He said he made the move from Baltimore to make a difference in metropolitan Washington, D.C., where there’s a large minority population and a high incidence rate of kidney disease.
“If you’re African-American in this country, you’re four times more likely to have kidney disease,” Melancon said."
see here for a chart on the 13-way set of three kidney exchange chains each started by an altruistic donor,
And this comment by Sally Satel and Mark Perry on how many more donors might be available if they could be legally compensated: More kidney donors are needed to meet a rising demand
Kidney exchange in Pittsburgh
"McGowan Institute for Regenerative Medicine faculty member Ron Shapiro, MD, is director of the kidney, pancreas, and islet transplant program at the UPMC Thomas E. Starzl Transplantation Institute and professor of surgery and Robert J. Corry Chair in Transplantation Surgery at the University of Pittsburgh School of Medicine. On December 10, Dr. Shapiro and a team of UPMC doctors participated in UPMC’s first kidney paired donation in collaboration with Temple University Hospital and the Paired Donation Network. The couples, a husband and wife from Pittsburgh and two sisters from Philadelphia, donated kidneys to each others’ loved ones in a two-way surgical swap. Such paired exchanges are still uncommon. All donors and recipients are recovering well.
...This exchange was facilitated by the Center for Organ Recovery and Education (CORE) and the Gift of Life".
and in CA: UC Davis Medical Center completes four kidney transplants in two days using paired exchange
"(SACRAMENTO, Calif.) — Using the revolutionary new approach to kidney transplants known as paired exchange, four patients have received live-donor kidney transplants through the UC Davis Kidney Transplant Program."
and in Philadelphia: Her one kidney changed four lives
meanwhile, mixed news from Europe:
EU want to impose ban on altruistic, pooled and paired kidney donations.
while in Spain things seem to be going the other way:
Donar órganos en vida a desconocidos será legal (ht Flip Klijn)
Here's a summary.
Transplant ethics
Two stories reflect different aspects of current debates about transplantation, and who are appropriate recipients, and donors.
Transplant tourism poses ethical dilemma for US doctors
"In the current case, a 46-year-old Chinese accountant (HQ) was placed on the UNOS transplant registry with a Model for End Stage Liver Disease (MELD) score of 18 that increased to 21 while on the candidate waitlist for over a year (MELD scores range from 6 for those least ill through 40 for those most sick). HQ then traveled to the People's Republic of China (PRC) and was transplanted two weeks after arrival. After transplantation, HQ returned to the Mount Sinai program requesting follow-up care, which was provided. HQ then developed biliary sepsis requiring hospitalization and re-transplantation seemed to be the only viable option.
"While the patient was a medically suitable candidate, team members disagreed if it were indeed, morally right to provide him with a transplant," said Thomas Schiano, M.D., one of the case clinicians and lead author of this study. Ultimately, the transplant team proceeded with a liver transplant for HQ and he is currently doing well. "Our consensus to transplant was based on the relevant principles of medical ethics—non-judgmental regard, beneficence, and fiduciary responsibility," added Dr. Schiano. " (emphasis added)
"The Dilemma and Reality of Transplant Tourism: An Ethical Perspective for Liver Transplant Programs." Thomas D. Schiano, Rosamond Rhodes. Liver Transplantation; Published Online: January 26, 2010 (DOI: 10.1002/lt.21967); Print Issue Date: February 2010.
Project to get transplant organs from ER patients raises ethics questions
"The practice could backfire by making an already skeptical public less likely to designate themselves as organ donors, several experts said. "
Transplant tourism poses ethical dilemma for US doctors
"In the current case, a 46-year-old Chinese accountant (HQ) was placed on the UNOS transplant registry with a Model for End Stage Liver Disease (MELD) score of 18 that increased to 21 while on the candidate waitlist for over a year (MELD scores range from 6 for those least ill through 40 for those most sick). HQ then traveled to the People's Republic of China (PRC) and was transplanted two weeks after arrival. After transplantation, HQ returned to the Mount Sinai program requesting follow-up care, which was provided. HQ then developed biliary sepsis requiring hospitalization and re-transplantation seemed to be the only viable option.
"While the patient was a medically suitable candidate, team members disagreed if it were indeed, morally right to provide him with a transplant," said Thomas Schiano, M.D., one of the case clinicians and lead author of this study. Ultimately, the transplant team proceeded with a liver transplant for HQ and he is currently doing well. "Our consensus to transplant was based on the relevant principles of medical ethics—non-judgmental regard, beneficence, and fiduciary responsibility," added Dr. Schiano. " (emphasis added)
"The Dilemma and Reality of Transplant Tourism: An Ethical Perspective for Liver Transplant Programs." Thomas D. Schiano, Rosamond Rhodes. Liver Transplantation; Published Online: January 26, 2010 (DOI: 10.1002/lt.21967); Print Issue Date: February 2010.
Project to get transplant organs from ER patients raises ethics questions
"The practice could backfire by making an already skeptical public less likely to designate themselves as organ donors, several experts said. "
Monday, March 22, 2010
Reserve prices in ad auctions: a field experiment by Ostrovsky and Schwarz
Reserve Prices in Internet Advertising Auctions: A Field Experiment by Michael Ostrovsky and Michael Schwarz.
Abstract
"We present the results of a large field experiment on setting reserve prices in auctions for online advertisements, guided by the theory of optimal auction design suitably adapted to the sponsored search setting. Consistent with the theory, following the introduction of new reserve prices revenues in these auctions have increased substantially."
