Showing posts with label incentives. Show all posts
Showing posts with label incentives. Show all posts

Saturday, June 26, 2021

Covid and COVAX, lessons being learned for the next pandemic

 From the Lancet:

A beautiful idea: how COVAX has fallen short by Ann Danaiya Usher, June 19, 2021DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(21)01367-2

"At the pledging summit for COVAX on June 2, 2021, hosted by Japan, Gavi finally reached its US$8·3 billion ask for the procurement and delivery of vaccines for the 92 eligible low-income and middle-income countries (LMICs) this year. However, even with full financing, the COVAX roll-out has moved much more slowly than that in high-income countries (HICs). Speaker after speaker at the summit lamented the gross inequity in access to vaccines. “Today, ten countries have administered 75% of all COVID-19 vaccines, but, in poor countries, health workers and people with underlying conditions cannot access them. This is not only manifestly unjust, it is also self-defeating”, UN secretary general António Guterres told the gathering. “COVAX has delivered over 72 million doses to 125 countries. But that is far less than 172 million it should have delivered by now.” Of the 2·1 billion COVID-19 vaccine doses administered worldwide so far, COVAX has been responsible for less than 4%.

...

"COVAX, managed by Gavi, along with the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations and WHO, was designed to stand on two legs: one for HICs, which would pay for their own vaccines, and the other for 92 lower-income countries, whose doses would be financed by donor aid.

"In the so-called self-financing leg of COVAX, HICs were asked to pay upfront by mid-September, 2020, for the option to buy vaccines for their own populations. The UK, for example, paid £71 million for 27 million doses from COVAX, and Canada paid CA$220 million for 15 million doses. Australia, New Zealand, Norway, and South Korea also bought vaccine options from COVAX as self-financing countries.

"In the other leg of COVAX, vaccines for lower-income countries would be financed with donor grants through an Advance Market Commitment (AMC). The poorest of the 92 countries would receive them at no cost. Team Europe (led by Germany) and the USA have together provided US$5 billion to the COVAX AMC, Japan has given US$1 billion, and the UK, US$735 million. Most of these funds have been pledged only in the past few months.

"The grand idea of COVAX was that the combination of these two funding streams—the self-financed part and the aid-financed AMC—would give the facility the means to invest in research and development of several promising vaccine candidates. Additionally, as a pooled procurement mechanism, COVAX would have the financial muscle as a buyer to drive down prices for all participants. Once any of the COVAX portfolio vaccines had successfully undergone clinical trials and proved themselves to be both safe and effective, both self-financing and AMC countries would be allocated vaccines at the same rate, proportional to their total population size.

...

"Everyone knew that rich countries would enter into bilateral vaccine deals, Yamey said. But it was hoped that they would also buy into COVAX as insurance in case some vaccine candidates did not prove successful. Most of them did not. In the end, “three dozen countries bypassed COVAX and made huge deals directly with manufacturers. They were very lucky that the vaccines worked out. And since they cleared the shelves, there were not enough doses left for COVAX”, he said.

...

"The report of the Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response also pointed to the harm caused by the slow mobilisation of resources for COVAX: “Had COVAX had sufficient and readily available early funding it would have been better able to secure enough immediate supply to meet its aims”, it states.

...

"The original notion of a global vaccine hub more or less collapsed, and COVAX ended up using a traditional aid-financed approach, which has left lower-income countries wholly at the mercy of wealthy nations and profit-driven companies.

“It is still this model of seeing how much money you can bring in and then seeing what you can negotiate with industry based on that money”, said Elder. “The promise of COVAX from the beginning that it would be the most attractive buyer for industry because it represented the ‘global need’ obviously did not pan out.” For any future iterations of COVAX, Taylor has argued that since national leaders have a responsibility to protect their own populations, vaccine nationalism is inevitable and this should be integrated into the design from the start.

"Several global health experts point to the failure to recognise supply constraints as a major obstacle to global vaccination and emphasise diversifying and scaling up manufacturing from the beginning. This lack of recognition was a serious flaw in the COVAX design, said Gostin. “Supply shortages should have been anticipated and ramping up supplies should have been baked into the design of COVAX from the start.

Monday, June 14, 2021

Repugnance to high incentives, by Robert Stüber

Here's a paper that seeks to understand why some transactions are permitted when only low incentives are offered, but banned when high incentives are offered. (Donation of human eggs is one example; high payments to participate in experiments is another...)

