Market design at the AEA meetings in Boston

Here are some market-design-related sessions that caught my eye on first glance through the big program. (Three of them are at the same time:)

Jan 03, 2015 8:00 am, Hynes Convention Center, Room 209 
American Economic Association

Empirical Market Design (D4)

Presiding: RAMESH JOHARI (Stanford University)

Quality Externalities and the Limits of Reputation in Two-Sided Markets

CHRIS NOSKO (University of Chicago)

STEVEN TADELIS (University of California-Berkeley)

[View Abstract]

At What Quality and What Price? Inducing Separating Equilibria as a Market Design Problem

JOHN JOSEPH HORTON (New York University)

RAMESH JOHARI (Stanford University)

[View Abstract]

Changing the Course Allocation Mechanism at Wharton

ERIC BUDISH (University of Chicago)

JUDD KESSLER (University of Pennsylvania)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

The Economics of the Common Application

CHRISTOPHER AVERY (Harvard University)

PARAG A. PATHAK (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

[View Abstract]

Discussants:

ALI HORTACSU (University of Chicago)

STEVEN TADELIS (University of California-Berkeley)

EDUARDO AZEVEDO (University of Pennsylvania)

ERIC BUDISH (University of Chicago)

******

Jan 03, 2015 2:30 pm, Sheraton Boston, Beacon E 
Econometric Society

Empirical Analyses of Selling Mechanisms in Dynamic Environments (D4)

Presiding: GLENN ELLISON (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

An Empirical Analysis of Informationally Restricted Dynamic Auctions of Used Cars

SUNGJIN CHO (Seoul National University)

HARRY JOHN PAARSCH (Amazon)

JOHN RUST (Georgetown University)

[View Abstract]

Invest in Information or Wing It? A Model of Dynamic Pricing with Seller Learning

GUOFANG HUANG (Carnegie Mellon University)

HONG LUO (Harvard Business School)

JING XIA (Harvard University)

[View Abstract]

Primary-Market Auctions for Event Tickets: Eliminating the Rents of "Bob the Broker"

ERIC BUDISH (University of Chicago)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

Discussants:

JAKUB KASTL (Stanford University)

BRADLEY LARSEN (Stanford University)

GLENN ELLISON (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

*********

Jan 04, 2015 8:00 am, Hynes Convention Center, Room 206 
American Economic Association

Electronic Commerce and Big Data (L8, M2)

Presiding: JUSTIN RAO (Microsoft Research)

Sales Taxes Shielding on the Amazon.com Platform

ALEJANDRO MOLNAR (Vanderbilt University)

PAULO SOMAINI (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

[View Abstract]

Salience and Quality Choice

BRADLEY LARSEN (Stanford University )

DOMINIC COEY (eBay Research Labs)

KANE SWEENEY (eBay Research Labs)

[View Abstract]

Do-Not-Track and the Economics of Third-Party Advertising

GIORGOS ZERVAS (Boston University)

JUSTIN RAO (Microsoft Research)

SHARAD GOEL (Microsoft Research)

CEREN BUDAK (Microsoft Research)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

Big Data to the Rescue? Machine Learning and Causal Inference in Online Advertising

RANDALL LEWIS (Google, Inc.)

MICHAEL HANKIN (University of Southern California)

[View Abstract]

Discussants:

DAVID REILEY (Google, Inc.)

MICHAEL OSTROVSKY (Stanford University)

STEVEN TADELIS (University of California-Berkeley and eBay Research Labs)

DENIS NEKIPELOV (University of California-Berkeley)

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Jan 04, 2015 10:15 am, Sheraton Boston, Commonwealth 
American Economic Association

Moral Values and Economic Behavior (A1, Z1)

Presiding: ALVIN E. ROTH (Stanford University)

Forbidden Fruits: The Political Economy of Science, Religion, and Growth

ROLAND BENABOU (Princeton University)

DAVIDE TICCHI (Institute for Advanced Studies-Lucca)

ANDREA VINDIGNI (Institute for Advanced Studies-Lucca)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

Combating Vote-Selling: A Field Experiment in the Philippines

ALLEN HICKEN (University of Michigan)

STEPHEN LEIDER (University of Michigan)

NICO RAVANILLA (University of Michigan)

DEAN YANG (University of Michigan)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

More Money, More Problems? Can High Pay Be Coercive And Repugnant?

