WHO Says Countries Should Be Self-Sufficient In (Unremunerated) Organs And Blood, by Krawiec and Roth

 Requiring national self sufficiency in blood and plasma supplies is particularly hard on low and middle income countries, as is limiting the possibility of participating in active kidney exchange programs.

WHO Says Countries Should Be Self-Sufficient In (Unremunerated) Organs And Blood by Kimberly D. Krawiec and Alvin E. Roth : August 24, 2024,   Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4935827

Abstract: This chapter critiques the twin World Health Organization (WHO) principles of self-sufficiency and nonremuneration in organs and blood, urging a more sensible approach to the scarce resources of blood products and transplantable organs. WHO and other experts have failed to acknowledge the tension between self-sufficiency and nonremuneration in blood products--no country that fails to pay plasma donors is self-sufficient. Furthermore, international cooperation and cross-border transplantation provide numerous benefits, especially in smaller countries and those without well-developed domestic exchange programs. The combination of these twin principles denies to health care many of the benefits that trade has brought to so many other human endeavors and the effects are particularly damaging to low and middle income countries. Substances of human origin are special, but not so special that we prohibit plasma or organ donation. We should be open to exploring and experimenting with ways to bring to health care some of the benefits that trade has brought to so many other human endeavors, such as the production and distribution of food and lifesaving vaccines and other medicines.

Here's the concluding paragraph:

"We close by noting that the combination of the nonremuneration principle and the self-sufficiency principle deny to health care many of the benefits that trade has brought to so many other human endeavors. Substances of human origin are special, but not so special that we prohibit plasma or organ donation. So we should be open to exploring and experimenting with ways to bring to health care some of the benefits that trade has brought to so many other human endeavors, such as the production and distribution of food and lifesaving vaccines and other medicines."

Text of the new EU regulations on Substances of Human Origin

 Kim Krawiec points me to this newly published document, with the 'final' regulations intended to prevent compensation of donors of Substances of Human Origin (SoHO), such as blood plasma.  How this will effect the five EU member states that compensate plasma donors remains to be seen, as these regulations are now scheduled to go into effect only in 2027.

REGULATION (EU) 2024/… OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL … on standards of quality and safety for substances of human origin intended for human application 

After a quick read, I think these are the sections of the new regulations that are most relevant to their elements of market design, and compensation to donors.

(4)… safety standards are to be based on the fundamental principle that the human body or its parts as such are not to be a source of financial gain.

…

(26) Solid organs are excluded from the definition of SoHO for the purposes of this Regulation and, thus, from the scope of this Regulation. Their donation and transplantation are significantly different, determined, inter alia, by the effect of ischemia in the organs, and are regulated in a dedicated legal framework, set out in Directive 2010/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council

…

(57) Article 3 of the Charter prohibits making the human body and its parts as such a source of financial gain. The use of financial incentives for SoHO donations can have an impact on the quality and safety of SoHO, posing risks to the health of both SoHO donors and recipients and therefore to the protection of human health. Without affecting the responsibilities of the Member States for the definition of their health policy, and for the organisation and delivery of health services and medical care, SoHO donation should be voluntary and unpaid, and be founded on the principles of altruism of the SoHO donor and solidarity between donor and recipient. Such solidarity should be built from the local and regional levels up to the national and Union levels, aiming for self-sufficiency of critical SoHO, and spreading the responsibility for donation evenly across the Union population to the extent possible. Voluntary and unpaid SoHO donation contributes to the respect for human dignity and to protecting the most vulnerable persons in society. It also contributes to high safety standards for SoHO and therefore to the protection of human health, increasing public trust in donation systems. AM\P9_AMA(2023)0250(244-244)_EN.docx 49/306 PE748.903v01-00 EN United in diversity EN 

(58) It is recognised, including by the Council of Europe Committee on Bioethics in its ‘Guide for the implementation of the principle of prohibition of financial gain with respect to the human body and its parts from living or deceased donors’ from March 2018, that while financial gain should be avoided, compensation should be able to be acceptable to prevent SoHO donors being financially disadvantaged by their donation. Therefore, compensation to remove any such risk is deemed appropriate as long as it endeavours to guarantee financial neutrality and does not result in a financial gain for the SoHO donor or constitute an incentive that would cause a SoHO donor to not disclose relevant aspects of their medical or behavioural history or to donate in any way that could pose risks to their own health and to that of prospective recipients, in particular by donating more frequently than is allowed. It should be possible for compensation to consist of the reimbursement of expenses incurred in connection with SoHO donation or of making good of any losses, preferably based on quantifiable criteria, associated with the donation of SoHO.

Whatever the form of compensation, including through financial and nonfinancial means, compensation schemes should not result in competition between SoHO entities for SoHO donors, including cross-border competition and in particular between SoHO entities collecting SoHO for different purposes, such as the manufacture of medicinal products versus human application as a SoHO preparation. The setting of an upper limit for compensation at national level and the application of compensation that is financially neutral for the SoHO donor have the effect of removing any incentive for SoHO donors to donate to one SoHO entity rather than another, significantly mitigating the risk that compensation differences might result in competition between SoHO entities, in particular between public and private sectors. It should be possible for Member States to delegate the setting of such conditions to independent bodies, in accordance with national law. Prospective SoHO donors should be able to receive information regarding the possibility of having their expenses reimbursed or of receiving compensation for other losses, through information tools, such as website 'Question and Answer' pages, information email addresses, telephone lines or other such neutral channels of factual information dissemination. However, because of the risk of undermining the voluntary and unpaid character of SoHO donation, references to compensation schemes should not be included in advertising, promotion and publicity activities that form part of SoHO donor recruitment campaigns, for example using advertising billboards or posters, on television, newspaper, magazine or social media advertisements or similar.

(59) SoHO entities should not offer financial incentives or inducements to potential SoHO donors or to those giving consent on their behalf as such an action would be contrary to the principle of voluntary and unpaid donation. Refreshments and small gifts, such as pens or badges, should not be considered as inducements and the practice of offering them to SoHO donors is acceptable as a recognition of their efforts. On the other hand, rewards or benefits, such as payment of funeral expenses, or payment of health insurance unrelated to the SoHO collection, should be considered as inducements, and as such contrary to the principle of voluntary and unpaid donation and should not be permitted.