WHY HIGH INCENTIVES CAUSE REPUGNANCE: A FRAMED FIELD EXPERIMENT* by Robert Stüber

WZB Berlin March 2021

Abstract: A key feature of markets for repugnant transactions is that certain transactions seem to raise moral concerns only when they involve high monetary incentives. Using a framed field experiment with a representative sample, I show that these preferences exist, and I investigate why people display it. Participants can permit or prevent a third party from being financially compensated for registering as a stem cell and bone marrow donor. I find that a substantial fraction of individuals permit a low payment but prevent high monetary incentives. With the help of experimental treatment variation, I show that their preference to prevent high incentive offers is caused by the desire to protect individuals with high reservation prices. Evidence from a survey experiment with ethic committees emphasizes the practical importance of this finding. These results imply that shortages in the supply of controversial goods are unlikely to be solvable by providing higher incentives. 

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Here's a short video presentation of (an early version of) the paper by Dr Stüber.  I understand that he will be moving from the WZP to NYU Abu Dhabi in September.



Friday, March 26, 2021

Ethical payment for research participation

 Discussions of ethical questions turn out to have less math or data than other discussions, but more, well, discussion...  Here's our reply to issues raised in the prior discussion in the preceding issues of the American Journal of Bioethics.

Holly Fernandez Lynch, Thomas C. Darton, Jae Levy, Frank McCormick, Ubaka Ogbogu, Ruth O. Payne, Alvin E. Roth, Akilah Jefferson Shah, Thomas Smiley & Emily A. Largent (2021) Plumbing the Depths of Ethical Payment for Research Participation, The American Journal of Bioethics, DOI: 10.1080/15265161.2021.1895364

"In closing, we’ll respond to Savulescu’s lamentation that our article did not offer “a full economic evaluation of a proposed HIC study such as the UK, with a proposal for a specific amount” (2021). Although we understand this criticism, and considered it ourselves, we were hesitant to make this final move, as there are several different amounts and rationales that could be ethically justified under our framework. Nonetheless, analyzing a particular protocol and the range of payment offers that might be justifiable would be a compelling next step."

Monday, March 1, 2021

Compensating challenge vaccine trial participants: further discussion in the American Journal of Bioethics

 The AJB invites commentaries on its target articles, and the comments on our article on payments in human infection challenge trials have now appeared.  (If I've done this right, you can read them by clicking on the links below.) This is from The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 21, Issue 3 (2021)

Our target article points out that while much of the medical ethics literature focuses on the claim that payments can subject potential participants, particularly poor people, to undue influence or coercion by being too large, there can be a countervailing concern that payments that are too small can be exploitative, and that this might often be the greater ethical concern.

The commentaries are all brief, but there are nine of them, so let me recommend to my regular market design readers that two that might be rewarding to begin with are those by Julian Savulescu, and by Seán O’Neill McPartlin & Josh Morrison.

Target Article
Open Peer Commentaries
Article commentary
Pages: 32-34
Published online: 22 Feb 2021
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Article commentary
Pages: 35-37
Published online: 22 Feb 2021
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Article commentary
Pages: 43-45
Published online: 22 Feb 2021
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Article commentary
Pages: 45-47
Published online: 22 Feb 2021
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Previous post:

Sunday, January 31, 2021

Paying employees to be vaccinated against Covid. (Is that repugnant? Could it be illegal??)

 Apparently paying workers to get vaccinated (even giving them paid time off to get vaccinated) may face some legal complications.

The Washington Post has the story:

Why grocery chains are paying workers to get vaccinated, but other industries are lagging   by By Jena McGregor and Taylor Telford

"A number of leading grocery chains are offering small cash bonuses and other incentives to encourage employees to get the coronavirus vaccine, in an effort that experts say could help speed protection of some of the country’s most vulnerable workers: low-paid, hourly retail workers.

"Dollar General, Trader Joe’s, Aldi and Lidl, as well as Instacart, have announced plans to promote the vaccine among employees, including flexible work schedules, paid time off to visit a vaccination site and bonuses of up to $200.

"The restaurant industry may also be moving toward incentives. On Tuesday, Darden Restaurants, which employs more than 175,000 workers across Olive Garden, LongHorn Steakhouse and many more brands, said it would offer up to four hours of paid time off to get the vaccine.

"However, few other companies have followed suit, potentially in part because of legal uncertainties involved with health screening questionnaires leading up to vaccination.

...

"Some lawyers believe companies will be able to successfully argue that the required screening questions for the coronavirus vaccine meet the standard of being needed for the business. 

...

"But others say the screening questions could complicate things if they’re seen as being part of a “voluntary wellness program,” which may limit the incentives companies can offer. If the employer contracts with an outside firm to vaccinate employees or has its own staff inoculate workers, new proposed rules from the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which says incentives can only be “de minimus” in size, might apply. The proposed rules give examples like a water bottle or gift card of “modest value.”

