Kevin Sontheimer (1938-2025)

 My old friend and colleague Kevin Sontheimer has died.  He was a great leader of Pitt’s economics department when I was there, not just while he was the department chair, but also before and after that too.

Here's his obit at Pitt:

Sontheimer transformed Pitt economics programs here and abroad
 

"Kevin Sontheimer, a 27-year faculty member who, as chairman, transformed the Department of Economics in the Dietrich School of Arts & Sciences and was instrumental in the founding of two pioneering international economics and management programs, died Feb. 3, 2025, at 86.

"His tenure as economics chair lasted through most of the 1980s. One of his early hires was future Nobel Prize-winning economist Alvin Roth as the first Mellon professorship at Pitt. “Kevin played a giant role in my decision to join the department in 1982,” Roth recalled. “He convinced me that, although the department had previously been somewhat under-resourced, it was a healthy department where it would be fun to work, with colleagues who would work together.

“And he was certainly right about that,” Roth continued. “During the time he was chair, we received permission to recruit fairly heavily, and successfully grew the department into a leading research department as well as a fine teaching department. I did some of the best work of my career at Pitt (1982-1998).

“One of the many things that Kevin did as chair was obtain a grant that allowed us to become one of the early economics departments to have an experimental laboratory. He built the department in other ways as well.”

"That included securing a Mellon Foundation grant to found, together with Jan Svenjar and Josef Zieleniec, the Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education (CERGE) at Charles University in Prague in 1991 (which became CERGE-EI in 1992, merging with the Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences). He was also an instrumental part of the team from his department and the Katz Graduate School of Business to receive USAID grants to work with Academia Istropolitana Nova and other institutions in Bratislava, Slovakia, to set up their economics program as well as the program at Comenius University in Bratislava.

“Kevin was instrumental … a very, very important player in both of these efforts,” said Andrew R. Blair, professor emeritus of business administration and of economics at Katz and the College of Business Administration, and a close colleague of Sontheimer. “Kevin’s role in the Czech Republic and, most especially, the Slovakia relationships was absolutely vital to the success of these Pitt ventures in Central Europe, which were aimed at incorporating free markets in these countries after decades of operating under Soviet domination,” he added.

"While Sontheimer was economics chair, Blair was director of Katz’s International Business Center, and their cooperation was crucial in such efforts. Blair explained that Sontheimer in particular was “the driving force” behind the latter international program, “with Kevin serving both as co-director of the USAID grant implementation and also as resident director in Bratislava of the economics portion of the Comenius relationship. The idea was to train people who were already faculty members at these institutions, to teach with them over there, and to bring them over here” to Pittsburgh: “Without the grant we couldn’t possibly have done that.

“It was a pleasure to work with Kevin.”

"Kevin Charles Sontheimer was born on March 6, 1938, in Pittsburgh, earning his bachelor's degree in physics at Pitt in 1960, a master's degree in economics from Penn State University in 1963 and a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Minnesota in 1969.

"He began his academic career on the faculties of Virginia Tech and SUNY–Buffalo, then joined Pitt in 1978 until his retirement as professor emeritus in 2006. He was economics department chair for eight years.

"His own research focus was on microeconomic theory, which led to publications in Econometrica, Journal of Economic Theory and Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, as well as other leading academic publications in his field. He was also a visiting professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif., and at the University of Mannheim in Germany.

"He is survived by his wife of nearly 65 years, Carol Sontheimer; daughter Leigh Ellen Sontheimer; son Erik Sontheimer and daughter-in-law Catherine Brekus; son Steven Sontheimer and daughter-in-law Morgan Triplett; grandchildren Claire, Rachel and Tanner Sontheimer; brother Adrian (“Dink”) Sontheimer and sister Sue Wilmot.

"A gathering to celebrate Sontheimer’s life will be held at a later date. Memorial gifts are suggested to the Alzheimer's Association or the Department of Economics at Pitt. "

Summer School in Experimental and Behavioral Economic, University of Crete, July 2025

 Here's an announcement of a summer school in experimental economics this summer in Crete

We are delighted to announce the 2nd Summer School in Experimental and Behavioral Economics for PhD and MSc students, which will take place at the Department of Economics, University of Crete, Rethymno, Greece, from July 7 to July 11, 2025. The School will feature lectures by leading faculty in Experimental and Behavioral Economics. Further, students can present their work in poster sessions and participate in our novel Bring your Experiment! sessions.