And, from the introduction:
"Reserve prices in the randomly selected "treatment" group were set based on the guidance provided by the theory of optimal auctions, while in the "control" group they were left at the old level of 10 cents per click. The revenues in the treatment group have increased substantially relative to the control group, showing that reserve prices in auctions can in fact play an important role and that theory provides a useful guide for setting them. This increase is especially pronounced for keywords with relatively high search volumes, for keywords in which the theoretically optimal reserve price is relatively high, and for keywords with a relatively small number of bidders."...
"Our paper makes several contributions relative to [earlier] studies. First, it analyzes a much larger and economically important setting, with thousands of keywords and millions (and potentially, given the size of the online advertising industry, billions) of dollars at stake. Consequently, many of the bidders in this setting spend considerable time and resources on optimizing their advertising campaigns. Second, the reserve prices in the experiment are guided by theory, based on the estimated distributions of bidder values. To the best of our knowledge, there are no other papers describing direct practical applications of the seminal results of Myerson (1981) and Riley and Samuelson (1981). Third, unlike the previous studies, the benchmark in our analysis is not a zero reserve price, but the existing reserve price set by the company after a long period of experimentation."
In the conclusion they say that setting optimal reservation prices reduces ads shown by about one per search, but increases search revenue by almost 3%, which is a big deal when multiplied by the enormous numbers of searches.
Abstract
"We present the results of a large field experiment on setting reserve prices in auctions for online advertisements, guided by the theory of optimal auction design suitably adapted to the sponsored search setting. Consistent with the theory, following the introduction of new reserve prices revenues in these auctions have increased substantially."
And, from the introduction:
"Reserve prices in the randomly selected "treatment" group were set based on the guidance provided by the theory of optimal auctions, while in the "control" group they were left at the old level of 10 cents per click. The revenues in the treatment group have increased substantially relative to the control group, showing that reserve prices in auctions can in fact play an important role and that theory provides a useful guide for setting them. This increase is especially pronounced for keywords with relatively high search volumes, for keywords in which the theoretically optimal reserve price is relatively high, and for keywords with a relatively small number of bidders."...
"Our paper makes several contributions relative to [earlier] studies. First, it analyzes a much larger and economically important setting, with thousands of keywords and millions (and potentially, given the size of the online advertising industry, billions) of dollars at stake. Consequently, many of the bidders in this setting spend considerable time and resources on optimizing their advertising campaigns. Second, the reserve prices in the experiment are guided by theory, based on the estimated distributions of bidder values. To the best of our knowledge, there are no other papers describing direct practical applications of the seminal results of Myerson (1981) and Riley and Samuelson (1981). Third, unlike the previous studies, the benchmark in our analysis is not a zero reserve price, but the existing reserve price set by the company after a long period of experimentation."
In the conclusion they say that setting optimal reservation prices reduces ads shown by about one per search, but increases search revenue by almost 3%, which is a big deal when multiplied by the enormous numbers of searches.
Sunday, March 21, 2010
Congressional briefing, postscript
On March 15, 2010 I gave a 15 minute presentation as part of a Congressional Briefing on the usefulness of Economics (particularly economic research supported by the NSF). Here are my slides: Improved Markets for Doctors, Organ Transplants and School Choice. (My talk focused on how early NSF-supported game theory research had led to recent developments in market design.)
The slides take a little while to load, since they contain a few photos. Speaking of photos, afterwards there were some photo opportunities, and I was happy to be included in the one above with my new Senator from MA, Scott Brown, who I wish the very best of luck in his demanding new job.
Saturday, March 20, 2010
Signaling and hiring: one law recruiter's opinion
From the Faculty Lounge: Tim Zinnecker writes
"Speaking solely for myself (and not fellow committee members or my law school institution), I hope we place a greater burden on candidates to prove a genuine interest in relocating, before we start the courtship. It can be frustrating (not only for law schools, but for other candidates who get "bumped") when, after the time and expense of a flyback, a candidate declines, citing "spousal relocation phobia." Some candidates disclose geographic restrictions on the FAR forms. Thank you. Some candidates decline the flyback, citing geographic concerns. Thank you (although why did you accept the screening interview?). But candidates who accept the flyback, receive an offer, and then disclose that the spouse won't relocate? Very frustrating."
"Speaking solely for myself (and not fellow committee members or my law school institution), I hope we place a greater burden on candidates to prove a genuine interest in relocating, before we start the courtship. It can be frustrating (not only for law schools, but for other candidates who get "bumped") when, after the time and expense of a flyback, a candidate declines, citing "spousal relocation phobia." Some candidates disclose geographic restrictions on the FAR forms. Thank you. Some candidates decline the flyback, citing geographic concerns. Thank you (although why did you accept the screening interview?). But candidates who accept the flyback, receive an offer, and then disclose that the spouse won't relocate? Very frustrating."
Friday, March 19, 2010
Market design posters
I'm giving a public talk on market design in Toronto on March 22, and Martin Osborne writes:
"Hi Al. We're making preparations for your visit. We've created some posters that you may be interested to see http://www.economics.utoronto.ca/osborne/poster1.pdf
http://www.economics.utoronto.ca/osborne/poster2.pdf
http://www.economics.utoronto.ca/osborne/poster3.pdf
http://www.economics.utoronto.ca/osborne/poster4.pdf
http://www.economics.utoronto.ca/osborne/poster5.pdf
(#4 is a much bigger file than the others, because we are going to us it for the hard copies.)"
The pictures are great. To my eye, the market in poster 2 looks like the one in most need of some design...
"Hi Al. We're making preparations for your visit. We've created some posters that you may be interested to see http://www.economics.utoronto.ca/osborne/poster1.pdf
http://www.economics.utoronto.ca/osborne/poster2.pdf
http://www.economics.utoronto.ca/osborne/poster3.pdf
http://www.economics.utoronto.ca/osborne/poster4.pdf
http://www.economics.utoronto.ca/osborne/poster5.pdf
(#4 is a much bigger file than the others, because we are going to us it for the hard copies.)"
