Signaling in resident and fellowship matches to reduce interview congestion

An article by Dr. Joseph Bernstein in Clinical Orthopaedics and Related Research (December 2017, Volume 475, Issue 12, pp 2845–2849 ) argues that a signaling mechanism might help deal with congestion in the Orthopaedic Surgery match.
"Not the Last Word: Want to Match in an Orthopaedic Surgery Residency? Send a Rose to the Program Director," (gated)

I was invited to write the comment, below, which appeared along with two other (less favorable) comments from surgeons. (All of the comments appear, without titles, in the same Not the Last Word column at the link...)

Roth, Alvin E. “Congestion and signaling in residency matching,” Clinical Orthopaedics and Related Research, December 2017, 475: 2847, 2849

Now that applying to many residency programs is easy, programs receive so many applications that they have trouble deciding whom to interview, particularly because receiving an application is no longer as strong a signal of interest as it was when applying was harder [1]. The same could be said for how residents applied to colleges when they were younger, and how they will apply to fellowships when they are older. The internet and common application tools make sending applications easier, and evaluating them harder. (This is the common problem of congestion: e.g. it’s harder to use email when we get too many emails, etc.…)

In congested markets, in which not every interesting applicant can be interviewed, signals are important. An application itself is a signal about an applicant’s accomplishments. Like a peacock’s tail, it shows how desirable a candidate is, i.e. why the program should be interested in the applicant. When a program receives too many applications it becomes more costly to read them all, but each one continues to convey the applicant’s accomplishments.

What is lost when applications are easy to send is how interested the applicant is in the program. And, in a congested market, it helps to be able to signal not only how interesting you are, but also how interested, because programs that can’t interview every attractive applicant need to devote much of their interviewing to applicants who might ultimately be interested.

In Economics, the AEA’s signaling system allows each candidate to send no more than two signals of particular interest in being interviewed, for free [2].  Why [only] two? Because while it can be shown how one signal can unambiguously improve the process of selecting candidates for interviews [3], too many signals could harm the process.  Suppose we allowed 50 signals: then the absence of a signal would start to be a signal itself (“this candidate must not be interested in us at all if he didn’t even send us one of his 50 signals…”)  Signals get much of their value by being scarce. So when you can send only two, a program which receives one knows that you targeted them as one of only two recipients.

To which programs should a candidate signal? We advise candidates not to send either of their signals to the very top programs in their field. Those programs can simply interview the candidates they like best, since they have good reason to believe that every application signals genuine interest. Signals will do the most good if sent to programs that should be interested in the candidate, but to whom it might not be obvious that he or she is interested in them.

The resident match removes congestion from the process of making offers and accepting or rejecting them, since each participant can submit a long rank order list that is processed centrally [4]. But interviewing remains congested, because interviews take time. It is worthwhile considering how changes in the market design [5] could smooth the process.  Organizing a signaling system—and then monitoring how it works--seems like a promising step.

[1] Bernstein, Joseph, “Want to Match in an Orthopaedic Surgery Residency? Send a Rose to the Program Director,” this journal, this issue [?]

[2] Coles, Peter, John H. Cawley, Phillip B. Levine, Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth, and John J. Siegfried, “The Job Market for New Economists: A Market Design Perspective,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24,4, Fall 2010, 187-206.

[3]  Coles, Peter, Alexey Kushnir and Muriel Niederle, “Preference Signaling in Matching Markets”, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2013, 5(2), 99-134

[4] Roth, Alvin E.  “The origins, history, and design of the resident match,” JAMA. Journal of the American Medical Association, vol. 289, No. 7, February 19, 2003, 909-912.

[5] Roth, Alvin E. Who Gets What—and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design, An Eamon Dolan Book, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, Boston, New York, 2015.

"Demonstrated interest" as costly signaling in college admissions

Costly signals are valuable as signals because they are costly to send. But of course they may be more costly for some to send than others.


"Demonstrated interest: Signaling behavior in college admissions" (by James Dearden, Suhui Li, Chad Meyerhoefer, and Muzhe Yang) Contemporary Economic Policy (2017)

Abstract

In college admission decisions, important and possibly competing goals include increasing the quality of the freshman class and making the school more selective while attaining the targeted size of the incoming class. Especially for high-quality applicants who receive multiple competing offers, colleges are concerned about the probability that these students accept the offers of admission. As a result, applicants' contacts with admissions offices, such as campus visits, can be viewed positively by the officers as demonstrated interest in the colleges. We provide empirical evidence on the effects of demonstrated interest on admission outcomes. Specifically, we use unique and comprehensive administrative data, which include all contacts made by each applicant to the admissions office of a medium-sized highly selective university during two admission cycles. We find that an applicant who contacts the university is more likely to be admitted, and that the effect of the contact on the probability of admission is increasing in the applicant's Scholastic Assessment Test score, particularly when the contact is costly to make. We also use a numerical example to explore policies to reduce the inequity associated with the use of demonstrated interest in admission decisions, examining in particular the subsidization of costly demonstrated interest by low-income students.