We are privileged that our speakers this year are:

Ariel Rubinstein, Tel Aviv University & New York University

Charles Holt, University of Virginia

Simon Gaechter, University of Nottingham

Roberto A. Weber, University of Zurich

John Duffy, University of California, Irvine

Nikos Georgantzis, Burgundy Business School

The topics of the lectures include Experimental Markets, Individual Decision Making, Experimental Games, Macroeconomic Experiments, Experimental Asset Pricing, Auctions, Organizational Behavior.

Bring your Experiment!

This year we have the novelty of offering special sessions with the title "Bring Your Experiment!" where experienced Lab Managers Jose Vicente Guinot Saporta (University of Nottingham) and Andonis Proestakis (Technical University of Crete), with the support of Lab Technician Dimitris Georgantzis Garcia (University of Sheffield), will answer questions on issues related to the implementation of students' experimental designs, protocols and/or programs. Ρilot sessions with small size groups will be also performed when necessary.

Free accommodation
We offer free accommodation for all students at the Student Dorms of the University of Crete.

Application procedure: see https://ebe.soc.uoc.gr/

Application deadline: March 1

Organizing Committee
Nikos Georgantzis, Burgundy Business School
Panagiotis Skartados, University of Crete
Giorgos Stamatopoulos, University of Crete

 

Informed consent and compensation for clinical trial participants (Ambuehl, Ockenfels and Stewart in REStat)

 Here's the latest in a series of papers that suggests that participants who are attracted to e.g. clinical trials by the pay may be those who have the most trouble evaluating the costs and risks. So high pay should be paired with robust procedures for informed consent.

Ambuehl, Sandro, Axel Ockenfels, and Colin Stewart. "Who opts in? Composition effects and disappointment from participation payments." Review of Economics and Statistics 107, no. 1 (2025): 78-94.

Abstract: "Participation payments are used in many transactions about which people know little but can learn more: incentives for medical trial participation, signing bonuses for job applicants, or price rebates on consumer durables. Who opts into the transaction when given such incentives? We theoretically and experimentally identify a composition effect whereby incentives disproportionately increase participation among those for whom learning is harder. Moreover, these individuals use less information to decide whether to participate, which makes disappointment more likely. The learning-based composition effect is stronger in settings in which information acquisition is more difficult. 

"we contribute to the burgeoning literature on the moral constraints on markets (Kahneman et al., 1986; Roth, 2007; Ambuehl et al., 2015; Ambuehl, 2022; Elias et al., 2019). Around the world, the principles of informed consent are fundamental to regulations concerning human research participation, as well as to transactions such as human egg donation, organ donation, and gestational surrogacy (DHEW 1978, The Belmont Report, 1978; Faden & Beauchamp, 1986). According to these principles, the decision to participate in a transaction is ethically sound if it is made not only voluntarily but also in light of all relevant information, properly comprehended.3 Our results show that payments for participation can be in conflict with participants’ understanding about the consequences of participation. They further show that the severity of this conflict grows with respect to both the amount of the payment and the difficulty of acquiring and processing information about the consequences of the transaction."

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Earlier:

Wednesday, September 4, 2024 Incentives matter for getting participation in clinical trials by low income households

 

Sunday, March 10, 2024 Does high pay equal "undue inducement"? An experiment by Sandro Ambuehl

 

 

Journal of Comments and Replications in Economics invites papers from Ph.D. students

I recently received this email, inviting papers from PhD students:

"I am writing you as Editor of the Journal of Comments and Replications in Economics (JCRE). JCRE is an online journal published by the German National Library of Economics (ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics). It is an open access journal with no article processing charges. Our Advisory Board includes David Autor, Anna Dreber, Richard Easterlin, Edward Leamer, David Roodman, and Jeffrey Wooldridge.

We are recruiting replication submissions from PhD students at top universities. With the end of the semester upon us, I am asking if you might be aware of any students who have done replications, either in your course or in the courses of your colleagues. If so, the Christmas break could be a great time to encourage them to prepare their replication research for submission to a journal.