The pictures are great. To my eye, the market in poster 2 looks like the one in most need of some design...
Thursday, March 18, 2010
Match Day!
This year's schedule for announcing the results of the resident match ends today, when most graduating medical students will learn where they have been matched.
Over the last few days, those who were not matched in the main match learned of this, so that they could "scramble" to match by the time that their colleagues would learn of their matches.
Here's this year's schedule:
March 15, 2010--Applicant matched and unmatched information posted to the Web site at 12:00 noon eastern time.
March 16, 2010--Filled and unfilled results for individual programs posted to the Web site at 11:30 a.m. eastern time.
Locations of all unfilled positions are released at 12:00 noon eastern time. Unmatched applicants may begin contacting unfilled programs at 12:00 noon eastern time.
March 18, 2010--Match Day! Match results for applicants are posted to Web site at 1:00 pm eastern time.
Next year this will all play out differently, since the NRMP has decided to organize a "managed scramble":
"The NRMP Board of Directors has voted to proceed with implementation of a "managed" Scramble for the 2012 Main Residency Match. Under the plan, unfilled positions must be offered and accepted through the NRMP R3 System during Match Week. Offers will be made every three hours Wednesday - Friday of Match Week, and applicants will be able to receive multiple simultaneous offers. Match Day will be moved from Thursday to Friday. Questions should be directed to nrmp@aamc.org."
Right now there is pressure on the number of residencies that can be funded, so there may not be as much problem with congestion as would otherwise be a concern. We'll have to wait until next year to find out. (I wasn't involved in this latest design discussion.)
Over the last few days, those who were not matched in the main match learned of this, so that they could "scramble" to match by the time that their colleagues would learn of their matches.
Here's this year's schedule:
March 15, 2010--Applicant matched and unmatched information posted to the Web site at 12:00 noon eastern time.
March 16, 2010--Filled and unfilled results for individual programs posted to the Web site at 11:30 a.m. eastern time.
Locations of all unfilled positions are released at 12:00 noon eastern time. Unmatched applicants may begin contacting unfilled programs at 12:00 noon eastern time.
March 18, 2010--Match Day! Match results for applicants are posted to Web site at 1:00 pm eastern time.
Next year this will all play out differently, since the NRMP has decided to organize a "managed scramble":
"The NRMP Board of Directors has voted to proceed with implementation of a "managed" Scramble for the 2012 Main Residency Match. Under the plan, unfilled positions must be offered and accepted through the NRMP R3 System during Match Week. Offers will be made every three hours Wednesday - Friday of Match Week, and applicants will be able to receive multiple simultaneous offers. Match Day will be moved from Thursday to Friday. Questions should be directed to nrmp@aamc.org."
Right now there is pressure on the number of residencies that can be funded, so there may not be as much problem with congestion as would otherwise be a concern. We'll have to wait until next year to find out. (I wasn't involved in this latest design discussion.)
Wednesday, March 17, 2010
Who would sell kidneys, if kidney sales were legal?
Not just the poor, according to a new (and sure to be controversial) study conducted by interviewing people at regional rail and urban trolley lines near Philadelphia.
The Annals of Internal Medicine has just published an article
Regulated Payments for Living Kidney Donation: An Empirical Assessment of the Ethical Concerns by Scott D. Halpern, Amelie Raz, Rachel Kohn, Michael Rey, David A. Asch, and Peter Reese.
It finds: "...participants' willingness to donate increased significantly as their risk for kidney failure decreased, as the payment offered increased, and when the kidney recipient was a family member rather than a patient on a public waiting list (P [lessthan] 0.001 for each). No statistical interactions were identified ...between payment and income (odds ratio, 1.01 [CI, 0.99 to 1.03]). The proximity of these estimates to 1.0 and narrowness of the CIs suggest that payment is neither an undue nor an unjust inducement, respectively. Alerting participants to the possibility of payment did not alter their willingness to donate for altruistic reasons (P = 0.40). "
The lead author, Scott Halpern, is at Penn, affiliated with the Center for Health Incentives.
The Annals of Internal Medicine has just published an article
Regulated Payments for Living Kidney Donation: An Empirical Assessment of the Ethical Concerns by Scott D. Halpern, Amelie Raz, Rachel Kohn, Michael Rey, David A. Asch, and Peter Reese.
It finds: "...participants' willingness to donate increased significantly as their risk for kidney failure decreased, as the payment offered increased, and when the kidney recipient was a family member rather than a patient on a public waiting list (P [lessthan] 0.001 for each). No statistical interactions were identified ...between payment and income (odds ratio, 1.01 [CI, 0.99 to 1.03]). The proximity of these estimates to 1.0 and narrowness of the CIs suggest that payment is neither an undue nor an unjust inducement, respectively. Alerting participants to the possibility of payment did not alter their willingness to donate for altruistic reasons (P = 0.40). "
The lead author, Scott Halpern, is at Penn, affiliated with the Center for Health Incentives.
Wiseguy Tickets
If I were planning to break the laws on ticket resales, I think I would refrain from calling my company Wiseguy Tickts: 4 Charged in Concert Ticket Resale Scheme
"Federal prosecutors in New Jersey said on Monday that four men operating under the name Wiseguy Tickets had broken into online sites, buying more than one million tickets to some of the country’s most popular musical and sporting events and then reselling them for more than $25 million in profit.
In its 43-count indictment, the prosecutors say the men built a computer network that created thousands of fake accounts and built a program that could outsmart the ticketing software that creates oddly shaped letters intended to require human verification.