Here's an article about the paper in Inside Higher Ed...
Another Edge for the Wealthy
"Many colleges favor applicants who show "demonstrated interest" -- and the way they measure it puts those without money at a disadvantage, study finds."

Signaling interest for college admissions

I've blogged before about Initial View, a service for overseas applicants to American colleges. It provides a video interview that can be part of their application, and also a signaling mechanism by which they can send a "star" to up to two colleges, to signal particular interest.

Some colleges make clear that they value such signals: here's a paragraph from the page for international applicants of Bates College.

"Does Bates accept interviews conducted through InitialView?

Yes. InitialView includes an interview and writing sample. Please list Bates as a recipient for your interview and designate a star if Bates is a top choice college for you."

In the market for new economists, some employers have adopted the same strategy and encourage applicants to send one of their AEA signals to them:

Signaling (by candidates) and advertising (by employers) on the Economics job market

New York City high school admissions, signaling 'demonstrated interest,' in The Atlantic

High school admissions in NYC may end with a (well designed) deferred acceptance algorithm, but the process starts long before students and some schools submit their preference lists. The Atlantic writes about how it is hard to form preferences over high schools, and to signal them to the schools through 'demonstrated interest'...

Broken Promise of New York City's High-School Admissions System
Its high-school fair is designed to give attendees a leg up in the application process—but that’s not always the case
(The URL is more informative than the headline:  http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/10/the-broken-promise-of-demonstrated-interest/503168/ )

College admissions, multiple applications, and signaling via "demonstrated interest"

The NY Times has two related stories, let's start with this one:Greater Competition for College Places Means Higher Anxiety, Too

"Though this year’s data is still largely anecdotal, applications at more than 70 percent of colleges have increased for 10 of the past 15 years.

"The number of students using the Common Application — an online application that can be submitted to multiple schools at the flick of a credit card — rose to 920,000 through mid-April, compared with 847,000 at the same time last year, said Aba Blankson, a spokeswoman for the Common Application.

"Students continue to apply to multiple colleges; the overall average is 4.4 applications, though many students apply to many more, Ms. Blankson said. As of 2013, 32 percent of students applied to seven or more schools, according to the National Association for College Admission Counseling.

"Charter school students in New England submitted the most applications, at nearly seven per student, followed closely by private school students in New England and the Middle States (a category including Washington, D.C., Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands), with more than six applications each, Ms. Blankson said. Home schoolers and public school students in the South and Southwest submitted the fewest, about three each.

"While colleges celebrate their record-setting applicant pools, high school guidance counselors take a dimmer view. Bruce Poch, the dean of admission and executive director of college counseling at Chadwick School, in Palos Verdes Peninsula, Calif., said admissions had turned into more of a lottery, as students express their fears of rejection by applying to more institutions.

“It is seen by them as more and more something they can’t control, a crapshoot, so they pile them up,” Mr. Poch said. “The multiples are at the, quote, most selective places.”
...
"At the most elite institutions, the rate of acceptance grew even more restricted. Harvard reported more than 39,041 applicants this year, compared with more than 37,307 last year. It admitted a record low 5.2 percent, compared with 5.3 percent last year, accepting 2,037 students. Yale said it had its largest-ever applicant pool, 31,455, and offered admission to 1,972 students, or 6.3 percent.

"Stanford University offered admission to 2,063 students out of 43,997 candidates, a selectivity rate of 4.7 percent.

The competition is also hard on colleges trying to predict who will ultimately attend. So as insurance, waiting lists have grown. For example, Yale put 1,095 students on its waiting list, more than half the number it admitted."
******

Here's a related story:  Common Application Saturates the College Admissions Market, Critics Say

"Admissions experts point to a trend called application inflation. Students are sending off more applications than ever. In 1990, just 9 percent of students applied to seven or more schools, according to the National Association for College Admission Counseling. By 2013, that group had grown to 32 percent.
...
"To ensure that freshmen classes are filled, “somehow, those institutions have to compensate,” said David Hawkins, the association’s director of public policy.

