The job market for economists, 2026

 The WSJ has the story:

Economists Are Studying the Slowing Job Market—and Feeling It Themselves
Newly minted Ph.D.s tend to work for universities, government agencies and big white-collar companies. It’s not a great hiring time for any of them.  By  Justin Lahart 

"The economics job market is getting buffeted by a confluence of forces. Worries about federal funding have led many major universities to reduce, or even freeze, hiring. Jobs within the federal government have dried up. The private sector, where demand for economists has been intense in recent years, has pulled back. 

“It’s like a perfect storm,” said Syracuse University economist John Cawley, who heads the American Economic Association’s job market committee.

"The tough market for doctoral students finishing up their studies is hardly unique to economics. What’s different about economists is that they are intensely interested in measuring and understanding how labor markets work—and they have brought that to bear on their own profession. As a result, armed with data from the AEA and all the knowledge they gained in graduate school, doctoral students in economics have a much more precise grasp of what type of environment they are facing than their counterparts in political science, philosophy or biophysics.

...

"The economics job market has its own peculiar rhythms and hierarchies. In the fall, students who are finishing their Ph.D.s, as well as economists in postdoctoral programs, apply for jobs that typically start the following summer. But because students can apply to dozens, or even hundreds, of jobs, this creates a matching problem: How does a prospective employer know which candidates are serious?

"Economists, being economists, have tried to solve this. When a candidate applies for jobs via JOE, they are able to send up to two “signals” of interest for jobs they are particularly interested in—almost like a winking emoji on a dating app. That signaling system was put together with the help of Stanford economist Alvin Roth, who also developed systems for matching kidney donors with patients and New York City schoolchildren with schools." 

Congestion and signaling in the job market, as the ratio of applications to positions continues to rise

 Aki Ito, at Business Insider, writes about how the number of job applications per position is growing, and how there's some exploratory use of signaling of interest through job sites that allow a small number of such signals.

How tech broke the job market
Applying to a job in 2025 is the statistical equivalent of hurling your resume into a black hole. By Aki Ito

"To see how bad it's gotten, I asked Greenhouse, one of the leading providers of hiring software, to take a look at their data. Last quarter, the average job opening received 242 applications — nearly triple the amount in 2017, when the unemployment rate was at a comparable level.

 

"Nobody's happy with the current situation," says Greenhouse CEO Daniel Chait. "Something broke in the technology." 

"This isn't the first time a market's grown so overcrowded it stopped functioning. Economists even have a name for it: congestion. Big markets hold the promise of creating better matches, but they also tend to devolve into total chaos.

"Congestion is the bane of a lot of markets," says Alvin Roth, a Nobel Prize-winning economist at Stanford who's helped design programs to better match students with schools, organ donors with patients, and hospitals with new doctors. "Successful marketplaces have to fight hard to defeat congestion."

...

"The forces that make it cheap to send more applications are working faster than the forces that allow you to quickly process many applications," says Roth. "We're deep into congestion."

...

[There is] "a new website where candidates can manage their applications to Greenhouse's clients. There, it introduced a feature called Dream Job, which lets people mark one application a month as a job they especially want. The idea is that recruiters don't just want qualified applicants. They want to know — amid the sea of people applying with a single click — who's actually serious enough that they'd likely accept an offer.

"Online daters might recognize the concept as the "rose" on Hinge or the "super like" on Tinder — gestures borrowed from a landmark study in market design. Dream Job launched in June, and the early data is promising: Employers have been five times more likely to hire Dream Job applicants than standard ones.

"Other intermediaries of the job market are trying their own fixes. LinkedIn, for instance, introduced its own "rose," called Top Choice, to its premium members (Top Choice candidates, the platform says, are 43% more likely to get a recruiter message). It also shows people whether they're a high, medium, or low match for the roles they view ("try exploring other jobs," it gently advises low-match candidates). And this year it's been testing daily limits on Easy Apply submissions."
 

Job market advice for new Ph.D. economists, from John Cawley

 From applying for jobs, to signaling for interviews,  through interviews, flyouts, offers and the scramble, John Cawley, the chair of the American Economic Association's Committee on the Job Market has measured advice in this video.  If you're on the market this year, do yourself a favor (pour a stiff drink) and listen, not just to the beginning discussion of disruptions in demand thisyear, but to the whole thing.

    
2025 Webinar on the Economics PhD Job Market 

Signaling to decongest job applications and interviews: update on the market for medical residents

 Signaling for interviews is evolving in the market for new doctors, i.e. for medical residencies.  Some specialties are allowing a relatively small number of signals (as in Economics), while others are moving towards many signals, which are functioning as soft caps on the number of applications, since many residency programs in those specialties won't give an interview to someone who doesn't signal them.

Ozair, A., Hanson, J. T., Detchou, D. K., Blackwell, M. P., Jenkins, A., Tissot, M. I., Barrie, U., & McDermott, M.  W. (2024). Program Signaling and Geographic Preferences in the United States Residency Match for Neurosurgery. Cureus, 16(9), e69780. https://doi.org/10.7759/cureus.69780