We believe JCRE could be an attractive outlet for graduate students’ replication research. Our quick turnaround time and online publishing model provides an opportunity to achieve a peer-reviewed journal publication quickly. Perhaps in time for next year’s job market.

The philosophy of JCRE is that replications are essential to assess the reliability of economics research. While some top journals publish replications, it is still difficult for most replications to get published in a peer-reviewed journal. JCRE provides a home for these studies.

We are asking your help to circulate this opportunity to any students or colleagues who might be interested. The attached flyer may be helpful in this regard

Thank you for your help. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact the journal at jcre@zbw-online.eu."

If I don't do it someone else will: markets and morals

 Here's a paper reporting an experiment that suggests that people are more willing to ignore the negative externalities they impose on others in a market in which they have little effect on quantities consumed. (They interpret this as being a moral question, hence the title.)

Ziegler, Andreas GB, Giorgia Romagnoli, and Theo Offerman. "Morals in multi-unit markets." Journal of the European Economic Association, Volume 22, Issue 5, October 2024, Pages 2225–2260, https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvae001

"Abstract: We examine how the erosion of morals, norms, and norm compliance in markets depends on the market power of individual traders. Previously studied markets allow traders to exchange at most one unit and provide market power to individual traders by de-activating two forces: (i) the replacement logic, whereby immoral trading is justified by the belief that others would trade otherwise and (ii) market selection, by which the least moral trader determines aggregate quantities. In an experiment, we compare single-unit to (more common) multi-unit markets, which may activate these forces. Multi-unit markets, in contrast to single-unit markets, lead to a complete erosion of morals. This is associated primarily with a deterioration in norm compliance: the observed level of immoral trade is in contrast with the prevailing social norm. The replacement logic is the main mechanism driving this finding.

HT: Stephanie Wang

Income inequality, risk, and repugnance by Hauge, Kverndokk, and Lange

Two recent papers by  Karen Hauge, Snorre Kverndokk, and Andreas Lange report on the roles played by inequality and risk in causing repugnance to markets.

First, an experiment, motivated by a hypothetical market in kidneys (expressed in abstract terms), that finds that income inequality boosts repugnance to trade.

Hauge, Karen E., Snorre Kverndokk, and Andreas Lange. "Opposition to markets: Experimental evidence." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 227 (2024): 106743.

Abstract: We experimentally investigate reasons for opposing market institutions. The experiment shows that opposition to implementing market institutions varies by background characteristics and shows that distributional concerns are a reason for opposing trade institutions. We find no evidence that the opposition to trade is due to risk preferences or paternalistic motives. A main driver of the opposition to trade is the information about background conditions: veils of uncertainty increase the support for the trade institution.

"This paper reports experimental evidence to better understand potential opposition to market institutions, i.e. for allowing people to trade. For this, we abstract from repugnancy concerns that relate to the specific characteristics of the good or service in question, and rather reduces the setting to the payoff dimension and thus the involved risks and distributional concerns. While we use a neutral framing, organ trade, in particular, trade in kidneys, inspires the set-up of the experiment. Trading kidneys for payment is illegal worldwide, apart from in Iran.1 While it is obvious that persons with kidney issues would substantially benefit from a transplant, healthy donors expose themselves to risk (e.g., Lentine and Patel 2012). Currently, there is not a large income gap between donors and recipients in the US (Gill et al., 2012). Nevertheless, studies suggest that - at a given price - the poor would have larger incentives to donate and therefore, are more exposed to potential risks (Moniruzzaman, 2012; Parada-Contzen and Vásquez-Lavín, 2019) and thus potentially more vulnerable in terms of Satz (2010).2 To illustrate this in the experiment, we vary both the initial income of players (rich/poor) as well as their condition (healthy/sick) which combined affect their potential prospects with and without trade. 

...

"In our experiment, a share of 20 % of respondents across all treatments oppose the trade institution although it is constructed such that personal expected payoff is unaffected or improved. We find that the major reasons individuals vote against trade are the unfair distributions of gains from trade. Importantly, the opposition towards trade is partly self-serving: opposition is lower among those that benefit the most from implementing a market institution. Specifically, we find a significantly smaller opposition to trade institutions when participants are behind the veil of ignorance and do not know their income level, their (abstractly defined) health condition, and thus, how trade affects their payoff. Similarly, we find that distributing gains from trade more evenly, thus benefiting the poor to a larger extent, reduces opposition to trade among the poor."