(60) This Regulation is not meant to cover research using SoHO when that research does not involve human application, for example in vitro research or research in animals. However, SoHO used in research involving studies where they are applied to the human body should comply with this Regulation. In order to avoid undermining the effectiveness of this Regulation, and in particular in view of the need to ensure a consistently high level of protection for SoHO donors, and sufficient availability of SoHO for recipients, the donation of SoHO that will be exclusively for use in research without any human application should also comply with the standards concerning voluntary and unpaid donation set out in this Regulation.

…

(68) In cases where the availability of critical SoHO or products manufactured from critical SoHO depends on potential commercial interests, such as those related to the production and distribution of plasma-derived products, there is a risk of not having the interests of patients and research at the forefront, and thus to jeopardise the quality and safety of SoHO, SoHO donors and recipients. There could even be situations in which some products with low profitability are no longer produced, thereby hampering their accessibility for patients. Therefore, by considering all reasonable efforts for an appropriate and continuous supply of critical SoHO, Member States contribute to limiting the risk of shortages of products manufactured from critical SoHO.

(69) The exchange of SoHO between Member States is necessary for ensuring optimal patient access and sufficiency of supply, particularly in the case of local crises or shortages. For certain SoHO that need to be matched between the SoHO donor and the SoHO recipient, such exchanges are essential to allow SoHO recipients to receive the treatment they need in the optimal timeframe. This is for instance the case of hematopoietic stem cell transplants, for which the level of compatibility between the SoHO donor and the SoHO recipient has to be high, which requires coordination at a global level, so that each SoHO recipient has as many options as possible to identify a compatible SoHO donor.

##########

“Next steps (from the European Commission): 

The Council will now formally adopt the new European Health Data Space regulation which is expected to be published in the Official Journal in autumn. It will then become applicable in different stages according to use case and data type.

The Council will also formally adopt the new revised legislation to increase the safety and quality of substances of human origin, which will become applicable in 2027.

#####

Earlier:

Monday, April 22, 2024

Plasma donation in the EU: compensated and uncompensated

The Ethical Limits of Markets by Kim Krawiec

 Here's a new summary by one of the leading scholars of "taboo trades."

Kimberly D. Krawiec, "The Ethical Limits of Markets: Market Inalienability," Forthcoming, The Research Handbook On The Philosophy of Contract Law (edited by Mindy Chen-Wishart and Prince Saprai)   3 Apr 2024

Abstract: Although ethical critiques of markets are longstanding, modern academic debates about the “moral limits of markets” (MLM) tend to be fairly limited in scope. These disputes center, not on the dangers of markets per se, but on the dangers of exchanging particular items and activities through the marketplace. Proponents of MLM theories thus do not want to eliminate markets entirely, but instead seek to identify the moral and ethical boundaries of the marketplace by considering which goods and services are inappropriate for market trading. This chapter summarizes and categorizes some of the more important arguments within this debate, with a focus on recent research, controversies, and applications. The goal is to provide an overview of these debates, highlighting some of the topics that have generated robust discussion, particularly when relatively recent empirical or theoretical work may shed new light on a topic. Specifically, I focus on crowding out, corruption, leaving a space for altruism, equality, and a trio of related debates regarding paternalism (coercion, unjust inducement, and exploitation).

Here's her opening paragraph:

"Markets have limits—even the staunchest libertarian agrees with that idea.1 But the consensus ends there. There is no agreement on what those limits should be or why, as demonstrated by the vast variation in legal regimes around the world. For example, markets in sex are legal in much of the world and illegal in most of the United States.2 Markets in gametes and surrogacy services are legal and thriving in most of the United States and illegal in much of the rest of the world.3 Most of the world prohibits payments to plasma donors and, as a result, are forced to meet their domestic plasma needs by importing plasma-derived products from the United States, which in turn meets demand by paying plasma donors.

Sex work contracts are enforceable in small claims court, in Canada

 In Nova Scotia (where selling sex is legal but buying it is not), a sex worker sued a delinquent client for her fee and won (despite his argument that contracts requiring a party to commit a crime were unenforceable).

Former sex worker's victory in small claims court sets precedent, lawyer says. Decision clarifies that contracts for sex work are enforceable. by Moira Donovan · CBC News 

"A former sex worker in Nova Scotia has successfully sued a client in small claims court for non-payment of services. She and her advocates hope the decision will change the legal landscape for sex work in Canada.

"The case relates to an incident in January 2022 when Brogan, whom CBC News is only identifying by her first name because she is a survivor of human trafficking, spent an evening with a client.

"Afterward, the client refused to pay the agreed-upon fee.

"Brogan then turned to small claims court to recover the money — in what advocates believe is the first time such a case has come before the courts in Canada — and won a judgment that she was entitled to the unpaid amount, plus interest and costs.

...

"Brogan met the client in question, ... through a website called LeoList that's used by sex workers and their clients. After some discussion about rates and services, Brogan travelled to Samuelson's apartment, where she spent the evening.

...

"There was offer, there was an acceptance of the offer, there was certainty of terms, so all the hallmarks of an enforceable contract were there," said Jessica Rose, Brogan's lawyer.

"But the central question in the case was whether contracts for sex work are enforceable — a question that relates to the legislation governing sex work in Canada. 

"The Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act, which passed in 2014, is supposed to protect people from the risks involved in sex work. It amended the Criminal Code to remove the criminal penalty for individuals who sell their own sexual services, and eliminated criminal charges for those who support sex workers, such as drivers or security personnel.

"But aspects of that work remained criminalized, including the purchase of services.

"In this case, the defendant argued that contracts for sexual services were not enforceable because you could not have a contract in which one party — in this case, the client — had to do something illegal.

...

"adjudicator Darrel Pink concluded that because sex work is legal and the business arrangements supporting sex work are legal, it follows that the benefits of commercial law apply, including access to a civil claim — the same as any other service provider.

...