SANDRO AMBUEHL (Stanford University)

MURIEL NIEDERLE (Stanford University)

ALVIN E. ROTH (Stanford University)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

Are Attitudes about Morally Controversial Transactions Affected by Information? The Case of Payments for Human Organs

JULIO J. ELIAS (Universidad del CEMA)

NICOLA LACETERA (University of Toronto)

MARIO MACIS (Johns Hopkins University)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

Discussants:

ANDREI SHLEIFER (Harvard University)

JUDD KESSLER (University of Pennsylvania)

THEODORE BERGSTROM (University of California-Santa Barbara)

RODNEY GARRATT (Federal Reserve Bank of New York)

**********

Jan 04, 2015 10:15 am, Boston Marriott Copley, Vermont 
Economic Science Association

Political Engineering (D7, D6)

Presiding: T. NICOLAUS TIDEMAN (Virginia Tech)

Quadratic Voting

STEVEN P. LALLEY (University of Chicago)

E. GLEN WEYL (Microsoft Research New England)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

Aggregating Local Preferences To Guide Policy

DANIEL BENJAMIN (Cornell University)

GABRIEL CARROLL (Stanford University)

ORI HEFFETZ (Cornell University)

MILES KIMBALL (University of Michigan)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

Storable Votes and Judicial Nominations in the United States Senate.

ALESSANDRA CASELLA (Columbia University)

SEBASTIEN TURBAN (California Institute of Tecnology)

GREGORY WAWRO (Columbia University)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

Purchasing Votes without Cash: Implementing Quadratic Voting Outside the Lab

ROMAN DAVID ZARATE (University of California-Berkeley)

CESAR MANTILLA (Toulouse School of Economics)

JUAN CAMILO CÁRDENAS (Universidad de los Andes)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

Discussants:

ERIC S. MASKIN (Harvard University)

RICHARD J. ZECKHAUSER (Harvard University)

JOHN MORGAN (University of California-Berkeley)

ERIK SNOWBERG (California Institute of Technology)

**********

Jan 04, 2015 10:15 am, Boston Marriott Copley, Simmons 
Industrial Organization Society

Frontiers of Empirical Industrial Organization (L1)

Presiding: MARC RYSMAN (Boston University)

Drip Pricing When Consumers Have Limited Foresight: Evidence from Driving School Fees

DAVID MUIR (University of Pennsylvania)

KATJA SEIM (University of Pennsylvania)

MARIA ANA VITORINO (University of Minnesota)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

The Welfare Effects of Congestion in Uncoordinated Assignment: Evidence from the NYC HS Match

ATILA ABDULKADIROGLU (Duke University)

NIKHIL AGARWAL (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

PARAG A. PATHAK (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

[View Abstract]

Deposit Competition and Financial Fragility: Evidence from the United States Banking Sector

MARK EGAN (University of Chicago)

ALI HORTACSU (University of Chicago)

GREGOR MATVOS (University of Chicago)

[View Abstract]

Information Frictions and the Welfare Consequences of Adverse Selection

BENJAMIN HANDEL (University of California-Berkeley)

JONATHAN KOLSTAD (University of Pennsylvania)

JOHANNES SPINNEWIJN (London School of Economics)

Discussants:

CHRIS CONLON (Columbia University)

FRANCESCO DECAROLIS (Boston University)

GINGER ZHE JIN (University of Maryland)

DAN ACKERBERG (University of Michigan)

******

Jan 04, 2015 12:30 pm, Sheraton Boston, Riverway 
Korea-America Economic Association/American Economic Association

The Economics of the Internet (L8, D8)

Presiding: JAY PIL CHOI (University New South Wales and Michigan State University)

Social Media and News Consumption

SUSAN ATHEY (Stanford University)

MARKUS MOBIUS (Microsoft Research)

JENO PAL (Central European University)

[View Abstract]