"They do that, he said, in part by accepting more students. They are also marketing their campuses more aggressively to widen the applicant pool while, when making admissions decisions, putting greater weight on how serious students are about attending.

"In the latest association survey, colleges attributed more importance to applicants’ so-called demonstrated interest than in class rank or teacher recommendations.

"At the same time, more and more universities are waiving application fees or buying the names of desirable students from testing agencies and sending them “fast track” applications that require little more than a signature."

Signaling English language proficiency with video interviews

Colleges are increasingly availing themselves of video and internet technology to assess language skills of foreign applicants: see e.g. this story in the WaPo:
Amid fraud fears, colleges vet China applicants with video

I'm an advisor to one of the companies they mention, Initial View.

"One service provider, InitialView, was launched in Beijing in 2009 by an American couple. While many colleges have interviewed students themselves on the Internet, the company offers verification of student identities. InitialView conducts interviews in 14 cities across China and has begun operating in other countries. "
************

Here's an earlier, related NYT story: Chinese Students and U.S. Universities Connect Through a Third Party

Should post-interview communications between residency programs and applicants be strictly regulated?

Here's an article saying that direct communications between residency programs and candidates can't be fixed, and so should be banned...

Lars J. Grimm, Carolyn S. Avery, and Charles M. Maxfield (2016) Residency Postinterview Communications: More Harm Than Good?. Journal of Graduate Medical Education: February 2016, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 7-9.

 ...

A Proposal to Reduce Misrepresentation

The prevalence of potentially misleading language in postinterview communications is troubling. Deliberate misrepresentation flouts expectations for ethics and professionalism in physician training. The residency application process is competitive for both applicants and residency programs, and both desire to maximize their chances for success. While this is no excuse for violating policies or misrepresenting the truth, when there is a pervasive belief that everyone is engaged in the same process, it feels like less of an egregious offense.

The simplest solution to stopping abusive postinterview communication practices is for the NRMP to ban all communications.¹⁰ This approach would be highly effective at leveling the playing field, and in our survey, was supported by 45.5% (122 of 268) of program directors. A simple abstention system would remove any ambiguity from the process and eliminate the temptation for abuse and mistrust. Unfortunately, this approach would also prevent appropriate forms of communications that help both sides make more informed decisions and provide reassurance when possible. Since applicants and residency programs will be matched for 1 to 7 years, it is important to make sure that all questions and doubts are addressed up front before a binding commitment is made.

A more realistic middle-ground option would limit postinterview communications to objective questions about training programs (box). Toward this goal, the Alliance for Academic Internal Medicine recommends that programs “should discourage routine thank you notes or e-mails from interviewed applicants,” and that questions should be directed “only to individuals on the program's approved contacts list.”¹⁷ By setting clear universal expectations about the types of permissible communications on interview day, residency programs could reduce the flow of misleading information in both directions. If additional oversight is needed, (ie, programs with a history of NRMP violations), all postinterview communications could be forced to pass through a messaging service on the NRMP website.⁹ Furthermore, if all communications are logged for potential future review, then individuals would be inclined to behave in a more ethical fashion.

box Recommendations

• Set clear expectations for applicants on interview day about appropriate forms of postinterview communications
• Limit postinterview communications to objective information
• Provide a point person to handle all postinterview communications
• Consider logging all postinterview communications to safeguard ethical standards
• Initiate dialogue on a national level within specialties to create specialty-specific consensus guidelines

Since medical students usually go through the application process once, the onus is on the residency programs to lay out clear expectations for appropriate behavior. An approach that designates a single individual within the residency program to handle all postinterview communications is likely the most practical. We also suggest that the approach should allow each specialty to set its own communication guidelines, as the number of applicants, size of residency programs, duration of training, and competitiveness are unique to each specialty. Our survey shows that each specialty differs in the type, frequency, and influence of postinterview communications. By allowing each specialty to set its own policies, this also allows programs to feel more engaged in the process, and thus more likely to follow the guidelines.

We encourage residency program directors in all specialties to talk with their colleagues and propose sensible regulations for postinterview communications to reduce the widely prevalent misrepresentation and unethical behavior that has come to be synonymous with the residency application process.

Econ Job market: send two signals by this weekend!

If you are a new Ph.D. economist on the job market, Happy Thanksgiving weekend, and now is the time to send two signals through the AEA. (The deadline is Monday, but if you wait til then you might forget to get your signal in in time: it's 5pm Eastern Standard Time.) The idea is that you can help break through the congestion for interviews at the AEA meetings, by sending signals to two employers who might otherwise think you were unlikely to be interested enough in them for them to devote one of their interview slots to you.