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And here's a related survey study:

Hauge, Karen Evelyn, Snorre Kverndokk, and Andreas Lange. "On the opposition to market institutions on moral grounds." Humanities and Social Sciences Communications 11, no. 1 (2024): 1-8.

Abstract

"From a liberal viewpoint, voluntary trade appears to be something that should meet universal approval. If no one is obliged to trade, establishing a market institution could only make all better off. Nonetheless, specific market institutions meet substantial skepticism and criticism. This paper extends the extant literature by surveying the moral opposition towards trade in multiple dimensions and linking this to policy support measures. We provide survey results on moral opposition to trade in organs, sex services, surrogate mothers, trade in carbon permits, goods produced in poor countries, and food from countries where people suffer from hunger. These cover the potential reasons for opposing trade institutions: moral concerns, paternalism regarding risk-taking, and distributional concerns. Beyond this, we measure support for policies on unemployment benefits, risk prevention, equality goals within society, and redistribution. The survey of Amazon Mechanical Turk workers from the U.S. reveals significant moral opposition to trade in diverse dimensions. About a third of the participants strongly oppose trade in body items, sex services, and food imports from countries where a large proportion of the population suffers from hunger and malnutrition. Fewer participants strongly oppose trading CO2 permits, importing from developing countries, or allowing surrogate mothership. Besides other correlates (e.g., gender, education, being conservative), individuals’ attitudes towards imposing risks on others are identified as an important correlate of the opposition to trade for all the contexts of trade: those who are averse to exposing others to risk for their own advantage are more likely to oppose trading institutions. This measure of social preferences also relates to support for policies on risk prevention, equality goals within society, and redistribution. We discuss potential mechanisms behind this explanatory power of the newly identified measure."

Behavioral market design (in the JEP)

 The Fall 2024 Journal of Economic Perspectives has three papers on behavioral market design:

Symposium: Behavioral Incentive Compatibility

6.	Evaluating Behavioral Incentive Compatibility: Insights from Experiments
	David Danz, Lise Vesterlund, and Alistair J. Wilson
	Full-Text PDF | Additional Information

 

Incentive compatibility is core to mechanism design. The success of auctions, matching algorithms, and voting systems all hinge on the ability to select incentives that make it in the individual's interest to reveal their type. But how do we test whether a mechanism that is designed to be incentive compatible is actually so in practice, particularly when faced with boundedly rational agents with nonstandard preferences? We review the many experimental tests that have been designed to assess behavioral incentive compatibility, separating them into two categories: indirect tests that evaluate behavior within the mechanism, and direct tests that assess how participants respond to the mechanism's incentives. Using belief elicitation as a running example, we show that the most popular elicitations are not behaviorally incentive compatible. In fact, the incentives used under these elicitations discourage rather than encourage truthful revelation.

 

7.	Behavioral Incentive Compatibility and Empirically Informed Welfare Analysis: An Introductory Guide
	Alex Rees-Jones
	Full-Text PDF | Additional Information

A growing body of research conducts welfare analysis that assumes behavioral incentive compatibility—that is, that behavior is governed by pursuit of incentives conditional on modeled imperfections in decision-making. In this article, I present several successful examples of studies that apply this approach and I use them to illustrate guidance for pursuing this type of analysis.

 

8.	Designing Simple Mechanisms
	Shengwu Li
	Full-Text PDF | Additional Information

It matters whether real-world mechanisms are simple. If participants cannot see that a mechanism is incentive-compatible, they may refuse to participate or may behave in ways that undermine the mechanism. There are several ways to formalize what it means for a mechanism to be "simple." This essay explains three of them, and suggests directions for future research.

Regulation of Organ Transplantation and Procurement (Chan and Roth in the JPE)

 Here's a new paper (in final form, online ahead of print) on how organ transplants are regulated.  The paper uses an experiment to make several points about the design of current regulations.  One of them is that transplant centers are incentivized to be risk averse, since they are measured only by the outcomes of the transplants they perform, and not on the outcomes for patients they decline to transplant (so they are reluctant to transplant risky kidneys or risky patients).