Net Neutrality, Business Models, and Internet Interconnection

JAY PIL CHOI (University New South Wales and Michigan State University)

DOH-SHIN JEON (Toulouse School of Economics)

BYUNG-CHEOL KIM (Georgia Institute of Technology)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

Match Quality, Search, and the Internet Market for Used Books

GLENN ELLISON (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

SARA ELLISON (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

[View Abstract]

An Empirical Analysis of Consumer Online Search

THOMAS BLAKE (eBay Research Labs)

CHRIS NOSKO (University of Chicago)

STEVEN TADELIS (University of California-Berkeley)

[View Abstract]

Discussants:

KYOO IL KIM (Michigan State University)

JOSHUA GANS (University of Toronto)

MINJAE SONG (Bates White)

YUN JEONG CHOI (Yonsei University)

*******

Jan 04, 2015 2:30 pm, Hynes Convention Center, Room 204 
American Economic Association

Recent Advances in the Analysis of Auction Data (L1, D4)

Presiding: KEN HENDRICKS (University of Wisconsin-Madison)

The Bidder Exclusion Effect

DOMINIC COEY (eBay Research Labs)

BRADLEY LARSEN (Stanford University)

KANE SWEENEY (eBay Research Labs)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

Collusion and Reciprocity in First-Price Procurements

PAULO SOMAINI (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

[View Abstract]

Simultaneous First-Price Auctions with Preferences over Combinations

MATTHEW GENTRY (London School of Economics)

TATIANA KOMAROVA (London School of Economics)

PASQUALE SCHIRALDI (London School of Economics)

[View Abstract]

A Simple Test for Moment Inequality Models with an Application to English Auctions

ANDRES ARADILLAS-LOPEZ (Pennsylvania State University)

AMIT GANDHI (University of Wisconsin-Madison)

DANIEL QUINT (University of Wisconsin-Madison)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

Discussants:

TATIANA KOMAROVA (London School of Economics)

SERAFIN GRUNDL (Federal Reserve Board)

PAULO SOMAINI (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

ALEJANDRO MOLNAR (Vanderbilt University)

***********

an 04, 2015 2:30 pm, Sheraton Boston, Beacon F 
Econometric Society

Advances in Collusion and Antitrust Policy (K2, L4)

Presiding: JUDITH CHEVALIER (Yale University)

Co-Opetition: Some Antitrust of Arrangements Between Competitors

JEAN TIROLE (Toulouse School of Economics)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

Effects of Antitrust Leniency on Concealment Effort by Colluding Firms

LESLIE MARX (Duke University)

CLAUDIO MEZZETTI (University of Melbourne)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

Cooperation, R&D Spillovers and Antitrust Policy

ANGEL LOPEZ (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)

XAVIER VIVES (IESE Business School)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

Discussants:

BARRY NALEBUFF (Yale University)

JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON (University of Pennsylvania)

LUIS CABRAL (New York University)

*******

Jan 05, 2015 8:00 am, Sheraton Boston, Constitution Ballroom B 
American Economic Association

Patent Economics (K2, O3)

Presiding: JOSHUA LERNER (Harvard University)

Standard-Essential Patents

JOSHUA LERNER (Harvard University)

JEAN TIROLE (Toulouse School of Economics)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

Do Firms Underinvest in Long-Term Research? Evidence from Cancer Clinical Trials

ERIC BUDISH (University of Chicago)

BENJAMIN ROIN (Harvard University)

HEIDI WILLIAMS (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

Intellectual Property Rights and Access to Innovation: Evidence from TRIPS

MARGARET KYLE (Toulouse School of Economics)

YI QIAN (Northwestern University)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

Discussants:

UFUK AKCIGIT (University of Pennsylvania)

PETRA MOSER (Stanford University)

PIERRE AZOULAY (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

LOUIS KAPLOW (Harvard University)

*******

Jan 05, 2015 8:00 am, Sheraton Boston, Beacon G 
Econometric Society

Theory of Matching Markets (C1)

Presiding: RAMESH JOHARI (Stanford University)

Stable Matching in Large Economies

YEON-KOO CHE (Columbia University)

JINWOO KIM (Seoul National University)