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Update: here's a related story from the Financial Times, focusing on the fact that there may be a shortage of vaccinated employees for some time:

Should Covid vaccines be mandatory at work? A few companies have introduced ‘no jab, no job’ policies, but it is unclear if such steps are lawful by Pilita Clark and Emma Jacobs


Sunday, January 10, 2021

Partial strategyproofness: Relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem by Mennle and Seuken in JET

 Most market mechanisms that we encounter in practice aren't strategy proof, and many markets don't admit any strategyproof mechanisms, so we need to have a language to talk about how strategyproof a mechanism is or isn't.  There are a number of approaches to that, and here's a new one.

Partial strategyproofness: Relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem

Timo Mennle  and Sven Seuken, Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 191, January 2021


Abstract: We present partial strategyproofness, a new, relaxed notion of strategyproofness for studying the incentive properties of non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms. Informally, a mechanism is partially strategyproof if it makes truthful reporting a dominant strategy for those agents whose preference intensities differ sufficiently between any two objects. We demonstrate that partial strategyproofness is axiomatically motivated and yields a parametric measure for “how strategyproof” an assignment mechanism is. We apply this new concept to derive novel insights about the incentive properties of the probabilistic serial mechanism and different variants of the Boston mechanism.

Friday, October 2, 2020

Trading truthfulness for efficiency in the Israeli medical internship market, by Ariel Rosenfeld and Avinatan Hassidim


Too smart for their own good: Trading truthfulness for efficiency in the Israeli medical internship market, by Ariel Rosenfeld and Avinatan Hassidim, Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 15, No. 5, September 2020

Abstract: The two most fundamental notions in mechanism design are truthfulness and efficiency. In many market settings, such as the classic one-sided matching/assignment setting, these two properties partially conflict, creating a trade-off which is rarely examined in the real-world. In this article, we investigate this trade-off through the high-stakes Israeli medical internship market. This market used to employ a standard truthful yet sub-optimal mechanism and it has recently transitioned to an “almost” truthful, more efficient mechanism. Through this in-the-field study, spanning over two years, we study the interns’ behavior using both official data and targeted surveys. We first identify that substantial strategic behaviors are exercised by the participants, virtually eliminating any efficiency gains from the transition. In order to mitigate the above, we performed an intervention in which conclusive evidence was provided showing that, for most of the interns, reporting truthfully was much better than what they actually did. Unfortunately, a re-examination of the market reveals that our intervention had only minor effects. These results combine to question the practical benefits of “almost” truthfulness in real-world market settings and shed new light on the typical truthfulness-efficiency trade-off."


Here's their description of the prior, inefficient random serial dictatorship rule:

"For about two and a half decades, until 2014, each intern was asked to submit her ranking of the hospitals relevant for her graduation class, and the assignment itself was decided by the RSD mechanism (with a few minor house rules aimed at providing special treatment for special intern groups such as PhD students and parents of young children), which has come to be known as the Internship Lottery. Up until a few years ago when the system was finally computerized, interns physically gathered in a large auditorium and ID numbers were drawn out of a hat. The RSDT mechanism has been deployed since 2014 in an attempt to increase efficiency (Bronfman et al., 2015) (see (Roth & Shorrer, 2015) for a review and discussion on the transition choice)."

And here (out of the sequence in the paper) is a quick description of the new, efficient mechanism.

"To mitigate the fact that the probability vectors induced by the RSD mechanism may be far from optimal, the RSDT mechanism was proposed: First, after each intern submits a ranked list of hospitals, a large number of RSD simulations is performed to approximate the true probability vector for each intern. Then, using a fitted utility function over probability vectors (learned through structured surveys), probabilities are automatically traded between the interns though a Linear Program (LP) which optimizes social welfare. The LP guarantees that each intern’s expected utility (given the utility function) is no-worse than what she had before the trade."

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Related post:

Thursday, March 26, 2015

Friday, August 14, 2020

Should residency program rank order lists be kept confidential from the Dean?

Here's the report of a survey of residency program directors in radiology. One issue, not confined to radiology, is the confidentiality of their rank order list for the resident match--confidentiality from their own administrative hierarchy.  The problem with having to show your rank order list to your dean is that it interferes with program directors' incentives to rank candidates in order of true preferences:   Thirty-seven percent felt pressure to match applicants from the top of the rank list in order to improve the perceived “success” in the match."  That is, some of these programs are refraining from ranking the most desirable applicants they interviewed because they worry these people will match to other programs.  This will make their program look bad to the dean (who will ask "how come you have to go so far down on your list?")

