Deceased-donor initiated kidney exchange chaiins in Italy, after six years

 Kidney exchange in Italy is now making good use of deceased-donor initiated chains.

 

American Journal of Transplantation

Available online 10 August 2026

In Press, Journal Pre-proof

Original Article

Integrating Deceased and Living Donation: Six-Year Outcomes of the Italian Deceased-Donor–Initiated Kidney Paired Exchange (DEC-K) Program

Author links open overlay panel, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , …

 ABSTRACT
Using a deceased donor (DD) to initiate living-donor (LD) exchange chains can expand access to kidney transplantation in recipients with an HLA or ABO incompatible living donor. The Italian DD-initiated Kidney Paired Exchange (DEC-K) program uses a DD kidney to start a chain among incompatible pairs, ultimately returning a LD kidney to the waiting list. We report the first long-term analysis of this approach worldwide. All DEC-K chains performed in Italy between March 2018 and May 2025 were analyzed. Thirty-four chains generated 84 transplants (34 chain initiating kidneys CIK, 22 from LD, 28 chain-ending kidneys CEK) versus 17 transplants from conventional Kidney Paired Donation (KPD) program in the same period. Five-year outcomes were similar between CIK and LD recipients (eGFR slope: −2.0 mL/min/1.73m2/year, P=0.37; graft survival: log-rank P=0.28). While this approach diverts blood-group O DD kidneys from the general waiting list, potentially affecting non-sensitized candidates, it was designed to address the unmet needs of highly sensitized patients facing years of waiting. In the Italian setting, the DEC-K program successfully initiates LD chains from DD kidneys with outcomes equivalent to LD transplant; implementation should include monitoring of blood-group-specific outcomes and flexible design to accommodate healthcare system priorities.

... 

 "DISCUSSION
The six-year DEC-K experience demonstrates that DD-initiated KPD chains are highly effective in small national pools such as Italy’s, which include about 70 incompatible pairs at a time. Because closed-loop exchanges rarely provide enough matches, especially for blood group O or highly sensitized recipients, open chains initiated by DDs can convert a single graft into multiple sequential transplants without simultaneous multi-center surgery. In our program, 34 DDs generated 84 transplants, corresponding to a threefold increase compared to conventional loops in the Italian KPD. Broader enrollment could further enhance impact, although participation remains limited by concerns about receiving a DD kidney while the paired LD proceeds, underscoring the need for transparent counseling and clear communication about outcomes and equity.
The rationale for DEC-K aligns with models proposed by Melcher and later implemented by Furian, in which a SCD kidney is allocated to an incompatible pair whose LD subsequently donates to another recipient, propagating the chain21, 23, 29. Similar donor-driven chains were pioneered in the United States, where Rees demonstrated that a single altruistic donor could initiate a ten-transplant sequence14. Mathematical modeling by Wang et al.23 supports this approach, showing that allocating just 2-3% of DD to initiate KPD chains could generate several hundred additional transplants annually, with maximum benefit for highly sensitized and blood-group O candidates23. In countries with rare or restricted altruistic donation and small KPD pools, such as Italy, DD initiation is the only practical way to generate compatible matches. Over the past decade, only ten non-directed donors enabled 30 transplants and unlocked 21 incompatible pairs, substantially fewer than DEC-K.

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Earlier: 

Monday, April 11, 2016  Using deceased donor kidneys to start living donor kidney exchange chains

 

Public attitudes towards deceased organ donation and allocation in china

 Deceased  organ donation in China does not  yet have overwhelming public support although receiving a deceased donor organ transplant does:

Hu, D., Wang, Y., Hu, Q. et al. Public attitudes and preferences on organ donation and allocation in china: a cross-sectional study. Sci Rep 16, 24995 (2026). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-026-54903-4 

 

 

 

Deceased organ donation by Ashlagi and Roth in the Annual Review of Economics (with open questions)

 Here's a review paper concentrating primarily on transplantation of  organs (primarily kidneys) from deceased donors. It closes with a set of open research questions.

Organ Allocation and Transplantation  by Itai Ashlagi and Alvin E. Roth,  Annual Review of Economics, Volume 18, 2026, Vol. 18:613-645, August 2026, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-092425-123425     
 
ABSTRACT: There is a large shortage of solid organs for transplants. This survey reviews the allocation of organs (particularly kidneys), with an emphasis on how deceased donor organs are obtained and allocated in the United States but with pointers to related issues involving living donors and transplantation around the world. We review some of the key institutional details and theoretical and empirical studies and describe some open questions that we hope will continue to attract attention from researchers interested in the economic and operational aspects of organ allocation.