FUHITO KOJIMA (Stanford University)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets

YEON-KOO CHE (Columbia University)

OLIVIER TERCIEUX (Paris School of Economics)

[View Abstract]

Managing Congestion in Dynamic Matching Markets

NICK ARNOSTI (Stanford University)

RAMESH JOHARI (Stanford University)

YASH KANORIA (Columbia University)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

Matching with Peers in School Choice

ATILA ABDULKADIROGLU (Duke University)

[View Abstract]

Discussants:

PARAG A. PATHAK (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

ITAI ASHLAGI (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

JOHN JOSEPH HORTON (New York University)

JACOB LESHNO (Columbia University)

*******

The effect of charter schools in New Orleans and Boston: Abdulkadiroglu, Angrist, Hull and Pathak

Two of the pioneers of market design for school choice, Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Parag Pathak, have teamed up with colleagues to analyse the effects of charter schools, using data from the school choice programs they helped design in Boston and New Orleans.


CHARTERS WITHOUT LOTTERIES: TESTING TAKEOVERS IN NEW ORLEANS AND BOSTON
Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Joshua D. Angrist, Peter D. Hull, and Parag A. Pathak
Working Paper 20792
http://www.nber.org/papers/w20792

ABSTRACT
Lottery estimates suggest oversubscribed urban charter schools boost student achievement markedly. But these estimates needn’t capture treatment effects for students who haven’t applied to charter schools or for students attending charters for which demand is weak. This paper reports estimates of the effect of charter school attendance on middle-schoolers in charter takeovers in New Orleans and Boston. Takeovers are traditional public schools that close and then re-open as charter schools. Students enrolled in the schools designated for closure are eligible for “grandfathering” into the new schools; that is, they are guaranteed seats. We use this fact to construct instrumental variables estimates of the effects of passive charter attendance: the grandfathering instrument compares students at schools designated for takeover with students who appear similar at baseline and who were attending similar schools not yet closed, while adjusting for possible violations of the exclusion restriction in such comparisons. Estimates for a large sample of takeover schools in the New Orleans Recovery School District show substantial gains from takeover enrollment. In Boston, where we can compare grandfathering and lottery estimates for a middle school, grandfathered students see achievement gains at least as large as the gains for students assigned seats in lotteries. Larger reading gains for grandfathering compliers are explained by a worse non-charter fallback.
*************

School choice in New Orleans is one of the design projects undertaken by the Institute for Innovation in Public School Choice (IIPSC).

The design of Boston's school choice system predated IIPSC; here's an early paper on that: The Boston Public School Match.

Black Market Kidney Broker Is Released From Prison

Black Market Kidney Broker Is Released From Prison

"A man who prosecutors said styled himself as 'the Robin Hood of kidneys" is out of prison after being the first person convicted in federal court of profiting from the illegal sale of human organs.

"Levy Izhak Rosenbaum, an Israeli citizen, won't be deported because federal immigration officials found that his crime was not one of "moral turpitude" that would have subjected him to being kicked out of the U.S., lawyer Edward Schulman said.

"It illustrates the intersection between legality and morality," Shulman said.

"Rosenbaum, now 63, was arrested in 2009 in what became the biggest corruption case ever in New Jersey. He had been living legally in the U.S.

"He pleaded guilty to illegally selling human organs in 2011 and served more than two years in prison.

"He was released this week from the federal correctional facility at New Jersey's Fort Dix, and Shulman said he has returned to his home in New York City's Brooklyn borough.

"Shulman said immigration officials decided not to send the case to a court to sort out because it was clear Rosenbaum's offense was not a deportable crime.

"Rosenbaum pleaded guilty to brokering the sale of three kidneys ? buying them from people in Israel for as little as $10,000, then selling them to U.S. patients who did not qualify for transplants or did not want to wait. The cost of the sale was over $100,000, and the operations were performed at top U.S. hospitals.

"While he pleaded guilty to three counts, authorities said he brokered many more kidney transplants and made millions from the deals.

"If he was drugging the people or knocking them out" to get their kidneys, Shulman said, that would have been a deportable offense. But, he said, that was not the case. "Both participants were willing."

