Here's a recent article on deceased organ donation, in The Economist, followed by a letter to the editor from Alex Chan and me.
In America, lots of usable organs go unrecovered or get binned. That is a missed opportunity to save thousands of lives
"More than four-fifths of all donated organs and two-thirds of kidneys come from dead people (who must die in hospital); living donors can give only a kidney or parts of a lung or liver. Whereas some countries, such as England, France and Spain, have an opt-out model, in America donors must register or their families must agree. Persuading them will always be hard: Dr Karp’s hospital gets consent from about half of potential donors.
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"Responsibility lies partly with some of the 56 nonprofit Organ Procurement Organisations (opos), like LiveOnNY, that do the legwork. Brianna Doby, a researcher and consultant, advised Arkansas’s opo in 2021 and was astounded to learn that most calls about potential donors went unanswered outside the nine-to-five workday and at weekends. Other opos, by contrast, sent staff to hospitals within an hour of an alert about a prospective donor.
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"Yet unrecovered organs are not the only reason America could do more transplants. A surprising number of organs from deceased donors end up in the rubbish: more than a quarter of kidneys and a tenth of livers last year.
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"Hospitals are often risk-averse, too. Discard rates are higher for organs of lower quality.
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"For elderly recipients, getting older or otherwise risky kidneys generally means better odds of survival than staying on dialysis. But hospitals dislike using them for two reasons. First, they can lead to more complications and thus require more resources, eating into margins. Second, if the recipient dies soon after the transplant, hospitals suffer—a key measure used to evaluate them is the survival rate of recipients a year after transplant. According to Robert Cannon, a liver-transplant surgeon at the University of Alabama at Birmingham, hospitals succeed by being excessively cautious and keeping patients with worse prospects off waiting lists."
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And here's our followup letter to the editor, published November 2:
Organ-donation economics
"More than 110,000 Americans are waiting for an organ transplant and over 5,000 died waiting for an organ in 2019. Close to 6,000 recovered organs were discarded. “Wasted organs” (September 23rd) correctly pointed out that the responsibility lies in part with non-profit Organ Procurement Organisations and in part with the excessive caution exercised by transplant centres when deciding who to conduct transplants for and which kidneys to use.
"Numerous initiatives in Congress, and more proposed by various non-governmental agencies, such as the Federation of American Scientists and the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, among others, have been focused on tweaking how the performance of organ procurers and transplant centres should be measured while keeping in place the system that put us in today’s quagmire. As we indicate in our recent paper (conditionally accepted at the Journal of Political Economy), such approaches that keep regulations fragmented are bound to be inefficient, given that the incentives and opportunities facing organ procurers and transplant centres are intertwined.
"We show that “holistic regulation”, which aligns the interests of organ procurers and transplant centres by rewarding them based on the health outcomes of the entire patient pool, can get at the root of the problem. This approach also leads to more organ recoveries while increasing the use of organs for sicker patients who otherwise would be left without a transplant.
"In the end increasing access to kidney transplantation will require the improvement of the entire supply chain of organs. This means boosting donor registrations and donor recoveries from the deceased. It also means increasing living donations, and co-ordinating donations through mechanisms like paired kidney donations and deceased-donor-initiated kidney- exchange chains.
Alex Chan, Assistant professor of business administration, Harvard University
Alvin E. Roth, Professor of economics, Stanford University
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And here's the paper referred to in our letter, on Alex's website:
Regulation of Organ Transplantation and Procurement: A Market Design Lab Experiment, by Alex Chan and Alvin E. Roth
Abstract: "We conduct a lab experiment that shows current rules regulating transplant centers (TCs) and organ procurement organizations (OPOs) create perverse incentives that inefficiently reduce both organ recovery and beneficial transplantations. We model the decision environment with a 2-player multi-round game between an OPO and a TC. In the condition that simulates current rules, OPOs recover only highest-quality kidneys and forgo valuable recovery opportunities, and TCs decline some beneficial transplants and perform some unnecessary transplants. Alternative regulations that reward TCs and OPOs together for health outcomes in their entire patient pool lead to behaviors that increase organ recovery and appropriate transplants."
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