 
1. INTRODUCTION
 "Since at least the turn of the century, organ transplants have attracted considerable interest from economists. This is due both to their importance in modern medicine and to the fact that organ transplantation deals directly with some of the most basic questions of economics—namely, how to efficiently allocate scarce resources and how to make them less scarce. "

...

OPEN QUESTIONS AND RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
 
This section highlights research opportunities, some of which have been raised above.

1.  Can we design allocation rules free of justified envy that place hard-to-match organs quickly enough so that they remain transplantable? A large number of recovered organs that might be transplanted are discarded. How can we increase utilization of marginal-quality organs and get them accepted after fewer offers and less CIT? How can we do this in a transparent and equitable way? How can we use the information about organ quality that arrives during the offering process? 91 How can we use offer refusals in real time? How should we design allocation rules in the presence of social learning and potential information cascades (Zhang 2010, Doval et al. 2024)? How should the variability in centers’ willingness to accept marginal organs be accounted for?
2.  How to design priorities to balance efficiency and equity? How can priorities be designed to account for both longevity and urgency (Zhang et al. 2024, Lazenby et al. 2025)? How can priorities depend on patients’ treatments, taking into account that treatment decisions may in turn depend on priorities (Sweat 2023)? Countries use different priority rules, and there is a need to compare these to better understand trade-offs between these rules. The OPTN is seeking to implement continuous distribution allocation policies for hearts and kidneys, which will assign priority points smoothly across patient and match features. There are not yet studies that offer guidance to the resulting (in)efficiencies. 92
3.  How should organ quality be measured and reported? The KDPI is currently used for both acceptance decisions by surgeons and prioritization in the allocation system. As supply changes over time, percentiles correspond to different qualities. For example, a KDPI of 85% (which is the threshold for requiring patient consent to receive an offer) in 2018 corresponds to (i.e., has the same underlying nonnormalized KDRI risk measure as) a KDPI of 75% in 2024 due to the recovery of more organs and therefore the higher availability of organs of marginal quality. Would the use of the nonnormalized KDRI substantially change behavior and outcomes?
4.  How should surgeons’ and patients’ preferences be elicited? The OPTN allows transplant centers to express preferences via filters that screen organ offers. Despite this, many organs are still declined hundreds and even thousands of times (Agarwal et al. 2021, Guan et al. 2025). How can we better design these filters? Can we use AI to help recommend filters or to predict organ refusals in real time? More broadly, how should waitlist mechanisms be designed given incomplete patient and center preferences?
5.  How should transplant centers’ performance be measured? Should transplant centers be incentivized to accept marginal organs, for example, for patients facing many years of dialysis? How should we regulate transplant centers? Are new incentive schemes useful in increasing utilization? For example, how will the acceptance rate and pre-transplant mortality rate metrics impact centers’ behavior? The CMS has also launched the Increasing Organ Transplant Access model, 93 using a long-term field experiment that offers monetary incentives based on the number of transplants performed, graft survival, and percentage of accepted offers (Chan & Roth 2026.) How should we incorporate the huge role that transplant centers play in acceptance/rejection decisions when studying organ allocation mechanisms (Chan & Roth 2024, Ashlagi et al. 2025a)? There is a need for research on designing centers’ performance measures that include outcomes for patients on the waiting list.
6.  How should OPO performance be measured? OPOs vary in performance in terms of organ recovery and utilization, and incentive schemes remain controversial. How effective is the new tier system for monitoring OPOs based on donation and age-adjusted transplant rates? How should OPOs be incentivized to improve performance and transparency and to coordinate with transplant centers (see Chan & Roth 2024, Bae et al. 2026, Skowronski et al. 2026)?
7.  What should we incorporate in transplant centers’ preferences? Most theoretical models treat patients as the decision makers who accept or reject organ offers. In practice, however, transplant centers exercise substantial discretion over acceptance decisions, listing practices, and setting filters. How do equilibrium outcomes reflect centers’ preferences? There is a need for empirical and theoretical studies of how centers’ characteristics and incentives shape outcomes.
8.  Can we design simulation tools that account for equilibrium behavior? Simulations and historical data have been instrumental to the study and design of allocation policies. Existing simulations apply myopic acceptance models that are invariant to the allocation rules. There is a need for simple modern simulation tools that account for the incentives of patients and centers. 94 It would be interesting to create tools that generate not only better equilibrium predictions but also short-term equilibration effects. 95
9.  What kinds of experiments should the OPTN conduct? The OPTN conducts very few controlled experiments, despite facing ongoing allocation policy decisions. While simulation tools are useful to inform policy, field experiments offer another approach. Experiments can generate useful data to evaluate different approaches (e.g., for expediting placements). The size and heterogeneity of the United States present opportunities to test different approaches; but they also raise questions about whether different approaches would work differently in different regions, and about how to overcome the reluctance to conduct experiments.
10.  How can countries with low transplant rates be helped? Many countries have low living and/or deceased donation rates. Understanding the underlying barriers (organization structure, population preferences, etc.) would be fruitful in making progress toward increasing transplant rates (see, e.g., Okubo et al. 2026).
11.  What can be done to increase incentives for organ donation in ways that attract social support? What accounts for the widespread reluctance to increase organ donation by compensating donors? How can economists better explain the value of incentives in addressing scarcity and gather persuasive evidence to engage in a productive dialog with those who fear that this will increase rather than decrease black markets, or who feel there are fundamental religious or ethical objections to compensating organ donation? [For some thoughts on this, readers are referred to Roth (2026b)]. 