"Shulman said his client's deals saved lives.

"One could contend that letting somebody die," Shulman said, "is also immoral."

The market for college football

The NY Times brings us up to date on the business which is college football:

What Made College Football More Like the Pros? $7.3 Billion, for a Start
By MARC TRACY and TIM ROHAN

"The story of college football’s gold rush can be told through television contracts. Under the championship playoff format that began this season, ESPN is paying $7.3 billion over 12 years to telecast seven games a year — four major bowl games, two semifinal bowl games and the national championship game. (In the first semifinal on Thursday, Oregon will play Florida State in the Rose Bowl; the title game is on Jan. 12.)

Each of the five major conferences — the Southeastern, the Atlantic Coast, the Pacific-12, the Big 12 and the Big Ten — will see its base revenue increase to about $50 million, from about $28 million under last season’s system. The base revenue will nearly triple for the five conferences that make up the next tier of college football."

Happy 500th birthday to Vesalius

Andreas Vesalius, son of an apothecary to Emperor Maximillian and to Charles V, was born in Brussels on December 31, 1514.

and this:

"Thus, the young, inquisitive, and impetuous Vesalius began his own studies of anatomy with a single-minded determination, frequently raiding the Cemetery of the Innocents and the gibbits of Montfaucon and storing the bodies in his bedroom. When news arrived of impending war between France and the Holy Roman Empire, Vesalius relocated to Padua, where he received his medical degree in 1537 and was appointed Professor of Surgery at the university."

In any event, he made a revolution in the scientific study of anatomy...

Early admissions come to English universities

The Guardian has the story:
Top universities 'ignoring final A-level grades' in race to sign up students
"Universities such as Lancaster and Birmingham are making record numbers of "unconditional offers" – places awarded irrespective of final A-level grades – in 2015"

"Leading universities have been accused of undermining A-levels by accepting students before they sit their final exams in a “desperate” rush to fill places.

"Research by the Telegraph shows universities are preparing to make increasing numbers of “unconditional offers” to sixth-formers next year.

"Top research institutions including Birmingham, Lancaster, Nottingham, Leicester, Sussex and Queen Mary, University of London, will admit students en masse in some subjects without waiting for results in August.

"Numbers are expected to significantly exceed the 12,000 unconditional offers made across the UK this year, with one university alone saying it will make 10,000 in 2015.
The move coincides with a government decision to abolish all restrictions on student recruitment in England for the first time in 2015 – creating a free market in undergraduate admissions.

"It has led to intense competition between universities to sign up the most talented sixth-formers before they are attracted to opposing institutions.

"In most cases, admissions tutors will make places available to candidates based on past performance in GCSEs and their predicted A-level grades, meaning students will win places even if they go on to fail their summer exams."

Uber apologizes to Sydney for surge pricing during the Sydney Siege

Ben Greiner writes from down under:

Here is something interesting, I am not sure if you followed the story. During the Sydney Siege last week, when companies closed down their offices and sent people home, Uber's price mechanism kicked in and raised Uber cab prices to get out of the city to as much as $200. People found that very repugnant, even though Uber argued that the high prices would increase cab supply when it was needed in such difficult moments ... Anyway, Uber just sent below email to its customers about 2 days ago.

Here is also an article arguoing that in general people do not like variable pricing.
http://www.vox.com/2014/12/15/7394323/uber-surge-pricing-psychology

Cheers from Sydney

/ben

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: David at Uber Sydney <supportsydney@uber.com>
Date: Wed, Dec 24, 2014 at 9:34 AM
Subject: An apology
To: bgreiner.mail@gmail.com