Don't over-think this (it's not that big a deal), but do send two signals to places at which you'd be glad to get an interview but which might not realize that about you.

Here's the link:

Signaling for Interviews in the Economics Job Market

The AEA coordinates a mechanism through which applicants can signal their interest in receiving an interview at the January meetings. In mid-November, each registered JOE candidate on the economics job market will have the opportunity to register and designate no more than two departments (or other employers) to whom to send a signal of particular interest. The AEA will transmit these signals to the departments the candidates choose. (Signals will not be made public.) Employers do not need to do anything to register to receive signals; signals will be sent automatically to the email address provided at the time the JOE listing was submitted.

Please see Signaling for Interviews in the Economics Job Market for a detailed description as well as theTerms of Use and Privacy Policy.

2015 Signaling Timeline:

-2015 Signaling Registration & Signal Selection is now open.

-2015 Signaling Registration & Signal Selection will close on Monday, November 30, 2015 at 5:00 p.m. EST.

-2015 Signals will be sent to employers on December 2, 2015.

Please contact aea_signals "at" aeaweb.org with any questions or problems.

You must be logged in as a candidate to participate in signaling.

Making college admissions work better; in today's NY Times

In today's NY Times, several very very short contributions, including one by me....

How to Improve the College Admissions Process

INTRODUCTION

André da Loba

The Times columnist Frank Bruni’s new book, “Where You Go Is Not Who You’ll Be,” appeals to teenagers and their parents to relax, because the college decision won’t matter as much as they think it will. But as those thin and thick envelopes arrive in mailboxes across the country, don’t colleges and universities share some of the responsibility for the absurd competition?

What can selective colleges and universities do to improve the admissions process?

READ THE DISCUSSION »

DEBATERS

• 

  One Word: Lottery!

  BARRY SCHWARTZ, PROFESSOR OF PSYCHOLOGY
• 

  Why Not a College Matching System?

  JENNIFER DELAHUNTY, AUTHOR, "I'M GOING TO COLLEGE, NOT YOU"
• 

  Fix the Financial Aid System First

  ALLAN GOLSTON, BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUNDATION
• 

  End Tuition at Elite Colleges to Attract More Applicants

  RON UNZ, THE UNZ REVIEW
• 

  Get Rid of the SAT and ACT and Abolish Preferences

  MICHELE HERNANDEZ, COLLEGE ADMISSIONS CONSULTANT
• 

  Limit the Number of Applications Allowed

  WAYLAND CHIU, COLLEGE FRESHMAN
• 

  Go Back to Paper Applications

  BRUCE POCH, CHADWICK SCHOOL
• 

  Students Need to Signal a Preferred College

  ALVIN E. ROTH, ECONOMIST
• 

  Greater Dialogue Between Colleges and Students

  ALAN T. PAYNTER, COLLEGE ADMISSIONS OFFICER

Congestion and signaling in college admissions

The college application season is approaching, and Ariel Kaminer in the NY Times notes the stress and congestion: Applications by the Dozen, as Anxious Seniors Hedge College Bets

"For members of the class of 2015 who are looking at more competitive colleges, their overtaxed counselors say, 10 applications is now commonplace; 20 is taking on a familiar ring; even 30 is not beyond imagining. And why stop there?
...
"A spokeswoman for Naviance, an online tool that many high school students and their counselors use to keep track of applications, said one current user’s “colleges I’m applying to” tab already included 60 institutions. Last year the record was 86, she said.

"A number of factors have contributed to this rapid escalation.

"One is the growing popularity of the Common Application, a standardized form that more than 500 colleges now honor, making the process of applying to multiple institutions far easier. Another is the tough economy, which drives students to look ever farther afield for a college that can meet their financial aid needs.

"But perhaps the most pressing factor has been plain old fear.

“Every year the story is that college is harder to get into, so kids panic and think they have to apply to more places,” said Jim Jump, academic dean and director of guidance at St. Christopher’s School in Richmond, Va. The resulting surfeit of applications drives acceptance rates down even further, making the next year’s high school seniors even more panicked.
...
"According to the National Association for College Admission Counseling, in 1990 just 9 percent of students applied to seven or more colleges. By 2011, the year of its most recent survey, that group had risen to 29 percent.