Deceased-donor-initiated kidney-exchange chains are performing well in Italy

 Here's a new report from Italy on initiating kidney exchange chains with a deceased donor.*  In Italy to date, 34 deceased donor initiated chains generated 84 transplants (34 from deceased donors  and 50 from living donors), including 56 among incompatible pairs and 28 to candidates on the waitlist.

Furian L., Di Bella C., Maggiore U., Fiaschetti P., Partelli S., Feltrin G. Integrating Deceased and Living Donation: Long-Term Outcomes of the Italian Deceased-Donor-Initiated Kidney Exchange (DEC-K) Program AJT_ 26/7S1, Volume 26, Issue 7, S1. The cover date will be July 2026. 

"Integrating deceased and living donation through deceased-donor (DD)-initiated chains can expand kidney transplant access in small paired exchange pools. The Italian DEC-K program allocates a DD kidney to initiate a chain (chain-initiating kidney, CIK) among incompatible living-donor (LD) pairs, ultimately returning a LD kidney to the national waiting list (WL). We report the first long-term national results of this donor organ allocation model.
 

"Methods: All DEC-K chains performed in Italy (2018-2025) were retrospectively analyzed. Recipients were stratified by kidney source (CIK vs LD).

...
"Results: Thirty-four DEC-K chains generated 84 transplants (34 DD and 50 LD), including 56 among incompatible pairs and 28 to candidates on the WL. Donor withdrawal occurred once. Four chains were terminated early after CIK transplantation due to newly developed contraindications to donation. At a median follow-up of 60 months, 1- and 3-year graft survival was 100% in both groups, while patient survival was 97.1% for CIK and 98.0% for LD. Three CIK and one LD recipients died with functioning graft (suicide, sepsis, urothelial carcinoma, and acute myocardial infarction, respectively). One CIK recipient experienced graft loss after 40 months due to chronic rejection. Adjusted eGFR trajectories were comparable between CIK and LD (P = 0.48). Chain-ending kidney recipients, with 4 graft loss overall (1 antibody-mediated rejection and 3 vascular thrombosis), showed outcomes comparable to LD (P = 0.64 for eGFR; P = 0.57 for graft survival).
 

"Conclusions: The DEC-K program proved feasible, safe, and effective in expanding transplant opportunities for incompatible and hard-to-match patients."

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* Some earlier posts on deceased donor initiated chains:

Sunday, April 3, 2022

Kidney Paired Donation Chains Initiated by Deceased Donors

Monday, November 22, 2021

A naturally occurring deceased-donor-initiated kidney exchange chain, by Maghen and Veale

Sunday, August 23, 2020

More on Deceased donors as non‐directed donors in kidney exchange chains

Tuesday, August 7, 2018

Deceased donor chains: Market design language is entering transplantation

Monday, April 11, 2016

Using deceased donor kidneys to start living donor kidney exchange chains

 

Organ Allocation and Transplantation, by Ashlagi and Roth, forthcoming in Annual Review of Economics 2026

 Here's a  forthcoming review paper on organ allocation and transplantation that focuses on the allocation of deceased-donor organs, particularly kidneys, and goes through the whole supply chain, from donor registration and family consent after death, to patient prioritization, and organ allocation. We also discuss the regulatory and political practices and ethical concerns that keep the availability of transplants far short of their need.