Regulation of Organ Transplantation and Procurement: A Market-Design Lab Experiment by Alex Chan and Alvin E. Roth, Journal of Political Economy, online ahead-of-print .

 Abstract: We conduct a lab experiment that shows that current rules regulating transplant centers (TCs) and organ-procurement organizations (OPOs) create perverse incentives that inefficiently reduce both organ recovery and beneficial transplantations. We model the decision environment with a two-player multiround game between an OPO and a TC. In the condition that simulates current rules, OPOs recover only the highest-quality kidneys and forgo valuable recovery opportunities, and TCs decline some beneficial transplants. Alternative regulations that reward TCs and OPOs together for health outcomes in their entire patient pool lead to behaviors that increase organ recovery and appropriate transplants.

Here's what transplants look like in our experimental environment:

And our results are robust to big changes in parameters:

Stanford celebrates Susan Athey

 This  from Stanford Report:

What motivates Susan Athey. The economist weighs in on incremental innovation, data-driven impact, and how economics is evolving to include a healthy dose of engineering. 

"Today, Athey, the Economics of Technology Professor at Stanford GSB, is using her expertise to promote the public good. In 2019, she founded the Golub Capital Social Impact Lab, which uses digital technology and social science research to improve the effectiveness of social sector organizations.

...

"For more than a decade, Athey’s professional passions have been linked to their potential for impact. She chose to return to Stanford — after six years teaching at Harvard — because of the opportunity for cross-disciplinary collaboration. And she has helped make such collaboration possible. In 2019, she was a founding associate director of the Stanford University Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence Institute. She is also a leader of the Business and Beneficial Technology pillar within Stanford GSB’s newly launched Business, Government, & Society Initiative, which brings together academics, practitioners, and policymakers to address issues such as technology, free markets, and sustainability.

"Athey’s Golub Capital Social Impact Lab epitomizes interdisciplinary work, putting students from computer science, engineering, education, and economics backgrounds to work helping partner organizations leverage digital tools and expertise that are generally only available to — or affordable for — large technology companies.

“I like building things that demonstrate how a class of problems can be solved,” Athey says. “If there is a problem worth solving, and I can solve it myself in a particular case, I know there are other people like me who are going to encounter the same problem. Part of the motivation and theory of change of the lab is that we will solve particular problems for particular social-impact organizations but also create the research that will guide others in solving similar problems.”

...

"Athey says some parts of economics are evolving to include a healthy dose of engineering. In the Microsoft Research interview, she described stereotypical economics research as evaluating existing programs and often finding that “stuff doesn’t work.”

“There’s a lot of negativity,” she says. With help from data and machine learning techniques, “my prediction is that economists are going to become more [like] engineers. Instead of complaining that nothing works, we’re going to start building things that do work to achieve economic outcomes…. We’re going to realize that nothing works if it’s one size fits all, but that a lot of things work if they are actually personalized and appropriately delivered.”

Incentives matter for getting participation in clinical trials by low income households

 Here's a study that casts some light (via a randomized experiment) on the importance of incentives to get representative participation in clinical trials.

Nonrepresentativeness in Population Health Research: Evidence from a COVID-19 Antibody Study By Deniz Dutz, Michael Greenstone, Ali Hortaçsu, Santiago Lacouture, Magne Mogstad, Azeem M. Shaikh, Alexander Torgovitsky, and Winnie van Dijk, AER: Insights 2024, 6(3): 313–323, https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20230195

Abstract: "We analyze representativeness in a COVID-19 serological study with randomized participation incentives. We find large participation gaps by race and income when incentives are lower. High incentives increase participation rates for all groups but increase them more among underrepresented groups. High incentives restore representativeness on race and income and also on health variables likely to be correlated with seropositivity, such as the uninsured rate, hospitalization rates, and an aggregate COVID-19 risk index."

"We analyze representativeness in a unique COVID-19 serological study. Unlike most studies, the Representative Community Survey Project (RECOVER)COVID-19 serological study experimentally varied financial incentives for participation. The study was conducted on households in Chicago (the target population). Randomly sampled households were sent a package that contained a self-administered blood sample collection kit and were asked to return the sample by mail to be tested for the presence of COVID-19 antibodies (“seropositivity”). Households in the sample were randomly assigned one of three levels of financial compensation for participating in the study: $0, $100, or $500.