"In the class of 2014, according to Naviance, 16.5 percent of seniors using the system said they intended to apply to 11 to 20 colleges. (Naviance did not have figures on how many applications were actually filed.)
...
"But the most compelling reason not to apply to dozens of colleges, counselors say, is that more applications do not necessarily mean better odds. “It’s not like the lottery,” said Michael Carter of St. Stephen’s & St. Agnes School in Alexandria, Va.

"Ms. Sohmer said she had found that when students file 20 or more applications, “they’ve loaded on lots of ultracompetitive schools, so their list becomes disproportionately top-heavy. Or they throw in lots of schools at the end where they’re overqualified.” A far better way to increase one’s chances, she and many others agree, is to come up with a manageable but carefully selected list of schools and get serious about them.
...
"As a result, many colleges have begun emphasizing “demonstrated interest” — tiny but telling indications of how badly students want to attend. “If they’re within a reasonable distance of the campus, did they visit?” asks Patrick O’Connor, associate dean of college counseling at the Cranbrook Kingswood Upper School in Bloomfield Hills, Mich. “Did they attend a college night and fill out a card? Have they contacted a rep to ask some legitimate questions?”

More on unpaid internships and repugnance

Over at the Chronicle, the issue seems clear to journalism student Peter D'Amato: The Unpaid Internship Is Indefensible

And he's not alone, he reproduces this image:


My previous post on Should unpaid internships be repugnant drew some interesting comments...

Dating is so 20th century (and how about marriage?)

Two recent articles on online dating sites both think that internet dating is changing courtship and marriage, by making it too easy to meet people.

The NY Times focuses on dating culture, and suggests that internet communication itself may remove some of the signaling that used to take place when dating was more formal, and the fact that multiple people can be dated contemporaneously may work to reduce investment in each date:  The End of Courtship?


"Traditional courtship — picking up the telephone and asking someone on a date — required courage, strategic planning and a considerable investment of ego (by telephone, rejection stings). Not so with texting, e-mail, Twitter or other forms of “asynchronous communication,” as techies call it. In the context of dating, it removes much of the need for charm; it’s more like dropping a line in the water and hoping for a nibble.

“I’ve seen men put more effort into finding a movie to watch on Netflix Instant than composing a coherent message to ask a woman out,” said Anna Goldfarb, 34, an author and blogger in Moorestown, N.J. A typical, annoying query is the last-minute: “Is anything fun going on tonight?” More annoying still are the men who simply ping, “Hey” or “ ’sup.”

...
"Online dating services, which have gained mainstream acceptance, reinforce the hyper-casual approach by greatly expanding the number of potential dates. Faced with a never-ending stream of singles to choose from, many feel a sense of “FOMO” (fear of missing out), so they opt for a speed-dating approach — cycle through lots of suitors quickly.

"That also means that suitors need to keep dates cheap and casual. A fancy dinner? You’re lucky to get a drink.

“It’s like online job applications, you can target many people simultaneously — it’s like darts on a dart board, eventually one will stick,” said Joshua Sky, 26, a branding coordinator in Manhattan, describing the attitudes of many singles in their 20s. The mass-mailer approach necessitates “cost-cutting, going to bars, meeting for coffee the first time,” he added, “because you only want to invest in a mate you’re going to get more out of.”
...
"THERE’S another reason Web-enabled singles are rendering traditional dates obsolete. If the purpose of the first date was to learn about someone’s background, education, politics and cultural tastes, Google and Facebook have taken care of that."
********************

Meanwhile, in The Atlantic, the concern is that as it becomes easier to meet people, the incentive to work to maintain existing relationships may be diluted: A Million First Dates--How online romance is threatening monogamy

"The positive aspects of online dating are clear: the Internet makes it easier for single people to meet other single people with whom they might be compatible, raising the bar for what they consider a good relationship. But what if online dating makes it too easy to meet someone new? What if it raises the bar for a good relationship too high? What if the prospect of finding an ever-more-compatible mate with the click of a mouse means a future of relationship instability, in which we keep chasing the elusive rabbit around the dating track?"

AEA signaling, and coffee, viewed from Stockholm

At a dinner hosted by the Economics Prize Committee in Stockholm, conversation turned to the signals just transmitted by the American Economic Association, from new Ph.D. economists to potential employers. Each of the Swedish universities represented by those sitting nearest to me, including the Universities of Stockholm and Uppsala, had received signals, and had decided to interview at least one candidate based on having received a signal.