Organ Allocation and Transplantation
by Itai Ashlagi and Alvin E. Roth, Annual Review of Economics   
Vol. 18 https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-092425-123425
Review in Advance first posted online on June 08, 2026. (Changes may still occur before final publication.)
 
Abstract: There is a large shortage of solid organs for transplants. This survey reviews the allocation of organs (particularly kidneys), with an emphasis on how deceased donor organs are obtained and allocated in the United States but with pointers to related issues involving living donors and transplantation around the world. We review some of the key institutional details and theoretical and empirical studies and describe some open questions that we hope will continue to attract attention from researchers interested in the economic and operational aspects of organ allocation. 

 

The paper ends with a set of open questions and research directions, followed by these concluding paragraphs about the future:

 "THE DAY AFTER TOMORROW

"Efforts to quickly improve the availability of transplants include recovering more transplantable organs from deceased donors, successfully transplanting more of those recovered organs, and facilitating more living donor organ transplants of kidneys and livers. In the longer term, efforts are under way to reduce the need for human organ transplants by reducing the need for re-transplantation (after graft failure) and by preventing organ failure or curing it by other means. 

"It is common to hear that xenotransplantation is tomorrow’s cure for organ failure, and always will be. However, recent developments in transplanting organs from genetically modified pigs into primates and humans suggest that the future possibilities are real, even though (as of this writing) no pig organ transplant to a human has yet survived for as much as a year (although there have now been some pig kidney and heart transplants that worked for months; Tector 2025). Another somewhat related approach involves trying to bioengineer an artificial kidney by removing from a pig kidney the pig cells that would be attacked by the human immune system, leaving a scaffold that could be populated with human kidney cells (Lo et al. 2024). Less developed so far is the hope of regrowing kidneys through some kind of stem cell manipulation, although some kidney cell growth in mice has been achieved (Araoka et al. 2025).
 

"Each of these lines of research offers the possibility of reducing or ending the need for, and hence the scarcity of, human organs for transplantation. That scarcity would also be reduced by medical progress in reducing the incidence and progression of kidney disease and its precursors and of other kinds of organ failure that now require transplantation.  Yet it remains likely that almost everyone whose life could be extended by a human organ transplant today will die without one, and so our attention to the shortage of transplants is still needed." 

Organ donation after euthanasia in the Netherlands

In the Netherlands, not only is it legal to receive medical aid in dying (MAID), but  a growing number of MAID patients are able to successfully achieve their desire to become deceased organ donors.

 From the American Journal of Transplantation:

 Wijbenga, N., Gan, C.T., Ruigrok, D., Berg, E.M., Hagenaars, J.A.M., Siregar, S., van der Kaaij, N.P., Mathot, B.J., van Pel, R., Seghers, L. and Manintveld, O.C., 2026. The Increasing Contribution of Organ Donation after Euthanasia to the Lung Transplantation Donor Pool in the Netherlands. American Journal of Transplantation. 

 "Abstract: The number of organ donation after euthanasia (ODE) procedures in the Netherlands has grown substantially, yet their contribution to the lung-donor pool remains unclear. There is no clinical consensus on how these potential ODE lung-donors should be assessed. We aimed to describe the total contribution of ODE to the lung-donor pool in the Netherlands and describe the assessment of potential ODE lung-donors.
We collected data from all ODE procedures performed between 2012-2024 in the Netherlands. We assessed the number of ODE-lungs offered, rejected, accepted, and transplanted, comparing characteristics of discarded and transplanted lungs.
Of 1166 lung-donor, 664(60%) were DCD donors of which 154(23%) were ODE lung-donors. The total proportion of donor lungs from ODE lung-donors acceptable to offer for lung transplantation was 117 of which 104 (89%) were transplanted. Evaluation prior to donation was highly variable, with medical history and chest CT most affecting acceptance decisions. Short-term outcomes were excellent, with 1-year survival of 84%.
Our findings indicate that ODE lung donors are increasingly important in the Netherlands, with high acceptance rates, despite highly variable evaluation methods. Standardizing the assessment of potential ODE lung donors could further improve acceptance rates and enhance the contribution of ODE to the lung-donor pool."

