Showing posts with label interview. Show all posts
Showing posts with label interview. Show all posts

Saturday, May 9, 2026

Markets, Morals and the Road Ahead: A Conversation with Dr. Vikas Shah about Moral Economics (on Thought Economics)

 Dr. Vikas Shah has published a post on his site Thought Economics, devoted to my imminently forthcoming book Moral Economics.  The long transcript combines a conversation we had together, interspersed with bits of the book itself, paraphrased to appear as part of the live conversation.

Markets, Morals and the Road Ahead: A Conversation with Nobel Laureate Professor Alvin Roth· by Dr. Vikas Shah 

"Roth’s new book, Moral Economics: From Prostitution to Organ Sales, What Controversial Transactions Reveal About How Markets Work (), is a tour through what he calls repugnant transactions — exchanges that consenting parties want to make but that others believe should be forbidden, often on moral or religious grounds. The territory ranges from sex, surrogacy and adoption to alcohol, drugs, blood plasma, vaccine challenge trials, kidney transplants and . Roth’s central argument is bracing in its calm: most contested markets cannot really be abolished, only relocated — driven underground, exported across borders, or left to operate informally and dangerously. The honest question is therefore not whether to permit such markets, but how to design and regulate them so that they command sufficient social support to work, and so that the costs and benefits fall in places we can defend. Markets, in his view, are tools to help decide who gets what; the work of moral economics is to keep asking, with evidence rather than absolutes, how those tools should be built. I spoke with him about the philosophical architecture of the book, the everyday paradoxes of repugnance, the lessons of kidney exchange, the controversies around vaccine challenge trials and assisted dying, and what new frontiers of moral contention the next generation of  — will force us to confront." 

Wednesday, April 22, 2026

Moral Economics, on the Armchair Expert podcast

At the Armchair Expert podcast, Dax Shepard interviewed me in anticipation of the May publication of my book Moral Economics: From Prostitution to Organ Sales, What Controversial Transactions Reveal About How Markets Work  

 

Here's the video (which was recorded last month at their studio in LA): 

Wednesday, December 24, 2025

Interview about the new edition of the Chinese translation of Who Gets What and Why

 Last month I was interviewed in connection with the new edition of the Chinese translation of my 2015 book Who Gets What and Why.  

Here is the interview in Chinese, and translated back to English. (You can also click "translate to English" from the Chinese version, to get a more creative translation that among other things renders my name as variations on "Erwin Ross.")

 Below are some excerpts from the better back-translation (from interview in English translated into Chinese, and then back to English):

"In November 2025, LatePost conducted a video interview with Roth. The interview began at 7 a.m. local time, and the 74-year-old had already arrived at his office, walking on a treadmill desk while conversing with us. A white beard, furrowed brow when deep in thought, a smiling expression, and concise communication—these are the impressions Roth gave during the conversation.

'Market design is economics confronting the external world,' Roth told us. A month earlier, his popular book on market design, Who Gets What―and Why, was republished in Chinese under the title Matching. Designing, improving, and maintaining well-functioning matching mechanisms is the work of market design. In Matching, Roth demonstrated how market design could be applied in practice to change people's destinies and the way societies operate. 

...

"Alvin Roth: Significant changes have occurred in both kidney transplantation and kidney exchange. By the way, since 2015, there has been a major transformation in the approach to transplant surgeries in China. Prior to that, most organs used in transplants came from executed prisoners; now, China is developing a voluntary organ donation program, which represents a significant shift. However, China has yet to initiate kidney exchange programs.

"A new global trend is that we are beginning to experiment with cross-border kidney exchanges. This is particularly crucial for smaller countries or regions with limited numbers of kidney transplants, where some patients struggle to find compatible donors. 

...

"Q: In your "Market Design" blog, you previewed a new book to be published next year titled Moral Economics: From Prostitution to Organ Sales, What Controversial Transactions Reveal About How Markets Work. Why did you write this book? What issues do you discuss and how do you address them?

"Alvin Roth: One issue that economists have yet to fully understand is which markets gain societal support and which ones do not. For instance, I have explored the surrogacy market. Surrogacy is legal in the United States but illegal in China. After the Chinese government relaxed its one-child policy, many people desired to have a second child, but age became an obstacle. In California, where I reside, there are agencies offering surrogacy services where Mandarin is spoken, and many clients come from China.