The events affected by the scheme cut across a wide swath of the entertainment business, from Hannah Montana concerts to Broadway shows and New York Yankees playoff games. The verification systems of many major online ticket vendors, including Ticketmaster, Telecharge and Major League Baseball, were breached."
"Federal prosecutors in New Jersey said on Monday that four men operating under the name Wiseguy Tickets had broken into online sites, buying more than one million tickets to some of the country’s most popular musical and sporting events and then reselling them for more than $25 million in profit.
In its 43-count indictment, the prosecutors say the men built a computer network that created thousands of fake accounts and built a program that could outsmart the ticketing software that creates oddly shaped letters intended to require human verification.
The events affected by the scheme cut across a wide swath of the entertainment business, from Hannah Montana concerts to Broadway shows and New York Yankees playoff games. The verification systems of many major online ticket vendors, including Ticketmaster, Telecharge and Major League Baseball, were breached."
Tuesday, March 16, 2010
B2B finance
Page 14 of a recent report by Morgan Stanley focuses on The Receivables Exchange, about which I have posted previously. (The Morgan Stanley report emphasizes: " This is not a research report and was not prepared by Morgan Stanley research department. It was prepared by Morgan Stanley sales, trading, banking and other non-research personnel. Past performance is not necessarily a guide to future performance.") Here it is.
The report has some recent performance statistics, and says "The Receivables Exchange, a private company, started trading on November 18, 2008 to bring private capital to the market for SME [small/medium enterprise] credit. Via The Receivables Exchange, an SME can auction its receivables to the highest bidder(s) for a substantial advance rate. The Receivables Exchange provides straight-through processing and acts as collateral agent and servicer, using an innovative approach to mitigate default risk."
Here are my previous posts about the Receivables Exchange, which strikes me as quite an interesting venture in disintermediation of credit. (Full disclosure; I'm on their advisory board.)
The report has some recent performance statistics, and says "The Receivables Exchange, a private company, started trading on November 18, 2008 to bring private capital to the market for SME [small/medium enterprise] credit. Via The Receivables Exchange, an SME can auction its receivables to the highest bidder(s) for a substantial advance rate. The Receivables Exchange provides straight-through processing and acts as collateral agent and servicer, using an innovative approach to mitigate default risk."
Here are my previous posts about the Receivables Exchange, which strikes me as quite an interesting venture in disintermediation of credit. (Full disclosure; I'm on their advisory board.)
New clearinghouse for new doctors in Scotland
There have been some changes in the SCOTTISH FOUNDATION ALLOCATION SCHEME, the program that matches new medical graduates to their first positions (which would be called residencies in the US) in Scotland.
Two features stand out in comparison to the American system (the NRMP).
First, employers may not submit preferences, but rather are all constrained to rank potential employees by their exam scores.
Second, couples cannot submit preferences over pairs of positions. Instead, each member of the couple submits a rank ordering of individual positions, and the algorithm combines these into a joint preference over pairs that is a function of the submitted rank order list and a table of compatibilities of positions.
"To accommodate linked applicants, a joint preference list is formed for each such pair, using their individual preference lists and the programme compatibility information. If such a pair, a and b, have individual preferences p1, p2, . . . , p10 and q1, q2, . . . , q10 respectively (with a the higher scoring applicant), then the joint preference list of the pair (a,b) is (p1,q1), (p1,q2), (p2,q1), (p2,q2), (p1,q3), (p3,q1), (p2,q3), (p3,q2), . . ., (p9,q10), (p10,q9), (p10,q10) (except that incompatible pairs of programmes are omitted)
In the main body of the algorithm, the members of a linked pair are handled together, so the match of the pair (a,b) to the programmes (p,q) will be accepted only if each of these programmes either has an unfilled place or a lower scoring applicant who can be displaced. A complication arises when one member x of a linked pair has to be withdrawn from a programme p because his/her partner was displaced from their current assigned programme. In this case, some other applicants may have been rejected by p because of the presence of x, and any such applicant a must be withdrawn from their current programme, if any, and have their best achievable preference reset to p. (A corresponding, but more complex reset operation is needed if a is a member of a linked pair). This reset operation thereby allows a further opportunity for applicant a to be matched to programme p.
The algorithm terminates when every single applicant and linked pair is either matched or has been rejected by, or displaced from, every entry in their preference list with no possibility of reconsideration by a programme that has had a withdrawal.
The final matching is stable for single applicants, as before, but also for linked pairs, in the sense that:
there can be no linked pair (a,b) of applicants who would prefer to be matched to compatible programmes (p,q), and at the same time, each of p and q has an unfilled place or an assigned applicant with a lower score than a and b respectively."
HT: Rob Irving, who has designed and implemented the algorithm.
Here are some related papers by members of the Scottish matching group.
Keeping partners together: algorithmic results for the hospitals/residents problem with couples by Eric J. McDermid and David F. Manlove in
Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, (2009)
R.W. Irving, D.F. Manlove and S. Scott, The stable marriage problem with master preference lists, Discrete Applied Mathematics vol. 156 (2008), pp. 2959-2977.
Two features stand out in comparison to the American system (the NRMP).
First, employers may not submit preferences, but rather are all constrained to rank potential employees by their exam scores.
Second, couples cannot submit preferences over pairs of positions. Instead, each member of the couple submits a rank ordering of individual positions, and the algorithm combines these into a joint preference over pairs that is a function of the submitted rank order list and a table of compatibilities of positions.