"We find that households in neighborhoods with high shares of minority and poor households are grossly underrepresented at lower incentive levels. High incentives increase participation rates for all groups but increase them more among underrepresented groups. A $500 incentive restores representativeness in terms of neighborhood-level race and poverty status. Representativeness is also restored in health variables likely to be correlated with seropositivity, such as the uninsured rate, hospitalization rates, and an aggregate COVID-19 risk index. Since incentives were randomly assigned and only revealed after the household was contacted, the noncontact rates at $0 and $100 should be the same as at $500, implying that differential hesitancy to participate is responsible for much of the nonrepresentativeness that we find at lower incentives.

"We are not aware of studies that randomize financial incentives in population health studies. It is well appreciated that racial minorities and lower-income households participate in health research at lower rates.1  The impact of incentives on survey participation rates conditional on demographic characteristics has been studied in the survey methodology literature (see Groves et al. 2009; Singer and Ye 2013, and references therein). The incentives used in this literature are typically an order of magnitude smaller than the incentives in the RECOVER study."

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Some earlier related posts:

Monday, February 22, 2021

Ethical Payment in Human Infection Challenge Studies in the American Journal of Bioethics

Monday, March 1, 2021

Compensating challenge vaccine trial participants: further discussion in the American Journal of Bioethics

Thursday, October 29, 2020

Paying participants in challenge trials of Covid-19 vaccines, by Ambuehl, Ockenfels, and Roth

"we note that increasing hourly pay by a risk-compensation percentage as proposed in the target article provides compensation proportional to risk only if the risk increases proportionally with the number of hours worked. (Some risky tasks take little time; imagine challenge trials to test bulletproof vests.) "

Sunday, November 1, 2020

What do we know about the effects of payments to participants in challenge trials for vaccines, and other public spirited activities?

Designing Complex Experiments, by Susan Athey and Guido Imbens

 Here's a tantalizing set of slides about online experiments

Designing Complex Experiments: Some Recent Developments SUSAN ATHEY AND GUIDO IMBENS

This is from the 

NBER Summer Institute 2024

SI 2024 Methods Lecture: New Developments in Experimental Design and Analysis

the above link contains pointers to background papers.

Danny Kahneman, remembered by Stanford's Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences

 Daniel Kahneman, 1934-2024: Nobel Prize Winner & CASBS Legend

"Daniel Kahneman, the Nobel laureate, professor emeritus of psychology and public affairs at Princeton University, and among the most distinguished and consequential cognitive and behavioral scientists of the past half-century, passed away on March 27, 2024. He was 90.

"Daniel Kahneman was a CASBS fellow during the 1977-78 academic year, occupying office (called “studies” at CASBS) #6. (Notably, this remarkable class included two other future Nobel Prize winners – Oliver Williamson (2009) and Robert B. Wilson (2020) – as well as future Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.)

"Kahneman’s 1977-78 year is legendary for two reasons. First, it is here, at CASBS, where Kahneman and his principal collaborator of nearly a decade, Amos Tversky – who had a visiting appointment at Stanford University’s psychology department that year[1] – completed a paper they painstakingly had been working on for years: “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk.” The paper, published in March 1979 in the journal Econometrica, is a landmark in the annals of the social sciences. The paper presents a direct challenge to standard expected utility theory through the concept of loss aversion, describing how economic agents assess prospective losses and gains in an asymmetric manner. In other words, people frame transactions or outcomes in their minds subjectively, affecting the value (or utility) they expect to receive.

...

"Though Kahneman himself had expressed it in various ways over the years, he put it crisply in 2016:

"CASBS is where behavioral economics took shape. When Richard Thaler heard that Amos Tversky and I would be in Stanford, he finagled a visiting appointment down the hill to spend time with us. We spent a lot of time walking around the Center and became lifelong friends. Those long conversations that Dick had with Amos and me helped him construct his then heretical (and now well-established) view of economics, by using psychological observations to explain violations of standard economic theory.[5]

***********

Earlier:

Wednesday, March 27, 2024

Danny Kahneman (1934-2024)