"This is one of the core questions I attempt to address: why are certain genuinely beneficial practices legal in some places but illegal in others? "

#######

When I search for the new edition on Google I get the following AI overview:

Alvin Roth's book, originally titled
Who Gets What―and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design, has been published in Chinese under two different titles. 
The two Chinese titles are:
  • 《共享经济:市场设计及其应用》 (Simplified Chinese: Gòngxiǎng jīngjì: Shìchǎng shèjì jí qí yìngyòng, meaning "Sharing Economy: Market Design and Its Application").
  • 《配对:诺奖得主艾文・罗斯教你赢得博弈,突破市场经济赛局的思维》 (Traditional Chinese: Pèiduì: Nuò jiǎng dé zhǔ Ài wén luō sī jiào nǐ yíng dé bó yì, tū pò shìchǎng jīngjì sài jú de sī wéi, meaning "Matching: Nobel Laureate Alvin Roth Teaches You to Win the Game and Break Through Market Economy Game Thinking"). 
The simplified Chinese characters edition was published by Machinery Industry Press in 2015. 
 
Earlier: 

Thursday, January 28, 2016  Who Gets What and Why in Chinese

 

 

Wednesday, September 25, 2024

Mohammad Akbarpour, interviewed by Scott Cunningham

Here's an interview of Mohammad Akbarpour, as part of Scott Cunningham's growing series of interviews of interesting economists. (Even the picture of the two of them looks interesting, and it gets better:)

   

Scott writes:
"Welcome to the Mixtape with Scott! Sometimes the shortest distance between point A and point B is a straight line, but other times the shortest distance is a winding path. This week’s guest, Mohammad Akbarpour from Stanford University, is perhaps an example of the latter. Mohammad is a micro theorist at Stanford who specializes in networks, mechanism and design and two sided matching. Mohammad is an emerging young theorist at Stanford, student of such luminaries as Matt Jackson and Al Roth, whose background in engineering, mathematics and computer science has given him a fresh approach to topics that I associate with Stanford’s theory people as a whole — policy oriented, applied work, mechanism design, networks and matching. He got into economics “the long way” — growing up in Iran, majoring in engineering, and then moving into Stanford’s operations research PhD program. In this interview, he generously shares a snippet of the arc of his life, and it’s a remarkable story, and one I really enjoyed hearing. I think you will too."

Sunday, September 15, 2024

Practical insights from market design, in Japan

I was recently interviewed by Fuhito Kojima as part of a symposium conducted by the University of Tokyo Market Design Center on practical insights from market design. The whole symposium is available on YouTube.

All but one of the presentations are in Japanese (summarized below by Fuhito):

1. Introduction (Fuhito) 

 2. Our interview (in English) 

3. More explanation of the stable matching problem and its application to personnel assignment (Shunya Noda)

4. Application of stable matching algorithm in personnel allocation in a firm: My team helped our partner firm, Sysmex, introduce the DA algorithm (in fact, a modified "flexible" deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Kamada and Kojima 2015 AER) in the assignment of new employees to different divisions of the firm. The firm has been using matching algorithm for 4 years now. Our partner from the firm talks about their experience.

5. Application to daycare assignments: My team is collaborating with a major government contractor for municipal governments IT system, CyberAgent. The project studies daycare-related data provided by  municipal governments and helps those government introduce and improve their matching algorithms of daycare seats to children. Our partner from the firm talks about our team's effort, e.g., how we convinced one city change algorithm from Boston-like mechanism to DA, and how we helped fine-tune their priority design to cope with problems in which kids with siblings were not matched as well as single kids.

 6. Application to auction: Shunya and his team helped an auction platform firm to introduce an auction mechanism for selling used electronic devices. His partner company, Aucnet, shares their experience.

 7. Q&A and closing remark (Fuhito)




Here's my interview with Fuhito


 

Saturday, September 14, 2024

Interview about repugnance (and this blog) in Hungary

 Here's a link to an interview about repugnance in the Hungary Daily News. The  last question and answer was about this blog.