"To accommodate linked applicants, a joint preference list is formed for each such pair, using their individual preference lists and the programme compatibility information. If such a pair, a and b, have individual preferences p1, p2, . . . , p10 and q1, q2, . . . , q10 respectively (with a the higher scoring applicant), then the joint preference list of the pair (a,b) is (p1,q1), (p1,q2), (p2,q1), (p2,q2), (p1,q3), (p3,q1), (p2,q3), (p3,q2), . . ., (p9,q10), (p10,q9), (p10,q10) (except that incompatible pairs of programmes are omitted)
In the main body of the algorithm, the members of a linked pair are handled together, so the match of the pair (a,b) to the programmes (p,q) will be accepted only if each of these programmes either has an unfilled place or a lower scoring applicant who can be displaced. A complication arises when one member x of a linked pair has to be withdrawn from a programme p because his/her partner was displaced from their current assigned programme. In this case, some other applicants may have been rejected by p because of the presence of x, and any such applicant a must be withdrawn from their current programme, if any, and have their best achievable preference reset to p. (A corresponding, but more complex reset operation is needed if a is a member of a linked pair). This reset operation thereby allows a further opportunity for applicant a to be matched to programme p.
The algorithm terminates when every single applicant and linked pair is either matched or has been rejected by, or displaced from, every entry in their preference list with no possibility of reconsideration by a programme that has had a withdrawal.
The final matching is stable for single applicants, as before, but also for linked pairs, in the sense that:
there can be no linked pair (a,b) of applicants who would prefer to be matched to compatible programmes (p,q), and at the same time, each of p and q has an unfilled place or an assigned applicant with a lower score than a and b respectively."
HT: Rob Irving, who has designed and implemented the algorithm.
Here are some related papers by members of the Scottish matching group.
Keeping partners together: algorithmic results for the hospitals/residents problem with couples by Eric J. McDermid and David F. Manlove in
Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, (2009)
R.W. Irving, D.F. Manlove and S. Scott, The stable marriage problem with master preference lists, Discrete Applied Mathematics vol. 156 (2008), pp. 2959-2977.
Monday, March 15, 2010
New school choice system in San Francisco
Board Approves New Student Assignment System for San Francisco Schools (now here)
Most of the last minute discussion was about what priorities different kinds of students will have at different kinds of schools. That is something that is likely to be adjusted from year to year. But the nice thing is that the underlying choice architecture will make it safe for parents to state their true preferences however the priorities are adjusted.
From the press release: "The choice algorithm was designed with the help of a volunteer team of market design experts who have previously been involved in designing choice algorithms for school choice in Boston and New York City. Volunteers from four prominent universities contributed to the effort, including Clayton Featherstone and Muriel Niederle of Stanford University, Atila Abdulkadiroglu of Duke University, Parag Pathak of MIT, and Alvin Roth of Harvard.
“We are pleased that the district has decided to adopt a choice architecture that makes it safe for parents to concentrate their effort on determining which schools they prefer, with confidence that they won’t hurt their chances by listing their preferences truthfully,” said Niederle and Featherstone, the Stanford research team."
Here are Rachel Norton's comments (she's a school board member with a blog), and here's the story from the SF Chronicle. Here are some of my recent posts on school choice; many of the recent ones tell the SF story as it unfolded.
Now, on to implementation.
Most of the last minute discussion was about what priorities different kinds of students will have at different kinds of schools. That is something that is likely to be adjusted from year to year. But the nice thing is that the underlying choice architecture will make it safe for parents to state their true preferences however the priorities are adjusted.
From the press release: "The choice algorithm was designed with the help of a volunteer team of market design experts who have previously been involved in designing choice algorithms for school choice in Boston and New York City. Volunteers from four prominent universities contributed to the effort, including Clayton Featherstone and Muriel Niederle of Stanford University, Atila Abdulkadiroglu of Duke University, Parag Pathak of MIT, and Alvin Roth of Harvard.
“We are pleased that the district has decided to adopt a choice architecture that makes it safe for parents to concentrate their effort on determining which schools they prefer, with confidence that they won’t hurt their chances by listing their preferences truthfully,” said Niederle and Featherstone, the Stanford research team."
Here are Rachel Norton's comments (she's a school board member with a blog), and here's the story from the SF Chronicle. Here are some of my recent posts on school choice; many of the recent ones tell the SF story as it unfolded.
Now, on to implementation.
Sunday, March 14, 2010
Raffle for a human egg
The Times of London reports: IVF doctors to raffle human egg
"A FERTILITY clinic is raffling a human egg in London to promote its new “baby profiling” service, which circumvents British IVF (in vitro fertilisation) laws.
The winner will be able to pick the egg donor by racial background, upbringing and education. Payment for profit is illegal in Britain, but the £13,000 of free IVF treatment will be provided in America. "
...
"The eggs are provided by American donors aged between 19 and 32, all of whom are university students or graduates. Overweight women or smokers are not accepted onto the donation programme Before picking a donor, the British women scan detailed anonymised profiles, including the donors’ motives for selling. The profiles include recordings of the women talking about their attitudes, as well as pictures taken of them in their childhood. They only provide an up-to-date photo if they enter serious negotiations.
Women egg donors in America can make $10,000 (£6,600) a time if they are well educated and with desirable physical characteristics.
The sale of their eggs was condemned yesterday by Josephine Quintavalle, founder of Comment on Reproductive Ethics, a pressure group, who said the infertility market had plumbed new depths.
“In no other branch of medicine would the ruthless exploitation of the vulnerable be tolerated. These women selling their eggs are taking a huge risk with their health and future fertility simply because they need the money.”
In Britain, donors have to agree to be identified and contacted by any resulting offspring when they reach the age of 18.
Payments are restricted to a maximum fee of £250 for expenses, and as a result donors are in extremely short supply. "
...
"The lure of payment means there is no shortage of would-be egg donors in America. GIVF receives up to 500 applications a month, but only about five will pass the two-month screening programme. "
...