"Failure of the court to provide a remedy for a wrong or a breach of duty owed by a client would contribute to the very exploitation the legislation was designed to prevent," he wrote."

HT: Kim Krawiec

Markets in human milk, placenta, and feces

I've blogged earlier about markets for breast milk, but here is an article that considers them also in connection with placenta and feces: 

The Law of Self-Eating—Milk, Placenta, and Feces Consumption by Mathilde Cohen, Law, Technology and Humans, 3(1), pp.109-122.

"Milk, Placenta, and Feces 

"Since antiquity at least, there have been markets in human milk. Until the twentieth century, they relied primarily on wet nurses hired (or forced) to nurse infants directly on the breast.14Ancient Egyptian, Greek, and Roman pharmacopeias called for human milk as a therapeutic substance to treat burns as well as ailments affecting the ears, eyes, and genitals.15Traditional Chinese medicine  employed  human  milk  in  a  variety  of  preparations  to  cure  diseases,  such  as  debilitation,  arthritis,  rheumatism, voicelessness, amenorrhea, eye infections, and poisoning.16

"Today, markets in human milk continue to thrive.17Such markets assume two main forms: 1) informal markets through which people give or sell their milk peer-to-peer via their social circles or online; and 2) formal markets whereby profit or non-profit organizations, such as milk banks and commercial human milk companies, collect, process, and distribute milk to hospitals and a few outpatients for a fee. Human milk is sought after by three main categories of consumers: infants, adults, and researchers.

...

"Placenta

"Human placentas are used for spiritual, nutritional, medical, pharmaceutical, and cosmetic purposes. Placentophagy, or the act of eating one’s placenta after childbirth, has been practiced in the Global North since the beginningof the home-and natural-birth movement in the 1970s.22It is not an unprecedented phenomenon. Indeed, historian Jacques Gélis reported that:

    "Placentophagy, the custom of eating the newly expelled placenta,     has existed at various times amongst people of very different         cultures. From the sixteenth century onwards, European travellers to     the new world were much struck by this custom, which they         unfailingly reported.23

"According to Gélis, placentophagy was also practiced in Europe; however, “doctors and churchmen  were  more  and  more repelled, from the end of the seventeenth century onwards, by this custom . . . so ‘repugnant to humanity."  In the past decade, placentophagy has reemerged as a mainstream practice in the U.S., where it has been described as “anew  American  birth ritual.25

"Few randomized controlled trials have corroborated the benefits of placentophagy. However, placenta eaters are motivated by the hope of obtaining nourishment, hastening post-birth recovery, warding off postpartum depression, facilitating lactation, as well as spiritual motives, such as connecting with the baby and the environment. Placentas can be eaten raw or cooked."

...

"Minimally processed placental membranes have significant commercial and medical potential to treat, among other indications, eye diseases and acute and chronic wounds. The for-profit American company MiMedx also “grinds up amniotic tissue from placenta into an injectable product to treat tendinitis, strains, and other ailments.”29Much  like  human  milk,placentas  are increasingly seen as reservoirs of stem cells and thus are attractive to the field of regenerative and tissue engineering, and, more recently, as potential sources for treating coronavirus patients."

...

"Feces

"Excrement is typically regarded as disgusting; however, the medical use of human and animal feces has a long record. Heinrichvon Staden notes that:

"Most prominent among the ingredients in the Hippocratic pharmacological ‘dirt’ arsenal is the excrement of various animals. ..  .  the  belief  in  the  therapeutic  usefulness  of  excrement  was  shared  by  ancient  Mesopotamian,  Egyptian,  Greek,  Chinese, Talmudic, and Indian healers. . . . There is, therefore, abundant evidence that . . . ‘excrement therapy’—was a cross-cultural phenomenon extant already in the ancient world.32

"In Chinese medicine, human feces were used 1,700 years ago as a “suspension by mouth for patients who had food poisoning or severe diarrhea.”33

"Fast forward to the twentieth century, the community of microorganisms that dwell in the human gut has been shown to play a crucial role in human health. Fecal microbiota transplantation (“FMT”) was first identified in the modern scientific literature in 195834and has rapidly grown in popularity since the early 2010s. FMT consists in the delivery of processed stool from a healthy donor into the intestinal tract of a sick person via an enema, colonoscopy, naso-duodenal tube, capsules, or other means. As microbiologist Mark Smith and his colleagues noted, “the goal is to displace pathogenic microbes from the intestine by re-establishing a healthy microbial community.”35FMT  has  proven  strikingly  effective  in  treating Clostridium  difficile, a potentially lethal infection that most commonly affects older adults in hospitals or in long-term care facilities, typically after the  use  of  antibiotics."

...

"Despite these differences, milk, placenta, and feces share two sets of core similarities that justify their grouping in this analysis. First, milk, placenta, and feces are tissues that can be severed from the body without harm or risk of harm. Notably, milk and feces  are  replenishable  bodily  substances,  while  the  placenta  is  a  transient  organ  expelled  from  the  body  during  childbirth. Thus, far from constituting “corpse medicine”42(i.e., medicine that uses human materials obtained from dead bodies), the use of such substances can be characterized as living food or medicine. There are also no adverse health effects associated with the act of donation. Quite the opposite, good health requires that people eject the milk, placenta, and feces they produce from their bodies.  

...

"Second, these three products have similar channels of circulation, including via private, domestic consumption, peer-to-peer markets, medical and research institutions, and global markets in foods, drugs, and cosmetics. This wide scope for circulation is possible due to the potential for DIY treatments alongside higher tech uses involving special processing and expertise. Milk, placenta, and feces are collected, processed, and distributed by banks similar to other tissue banks; however, aspiring consumers can  also  obtain  milk,  placenta,  and  feces  and  use  them  on  their  own.  Unlike  blood  transfusion  or  organ  transplantation,  no professional expertise or complicated equipment is necessary to achieve basic forms of consumption. Milk, placenta, and fecescan be obtained directly from their producersafter some screening (or not) and consumed as is or minimally processed at home. Conversely, bio-banks systematically screen donors, subjecting them and their samples to a battery of tests, before processing their  products  in  various  ways;  for  example,  by freezing,  thawing,  pooling,  enriching,  freeze-drying  (in  the  case  of  milk), irradiating (in the  case of placenta), encapsulating (in the  case of stool). This is a fast-evolving field.