“Repugnance in human transactions became interesting to me” – interview with Alvin Roth

  "You have been writing the blog Market Design since 2008, and since then you have written almost every day a post. What motivated you to start this blog and what role does it play in your professional life? 

Alvin Roth: I started it for my class. I wanted the students to know that the way to think of ideas for market design is not just to read papers in economics journals but to read the newspaper and follow why markets weren’t working well. Many of my blog posts are short comments on a newspaper article about something in the world. Since I started, it’s also proved to be a useful tool for me to remember things. So, it’s a kind of intellectual diary, as well. I’m currently working on a book on controversial markets and I look at my blog posts for each chapter. Market Design blog is my memory for everything related to market design."

###########

Related:

Sunday, July 7, 2024

Sunday, February 25, 2024

Mark Satterthwaite interviewed by Sandeep Baliga (video)

After listening to this interview with the great Mark Satterthwaite, I now understand the independent origins of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, and the collaborative origins of the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem. 
In the final ten minutes or so of the interview, Mark describes worthwhile future research directions (and methods:), starting just after minute 28:30, particularly about appropriately matching patients to medical specialists.

   
xxxxxxxx

Earlier interviews by Sandeep Baliga:

Thursday, February 8, 2024

Morally contested markets on NPR's Planet Money (including kidneys, revenge and insider trading)

 The NPR show Planet Money discusses kidney sales, revenge, and insider trading. The hosts are enthusiastic about at least thinking about all of these.* 

They start with a discussion of organ transplants, and in the first 9 minutes of the show you can hear some parts of an interview with me, discussing tradeoffs (and possible titles for a book I'm working on).  Then they talk to Siri Isaksson about retaliation, and after that to Chester Spatt about insider trading.

 

They write:

"There are tons of markets that don't exist because people just don't want to allow a market — for whatever reason, people feel icky about putting a price on something. For example: Surrogacy is a legal industry in parts of the United States, but not in much of the rest of the world. Assisted end-of-life is a legal medical transaction in some states, but is illegal in others.

"When we have those knee-jerk reactions and our gut repels us from considering something apparently icky, economics asks us to look a little more closely.

"Today on the show, we have three recommendations of things that may feel kinda wrong but economics suggests may actually be the better way. First: Could the matching process of organ donation be more efficient if people could buy and sell organs? Then: should women seek revenge more often in the workplace? And finally, what if insider trading is actually useful?"

##########

*In their enthusiasm, they mis-state how few kidney exchanges were done before my colleagues and I got involved. (There weren't many, but more than two...)

As it happens, earlier this week I blogged about another interview, in the NYT, by Peter Coy (in print, not audio) that focused on kidney exchange:

Tuesday, February 6, 2024

Update (5pm): now I see that on the Planet Money site there's a transcript.  Here's the part that I participated in:

SYLVIE DOUGLIS, BYLINE: This is PLANET MONEY from NPR.

(SOUNDBITE OF COIN SPINNING)

MARY CHILDS, HOST:

A couple decades ago, Al Roth was working on solving this problem - people who needed kidneys weren't getting matched effectively with people who had kidneys to donate.

AL ROTH: Part of the kind of work I do is called matching theory.

GREG ROSALSKY, HOST:

Al helped create this, like, beautiful, elegant algorithm that would match kidney donors with recipients.

CHILDS: You obviously won a pretty big prize for this work.

ROTH: I did. I recommend it.

CHILDS: OK. Yeah (laughter). You like the prize. It's a good prize.

ROTH: Yeah.

CHILDS: That's good to know.

ROTH: A week long of parties.

CHILDS: The prize he won? - it was the Nobel Prize in economics.

ROSALSKY: As you might know, Al's matching work vastly improved the way people get kidneys and saved literally thousands of lives. Like, in the year 2000, before Al's work, there were only two paired kidney transplants - two. Thanks to Al's algorithm, there are now about a thousand per year.

CHILDS: But, Al says, his Nobel Prize-winning algorithm - it isn't even the best way to get people kidneys. Technically, he says, the best way is to grow kidneys in a lab, so it's not even the second-best way.

I'm just envisioning you doing all this matching work knowing that this is, like, a little goofy. Like...

ROTH: Oh.

CHILDS: ...There's a easier way.

ROTH: I hope it's a lot goofy...

