NBER workshop on Market Design, Stanford, Oct 16-17, call for papers

 Here's the call for papers for the NBER workshop on market design, at Stanford in October.

"To: NBER Market Design Working Group

From: Michael Ostrovsky and Eric Budish

 The National Bureau of Economic Research workshop on Market Design is a forum to discuss new academic research related to the design of market institutions, broadly defined. The next meeting will be held in Stanford, California on October 16 & 17, 2026.  We are planning for an in-person only meeting. There will not be an option to attend virtually.

 We welcome new and interesting research and are happy to see papers from a variety of fields.  Participants in the past meeting covered a range of topics and methodological approaches. Last year's program can be viewed at:

https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.nber.org/conferences/market-design-working-group-meeting-fall-2025__;!!G92We9drHetJ8EofZw!dlT9ZZcoCaeO7GqTUkKgKVVgvGpB5MDHs3RNvyJj9679UKlOmu2AuKoOlSYuYRe1c8QYnkLCcm9R5cJtdME$

 

The conference does not publish proceedings or issue NBER working papers - most of the presented papers are presumed to be published later in journals.

 

We would appreciate it if you could pass this call for papers on to colleagues who might be interested, but who may not be on the Bureau's mailing list. Submissions are welcome from researchers with and without NBER affiliations and from researchers at all career stages.

 

If you are interested in presenting a paper this year, please upload a PDF version by midnight EDT on August 23, 2026, to this link:

 https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://conference.nber.org/confsubmit/backend/cfp?id=MDf26__;!!G92We9drHetJ8EofZw!dlT9ZZcoCaeO7GqTUkKgKVVgvGpB5MDHs3RNvyJj9679UKlOmu2AuKoOlSYuYRe1c8QYnkLCcm9RUJB5pBU$

 Preference will be given to papers for which at least a preliminary draft is ready by the time of submission. Only authors of accepted papers will be contacted.

 Unfortunately, the NBER cannot cover the travel costs or hotel expenses of participants.

 There are a limited number of spaces available for graduate students to attend the conference, though we cannot cover their costs. Please email ostrovsky@stanford.edu and eric.budish@chicagobooth.edu  a short nominating paragraph.

 Please forward this announcement to any potentially interested scholars. We look forward to hearing from you."

The NBER celebrates market design

 From the NBER Reporter:

Working Group Report: Market Design  By Michael Ostrovsky and Parag A. Pathak

Here are the introductory paragraphs (after which the report goes on to survey various areas of market design research).

"The Market Design Working Group, established in 2009 under the leadership of Susan Athey and Parag Pathak, is a preeminent research forum in the field of market design. The working group meets annually, alternating between Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Palo Alto, California, to present research that bridges theoretical economics and practical applications, all focused on what The Economist aptly characterized as “an intelligently designed invisible hand.”1 Research in market design has been celebrated in academic circles, as evidenced by recognitions like the 2012 Nobel Prize for work on matching markets and the 2020 Nobel Prize for auction theory, and has also been instrumental in catalyzing tangible reforms in real-world institutions and markets.

"One feature that sets market design apart from much of traditional economic theory is its unwavering commitment to practical applications. Market designers have developed a unique professional profile, equally at home in university lecture halls, hospital surgery wards, school committee meetings, and the boardrooms of technology companies. This versatility allows them to translate complex economic models and analyses into solutions for real-world problems. The field’s research has informed an impressive range of applications across various sectors of society. "

NBER market design workshop at Stanford, tomorrow and Saturday

 Tomorrow and Saturday, market design at Stanford...

NBER Market Design Working Group Meeting, Fall 2024   DATE October 18-19, 2024

LOCATION SIEPR, Stanford University, Koret-Taube Conference Center, 366 Galvez Street

ORGANIZERS Michael Ostrovsky and Parag A. Pathak

  Format: 35 minute presentation, followed by 10 minute discussion.