The events of last week in Sydney were upsetting

AN APOLOGY FROM UBER SYDNEY The events of last week in Sydney were upsetting for the whole community and we are truly sorry for any concern that our process may have added.  Our priority was to help get as many people out of the CBD safely in the midst of a fast-moving event. The decisions we made were based only on helping to achieve this but we communicated this poorly, leading to a lot of misunderstanding about our motivations. Surge pricing is algorithmic and kicks in automatically when demand for rides outstrips the supply of cars that are on the road. This encourages more drivers to the area where people are requesting rides. As an increasing number of people were requesting rides that morning in the CBD, surge pricing came into effect automatically and this is when you might have seen higher prices. We didn't stop surge pricing immediately. This was the wrong decision. We quickly reversed course and provided free rides to people needing to leave the CBD. In the end, no rider was charged to leave the CBD on Monday and all higher fares resulting from surge pricing earlier in the day were fully refunded. It's unfortunate that the perception is that Uber did something against the interests of the public. We certainly did not intend to. We will learn from this incident and improve as a result of this lesson. Uber is committed to ensuring users have a reliable ride when they need it most - including and especially during disasters and relevant states of emergency. We take our community commitment very seriously in the 250+ cities Uber serves around the globe. Please know that we have listened to the feedback and we are working to standardise a global policy to ensure we're serving communities in the most efficient, effective and helpful way possible at all times. Our thoughts and prayers remain with the victims' families, those that were injured and the Sydney community of which we are so proud to be a part. Have a happy holidays,  David and the team at Uber Sydney

Cass Sunstein in Harvard Magazine

Harvard Magazine has a nice long article about Cass Sunstein, who, when he's not thinking about choice architecture and nudges, also thinks about the Constitution: The Legal Olympian. Cass Sunstein and the modern regulatory state

"A central part of his argument is that debate about the Constitution’s meaning should expand to legislative, regulatory, and other democratic bodies, because “court-centeredness is a continuing problem for constitutional thought in the United States. It has helped to weaken the sense of responsibility of other officials and indeed ordinary citizens….”"

Kidney transplantation in Kenya?

Kenya is one of the countries in which a diagnosis of kidney failure is largely a death sentence, since there is little treatment available.  At a meeting in Ohio, there were recently signs that maybe that will change, and that the reluctance to donate organs might be relaxed, and that possibilities of international kidney exchange can be explored:

Governor William Kabogo donates all his organs to those in need

"In his speech as the chief guest at a dinner at the University of Toledo hosted by Professor Michael Rees, Governor Kabogo said, ‘when I was invited to come to America by the UK group lead by kidney transplant patient and founder of Kidney Research Kenya Macharia Gakuru, I was not sure what exactly we were to achieve. Now my mind is very clear. Having met Prof. Michael Rees who runs Alliance for Paired Donation and has developed software in collaboration with Nobel Prize Winner Prof Alvin Roth, I believe we have a solution to the less fortunate in our society to have affordable dialysis and kidney transplant in our county level four hospitals.’

‘I have come to know that the American population and our population can have a cross match of their donors to make the best match depending on blood groups and tissue typing that our population will also benefit from the American technology and international funding that this may attract because of our difference in financing and insurance costing resulting in savings to American tax payers and gain to Kenyans. The thing we need to embark on now is to educate our masses. Organ donation is a taboo in our culture. I lead from the front and offer my organs in the event of my death to be harvested and used to save lives and research to improve our knowledge of science. We must be our brothers keeper,’ he said.

 In reply, ‘Prof. Michael Rees said, this gives a great opportunity to share our knowledge and expertise in areas of kidney pairing that can solve the problems in America as well fund as solution for kidney patients in Kenya.  The University of Toledo is prepared to help train doctors, nurses and people involved in this project to the international standards. We are looking forward to visiting Kenya and more so Kiambu County where we have prepared the grounds to start our pilot project with our partners in the UK and elsewhere in the world. ’

Dr. Jonah Mwangi who is Kiambu Health Minister said, ‘our next step is to get reliable statistics in our county to identify our incident rates of kidney failure. People don’t have to go to India anymore but we will find our own solution from within.’ "

Resident matching for urologists

The American Urological Association runs an independent matching program for urology residencies.  Here's a recently published history, from volume 1 of the new journal Urology Practice:

The History and Rationale of the American Urological Association Residency Matching Program
Steven J. Weissbart and Jeffrey A. Stock

Bringing sand to Dubai: The market for sand

The NY Times has the story (by John Gillis):
Why Sand Is Disappearing

"Today, however, 75 to 90 percent of the world’s natural sand beaches are disappearing, due partly to rising sea levels and increased storm action, but also to massive erosion caused by the human development of shores. Many low-lying barrier islands are already submerged.