...

"No uniform perspective  has emerged on the  legal  classification of the  various body materials consumed by humans. In this respect, milk, placenta, and feces provide a case in point, as they do not fit neatly within the standard legal classifications for comparable products, such as foods, drugs, tissues, cosmetic ingredients, or waste products. Different countries have adopted contrasting legal regimes—or no regimes at all—to regulate these substances.

...

"In  the  so-called  post-colonial  era,  the  law  of  self-consumption  illustrates  the broader phenomenon of a “jurisprudence of disgust,” to use an expression that Alison Young developed to describe the legal censorship of provocative or “obscene” artwork.71A  significant  dimension  of  contemporary  law  making  can  be  characterized  as  a  response  to  what  is  considered disgusting around or among us, which reflects an endeavor to confine and tame what repulses us. This is particularly obvious in the context of what legal scholar Kim Krawiec calls “taboo trades” (and economist Alvin Roth dubs “repugnant markets”); that is, the exchanges and transactions of products that are considered culturally immoral and uncaring, such as those involving organs, babies, sex, drugs, and corruption."

Are embryos property?

 A Virginia judge has managed to make a repugnant legal argument about a repugnant transaction, since the relevant precedent he identifies has to do with the ownership of slaves.

Virginia judge rules human embryos are ‘chattel’ based on centuries-old slave laws  by Matthew Barakat, Associated Press

"Frozen human embryos can legally be considered property, or “chattel,” a Virginia judge has ruled, basing his decision in part on a 19th century law governing the treatment of slaves.

"The preliminary opinion by Fairfax County Circuit Court Judge Richard Gardiner – delivered in a long-running dispute between a divorced husband and wife – is being criticized by some for wrongly and unnecessarily delving into a time in Virginia history when it was legally permissible to own human beings.

“It’s repulsive and it’s morally repugnant,” said Susan Crockin, a lawyer and scholar at Georgetown University’s Kennedy Institute of Ethics and an expert in reproductive technology law.

...

"In a separate part of his opinion, Gardiner also said he erred when he initially concluded that human embryos cannot be sold.

“As there is no prohibition on the sale of human embryos, they may be valued and sold, and thus may be considered ‘goods or chattels,’” he wrote."

HT: Kim Krawiec

Donate blood or organs to pay a traffic fine or shorten a prison term?

I spend a lot of my time thinking and writing about repugnant transactions and controversial markets, and some of that intersects with my work on blood and organ donation and transplantation (particularly on the controversial issue of compensation for donors, and how that might intersect with varieties of coercion). But today's post is about two proposals that mix all these things together. (My guess is that many people will find them differently repugnant: think of them as a quick test of your own views.)

In Argentina, a municipal judge proposes blood donation to pay traffic fines, and in Massachusetts several legislators co-sponsor a bill to allow bone marrow (blood stem cell) donation or organ donation to reduce prison sentences.

First, blood donation and traffic fines:

 Mario Macis points me to this story in La Nacion, about a city in the Argentine province of Salta:

En una ciudad de Salta las multas de tránsito se pueden pagar con una donación de sangre  [In a city of Salta, traffic fines can be paid with a blood donation]  (English from Google Translate)

"In the city of Tartagal, Salta, it is possible to pay a traffic ticket with a blood donation . The measure, taken two months ago, generates both support and questioning.

...

"The judge of the Court of Misdemeanors of the Municipality of Tartagal, Farid Obeid , proposed in a ruling last August that those who had traffic fines could pay them with their own blood donation or from third parties on behalf of the offenders.

"It was then determined that donations be made in hospitals, voluntarily and only once; that is to say that repeat offenders cannot opt ​​for blood donation.

...

"The ruling received support and criticism, the latter basically from the health sector. Oscar Torres, president of the Argentine Association of Hemotherapy, Immunohematology and Cellular Therapy , sent a letter to the Deliberative Council of Tartagal indicating that the measure removes the "spirit of solidarity and altruism from blood donation" 

Here's a related story about the ongoing debate (also using Google translate):

Controversy over an unusual municipal project: they claim that fines can be paid with blood. "This controversial project was presented to the Deliberative Council of Tartagal, and criticism has already begun"

***********

And here's the new bill proposed in Massachusetts (don't hold your breath waiting for it to be passed into law). It's in English, so the phrase about the necessary "amount of bone marrow and organ(s) donated to earn one’s sentence to be commuted" isn't a translation error; I think it's just awkward (i.e. not meant to be chilling). (But the discussion of donated "organ(s)" makes me think of Kazuo Ishiguro's novel "Never Let Me Go"). 

Bill HD.3822, 193rd (Current), An Act to establish the Massachusetts incarcerated individual bone marrow and organ donation program

"Section 170. (a) The Commissioner of the Department of Corrections shall establish a Bone Marrow and Organ Donation Program within the Department of Correction and a Bone Marrow and Organ Donation Committee. The Bone Marrow and Organ Donation Program shall allow eligible incarcerated individuals to gain not less than 60 and not more than 365 day reduction in the length of their committed sentence in Department of Corrections facilities, or House of Correction facilities if they are serving a Department of Correction sentence in a House of Corrections facility, on the condition that the incarcerated individual has donated bone marrow or organ(s). 

...

"The Bone Marrow and Organ Donation Committee shall also be responsible for promulgating standards of eligibility for incarcerated individuals to participate and the amount of bone marrow and organ(s) donated to earn one’s sentence to be commuted. Annual reports including actual amounts of bone marrow and organ(s) donated, and the estimated life-savings associated with said donations, are to be filed with the Executive and Legislative branches of the Commonwealth. All costs associated with the Bone Marrow and Organ Donation Program will be done by the benefiting institutions of the program and their affiliates-not by the Department of Correction. There shall be no commissions or monetary payments to be made to the Department of Correction for bone marrow donated by incarcerated individuals."