CHILDS: (Laughter).

ROTH: ...The work I'm doing, anyway.

CHILDS: (Laughter).

ROTH: No, no. That's right. So could we figure out a way to have more donors to have fewer deaths? I bet we could.

ROSALSKY: OK, so there is a much easier, more efficient way to get people kidneys. It's the way people get most things - with money. Like, what if we could just buy and sell organs?

ROTH: Oh, we'd have a lot more organs. That's how we get most of our stuff. There's a famous passage quoted from Adam Smith, which I'm going to paraphrase, but it says something like, it's not through the generosity of the butcher and the baker that you get your food. You buy it from them. It's how they - that's how they sustain their families - is by selling you food. And that's how you get food, and that's why there's enough food.

CHILDS: Right. The kidney market already has supply and demand. It just doesn't have prices to balance them because buying and selling kidneys is illegal in basically the entire world. So here we are. We don't have enough kidneys. We desperately need more, and yet, we refuse to pay more than $0 for them.

ROSALSKY: And as Al saw while working on kidneys, people had moral objections to the idea of paying for organs. They had concerns that just didn't really make sense to him as an economist.

ROTH: But when I started to look, it turns out there are lots of markets like that.

CHILDS: Lots of markets where people just don't want to allow a market. They feel icky about putting a price on something. Al has a list - for example, surrogacy - a legal and flourishing industry in much of the U.S., not in much of the rest of the world; assisted end of life - perfectly fine medical transaction in Oregon, illegal where I am in Virginia.

ROSALSKY: Al is actually working on a book about all of this.

ROTH: Its working title is "Repugnant Transactions And Controversial Markets." And the idea is that sometimes economists have perfectly good ideas that other people don't think are perfectly good.

ROSALSKY: Al has sort of made his own little subdiscipline in economics about this.

ROTH: "Ickonomics" (ph), "Yuckonomics" (ph) - you know, I trade in book titles. I'm open to suggestions.

CHILDS: You can email Al with your book title suggestions, though honestly, that's kind of hard to beat. In the meantime, when we have those knee-jerk reactions and our gut repels us from considering the icky thing, economics would like to humbly submit that maybe we should.

(SOUNDBITE OF JORDACHE V. GRANT AND SKINNY WILLIAMS' "OLDER HEADS")

CHILDS: Hello, and welcome to PLANET MONEY. I'm Mary Childs.

ROSALSKY: And I'm Greg Rosalsky. Today on the show, we apply an elegant economic framework to Al's market, the trading of human organs, to whether or not we should exact revenge on our enemies, and to whether or not we should trade on inside information.

(SOUNDBITE OF JORDACHE V. GRANT AND SKINNY WILLIAMS' "OLDER HEADS")

CHILDS: When we face difficult situations that don't have an absolutely clear right answer, economist Al Roth says borrowing tools from economics can be useful.

ROTH: Economists deal in trade-offs, and one of the things about trade-offs is you have to say to yourself, supposing there's something we really don't like, what will happen if we ban it? And if the answer is it won't go away, but it'll go underground or become criminalized or become very irregular, then you might prefer to regulate it rather than ban it.

ROSALSKY: And there are real problems with banning things. For example, remember that time we tried to ban alcohol, like, in the 1920s and 1930s?

ROTH: We discovered that it gave rise to a big criminal economy and didn't completely wipe out alcohol at all. So we legalized it. And the legal market for alcohol, with all its problems, is a lot nicer in many ways, a lot more socially useful than the criminal market - you know, Al Capone and the Saint Valentine's Day massacre and, you know, Eliot Ness.

CHILDS: Alcohol, as you may know, is legal today. Selling kidneys - no, not legal - with kidneys, we are in our Prohibition era.

ROTH: There is a black market for kidneys. And often it's pretty terrible because the almost-universal laws against compensating kidney donors have driven that market underground. And what underground often means is out of the hospitals and into hotel suites and apartments...

CHILDS: Eugh (ph).

ROTH: ...And - yes, so medically very bad, as well as, you know, not just illegal but dealing with criminals - medically very bad, bad for the donors, bad for the recipients.

CHILDS: And that's what we have today. That's the market we have chosen. We have the black market with money and the legal market with no money.