Incidentally, 1,285 candidates sent their two signals to 666 employers this year, and these signals were sent out on Dec 3, and confirmation emails were sent to candidates on Dec 4. If you were one of those candidates, good luck, and please fill out the attached survey.

 Dinner was held in the "Ghost Castle" of the University of Stockholm, which houses two impressive art collections, of paintings, and of glassware.  Here's a picture I like, showing that coffee has long played a role in serious discussions.

Law review submissions: too cheap?

It has always been the custom to submit papers to multiple law reviews, but the new ExpressO system makes it so easy that some journals are no longer accepting papers from it. Dan Filler at the Faculty Lounge write: Is Now the Moment to Re-jigger the Law Review Submission Process?

"As I noted here, the University of Chicago Law Review and California Law Review are no longer accepting submissions from ExpressO.  They now accept articles submitted for five dollars a pop via Scholastica.  The Stanford Law Review and Yale Law Journal only accept pieces submitted through their proprietary submission systems.  The anachronistic law review publication system has always been problematic - both because law students with limited knowledge make the big decisions and because, given multiple submissions and an expedite bid system, those student editors are asked to read vastlymore articles than they are ever going to have a shot at publishing. (Of course the two are related; you could never find enough faculty volunteers to referee one article seventy-five times per submission season.  And efforts to create a referee bank - like this - have had limited success.)

I strongly suspect that the volume generated by the low-cost convenience of ExpressO might literally be breaking this camel's back. If ever there was a time to get journals on board for some sort of rationalization, it might be now.  "

The market for marriage proposals...as signals

Need some background as you drop to one knee? There's a market for that...Shock and Aww!

"She had no idea what this was all leading to until Mr. Centner, who had carefully orchestrated this flash mob, took her hand and led her into the circle of dancers.
...
"When asked why some men make a spectacle of their marriage proposal, W. Bradford Wilcox, the director of the National Marriage Project at the University of Virginia, said: “Over-the-top proposals allow men to signal to a future wife, and to family and friends, that they are all in. They are ready to man up, forgo all others and become a responsible husband.”
...
"Which helps explain why, when it comes to proposing, “they want the wow factor,” said Paula Broussard, founder of Dance Mob Nation, a production company based in Los Angeles that has made a specialty out of staging engagements, like the one for Mr. Centner, and other events. Having the aid of a middleman, so to speak, lowers the pressure of having to create a unique will-you-marry-me moment, she said. “They can still have something beautiful, romantic and fun,” she said, “and they don’t personally have to get up and dance — unless they want to.”

"A flash proposal can start at $2,000 for a simple affair, which involves all supporting players — choreographers, videographers, rehearsal rental space and D.J.’s, but Ms. Broussard said that the costs could vary widely because each event is customized. If the would-be groom wants multiple cameras, professional dancers with complex choreography and costumes, the costs can surpass $10,000."

Signaling in Internet Dating Markets (and welcoming Soo Lee to Harvard)

 Soohyung Lee arrived today at Harvard where she'll spend the coming academic year as a research visitor, on leave from the University of Maryland. (She'll be sitting in Baker Library, come by and join us for coffee some morning and say hello.)

Here's a recent paper that I admire:
Propose with a Rose? Signaling in Internet Dating Markets, (ungated version here)
by Soohyung Lee, Muriel Niederle, Hye-Rim Kim, Woo-Keum Kim
NBER Working Paper No. 17340
August 2011

"Abstract: The large literature on costly signaling and the somewhat scant literature on preference signaling had varying success in showing the effectiveness of signals. We use a field experiment to show that even when everyone can send a signal, signals are free and the only costs are opportunity costs, sending a signal increases the chances of success. In an online dating experiment, participants can attach “virtual roses” to a proposal to signal special interest in another participant. We find that attaching a rose to an offer substantially increases the chance of acceptance. This effect is driven by an increase in the acceptance rate when the offer is made to a participant who is less desirable than the proposer. Furthermore, participants endowed with more roses have more of their offers accepted than their counterparts."

One of the things I like about this paper (aside from the fact that it reports an experiment in market design, that is), is that it also sheds some light on the signaling mechanism for new Ph.D.s on the economics job market.

Congestion in college applications and admissions

The Chronicle of Higher Ed writes about changes in college admissions: Those Tweedy Old Admissions Deans? They're All Business Now

"More applicants doesn't necessari­ly mean better applicants, however. Four years ago, Mr. Allen decided to refine his recruitment strategy to emphasize quality over quan­tity. How? By shrinking the college's prospect pool. Since then, his office has done more to identify and engage students who are genuinely interested in the college.