“What Program Directors Think” V: Results of the 2019 Spring Survey of the Association of Program Directors in Radiology (APDR) Academic Radiology,  8 August 2020, In Press, Corrected Proof

by Anna Rozenshtein MD, MPH1 Brent D. Griffith MD2 Priscilla J.Slanetz MD, MPH3 Carolynn M.DeBenedectis MD4 Jennifer E.Gould MD Jennifer R.Kohr MD6 Tan-Lucien Mohammed MD, MS7Angelisa M.PaladinMD8Paul J.Rochon MD9 Monica Sheth MD10Ernest F.Wiggins III MD11 Jonathan O.Swanson MD12   Academic Radiology Available online 8 August 2020, In Press, Corrected Proof 

"The Association of Program Directors in Radiology (APDR) surveys its membership annually on hot topics and new developments in radiology residency training. Here we report the results of that annual survey.

...

"Radiology Residency Match: Forty-nine percent of respondents reported that the final rank list is known only to the program administration (PD/APD) and the selection committee, while 27% disclosed the rank list to the department administration and 24% to the institution. Thirty-seven percent felt pressure to match applicants from the top of the rank list in order to improve the perceived “success” in the match."

Saturday, July 4, 2020

Stanford GSB highlights Akbarpour and van Dijk on the virtues of strategy-proof school choice


Here's an article on the Stanford GSB website, describing a paper by Mohammad Akbarpour and Winnie van Dijk:

How School Choice Systems Create Unfair Advantages
Lotteries for public school admissions unintentionally favor students who have the option to attend private institutions, a new study shows.
June 26, 2020|by Maggie Overfelt

And here's the paper that the article highlights:
School Choice with Unequal Outside Options
September 2018 Working Paper No. 3764
Students with identical valuations for public schools but unequal outside options have different opportunity costs of revealing their preferences. Consequently, manipulable mechanisms need not resolve conflicting preferences in a Pareto-improving manner. We show that when they do not, welfare improvements for students with outside options come at the expense of students without outside options. This result strengthens the argument that strategyproof mechanisms “level the playing field.” Our model predicts that students without outside options are more likely to strategize, consistent with recent findings in empirical studies of education markets.

Saturday, June 27, 2020

Strategy proofness in auctions, beyond the frontiers of our most reliable knowledge

A lot of market design goes on beyond the frontiers for which we have robust general theorems. Computational methods are important in these cases (and sometimes the theory follows along eventually).   Here's a recent auction paper on archiv.org that sheds some light on strategy proofness.

Certifying Strategyproof Auction Networks
Michael J. Curry∗ Ping-Yeh Chiang∗ Tom Goldstein and  John P. Dickerson
 
Abstract: Optimal auctions maximize a seller’s expected revenue subject to individual rationality and strategyproofness for the buyers. Myerson’s seminal work in 1981 settled the case of auctioning a single item; however, subsequent decades of work have yielded little progress moving beyond a single item, leaving the design of revenue-maximizing auctions as a central open problem in the field of mechanism design. A recent thread of work in “differentiable economics” has used tools from modern deep learning to instead learn good mechanisms. We focus on the RegretNet architecture, which can represent auctions with arbitrary numbers of items and participants; it is trained to be empirically strategyproof, but the property is never exactly verified leaving potential loopholes for market participants to exploit. We propose ways to explicitly verify strategyproofness under a particular valuation profile using techniques from the neural network verification literature. Doing so requires making several modifications to the RegretNet architecture in order to represent it exactly in an integer program. We train our network and produce certificates in several settings, including settings for which the optimal strategyproof mechanism is not known

Tuesday, May 26, 2020

Incentive compatibility is not enough: evidence from the Israeli matching market for psychologists, by Hassidim, Romm and Shorrer

While it has taken some time for this paper to be published, I think it was the first to discover that some applicants in a labor market clearinghouse organized as an applicant proposing deferred acceptance algorithm were systematically misrepresenting their preferences, perhaps out of confusion. (This has since been observed in other markets as well.)  Their data are from the Israeli match for psychology graduate programs, which the authors also designed and organized.