Simultaneous HT to Ron Shorrer, Kim Krawiec, Akhil Vohra

Unraveling of the market for new law professors

 Kim Krawiec, a law professor who is among the most penetrating analysts of controversial markets and market practices, emails me about unraveling in the market for new law professors:

"prior to Covid, the AALS (American Association of Law Schools) ran a hiring process with a central meeting in Washington DC and nearly every law professor was hired through this process. During Covid, this of course stopped and has now been dropped (I think) permanently, so now schools are sort of making up their own schedules. Some schools are starting early and making exploding offers before other schools have even begun the process. The idea of exploding offers is not new — it happened before. Though some (mostly higher ranked schools) considered it bad form, other schools argued that they had to do it or would wind up hiring no one year after year as favored candidates accepted other jobs near the end of the season. But the physical meeting and control over the timing by the AALS at least posed a basic schedule. That now appears to be gone and people (both candidates and hiring committees) are up in arms. ... My guess (completely speculating) is that the interests of higher ranked and lower ranked schools are not aligned on this and that makes it harder to find a new equilibrium, but I don’t know."

*******

Law already 'enjoys' a number of unraveled markets, for law clerks, for associates (and summer associates) in law firms, and for articles in law reviews.  So I have to admit the prospects for preventing wholesale unraveling of the law professor market looks bleak, unless law schools can start to think outside of the box, perhaps e.g. by preparing to give offers to students who have already accepted exploding offers, if necessary to start in the following academic year...  

Maybe in that way the academic law community can start to come to some agreement on some  time, midway between early and late, in which offers should be made and during which they should be left open.

Kidney exchange collaboration between Stanford and APKD

 I recently had occasion to review the long collaboration between my Stanford colleagues and Mike Rees and the Alliance for Paired Kidney Donation. It turns out that, together with other coauthors, Mike and his APKD colleagues have written well over a dozen papers with me and my colleagues at Stanford.  (My own collaboration with Mike and APKD goes back to when Itai Ashlagi and I were still in Boston, where my earliest papers on kidney exchange were with  Tayfun Sönmez and Utku Ünver, and with Frank Delmonico and his colleagues at the New England Program for Kidney Exchange.)

Here's the list I came up with, probably not exhaustive:

Mike Rees/APKD collaborations with Stanford scholars (Ashlagi, Melcher, Roth, Somaini)

 1. Rees, Michael A., Jonathan E. Kopke, Ronald P. Pelletier, Dorry L. Segev, Matthew E. Rutter, Alfredo J. Fabrega, Jeffrey Rogers, Oleh G. Pankewycz, Janet Hiller, Alvin E. Roth, Tuomas Sandholm, Utku Ünver, and Robert A. Montgomery, “A Non-Simultaneous Extended Altruistic Donor Chain,” New England Journal of Medicine, 360;11, March 12, 2009, 1096-1101. https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMoa0803645

2.     Ashlagi, Itai, Duncan S. Gilchrist, Alvin E. Roth, and Michael A. Rees, “Nonsimultaneous Chains and Dominos in Kidney Paired Donation – Revisited,” American Journal of Transplantation, 11, 5, May 2011, 984-994 http://www.stanford.edu/~alroth/papers/Nonsimultaneous%20Chains%20AJT%202011.pdf

3.     Ashlagi, Itai, Duncan S. Gilchrist, Alvin E. Roth, and Michael A. Rees, “NEAD Chains in Transplantation,” American Journal of Transplantation, December 2011; 11: 2780–2781. http://web.stanford.edu/~iashlagi/papers/NeadChains2.pdf

4.     Wallis, C. Bradley, Kannan P. Samy, Alvin E. Roth, and Michael A. Rees, “Kidney Paired Donation,” Nephrology Dialysis Transplantation, July 2011, 26 (7): 2091-2099 (published online March 31, 2011; doi: 10.1093/ndt/gfr155, https://academic.oup.com/ndt/article/26/7/2091/1896342/Kidney-paired-donation

5.     Rees, Michael A.,  Mark A. Schnitzler, Edward Zavala, James A. Cutler,  Alvin E. Roth, F. Dennis Irwin, Stephen W. Crawford,and Alan B.  Leichtman, “Call to Develop a Standard Acquisition Charge Model for Kidney Paired Donation,” American Journal of Transplantation, 2012, 12, 6 (June), 1392-1397. (published online 9 April 2012 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1600-6143.2012.04034.x/abstract )

6.     Anderson, Ross, Itai Ashlagi, David Gamarnik, Michael Rees, Alvin E. Roth, Tayfun Sönmez and M. Utku Ünver, " Kidney Exchange and the Alliance for Paired Donation: Operations Research Changes the Way Kidneys are Transplanted," Edelman Award Competition, Interfaces, 2015, 45(1), pp. 26–42. http://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/pdf/10.1287/inte.2014.0766

7.     Fumo, D.E., V. Kapoor, L.J. Reece, S.M. Stepkowski,J.E. Kopke, S.E. Rees, C. Smith, A.E. Roth, A.B. Leichtman, M.A. Rees, “Improving matching strategies in kidney paired donation: the 7-year evolution of a web based virtual matching system,” American Journal of Transplantation, October 2015, 15(10), 2646-2654 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/enhanced/doi/10.1111/ajt.13337/ (designated one of 10 “best of AJT 2015”)

8.     Melcher, Marc L., John P. Roberts, Alan B. Leichtman, Alvin E. Roth, and Michael A. Rees, “Utilization of Deceased Donor Kidneys to Initiate Living Donor Chains,” American Journal of Transplantation, 16, 5, May 2016, 1367–1370. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajt.13740/full