"That move, coupled with the recession, has shrunk the college's application total. In the 2007-8 cycle, Grinnell received 3,900 applications; for this fall's freshman class, it received 3,000. During that time, however, Grinnell increased its enrollment of minority, low-income, and first-generation students, as well as those from other countries.

"This wouldn't have happened if apps had been skyrocketing, and we didn't know who all these applicants were," Mr. Allen says. "My experience helped me get off the treadmill of thinking that more applications are better. They're still important, but as a crude measure, they're not the most important thing."

"In other words, Mr. Allen had to re-evaluate his relationship with one of the most powerful numbers in his profession. He predicts that in a market­place saturated with messaging, colleges will need to rethink recruitment in the coming years. "The new enrollment manager," he says, "is going to have to take a more-sophisticated approach to pierce through all that stuff, to make an impression on students."

The assignation game: attempting to make an illegal market safe

Scott Cunningham (who studies risky behavior, crime, and illicit labor markets) points me to this story, which illustrates some of the difficulties of running a recommender system for an illegal transaction:  Fairleigh Dickinson professor accused of running prostitution website

"a professor at Fairleigh Dickinson University, was arrested Sunday while sitting in a Starbucks in Albuquerque, N.M., said Lt. William Roseman of the Albuquerque police."
...

"Flory’s website, Southwest Companions, had operated for months before several prostitutes in Albuquerque mentioned the site to police and they began investigating late last year, Roseman said.

"Users were split into three categories, and first-time visitors had to first gain the trust of Flory before gaining any access. Ordinarily this was done, Roseman said, by "sleeping with a prostitute." The prostitute would then report to Flory what sexual acts the two had engaged in, as well as how much money was exchanged.

"After that process, users were designated as "Verified," gaining access to a wider circle of women to choose from, Roseman said. If users became more frequent customers, their status was increased to "Trusted," which gave them access to more women and more portions of the website, including message boards explaining how to avoid the police, Roseman said.

"They had descriptions of my officers, phone numbers they used, videos of an attorney telling them that if you get busted by the police, here’s what you should do," Roseman said. "This was a website designed, managed and run fully for prostitution."

"The site also included message boards where users could rate the prostitutes with stars, including the rating of specific sexual acts, Roseman said.

"Roseman said Flory told police he did not make money off of the website and instead saw it as a hobby, "a safe place for guys to find female prostitutes," Roseman said."
*******

Another news account gives more details on the police operation, which made use of an informant:

"Seemingly aware of possible legal issues, the site notes its content is for "entertainment purposes" only.


"Police, however, contend that Flory knew he was promoting illegal activity. A detective infiltrated the site, gaining a “verified account” through an informant, according to an arrest warrant. Using the screen name “David8,” the warrant said Flory posted “helpful tips” on how to avoid arrest and removed users who he thought had contact with authorities.

"Through a subpoena to Internet domain registration company GoDaddy.com, police learned that Flory used his FDU e-mail account to create the site. A GoDaddy spokesman declined to comment on the case, but issued a statement noting the company "routinely" works with law enforcement. According to the warrant, Flory also used DCF8.org for e-mail on the prostitution site, with the domain matching his initials. "

Report of the economics Job Market Committee in the May AER

The Report of Ad Hoc Committee on the Job Market in the May 2011 AER (pp 744-6) has four sections:

I. Signaling;
"The number of participating job candidates held steady at roughly 1,000 signalers per year. About two-thirds of those in the job market signal each year."
...
"We note that at least a small number of ads in JOE this season solicit signals (e.g., “Candidates will be interviewed at ASSA (Denver) and are encouraged to use AEA signaling”).

II. Scramble;
"Survey results indicate that about half of the employers who register for the scramble initiate an interview as a result of the scramble. It is difficult to count the number of job placements initiated by the scramble. For the 2009–2010 job market, it appears that there were at least 15 job placements facilitated by the scramble."

III. Letters of Reference;
"The Committee is keeping an eye on the proliferation of websites to which letters of reference for new PhDs have to be uploaded, with many universities having their own sites."
...
"The Job Market Committee has considered whether the AEA ought to recommend a short list of application service providers and suggest that departments use one of just a few Internet portals, eschewing the unique url approach that is so costly. However, economics departments may not always be in a position to override their human resources departments, which seek other advantages by having all the jobs offered by their university handled on the same software. In this case it might be useful to press for common interfaces, so that centralized job market services that provide efficiencies to letter writers could upload letters to centralized university-specific services (many of which depend on only a small numberof software providers).