"In Britain, only 956 of the 36,861 women who had IVF in 2007 received donor eggs. Half of those were egg sharers and of the remainder many were friends or relatives of the women being treated.
The number of donors is boosted by an arrangement whereby women receive free treatment if they agree to share their eggs with another patient who has no useable eggs at all. The drawback is that anyone undergoing fertility treatment necessarily has inferior eggs, so the chances of pregnancy for both women is relatively poor.
Egg donation is a protracted and painful process that requires treatment with potentially dangerous drugs. A donor has to undergo a course of treatment aimed at stimulating her ovaries to produce a dozen or more eggs in one menstrual cycle, instead of the single ripe egg released every month in natural conditions.
Bridge Centre staff admit they were bemused by the GIVF free egg offer from America. “They are much more market-driven than we are, and they do have some rather more creative techniques,” said Michael Summers, a senior consultant in reproductive medicine at the Bridge."
The debate over whether it's ok for women to sell eggs is not over in America. Kim Krawiec at Faculty Lounge asks How Is An Egg Donor Like A Prostitute?
"A few weeks ago, House Bill 3077, which would make it illegal to compensate women for oocyte donation, easily passed the Oklahoma house by a vote of 85-8. Said Rep. Rebecca Hamilton, D-Oklahoma City, the bill’s author, fertility clinics "could use donor eggs all they want; they just can’t go out and solicit women with money.” According to news reports, Hamilton has likened the practice to prostitution, claiming that “it turns doctors into predators.”
The debate harkens back to an exchange in September, in which Dr. Naomi Pfeffer drew fire for a statement to the Motherhood in the 21st Century Conference at the University College London that compared egg donors to prostitutes. As reported in The Times:
British couples who travel abroad for IVF treatment and buy other women’s eggs are engaging in a form of prostitution, a fertility conference was told yesterday. . .
Professor Pfeffer, who researches controversial developments in medicine, told the Motherhood in the 21st Century Conference at University College London: “The exchange relationship is analogous to that of a client and a prostitute. It’s a unique situation because it’s the only instance in which a woman exploits another woman’s body….
These women are being encouraged to take real risks with their health through ovarian stimulation and egg retrieval. It commodifies women’s bodies and treats their reproductive capacities as a service.
So, what sort of crazy person would compare an egg donor to a prostitute?
I would. But not for the reasons that either Hamilton or Pfeffer have in mind.
As I argue in the recently posted, A Woman’s Worth, an egg donor is much like a prostitute in the following sense: both are selling something that is often expected or encouraged to be given for free or at a reduced price, despite its high economic value. "
"A FERTILITY clinic is raffling a human egg in London to promote its new “baby profiling” service, which circumvents British IVF (in vitro fertilisation) laws.
The winner will be able to pick the egg donor by racial background, upbringing and education. Payment for profit is illegal in Britain, but the £13,000 of free IVF treatment will be provided in America. "
...
"The eggs are provided by American donors aged between 19 and 32, all of whom are university students or graduates. Overweight women or smokers are not accepted onto the donation programme Before picking a donor, the British women scan detailed anonymised profiles, including the donors’ motives for selling. The profiles include recordings of the women talking about their attitudes, as well as pictures taken of them in their childhood. They only provide an up-to-date photo if they enter serious negotiations.
Women egg donors in America can make $10,000 (£6,600) a time if they are well educated and with desirable physical characteristics.
The sale of their eggs was condemned yesterday by Josephine Quintavalle, founder of Comment on Reproductive Ethics, a pressure group, who said the infertility market had plumbed new depths.
“In no other branch of medicine would the ruthless exploitation of the vulnerable be tolerated. These women selling their eggs are taking a huge risk with their health and future fertility simply because they need the money.”
In Britain, donors have to agree to be identified and contacted by any resulting offspring when they reach the age of 18.
Payments are restricted to a maximum fee of £250 for expenses, and as a result donors are in extremely short supply. "
...
"The lure of payment means there is no shortage of would-be egg donors in America. GIVF receives up to 500 applications a month, but only about five will pass the two-month screening programme. "
...
"In Britain, only 956 of the 36,861 women who had IVF in 2007 received donor eggs. Half of those were egg sharers and of the remainder many were friends or relatives of the women being treated.
The number of donors is boosted by an arrangement whereby women receive free treatment if they agree to share their eggs with another patient who has no useable eggs at all. The drawback is that anyone undergoing fertility treatment necessarily has inferior eggs, so the chances of pregnancy for both women is relatively poor.
Egg donation is a protracted and painful process that requires treatment with potentially dangerous drugs. A donor has to undergo a course of treatment aimed at stimulating her ovaries to produce a dozen or more eggs in one menstrual cycle, instead of the single ripe egg released every month in natural conditions.
Bridge Centre staff admit they were bemused by the GIVF free egg offer from America. “They are much more market-driven than we are, and they do have some rather more creative techniques,” said Michael Summers, a senior consultant in reproductive medicine at the Bridge."
The debate over whether it's ok for women to sell eggs is not over in America. Kim Krawiec at Faculty Lounge asks How Is An Egg Donor Like A Prostitute?
"A few weeks ago, House Bill 3077, which would make it illegal to compensate women for oocyte donation, easily passed the Oklahoma house by a vote of 85-8. Said Rep. Rebecca Hamilton, D-Oklahoma City, the bill’s author, fertility clinics "could use donor eggs all they want; they just can’t go out and solicit women with money.” According to news reports, Hamilton has likened the practice to prostitution, claiming that “it turns doctors into predators.”
The debate harkens back to an exchange in September, in which Dr. Naomi Pfeffer drew fire for a statement to the Motherhood in the 21st Century Conference at the University College London that compared egg donors to prostitutes. As reported in The Times:
British couples who travel abroad for IVF treatment and buy other women’s eggs are engaging in a form of prostitution, a fertility conference was told yesterday. . .