9.     Michael A. Rees, Ty B. Dunn, Christian S. Kuhr, Christopher L. Marsh, Jeffrey Rogers, Susan E. Rees, Alejandra Cicero, Laurie J. Reece, Alvin E. Roth, Obi Ekwenna, David E. Fumo, Kimberly D. Krawiec, Jonathan E. Kopke, Samay Jain, Miguel Tan and Siegfredo R. Paloyo, “Kidney Exchange to Overcome Financial Barriers to Kidney Transplantation,” American Journal of Transplantation, 17, 3, March 2017, 782–790. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajt.14106/full  

a.     M. A. Rees, S. R. Paloyo, A. E. Roth, K. D. Krawiec, O. Ekwenna, C. L. Marsh, A. J. Wenig, T. B. Dunn, “Global Kidney Exchange: Financially Incompatible Pairs Are Not Transplantable Compatible Pairs,” American Journal of Transplantation, 17, 10, October 2017, 2743–2744. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajt.14451/full

b.     A. E. Roth, K. D. Krawiec, S. Paloyo, O. Ekwenna, C. L. Marsh, A. J. Wenig, T. B. Dunn, and M. A. Rees, “People should not be banned from transplantation only because of their country of origin,” American Journal of Transplantation, 17, 10, October 2017, 2747-2748. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajt.14485/full

c.      Ignazio R. Marino, Alvin E. Roth, Michael A. Rees; Cataldo Doria, “Open dialogue between professionals with different opinions builds the best policy, American Journal of Transplantation, 17, 10, October 2017, 2749. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajt.14484/full

10.  Danielle Bozek, Ty B. Dunn, Christian S. Kuhr, Christopher L. Marsh, Jeffrey Rogers, Susan E. Rees, Laura Basagoitia, Robert J. Brunner, Alvin E. Roth, Obi Ekwenna, David E. Fumo, Kimberly D. Krawiec, Jonathan E. Kopke, Puneet Sindhwani, Jorge Ortiz, Miguel Tan, and Siegfredo R. Paloyo, Michael A. Rees, “The Complete Chain of the First Global Kidney Exchange Transplant and 3-yr Follow-up,” European Urology Focus, 4, 2, March 2018, 190-197. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2405456918301871

11.  Itai Ashlagi, Adam Bingaman, Maximilien Burq, Vahideh Manshadi, David Gamarnik, Cathi Murphey, Alvin E. Roth,  Marc L. Melcher, Michael A. Rees, ”The effect of match-run frequencies on the number of transplants and waiting times in kidney exchange,” American Journal of Transplantation, 18, 5, May 2018,  1177-1186, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/ajt.14566

12.   Stepkowski, S. M., Mierzejewska, B., Fumo, D., Bekbolsynov, D., Khuder, S., Baum, C. E., Brunner, R. J., Kopke, J. E., Rees, S. E., Smith, C. E., Ashlagi, I., Roth, A. E., Rees, M. A., “The 6-year clinical outcomes for patients registered in a multiregional United States Kidney Paired Donation program- a retrospective study,” Transplant international 32: 839-853. 2019. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/tri.13423

13.   Roth, Alvin E., Ignazio R. Marino, Obi Ekwenna, Ty B. Dunn, Siegfredo R. Paloyo, Miguel Tan, Ricardo Correa-Rotter, Christian S. Kuhr, Christopher L. Marsh, Jorge Ortiz, Giuliano Testa, Puneet Sindhwani, Dorry L. Segev, Jeffrey Rogers, Jeffrey D. Punch, Rachel C. Forbes, Michael A. Zimmerman, Matthew J. Ellis, Aparna Rege, Laura Basagoitia, Kimberly D. Krawiec, and Michael A. Rees, “Global Kidney Exchange Should Expand Wisely, Transplant International, September 2020, 33, 9,  985-988. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/tri.13656

14.  Vivek B. Kute, Himanshu V. Patel, Pranjal R. Modi, Sayyad J. Rizvi, Pankaj R. Shah, Divyesh P Engineer, Subho Banerjee, Hari Shankar Meshram, Bina P. Butala, Manisha P. Modi, Shruti Gandhi, Ansy H. Patel, Vineet V. Mishra, Alvin E. Roth, Jonathan E. Kopke, Michael A. Rees, “Non-simultaneous kidney exchange cycles in resource-restricted countries without non-directed donation,” Transplant International,  Volume 34, Issue 4, April 2021,  669-680  https://doi.org/10.1111/tri.13833

15.   Afshin Nikzad, Mohammad Akbarpour, Michael A. Rees, and Alvin E. Roth “Global Kidney Chains,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, September 7, 2021 118 (36) e2106652118; https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2106652118 .

16.    Alvin E. Roth, Ignazio R. Marino, Kimberly D. Krawiec, and Michael A. Rees, “Criminal, Legal, and Ethical Kidney Donation and Transplantation: A Conceptual Framework to Enable Innovation,” Transplant International  (2022), 35: doi: 10.3389/ti.2022.10551, https://www.frontierspartnerships.org/articles/10.3389/ti.2022.10551/full

17.   Ignazio R. Marino, Alvin E. Roth, and Michael A. Rees, “Living Kidney Donor Transplantation and Global Kidney Exchange,” Experimental and Clinical Transplantation (2022), Suppl. 4, 5-9. http://www.ectrx.org/class/pdfPreview.php?year=2022&volume=20&issue=8&supplement=4&spage_number=5&makale_no=0

18.  Agarwal, Nikhil, Itai Ashlagi, Michael A. Rees, Paulo Somaini, and Daniel Waldinger. "Equilibrium allocations under alternative waitlist designs: Evidence from deceased donor kidneys." Econometrica 89, no. 1 (2021): 37-76.