IV. Applications to Ph.D. programs
"There is a related issue not pertaining to the job market that affects a broader group of economics departments than just those that produce PhDs. It is the PhD admission process.
...
"The problem, even more than in the job market, is that the graduate school admission process usually is not under the control of the economics department. Often the platform and application apply to all PhD programs in the graduate school. The process stands in contrast to law schools and medical schools, which have centralized admissions forms and recommendation procedures. It is ironic that electronic processing of graduate school and job applications has increased the time required to apply and write letters in support of applicants."
***********

Here's our original report:
Peter Coles, John Cawley, Phillip B. Levine, Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth, and John J. Siegfried , " The Job Market for New Economists: A Market Design Perspective," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24,4 (Fall) 2010, 187-206.

"Likely letters" of admission and student athletes at Harvard

The Harvard Crimson describes one of the tools that Ivy League athletic coaches use to recruit student athletes. (The Ivy League faces some self-imposed restrictions, such as no athletic scholarships, that put it at a disadvantage compared to other schools when it comes to recruiting student athletes.)

For Some Athletes, An Early Notice
"In mid-October, when ambitious high school seniors are still anxiously toiling away at their Harvard College application, a select few already have received word of their likely acceptance.
...
"Every year, a group of approximately 200 recruited athletes are offered “likely letters” between Oct. 1 and March 15. While these letters technically do not guarantee an applicant admission to the College, admissions experts agree that a student who receives such a letter would only be denied admission in the most extreme circumstances.

“Barring a severe drop in grade, you can expect to get an offer,” said Penny Deck, an independent college counselor in Virginia.

"While the exact timeline for the recruiting process varies by sport, Harvard coaches say that they make their first contact the summer before a prospective athlete’s senior year of high school.

"From there, it is a hurried process where coaches evaluate a potential player in everything from athletic ability to character so that they can determine who they want to join their team.
...
"Beginning on Oct. 1, Harvard and its Ivy League counterparts can begin issuing likely letters to any of their applicants. While these letters are given to students for a variety of reasons, recruited athletes receive the majority early on in this period.

At Harvard and its Ivy peers, these letters are especially important.

Dave Galehouse, co-author of a guide for high school recruits titled “The Making of a Student Athlete”, said that Ivies are at a disadvantage because they do not offer special binding admissions decisions to student athletes.

According to Galehouse, the athletic programs at many other Division I institutions can essentially guarantee a student’s acceptance at their schools. He said he believes likely letters are a way to compensate for that disadvantage.

“It’s challenging for [Ivy League schools] because other schools can give notice earlier than we can,” said Ivy League Executive Director Robin Harris.


Since the elimination of early action*, Harvard has lost another tool to assure athletes—many of whom receive time-sensitive offers from other schools—that Harvard will admit them.

“Now that we don’t have our early action program, it’s very important to have likely letters,” said Harvard women’s volleyball coach Jennifer Weiss. “We’re still competing against schools that [do].”

“People are making decisions early. They can’t hold out a decision from Harvard until April,” said Weiss, the wrestling coach.

The Commitment Question

The Ivy League has minimal rules governing how its member institutions can utilize the likely letter, according to Harris. Still, the rules that exist are clear. While coaches may inquire as to a student’s level of interest, they cannot require a commitment or suggest that the applicant’s admission be contingent upon a commitment, according to the league’s website.

Dean of Admissions and Financial Aid William R. Fitzsimmons ’67 said that Harvard not only follows the rule, but takes the principle one step further.


“We don’t really ask them or inquire [whether they plan on coming]. It’s not an issue,” he said. “To have a likely be binding would be antithetical to our admissions philosophy.”


"Despite acknowledging the Ivy League policy of not requiring a commitment, Galehouse said that coaches do gauge interest levels before submitting their preferences to the admissions office.


“If coaches are going to go to bat for you, they want a pretty strong commitment,” he said of his understanding of the process in the Ivies. “You’re not really supposed to be going after likely letters from multiple schools. Coaches talk.”


"Fitzsimmons acknowledged that few recruited athletes who receive likely letters from Harvard end up attending other institutions.

“A pretty high percentage of the athletes end up coming,” he said, adding that the trend can be attributed to a bond that recruits feel to the coach or the institution, not because Harvard requires any sort of commitment.

“It’s up to them whether they keep their applications in elsewhere,” Fitzsimmons said. “We’ve certainly had athletes who received likelies who end up not coming.”

*but see yesterday's post on the return of early admissions to Harvard