Professor Pfeffer, who researches controversial developments in medicine, told the Motherhood in the 21st Century Conference at University College London: “The exchange relationship is analogous to that of a client and a prostitute. It’s a unique situation because it’s the only instance in which a woman exploits another woman’s body….
These women are being encouraged to take real risks with their health through ovarian stimulation and egg retrieval. It commodifies women’s bodies and treats their reproductive capacities as a service.
So, what sort of crazy person would compare an egg donor to a prostitute?
I would. But not for the reasons that either Hamilton or Pfeffer have in mind.
As I argue in the recently posted, A Woman’s Worth, an egg donor is much like a prostitute in the following sense: both are selling something that is often expected or encouraged to be given for free or at a reduced price, despite its high economic value. "
Saturday, March 13, 2010
School choice in Britain
A story in the Telegraph appears to report the remarkable fact that some schools in Britain are more popular than others, and are over-demanded: School admissions: half lose out in some areas
"Half of children in some areas have been rejected from their preferred secondary school amid fierce competition for the most sought-after places. "
...
"In Birmingham, only two-third of children gained places in their preferred school, a fall compared with last year.
The squeeze on places has led some over-subscribed schools to run controversial “lotteries” in which names are effectively picked from a hat.
The system is employed to stop middle-class parents jumping the queue for the best schools by buying homes in the catchment area.
Lotteries are believed to be used in at least one school in a third of local authorities. Hertfordshire council told the Telegraph yesterday that seven schools had employed the system.
Michael Gove, shadow schools secretary, said: “Unfortunately too often too many parents don’t get the school they want. The reality is that it is only the rich who can guarantee the kind of education they want for their children.” "
"Half of children in some areas have been rejected from their preferred secondary school amid fierce competition for the most sought-after places. "
...
"In Birmingham, only two-third of children gained places in their preferred school, a fall compared with last year.
The squeeze on places has led some over-subscribed schools to run controversial “lotteries” in which names are effectively picked from a hat.
The system is employed to stop middle-class parents jumping the queue for the best schools by buying homes in the catchment area.
Lotteries are believed to be used in at least one school in a third of local authorities. Hertfordshire council told the Telegraph yesterday that seven schools had employed the system.
Michael Gove, shadow schools secretary, said: “Unfortunately too often too many parents don’t get the school they want. The reality is that it is only the rich who can guarantee the kind of education they want for their children.” "
Friday, March 12, 2010
Congressional briefing on market design
CONSORTIUM OF SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATIONS
Better Living Through Economics (Harvard University Press 2010) illustrates the fundamental contributions of economic research to important public policy decisions through twelve case studies. A panel of distinguished scholars will discuss some of these examples of how basic economic research by academic economists has improved people’s lives and continues to impact policy decisions.
Speakers:
Brigitte Madrian, Harvard Kennedy School: “More Saving and Better Retirements.”
Lawrence Ausubel, University of Maryland, “The Greatest Auction in History: Raising Billions from the Communications Spectrum”
Alvin Roth, Harvard University, “Improved Markets for Doctors, Organ Transplants and School Choice”
John Siegfried, Vanderbilt University, “Cheaper Airfares, Welfare Reform and an All-Volunteer Military”
Sponsored by: The Consortium of Social Science Associations (COSSA)
A box lunch will be served. This is a widely attended event!
Positive RSVPs to cossa@cossa.org or 202/842-3525.
You are invited to a Congressional Briefing on
“Better Living through Economics: How Fundamental Economic Research Improves People’s Lives”
March 15, 2010, 12:00-1:30
March 15, 2010, 12:00-1:30
B338 Rayburn House Office Building
Better Living Through Economics (Harvard University Press 2010) illustrates the fundamental contributions of economic research to important public policy decisions through twelve case studies. A panel of distinguished scholars will discuss some of these examples of how basic economic research by academic economists has improved people’s lives and continues to impact policy decisions.
Speakers:
Brigitte Madrian, Harvard Kennedy School: “More Saving and Better Retirements.”
Lawrence Ausubel, University of Maryland, “The Greatest Auction in History: Raising Billions from the Communications Spectrum”
Alvin Roth, Harvard University, “Improved Markets for Doctors, Organ Transplants and School Choice”
John Siegfried, Vanderbilt University, “Cheaper Airfares, Welfare Reform and an All-Volunteer Military”
Sponsored by: The Consortium of Social Science Associations (COSSA)
A box lunch will be served. This is a widely attended event!
Positive RSVPs to cossa@cossa.org or 202/842-3525.
Elliott Spitzer on government’s role in the market
Government’s proper role in the market, in the Boston Review.
Spitzer writes from the point of view of a former Attorney General of New York (as opposed to real estate heir, former Governor, or Greek tragedian).
"To sum up, I want to leave you with ten points:
• Only government can enforce integrity and transparency in the marketplace; self-regulation is a failure.
• Only government can take necessary steps to overcome market failures, such as negative externalities or monopoly power.
• Only government can act to preserve certain core values in the market, such as prohibitions on discrimination.
• Too-big-to-fail is too-big-not-to-fail.
• We’re suffering from the Peter Principle on Steroids, and it will get us into deeper trouble.
• Taxpayers have been getting the short end of the stick in everything we’ve been doing. The Treasury Department is not negotiating for us.
• Risk is real, and no complex scheme of financial instruments can make it go away.
• We have de-leveraged the wrong way, by socializing risks and privatizing benefits. The government has accepted all the debt obligations of the private sector, and taxpayers now owe this money.