And here’s a report of work in progress:

The First 52 Global Kidney Exchange Transplants: overcoming multiple barriers to transplantation by MA Rees, AE Roth , IR Marino, K Krawiec, A Agnihotri, S Rees, K Sweeney, S Paloyo, T Dunn, M Zimmerman, J Punch, R Sung, J Leventhal, A Alobaidli, F Aziz, E Mor, T Ashkenazi, I Ashlagi, M Ellis, A Rege, V Whittaker, R Forbes, C Marsh, C Kuhr, J Rogers, M Tan, L Basagoitia, R Correa-Rotter, S Anwar, F Citterio, J Romagnoli, and O Ekwenna.  Transplantation: September 2022 - Volume 106 - Issue 9S - p S469 doi: 10.1097/01.tp.0000887972.53388.77  https://journals.lww.com/transplantjournal/Fulltext/2022/09001/423_9__The_First_52_Global_Kidney_Exchange.697.aspx

The First 52 Global Kidney Exchange Transplants: today at TTS2022 in Buenos Aires

 Tomorrow at TTS2022 in Buenos Aires, Mike Rees will present

The First 52 Global Kidney Exchange Transplants: overcoming multiple barriers to transplantation by MA Rees, AE Roth , IR Marino, K Krawiec, A Agnihotri, S Rees, K Sweeney, S Paloyo, T Dunn, M Zimmerman, J Punch, R Sung, J Leventhal, A Alobaidli, F Aziz, E Mor, T Ashkenazi, I Ashlagi, M Ellis, A Rege, V Whittaker, R Forbes, C Marsh, C Kuhr, J Rogers, M Tan, L Basagoitia, R Correa-Rotter, S Anwar, F Citterio, J Romagnoli, and O Ekwenna.  

Introduction: Many barriers currently stand in the way of achieving international kidney exchange including: financial, regulatory, logistical, cultural, immunological and legal barriers. 

Methods: The Alliance for Paired Kidney Donation serves patients in 15 countries. Ten of these countries have participated in Global Kidney Exchange (GKE) transplants in which either living donors, their kidneys or recipients have traveled internationally to achieve successful living donor kidney transplantation (LDKT). In all cases, barriers were present that prevented LKDT in the donor or recipient country of origin.

Results: Between January of 2015 and February of 2022, GKE has produced 11 chains and 4 cycles that has provided LDKT for 17 international patients from 10 countries to be transplanted, as well as 35 LDKT for patients in the United States (US). GKE chains lengths have ranged from 1 to 11; cycles were length 2 or 3. Eight GKE transplants overcame immunologic barriers, 4 financial barriers, and 5 both immunologic and financial barriers. GKE has involved 19 US transplant centers across 18 states and 38% of recipients were minorities. For US recipients 11% had blood type (BT)-A, 57% BT-0, 17% BT-B, and 14% BT-AB; for international recipients 41% had BT-A, 53% BT-O and 6% BT-B. The PRA was 0-20% for 23 patients, 21-79% for 14 and > 80% for 15 (10 international). International pairs were funded by a combination of self-pay, insurance and philanthropy. Transplanting 35 US patients saved US healthcare payers $7-10M vs. dialysis. International recipients have 100% 3-year patient and graft survival and all international donors are alive and have normal creatinine and blood pressure.

Conclusion: GKE overcomes financial and immunological barriers to transplantation. Savings from avoided dialysis offers scalability. Our program ensures transparency of international pair selection, emphasis on donor safety, and assurance of longterm immunosuppression for recipients as prerequisites for sustainability.

The market for prison beds and prisoners

 Kim Krawiec points me to this article about prison space for rent, from the Brennan Center at NYU:

A Market for Holding Humans: The Correctional and Detention Bed Trade, by Lauren-Brooke Eisen and Ram Subramanian

"For decades, sher­iffs, correc­tions agen­cies, and for-profit firms have sought to alle­vi­ate prison and jail over­crowding by offer­ing avail­able beds to other juris­dic­tions in need of space. And the need is great. Despite the over­all decline in impris­on­ment rates since 2009, many places still have too many people to safely house. The same goes for deten­tions by U.S. Immig­ra­tion and Customs Enforce­ment.

"This market can be a much-needed source of revenue for local­it­ies. In Louisi­ana, for example, ICE pays $74 per day — nearly three times what the state prison system reim­burses local sher­iffs. Midland County, Michigan, where the local budget depends on jail bed rent­als, charges $45 per bed per day to other counties and $35 to the state.

...

"At one point, a website called Jail­Bed­Space.com covered 48 states, serving more than 150 agen­cies. The company matched jail admin­is­trat­ors with empty beds in facil­it­ies in other counties or states. Other so-called “bed brokers” have popped up over the years, all receiv­ing fees for each bed they rent out.

...

"The detained people bear the cost as they are shuttled across juris­dic­tional lines, hundreds or even thou­sands of miles from their famil­ies, friends, and communit­ies. Addi­tional miles and state lines present finan­cial and prac­tical barri­ers to retain­ing these import­ant ties. One man incar­cer­ated in Vermont who was moved in the middle of the night to Kentucky without warn­ing said, “This prac­tice of trans­fer­ring inmates out-of-state is horrendous. You’re taking people who, whatever support network they may have, is gone. . . . you’re alone. You’re isol­ated.”

Gary Becker's last paper: appropriately, on a monetary market for kidneys (with Julio Elias and Karen Ye, JEBO, 2022)

 Gary Becker, who passed away in 2014, has a new paper, finished by his coauthors Julio Elias and Karen Ye. It recounts how the shortage of transplantable kidneys has only increased as the demand has grown, and the argument for paying donors is as strong as ever.  (In the meantime, the obstacles to that approach haven't vanished.)

The shortage of kidneys for transplant: Altruism, exchanges, opt in vs. opt out, and the market for kidneys*  by Gary S.Becker, Julio Jorge Elias, and Karen J.Ye, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 202, October 2022, Pages 211-226 (Another link to the paper is here, temporarily.)

Abstract: "In 2007 we published a paper on organ transplants that used data from 1990–2005. We proposed a radical solution of paying individuals to donate kidneys, and claimed that this would clean out the waiting list for kidney transplants in a short period of time. In this paper, we revisit the topic, and examine 14 years of additional data to see if anything fundamental has changed. We show that the main altruistic based policies implemented, such as kidney exchanges or opt out systems for organ procurement, have been unable to solve the problem of shortages. Our analysis suggests that, because of the reaction of direct living donors to increases in other sources of donations, the supply curve of kidney transplants is highly inelastic to altruistic policies. In contrast, a market in organs would eliminate organ shortages and thereby eliminate thousands of needless deaths."