Friday, October 18

9:00 am Continental Breakfast

9:30 am Designing Dynamic Reassignment Mechanisms: Evidence from GP Allocation, Ingrid Huitfeldt, University of Oslo, Victoria Marone, University of Texas at Austin and NBER, Daniel C. Waldinger, New York University and NBER

10:15 am Dynamic Matching with Post-allocation Service and its Application to Refugee Resettlement, Kirk C. Bansak, University of California, Berkeley, Soonbong Lee, Yale University, Vahideh Manshadi, Yale University, Rad Niazadeh, University of Chicago, Elisabeth Paulson, Harvard University

11:00 am  Break

11:30 am  Social Learning in Lung Transplant Decisions, Laura Doval, Columbia University, Federico Echenique, University of California, Berkeley, Wanying Huang, Monash University, Yi Xin, California Institute of Technology

12:15 pm  Endogenous Priority in Centralized Matching Markets: The Design of the Heart Transplant Waitlist, Kurt R. Sweat, Johns Hopkins University

1:00 pm Lunch

2:00 pm  Mechanism Reform: An Application to Child Welfare, E. Jason Baron, Duke University and NBER, Richard Lombardo, Harvard University, Joseph P. Ryan, University of Michigan, Jeongsoo Suh, Duke University, Quitze Valenzuela-Stookey, University of California, Berkeley

2:45 pm  The Competitive Core of Combinatorial Exchange, Simon Jantschgi, University of Oxford, Thanh T. Nguyen, Purdue University, Alexander Teytelboym, University of Oxford

3:30 pm  Break

4:00 pm  "Bid Shopping" in Procurement Auctions with Subcontracting(slides), Raymond Deneckere, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Daniel Quint, University of Wisconsin-Madison

4:45 pm Ads in Conversations: Market Thickness and Match Quality, Martino Banchio, Bocconi University, Aranyak Mehta, Google Research, Andres Perlroth, Google Research

5:30 pm Adjourn

7:00 pm  Group Dinner  Il Fornaio Palo Alto, 520 Cowper Street, Palo Alto, CA

Saturday, October 19

8:30 am Continental Breakfast

9:00 am Dynamic Auctions with Budget-Constrained Bidders: Evidence from the Online Advertising Market, Shunto J. Kobayashi, Boston University, Miguel Alcobendas, Yahoo Research

9:45 am The Welfare Effects of Sponsored Product Advertising, Chuan Yu, Harvard University

10:30 am Break

11:00 am An Empirical Analysis of the Interconnection Queue, Sarah Johnston, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Yifei Liu, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Chenyu Yang, University of Maryland

11:45 am  Iterative Network Pricing for Ridesharing Platforms Chenkai Yu, Columbia University, Hongyao Ma, Columbia University

12:30 pm  Lunch and Adjourn

NBER Market Design Working Group Meeting, Fall 2023, Cambridge MA

 Market Design Working Group Meeting, Fall 2023

Friday, October 27

8:30 am

Continental Breakfast

Session 1: Equity

9:00 am

Equal Pay for Similar Work

Diego Gentile Passaro, Brown University

Fuhito Kojima, Stanford University

Bobak Pakzad-Hurson, Brown University

9:45 am

Market Design for Social Justice: A Case Study on A Constitutional Crisis in India

Tayfun Sönmez, Boston College

M. Utku Ünver, Boston College

10:30 am

Break

Session 2: Artificial Intelligence

10:45 am

Artificial Intelligence and Statistical Collusion

Martino Banchio, Google Research

Giacomo Mantegazza, Stanford University

11:30 am

Combining Human Expertise with Artificial Intelligence: Experimental Evidence from Radiology

Nikhil Agarwal, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER

Alex Moehring, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Pranav Rajpurkar, Harvard University

Tobias Salz, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER

12:15 pm

Lunch

Session 3: Auctions

1:30 pm

Auctions with Withdrawal Rights: A Foundation for Uniform Price

Alexander Haberman, Stanford University

Ravi Jagadeesan, Stanford University

2:15 pm

Unobserved Auctions

Hao Li, University of British Columbia

Michael Peters, University of British Columbia

3:00 pm

Entry and Exit in Treasury Auctions

Jason Allen, Bank of Canada

Ali Hortaçsu, University of Chicago and NBER

Eric Richert, University of Chicago

Milena Wittwer, Boston College

3:45 pm

Break

Session 4: Mechanism Design for Social Good

4:15 pm

Test-Optional Admissions

Wouter Dessein, Columbia University

Alexander P. Frankel, University of Chicago

Navin Kartik, Columbia University

5:00 pm

Maximizing the Effect of Altruism

Nicholas T. Wu, Yale University

Nicole Immorlica, Microsoft Research

Brendan Lucier, Microsoft Research

5:45 pm

Adjourn

6:30 pm

Group Dinner at Bambara (across the street from the Royal Sonesta)

Saturday, October 28

8:30 am

Continental Breakfast

Session 5: Distributed Ledgers

9:00 am

The Economic Limits of Bitcoin and Anonymous, Decentralized Trust on the Blockchain

Eric Budish, University of Chicago and NBER

9:45 am

Can Open Decentralized Ledgers be Economically Secure?