Online early in Management Science:

The Limits of Incentives in Economic Matching Procedures
Avinatan Hassidim, Assaf Romm, Ran I. Shorrer
Published Online:13 May 2020
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3591

Abstract: Organizations often require agents’ private information to achieve critical goals such as efficiency or revenue maximization, but frequently it is not in the agents’ best interest to reveal this information. Strategy-proof mechanisms give agents incentives to truthfully report their private information. In the context of matching markets, they eliminate agents’ incentives to misrepresent their preferences. We present direct field evidence of preference misrepresentation under the strategy-proof deferred acceptance in a high-stakes matching environment. We show that applicants to graduate programs in psychology in Israel often report that they prefer to avoid receiving funding, even though the mechanism preserves privacy and funding comes with no strings attached and constitutes a positive signal of ability. Surveys indicate that other kinds of preference misrepresentation are also prevalent. Preference misrepresentation in the field is associated with weaker applicants. Our findings have important implications for practitioners designing matching procedures and for researchers who study them.

Thursday, April 23, 2020

Gaming organ allocation: Heart failure treatment responds to changes in the priority rules for heart transplants

Recent changes in the allocation of deceased donor hearts for transplantation have focused on what kinds of mechanical interventions a patient has.  And as choice of alternative interventions has changed priorities for donation, cardiologists have responded by changing the interventions they choose.

Several articles in JAMA Cardiology speak to this and related matters, and here's an editorial describing the issue:

Anticipating a New Era in Heart Transplantation
Clyde W. Yancy, MD, MSc1,2; Gregg C. Fonarow, MD3,4
JAMA Cardiol. Published online April 15, 2020. doi:10.1001/jamacardio.2020.0611

The first paragraph gives this capsule history:

"The 50th anniversary of heart transplantation was celebrated in 2018. During those 50 years, heart transplantation as treatment of advanced heart failure evolved from a heroic intervention with uncertain outcomes to a guideline-directed treatment appropriate for selected patients to restore quality of life and to improve survival. Today, 1-year survival after heart transplant is nearly 90%, and the conditional half-life after heart transplant is now 13 years.1 Those robust outcomes reflect myriad breakthrough initiatives, including the definition of brain death; introduction of routine endomyocardial biopsy for rejection surveillance, development of potent immunosuppressive therapies, particularly those inhibiting calcineurin and in turn interleukin 2 production, and advances in therapies to support the failing ventricle, especially mechanical circulatory support devices. For more than 2 decades, the number of heart transplants performed in the United States has been approximately 2000 per year and, having recently increased, was 3551 in 2019.2 Taken together, the observed early and late benefits of heart transplant punctuate an incredible journey from heretical concept to clinical standard of care. The courageous pioneer physicians and especially the early patients who faced overwhelming risks are revered for establishing a foundational pillar in the care of patients with advanced heart failure. It is reasonable to assert that after 50 years, heart transplantation is a well-established success poised for the next era."

They then turn their attention to ways in which cardiologists have responded to changes in the deceased donor allocation system:

"Three articles in this issue of JAMA Cardiology further address new challenges in the process of care improvement for heart transplantation, some of which we think may require urgent attention.

"The first of these articles, by Hanff and colleagues,7 evaluated changes in the use of mechanical circulatory support under the auspices of new organ allocation rules introduced in October 2018 by the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network. The new system was intended to redirect available donors to those patients of greatest need. The original status IA category was partitioned into 3 categories, and the original status IB category became category 4. A patient with advanced heart failure supported with a left ventricular assist device (LVAD) without LVAD-associated complications became a status 4 candidate. A similar patient with advanced heart failure experiencing manageable LVAD-associated complications became a status 3. Status 2 now captures those patients with LVAD device malfunction who may be facing eminent demise or need for LVAD replacement, whereas status 1 captures patients with life-threatening arrhythmias or patients being supported with venoarterial extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (VA-ECMO). Evaluating data through June 2019, Hanff and colleagues7 noted an abrupt increase in the use of VA-ECMO support that was temporally associated with implementation of the new system. Concomitantly, LVAD support for advanced heart failure in patients awaiting heart transplant abruptly decreased from 35.1% before implementation of the new rules to 24.5% after their implementation."

Finally, they also consider center variability to understand what happens to patients when a proffered heart transplant is declined:

"In another article in this issue of JAMA Cardiology, Choi et al10 evaluated data in the US National Transplant Registry between 2007 and 2017 with the intention to assess transplant center variability in donor organ acceptance. The evaluable data emanated from 93 transplant centers and encompassed 19 703 donors and 9628 candidates, with 32% of the donors accepted as first-ranked candidates. After adjustment for pertinent donor, candidate, and geographic covariates, the center variability in acceptance rates was quite remarkable at 12% to 62%. For every 10% increase in center acceptance rate, waiting-list mortality decreased by 27%. Those centers with lower acceptance rates experienced higher waiting-list mortality among candidates listed for a heart transplant..."