"Yet the extent of this global crisis is obscured because so-called beach nourishment projects attempt to hold sand in place and repair the damage by the time summer people return, creating the illusion of an eternal shore.
...
"The sand and gravel business is now growing faster than the economy as a whole. In the United States, the market for mined sand has become a billion-dollar annual business, growing at 10 percent a year since 2008. Interior mining operations use huge machines working in open pits to dig down under the earth’s surface to get sand left behind by ancient glaciers. But as demand has risen — and the damming of rivers has held back the flow of sand from mountainous interiors — natural sources of sand have been shrinking.

One might think that desert sand would be a ready substitute, but its grains are finer and smoother; they don’t adhere to rougher sand grains, and tend to blow away. As a result, the desert state of Dubai brings sand for its beaches all the way from Australia.

"And now there is a global beach-quality sand shortage, caused by the industries that have come to rely on it. Sand is vital to the manufacturing of abrasives, glass, plastics, microchips and even toothpaste, and, most recently, to the process of hydraulic fracturing. The quality of silicate sand found in the northern Midwest has produced what is being called a “sand rush” there, more than doubling regional sand pit mining since 2009.

"But the greatest industrial consumer of all is the concrete industry. Sand from Port Washington on Long Island — 140 million cubic yards of it — built the tunnels and sidewalks of Manhattan from the 1880s onward. Concrete still takes 80 percent of all that mining can deliver. Apart from water and air, sand is the natural element most in demand around the world, a situation that puts the preservation of beaches and their flora and fauna in great danger. Today, a branch of Cemex, one of the world’s largest cement suppliers, is still busy on the shores of Monterey Bay in California, where its operations endanger several protected species.

"The huge sand mining operations emerging worldwide, many of them illegal, are happening out of sight and out of mind, as far as the developed world is concerned. But in India, where the government has stepped in to limit sand mining along its shores, illegal mining operations by what is now referred to as the “sand mafia” defy these regulations. In Sierra Leone, poor villagers are encouraged to sell off their sand to illegal operations, ruining their own shores for fishing. Some Indonesian sand islands have been devastated by sand mining.

Christmas dinners in Switzerland may never be the same...

Swiss group wants sausage dogs to be petted, not eaten 

"ZURICH - An animal rights group has petitioned the Swiss government to ban a traditional, if rare, practice of eating cats for dinner and turning dogs into sausages.

Tomi Tomek, president of the animal rights group SOS CHATS Noiraigue, which campaigned successfully last year to ban the sale of cat fur, said 3 percent of the population still eat cat and dog, mainly in the regions of Appenzell, Lucerne, Jura and Berne.

"You can't report it to the police because there's no law against it," she said.

Dog meat is traditionally used to make sausages and a fatty remedy for rheumatism, while cat can be served for Christmas dinner.

The activists handed in a petition with 17,900 signatures calling for the consumption of family pets to be outlawed. "

HT: Ran Shorrer

Fushimi Inari-taisha: a shrine to business and a pioneer in advertising

The Inari shrine in Kyoto is devoted to a patron of business. Unlike many other shrines and temples we visited in Japan it does not support itself by charging admission to visitors. Rather, many of its "thousand gates" are endowed by an advertiser.  There are still gates available.

Below are some of the ads on gates, and a price list for adding your ad, to gates of different sizes.

International trade in french fries

There's an imported potato drought in Japan, leading to rationing: The Japan News (English language news from The Yomiuri Shimbun) has the story.

 Sorry! Small fries only

"Japan’s food service industry is in the middle of a potato shortage, due to a port labor dispute on the U.S. West Coast.

"Most of the nation’s chain restaurants use processed spuds from the United States to make french fries, and the prolonged dispute is delaying shipments of the fast food ingredient. McDonald’s Holdings Co. (Japan) stopped selling large- and medium-size fries on Wednesday, and other restaurant chain operators are starting to consider such measures as the expensive process of flying in supplies and suspending french fry sales."