• The only way to reform corporate governance is to get the owners—the shareholders—of companies involved and actually paying attention.
• All of this is very tough: being able to diagnose a problem is a whole lot easier than mustering the will to fix it. "
Spitzer writes from the point of view of a former Attorney General of New York (as opposed to real estate heir, former Governor, or Greek tragedian).
"To sum up, I want to leave you with ten points:
• Only government can enforce integrity and transparency in the marketplace; self-regulation is a failure.
• Only government can take necessary steps to overcome market failures, such as negative externalities or monopoly power.
• Only government can act to preserve certain core values in the market, such as prohibitions on discrimination.
• Too-big-to-fail is too-big-not-to-fail.
• We’re suffering from the Peter Principle on Steroids, and it will get us into deeper trouble.
• Taxpayers have been getting the short end of the stick in everything we’ve been doing. The Treasury Department is not negotiating for us.
• Risk is real, and no complex scheme of financial instruments can make it go away.
• We have de-leveraged the wrong way, by socializing risks and privatizing benefits. The government has accepted all the debt obligations of the private sector, and taxpayers now owe this money.
• The only way to reform corporate governance is to get the owners—the shareholders—of companies involved and actually paying attention.
• All of this is very tough: being able to diagnose a problem is a whole lot easier than mustering the will to fix it. "
Thursday, March 11, 2010
Wikis
My busy sometimes co-blogger Peter writes:
"I was just reading about the company "Wikia," which is owned by Wikipedia founder Jimmy Wales. Interestingly, he #2 most active wiki is an academic jobs info wiki:
http://academicjobs.wikia.com/wiki/Humanities_and_Social_Science_Postdocs_2009-2010
(The most active wiki is lostpedia, the wiki about the TV Series LOST)
"I was just reading about the company "Wikia," which is owned by Wikipedia founder Jimmy Wales. Interestingly, he #2 most active wiki is an academic jobs info wiki:
http://academicjobs.wikia.com/wiki/Humanities_and_Social_Science_Postdocs_2009-2010
(The most active wiki is lostpedia, the wiki about the TV Series LOST)
Law faculty recruitment
The Association of American Law Schools (AALS) helps organize law faculty recruitment, with services including a database of candidates called the Faculty Appointments Register, a job advertisement service called the Placement Bulletin, and a dedicated Faculty Recruitment Conference (different from the annual meeting of the organization), which this year took place Nov 5-7.
Here's an account of the experience from a survivor: One Candidate's Experience in the AALS Hiring Process
"As you can imagine, my experience at the hiring conference mainly consisted of running up and down staircases, from one building to the next and back again. I scheduled 15 interviews on Friday and began my day with seven back-to-back. My eight years of competitive speech tournaments, which also consisted of running from room to room talking all day long, were good preparation. I think the best advice that I got about the hiring conference was from Dean Blake Morant, who advised the candidates at an opening session to “be our most authentic selves” and “bring up the energy level in the room” during each interview. "
...
"One of the most interesting and craze-inducing aspects of the hiring process was the law school hiring discussion on Prawfs Blawg. The four threads, which began on August 19th, have received well over 1300 comments. I admit that I read the threads nearly every day in the weeks before and after the hiring conference. I’m not sure that I know why, except that I felt that I was part of a large anonymous community of people who were just as freaked out and insecure as I was. I suppose its better to be in such a community of such people than be alone.
If I have learned anything from this process, it is that nobody really knows the secret to success and, in fact, the process is so individualized to particular hiring committees in a particular year at a particular school, that there likely is no secret. This is extremely frustrating to wanna-be law professors because we are analytical people. We (sometimes desperately) want to know the rules and the facts so that we can weigh our odds and predict our futures.
One big gaping hole getting in the way of our analysis is the lack of data on the members of the candidate pool. A few schools do a great job advising their alumni and keeping track of those in the process (shout out to Akiba Covitz!). Most don’t, and nobody aggregates that data. It appears that AALS doesn’t release it either (other than to the schools in the FAR forms themselves). So the candidates are left to guess who their competition is and how they stack up."
HT: faculty lounge
Here's an account of the experience from a survivor: One Candidate's Experience in the AALS Hiring Process
"As you can imagine, my experience at the hiring conference mainly consisted of running up and down staircases, from one building to the next and back again. I scheduled 15 interviews on Friday and began my day with seven back-to-back. My eight years of competitive speech tournaments, which also consisted of running from room to room talking all day long, were good preparation. I think the best advice that I got about the hiring conference was from Dean Blake Morant, who advised the candidates at an opening session to “be our most authentic selves” and “bring up the energy level in the room” during each interview. "
...
"One of the most interesting and craze-inducing aspects of the hiring process was the law school hiring discussion on Prawfs Blawg. The four threads, which began on August 19th, have received well over 1300 comments. I admit that I read the threads nearly every day in the weeks before and after the hiring conference. I’m not sure that I know why, except that I felt that I was part of a large anonymous community of people who were just as freaked out and insecure as I was. I suppose its better to be in such a community of such people than be alone.
If I have learned anything from this process, it is that nobody really knows the secret to success and, in fact, the process is so individualized to particular hiring committees in a particular year at a particular school, that there likely is no secret. This is extremely frustrating to wanna-be law professors because we are analytical people. We (sometimes desperately) want to know the rules and the facts so that we can weigh our odds and predict our futures.
One big gaping hole getting in the way of our analysis is the lack of data on the members of the candidate pool. A few schools do a great job advising their alumni and keeping track of those in the process (shout out to Akiba Covitz!). Most don’t, and nobody aggregates that data. It appears that AALS doesn’t release it either (other than to the schools in the FAR forms themselves). So the candidates are left to guess who their competition is and how they stack up."
HT: faculty lounge
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