Here's the Faculty FAQ:
Course
Match FAQ for Faculty
How
it works
With
Course Match students express their relative preferences across sections. Each
student is endowed with a set of course tokens which are used to purchase
seats. Second year students are given more tokens than first year
students, and first year students are given more tokens the more fixed core
courses they waive. Students must submit their preferences by August 14th.
Then Course Match establishes a clearing price for each section such that (a)
every student gets the best schedule they can afford and (b) course capacity
constraints are satisfied. A Drop/Add period begins shortly before
classes start to allow students to make final adjustments to their schedule.
How
many students will be enrolled in my class?
Each
section has a target capacity, T, and is assigned in a room that has a
legal limit of C seats, where clearly T <= C.
Typical values for T are 36, 60 and 78. Course Match attempts to assign
no more than T students to a section. However, the maximum number
that will be enrolled is min{1.1 T, C}. We refer to this as the
“10% rule” – if the room allows it, we will allow up to 10% more students above
the target capacity in order to optimize the solution if necessary. For
example, if T = 60, but the section is assigned to a room that legally
can seat as many as 78 students, then Course Match may assign as many as 1.1 x
60 = 66 students. However, if the section is assigned to a room that
seats 60, then no more than 60 students will be enrolled. Note, the target
capacity remains the target – Course Match attempts to adhere to the target.
For example, if T = 60, Course Match views a solution with 60 students
as preferred over a solution with 64 students (and 64 would be considered only
if it is legal). But as Course Match utilizes a complex integer programming
optimization engine, the quality of the overall solution improves considerably
by allowing 10% leeway.
Does
the 10% rule apply to every section?
Yes.
When
will I be able to see my course enrollment?
On
August 21 fall semester enrollments will be available to students and faculty.
How
will drop/add work?
Students
submit requests to drop or add sections. Students must always have a feasible
section. Therefore, if they add a section that conflicts with a section they
already own (e.g., the two sections are the same course or they meet at the
same time), then the added section is retained and the other section is
automatically dropped from the student’s schedule. First-come first-served
waitlists are maintained for every section, and students are removed from the
waitlist whenever a seat becomes available. “Chain reactions” of drops
and adds are possible. For example, if a student adds course A, which triggers
that student to drop course B, then the first student on course B’s waitlist is
automatically added to the course, which may cause that student to drop a
course (because of a conflict). The series of adds and drops continues as far
as it progresses to maximize the number of trades and to remove as many
students from waitlists as possible.
When
will the Add period start and end?
The
add period starts shortly before classes begin and continues to September 9th
– the Add period ends once every section has met at least once. Students will
not be able to add Q1 and semester courses after September 9th.
Can
students add my class after the add period ends?
Yes,
but after the add deadline, students may add a course only with written
permission from the instructor.
Will
the course waitlist be maintained after the add period?
No.
At the end of the add period, waitlists are deleted.
If
my enrollment is greater than my target, T, will students be added to the
class?
No.
If, due to the 10% rule, enrollment slightly exceeds T, students will be
added to the class only when enrollment falls below T.
The academic papers on which this work is based, so far, are here (from Eric Budish's site, so when there's no author listed, it's just Eric):
- The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes
Published: Journal of Political Economy Vol. 119(6), Dec 2011, pp 1061-1103
2010 Working Paper Version
Data Appendix - The Multi-Unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard
(with Estelle Cantillon)
Published: American Economic Review Vol 102(5), Aug 2012, pp 2237-71.
Data Appendix - Finding Approximate Competitive Equilibria: Efficient and Fair Course Allocation
(with Abe Othman and Tuomas Sandholm)
Published: Proc. of 9th Int. Conf. on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2010)
1 comment:
Kidney exchanges will be covered in an online course starting in two weeks:
https://www.coursera.org/course/optimization
http://youtu.be/2IbJf4oXOxU?t=10m14s
Post a Comment