Funeral expenses for deceased organ donors in Taiwan

 In Taiwan, the Ministry of Health and Welfare helps pay for the funerals of deceased organ donors.

 From the Taiwan Organ Sharing Registry and Patient Autonomy Promotion Center

(2)  Grants and Assistance for Donors' Families

a.        Funeral Subsidies:
The MOHW provides funeral subsidies to the donor's family, including NT$50,000 for corneal donations and NT$100,000 for multiple organ donations in addition to the cornea.

b.        Farewell Care Service:
In order to express our gratitude to the organ donors and their families, we provided flower baskets and certificates of appreciation at the farewell ceremony of the donors. In addition to affirming the selfless dedication of the organ donors, we also thanked the family members for their decision. 

Alex Chan on deceased organ donation

 The Harvard Gazette points to this interview with HBS professor Alex Chan:

Designing Incentives That Matter—Even After Death: Interview with Alex Chan By Avery Forman 

"In “Reimagining Transplant Center Incentives Beyond the CMS IOTA Model,” published in January in the Journal of the American Medical Association, Chan explores a government experiment that pays kidney centers for volume and efficiency—not just outcomes—which could increase transplant numbers. Chan cowrote the article with Alvin E. Roth, the George Gund Professor of Economics and Business Administration, Emeritus, at HBS.

In addition, covering funeral costs for organ donors could increase donation rates by up to 35%, and save up to 419,000 life years and as much as $800 million in Medicare expenses, Chan and coauthor Kurt Sweat of the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center write in “Funeral Expense Reimbursement as a Strategy to Enhance Organ Donation and Transplantation Access,” published in October in NPJ Health Systems.

 ...

"Why Chan felt compelled to study the organ market

“Two things pulled me in. First, this is a market where the stakes are brutally clear. Organ transplantation is one of the few places where inefficiency shows up not as a deadweight loss in a textbook, but as people dying on a waiting list. When a market fails here, it fails loudly.

Second, the level of inefficiency is staggering. Each year, more than 5,000 organs are recovered and then discarded, while roughly the same number of people die waiting for an organ. These are million-dollar transactions once you account for surgery, lifelong care, and avoided dialysis. So even small improvements in incentives can save lives directly and save the healthcare system billions of dollars.

For an economist or market designer, that’s a rare alignment: moral urgency and economic leverage pointing in the same direction.”

Incentives must consider what’s socially acceptable

“Incentive design is much harder than we like to admit. Organ transplantation is a supply chain. You have procurement organizations, hospitals, surgeons, patients, regulators, all responding to different incentives.

Designing a good incentive for one actor is already difficult. Designing incentives so that the entire chain works well is not just adding up the optimal incentives for each link. Sometimes improving one part of the system quietly breaks another.

The choice isn't between market and no market. It’s between a system we design on purpose and a system that fails by accident.

This is a market with moral and political constraints embedded in it. In healthcare, and frankly now in most markets, the incentives that are economically sensible also need to be socially legitimate.

Incentives don’t just change behavior; they express values. In markets that touch life, death, or dignity, people react not only to what the incentive does, but to what it seems to say. That makes incentive design less like tuning a machine and more like negotiating a fragile social contract.

 ...

"The ‘ick factor’ might prevent progress

“Very often people do not want to use the right incentives because they have this concept of it being repugnant.

[For instance], we would pay for the funeral of someone who gives their life for their country when they serve in the military. We will pay for the funeral of someone who donated their body for scientific research to advance society. But if people want to donate an organ to save another person's life? If [that donor’s] family would very much welcome some support at a moment of crisis, we are not going to pay for the funeral. Even a very sensible incentive sometimes is bound by social norms, or even what we call the ‘ick factor,’ and we have a less effective system at the end.

People worry that incentives will corrupt the gift of life. But the truth is that we already have incentives; they’re just accidental and poorly distributed. The choice isn't between market and no market. It’s between a system we design on purpose and a system that fails by accident. Ignorance of incentives doesn't make a system moral; it just makes it inefficient.”