Jacob D. Leshno, University of Chicago

Rafael Pass, Cornell University

Elaine Shi, Carnegie Mellon University

10:30 am

Break

Session 6: School Choice

11:00 am

Leveraging Uncertainties to Infer Preferences: Robust Analysis of School Choice

Yeon-Koo Che, Columbia University

Dong Woo Hahm, University of Southern California

YingHua He, Rice University

11:45 am

Search and Biased Beliefs in Education Markets

Patrick Agte, Princeton University

Claudia Allende, Stanford University and NBER

Adam Kapor, Princeton University and NBER

Christopher Neilson, Yale University and NBER

12:30 pm

Lunch

Session 7: Signalling and Screening

1:30 pm

Comparison of Screening Devices

Frank Yang, Stanford University

Piotr Dworczak, Northwestern University

Mohammad Akbarpour, Stanford University

2:15 pm

Privacy Preserving Signals

Philipp Strack, Yale University

Kai Hao Yang, Yale University

3:00 pm

Adjourn

NBER Market Design meeting, Cambridge, October 18-19

Market Design Working Group Meeting

Michael Ostrovsky and Parag A. Pathak, Organizers

October 18-19, 2019

NBER
Feldstein Conference Room, 2nd Floor
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA


Conference Code of Conduct

Friday, October 18
8:30 am	Continental Breakfast
9:00 am	Christina Aperjis, Power Auctions LLC Lawrence Ausubel, University of Maryland Oleg V. Baranov, University of Colorado, Boulder Supply Reduction in the Broadcast Incentive Auction
9:45 am	Gianluca Brero, University of Zurich Benjamin Lubin, Boston University Sven Seuken, University of Zurich Machine Learning-Powered Iterative Combinatorial Auctions
10:30 am	Break
11:00 am	Tayfun Sönmez, Boston College M. Bumin Yenmez, Boston College Affirmative Action in India via Vertical and Horizontal Reservations
11:45 am	Joshua Angrist, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER Parag A. Pathak, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER Roman Zarate, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Choice and Consequence: Assessing Mismatch at Chicago Exam Schools
12:30 pm	Lunch
2:00 pm	Marek Pycia, University of Zurich Invariance and Matching Market Outcomes
2:45 pm	Nicole Immorlica, Microsoft Research Jacob D. Leshno, University of Chicago Irene Y. Lo, Stanford University Brendan Lucier, Microsoft Research Information Acquisition Costs in Matching Markets
3:30 pm	Break
4:00 pm	Mohammad Akbarpour, Stanford University Julien Combe, University College London Yinghua He, Rice University Victor Hiller, Université Paris 2 Robert Shimer, University of Chicago and NBER Olivier Tercieux, Paris School of Economics Unpaired Kidney Exchange: Overcoming Double Coincidence of Wants without Money
4:45 pm	Liran Einav, Stanford University and NBER Amy Finkelstein, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER Yunan Ji, Harvard University Neale Mahoney, University of Chicago and NBER Voluntary Regulation: Evidence from Medicare Bundled Payments
5:30 pm	Adjourn
6:30 pm	Group Dinner at Bambara (across the street from the Royal Sonesta Hotel)
Saturday, October 19
8:30 am	Continental Breakfast
9:00 am	Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Microsoft Research Lior Kovalio, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Noam Nisan, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Assaf Romm, Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Stanford University Matching for the Israeli "Mechinot" Gap-Year Programs: Handling Rich Diversity Requirements
9:45 am	Amanda Y. Agan, Rutgers University and NBER Bo Cowgill, Columbia University Laura K. Gee, Tufts University Salary Disclosure and Hiring: Field Experimental Evidence from a Two-Sided Audit Study
10:30 am	Break
11:00 am	Nick Arnosti, Columbia University Peng Shi, University of Southern California Design of Lotteries and Waitlists for Affordable Housing Allocation
11:45 am	Daniel C. Waldinger, New York University Targeting In-Kind Transfers Through Market Design: A Revealed Preference Analysis of Public Housing Allocation
12:30 pm	Adjourn
	FORMAT 35 mins presenter 10 mins discussion