Here's the most relevant part of the first footnote:

*"We started working on this paper together with Gary Becker in 2011. In 2012, we presented the paper at the Law and Economics Workshop and the MacLean Center's Seminar Series of the University of Chicago. The paper was unfinished when Becker passed away in May 2014. In this version of the paper, we updated the data and made some additions. The paper preserves all the economic analysis that was developed in the last version that we collaborated with Becker.

"Becker wrote his first article about the organ shortage in 1997, as part of his monthly BusinessWeek Column. The article was entitled How Uncle Sam Could Ease the Organ Shortage. In the article, he “suggest(s) considering the purchase of organs only because other modifications to the present system so far have been grossly inadequate to end the shortage.”

"In the 2000s, Julio Elias collaborated with Becker in a paper that uses the economic approach to analyze the consequences of legalizing the purchase and sale of kidneys for transplants from both deceased and living donors. In 2014, Becker published with Julio Elias a column in the Saturday Essay section of the Wall Street Journal entitled Cash for Kidneys: The Case for a Market for Organs. For Becker, the problem of the organ shortage and finding ways to solve it was a lifelong project. This paper reflects some of his last thoughts on this problem."

Here are their conclusions:

"The current state of the market of kidney transplants is a disaster. Over the last years, the waiting list has grown in over 4000 individuals each year, while transplants have grown by only about 250 per year. The result has been longer and longer queues to receive organs. 4000 patients died each year while waiting 3 and a half years on average for a transplant. According to our estimations, the annual social cost of those who die while waiting for kidney transplants is over $7 billion.

"Neither kidney exchange programs nor opt out systems nor educational campaigns to increase donations from altruistic donors have solved the problem of shortages. The main reason for their mild effects, as we show in this paper, is that the altruistic supply curve of kidney transplants is highly inelastic to these type of policies because of the reaction of direct living donors to increases in other sources of donations.

"The only feasible way to eliminate the large queues in the market for kidney transplants is by significantly increasing the supply of kidneys. The introduction of monetary incentives could increase the supply of organs sufficiently to eliminate the large queues and thereby eliminate thousands of needless deaths, and it would do so without increasing the total cost of kidney transplant surgery by a large percent.

"A market for the purchase and selling of organs would appear strange at first. However, much as the voluntary military today has universal support, the selling of organs would come to be accepted over time. " advantages of accepting payment for organs would eventually become clear, and people will wonder why it took so long for such an ovious and sensible remedy to the organ shortage to be implemented.

***********

Some related earlier posts:

Another take on compensating donors:

Tuesday, August 16, 2022

Kim Krawiec interviews Frank McCormick on the kidney shortage (and how to end it)

Commentary on the  legal monetary market for kidneys in Iran (and how it differs from illegal black markets):

Monday, June 27, 2022

A Forum on Kidneys for Sale in Iran, in Transplant International

The Pontifical Academy of Science says that compensating donors is a crime against humanity:

Friday, February 17, 2017

Vatican statement on organ transplantation

All my posts on compensation for donors (not just kidney donors) are here.

And here's my 2007 paper on repugnance (that came out in the same issue of JEP as the Becker and Elias paper), and was a first attempt at understanding some of the obstacles that face proposals to compensate donors of kidneys (and other things):

• Roth, Alvin E. "Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21:3, Summer, 2007, pp. 37-58.

I'm slowly writing a book that will expand on it.

Kim Krawiec interviews Frank McCormick on the kidney shortage (and how to end it)

Here is Kim Krawiec's latest podcast (click on this link to listen, not the picture below...:): 

Taboo Trades 

AUGUST 06, 2022 KIM KRAWIEC

Taboo Trades

Bonus Episode: Ending the Kidney Shortage with Frank McCormick

00:00|44:40

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Frank McCormick is an economist and the author of numerous articles focused on the shortage of kidneys for transplantation. He is retired from the Bank of America where he was Vice-president and Director of U.S. Economic and Financial Research. Today, we’re discussing his recent article, Projecting the Economic Impact of Compensating Living Kidney Donors in the United States: Cost-Benefit Analysis Demonstrates Substantial Patient and Societal Gains, co-authored with Philip J. Held, Glenn Chertow, Thomas G. Peters, and John P. Roberts. It is published in the journal, Value in Health and is available here: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S109830152201957X/

*************

In an email to his extensive mailing list, McCormick writes:

If you don’t have 45 minutes to spare, the key points I have to make are:

1. The death toll due to the shortage of transplant kidneys is much greater than is generally realized.  The Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) misleads everyone by saying only 19 people a day die waiting for a transplant organ -- because it counts only patients who die while on the waiting lists (for kidneys alone that number is about 13 deaths per day).

But HRSA does not count:

A. Patients who are removed from the wait list because their health has become so poor they may not survive a transplant operation (or for other reasons) who soon die;

B. Patients who are never placed on the waiting list to begin with, but who could be saved from a premature death by transplantation if there were no kidney shortage.

Adding the latter two groups raises the death toll due to the kidney shortage to more than 110 deaths per day (40,000 per year).

 2. This appalling death toll due to the kidney shortage could be completely ended if the government compensates kidney donors about $77,000 per donor (with a wide range of uncertainty surrounding that estimate).  But even if the required compensation is two or three times this amount, it would be trivial compared to:

A. The value of a longer and healthier life to a kidney recipient (and their caregiver), which my co-authors and I estimate at about $1.5 million.

B. The savings (mainly to taxpayers) from the kidney recipient not needing expensive dialysis therapy, which we estimate at about $1.2 million per recipient.

In the long run, this program of government compensation of kidney donors would not cost taxpayers anything; rather it would save them about $7 billion per year.

 References:

1. McCormick F, Held PJ, Chertow GM.  The Terrible Toll of the Kidney Shortage.   J Am Soc Nephrol 2018;29:2775-2776. https://jasn.asnjournals.org/content/jnephrol/29/12/2775.full.pdf.

 2. McCormick F, Held PJ, Chertow GM, Peters TG, Roberts JP.  Perspectives: Projecting the Economic Impact of Compensating Living Kidney Donors in the United States: Cost-Benefit Analysis Demonstrates Substantial Patient and Societal Gains.  Value in Health, online 9 June 2022.  https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jval.2022.04.1732.