Venture capital for lawsuits

There are lots of different kinds of financial markets, of which venture capital is among the most interesting and varied. Nevertheless, this headline struck me:

Steven Cohen’s Ex-Wife Gets Outside Financing for Lawsuit

"Helping to fuel the long-running legal battle is Asta Funding, a financial backer of a Beverly Hills, Calif., firm that has provided litigation financing to Ms. Cohen, according to court documents and people briefed on the matter. Asta and the firm that is financing Ms. Cohen’s lawsuit — Balance Point Divorce Funding — have an agreement to share in the proceeds of legal recoveries by clients.
...
"Balance Point is part of a niche business that provides financing in drawn-out matrimonial cases to litigants with wealthy spouses. Only a handful of companies provide such financing in the United States.

One of Balance Point’s main competitors is BBL Churchill, a New York firm that offers high-interest loans to a divorcing spouse in need of cash to pay legal bills. The firm, unlike Balance Point, does not seek to collect a portion of any divorce settlement and instead looks to collect on the loan at the end of the litigation. This summer, BBL Churchill secured financial backing from a large private equity firm, said a person briefed on the matter who spoke on the condition of anonymity."

US policy that gives priority to prior organ donors who need a transplant

US policy that gives priority to prior organ donors who need a transplant is working

Washington, DC (November 20, 2014) -- Prior organ donors who later need a kidney transplant experience brief waiting times and receive excellent quality kidneys, according to a study appearing in an upcoming issue of the Journal of the American Society of Nephrology (JASN). The findings indicate that a US policy that gives priority to prior organ donors on the transplant waiting list is working.

Live organ donors provide a remarkable gift to relieve another person of the burden of organ failure. While most live kidney donors enjoy excellent health after kidney donation, recent research has revealed that kidney donation is linked with an increased risk of developing kidney failure.

Because of the gift of kidney donation, prior live organ donors receive priority on the kidney transplant waiting list. Peter Reese, MD MSCE (University of Pennsylvania's Perelman School of Medicine), Vishnu Potluri, MD, MPH (Lankenau Medical Center), and their colleagues looked to see whether the current national kidney allocation policy was succeeding in its goal of minimizing waiting time to transplant forpeople who had once donated an organ. The researchers analyzed prior organ donors and matched non-donors who were wait-listed during the years 1996 to 2010.

"The research reveals that, fortunately, these donors did not wait a long time for their kidney transplants and received high quality kidneys," said Dr. Reese. Prior organ donors had much shorter waiting time to receive a kidney transplant, and they received better quality kidneys compared with similar people on the waiting list who had not donated an organ. "This study shows that the policy is working: prior organ donors get rapid access to high quality organs. After transplant, their survival is excellent compared with similar people whowere not organ donors," said Dr. Reese. He noted, however, that most prior organ donors needed dialysis before they received their transplant. Ideally, these prior donors would have received kidney transplants before they ever needed dialysis.

Source: American Society of Nephrology

Just out in JEBO, and temporarily un-gated, here is a multi-part paper in honor of Werner Guth and the ultimatum game. (Being one of so many coauthors is probably as close as I'll get to the experience of being a high energy physicist or a planetary scientist...)

How Werner Güth's ultimatum game shaped our understanding of social behavior ^☆

• Eric van Damme

• Kenneth G. Binmore, 
• Alvin E. Roth, 
• Larry Samuelson

• Eyal Winter

• Gary E. Bolton, 
• Axel Ockenfels

• Martin Dufwenberg, 
• Georg Kirchsteiger

• Uri Gneezy

• Martin G. Kocher, 
• Matthias Sutter

• Alan G. Sanfey

• Hartmut Kliemt

• Reinhard Selten, 
• Rosemarie Nagel

• Ofer H. Azar

Roads and escalators in Japan: national versus regional equilibria

I presume that drivers drive on the left on roads throughout Japan, and so I wasn't surprised, in Tokyo, to find that pedestrians tend to keep to the left as well, and that on escalators, riders stay to the left to allow those in a hurry to pass on the right.

But in Osaka, the escalator equilibrium is reversed: on escalators one stays to the right to allow passing on the left. Roads and sidewalks seem to be as in Tokyo however.