ROSALSKY: So Al has been thinking about solutions to this. Like, what can we do realistically to incentivize more kidney donations? How else could we go about creating a market for kidneys to be, as Al likes to put it, more generous to kidney donors?

CHILDS: And when Al thinks about how to design a market, he prioritizes investigating what exactly it is that we're objecting to so he can build a market that fixes or avoids those problems. And in the case of kidneys...

ROTH: There are metaphysical objections. You know, it's just wrong. But the objections that seem to touch on the world seem to say that you can't do this without exploiting poor people because poor people are so vulnerable that just offering them money takes away their agency.

CHILDS: The first reaction is just a gut reaction, which doesn't help inform Al on design. The second reaction is that money can be coercive, that if people have no money and you offer them money to participate in a study, they might have to do the study, especially if you offer a huge amount, like a life-changing amount of money. It's just too compelling. They wouldn't have a choice.

ROSALSKY: This argument does strike Al as unreasonable.

ROTH: There's lots of jobs that we pay people to do because otherwise no one would do them. And you can earn a decent living being a meatpacker. But that's one of the things that bothers people. They say, why should we allow a market that will be mostly - most of the participants will be in the lower parts of the income range? And of course, that isn't very sympathetic to people who are lower income, right? In other words...

CHILDS: Right.

ROTH: ...We need jobs that people with lower income can get. That's why they have some income - is that there are jobs.

CHILDS: Luckily, there is a really obvious, easy solution to this objection - just solve poverty.

ROTH: There'd be a lot less repugnance to monetary transactions if there was no income inequality.

CHILDS: (Laughter).

ROTH: If you wanted to sell me your kidney, but we all had the same income and the same prospects, it just might not be a big thing.

CHILDS: OK, failing that, Al mentioned another way to create a kidney market, a way to get kidneys only from people who aren't that poor - a tax break.

ROTH: People who are wealthy enough to benefit from tax credits on income tax aren't the poorest of the poor. So it might be that the way to start paying kidney donors is to say, we will give you a tax break on everything after the first $10 million of income in the year that you - you know, and then only hedge fund managers would donate kidneys, and that would be repugnant.

CHILDS: But there's a twisted logic to it because at least they could - like, should something go awry in the surgery or in the...

ROTH: Yeah, they'd be fine. They'd be fine. Yeah.

ROSALSKY: Perfect. Like, now we have a few ideas of how to make this happen without paying people for kidneys. We could resolve income inequality, or we could just, you know, do a tax credit and receive only hedge fund manager kidneys. And - right? - there's something a little goofy about all this because these solutions are trying to account for objections that are just hard to design around 'cause those objections are at least partly stemming from some messy human feeling or intuition that just won't let us exchange things in the normal way.

CHILDS: So do you think there'll ever be a U.S. market for kidneys?

ROTH: Well, I think we're not doing a good job yet and that we ought to find a way to be more generous to donors so that we have more of them.

CHILDS: And what that looks like - you're open to suggestion?

ROTH: I'm open to suggestions.

Tuesday, February 6, 2024

Kidney exchange (and other bits of market design) in the New York Times

 Peter Coy, the veteran New York Times economics columnist, writes about kidney exchange, after an interview/conversation sparked by a recent working paper of mine, Market Design and Maintenance. (He's a rare economic journalist who reads economists' papers.)

Here's his column, published yesterday afternoon:

The Economist Who Helped Patients Get New Kidneys, Feb. 5, 2024, 3:00 p.m. ET, By Peter Coy

He's also a rare interviewer: his column includes the names of more of my coauthors than I can recall in any other interview. In order of appearance: Tayfun Sonmez and Utku Unver, Frank Delmonico, Susan Saidman, Mike Rees (implicitly) when he names Mike's nonprofit Alliance for Paired Kidney Donation, and Elliott Peranson.  Market design is, after all, a team sport.

Here's his concluding paragraph:

"What is it like to straddle the worlds of academia and practice? I asked. “It takes a lot of patience,” he said. “Market design is outward-facing. I learn from trying to persuade people who aren’t economists. It’s a lot of fun also. Sometimes you have to go beyond your completely reliable scientific knowledge.”

########

Earlier post:

Monday, December 11, 2023