Showing posts with label c. Show all posts
Showing posts with label c. Show all posts

Monday, November 23, 2020

Colin Sullivan on organ transplant policy (and on the job market this year)

 Colin Sullivan is completing a two-year postdoc at Stanford this year, and is on the job market.

His job market paper is an experiment with an exceptionally creative design. (Spoiler: it involves a cat actually getting a kidney transplant.) 

Eliciting Preferences Over Life And Death: Experimental Evidence From Organ Transplantation by Colin by D. Sullivan

Abstract: Optimal allocation of scarce, life-saving medical treatment depends on society’s preferences over survival distributions, governed by notions of equality and  efficiency.  In  a  novel  experiment,  I  elicit  preferences  over  survival  distributions in incentivized, life-or-death decisions. Subjects allocate an organ transplant among real cats with kidney failure. In each choice, subjects allocate a single organ based on the expected survival of each patient. The survival rates imply a price ratio, allowing me to infer the shape of indifference curves over survival bundles. I find that the vast majority (80%) of subjects respond to  increases  in  total  expected  survival  time,  while  a  small  minority  display Leontief preferences, providing the transplant to the shortest-lived patient at all  price  ratios.  Hypothetical  decisions  may  not  be  reliable  in  this  context: a large share (46%) of subjects allocate a hypothetical transplant differently than a real transplant, though estimates of aggregate preferences are the same across incentivized and unincentivized conditions. Finally, I show that aversion to wealth inequality is a good predictor of aversion to survival inequality.

(This human subjects research proto-col  was  approved  by  the  Stanford  University  Institutional  Review  Board  (IRB).  A discussion of ethical considerations in designing this protocol is included in Appendix A.)

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It's not his first really very creative experimental design: check out is 2019 paper in the AER

Incentivized Resume Rating: Eliciting Employer PreferencesWithout Deception (With Judd B. Kessler And Corinne Low)

American Economic Review, 2019, Vol. 109 (11): 3713-44. Online Appendix


Abstract: We introduce a new experimental paradigm to evaluate employer preferences, called Incentivized Resume Rating (IRR). Employers evaluate resumes they know to be hypothetical in order to be matched with real job seekers, preserving incentives while avoiding the deception necessary in audit studies. We deploy IRR with employers recruiting college seniors from a prestigious school, randomizing human capital characteristics and demographics of hypothetical candidates. We measure both employer preferences for candidates and employer beliefs about the likelihood candidates will accept job offers, avoiding a typical confound in audit studies. We discuss the costs, benefits, and future applications of this new methodology.

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My advice if you're hiring: check him out.