True Crime: Illegal markets have great variety (PNAS)

 The forthcoming issue of PNAS (August 18, 2026 | vol. 123 | no. 33) has a big set of papers on illegal markets, with the goal of searching for common features, which turn out to be somewhat elusive.

Research ArticleAugust 10, 2026

A budding science of illegal markets

Illegal markets create untold societal and environmental harm, but they have attracted surprisingly little scholarly attention. This paper explores illegal markets as a class of objects. It considers similarities and differences across markets, with ...

• Jonathan P. Caulkins

"The raw material for these comparisons mostly comes from the February 2025 Policy and Research on Illegal Markets (PRIM) workshop held at RAND in Santa Monica. The workshop convened 17 experts on nine specific markets, or types of markets. They wrote the market-specific papers contained within this volume."  

Research ArticleAugust 10, 2026

Stability and turbulence in illegal drug markets

This article provides a primer on illegal drug markets, with a focus on the structure and nature of these markets and the enterprises involved. The markets for illegal drugs are large, with annual retail expenditures likely exceeding $100 billion in the ...

• Beau Kilmer
• 
  

IntroductionAugust 10, 2026

Illegal markets: An important domain for applied science

• Jonathan P. Caulkins,
• Beau Kilmer and
• Peter Reuter

"One premise of this special issue is that illegal markets and the supply chains that support them are a worthy topic of scientific inquiry. That turns out to be a novel claim. Illegal markets have simply not been a major topic of interest to economists, the discipline that would most plausibly study them. For example, Nobel laureate Alvin Roth, in his magisterial review of markets and market design, describes illegal markets but offers no specific analytic insights about them (2[A. E. Roth, Marketplaces, markets, and market design. Am. Econ. Rev. 108, 1609–1658 (2018).]). Gary Becker, one of the giants of microeconomics, wrote occasionally about drug markets but forced on them the presumption that they were analytically no different than legal markets (e.g., ref. 3). 

Research ArticleAugust 10, 2026

How illegal wildlife trade adheres to and defies conventional market behavior

Illegal wildlife markets comprise a complex global economy generating criminal profits while harming biodiversity and livelihoods. The negative externalities from biodiversity loss, ecosystem destabilization, and zoonotic disease risk may be orders of ...

• Greg Midgette and
• Meredith L. Gore

"At least since the third century BCE, when the Edicts of Ashoka prohibited the killing of animals with aesthetic value on the Indian subcontinent, wildlife has been trapped, harvested, and sold in contravention of laws (1). " 

PerspectiveAugust 10, 2026

Illegal firearms markets: Transaction patterns, evolving sources, and importance in criminal misuse

In the United States, the legal status of the 30 to 40 million annual firearms transactions is defined by state and federal regulations. These regulations primarily aim to reduce criminal misuse while preserving access for the large majority of adults who ...

• Philip J. Cook and
• Rosanna Smart

"Illegal transactions in firearms are often embedded in the much larger formal and informal markets, simply because sellers cannot easily distinguish between legal and illegal buyers even if they are motivated to do so. As one analogy, illegal firearms transactions look less like the market for heroin, where everyone involved knows the illegality of their transaction, than that for diverted pharmaceuticals." 

PerspectiveAugust 10, 2026

The market for human smuggling: Structure, mechanisms, and paradoxes

Human smuggling is the facilitation of unlawful cross-border movement. It is primarily a commercial activity, offered as a service to willing, paying customers, and a large-scale market catering to millions seeking to circumvent mobility restrictions. ...

• Paolo Campana

"The terms human smuggling and human trafficking are often confused, but they represent two very different phenomena, albeit potentially occurring in the same places and populations. While a victim of trafficking and a genuine client of a smuggler might find themselves shoulder-to-shoulder in the same inflatable boat, thus sharing the same means to cross the same border, smuggling and trafficking remain distinct—both analytically and legally. In the case of smuggling, the service provided is the illegal entry into a country—and a migrant enters into the transaction with a smuggler voluntarily (1). Some may have few options other than to migrate, and in that sense be forced to migrate, but they are not forced into that action by an individual or organization selling them the smuggling service. The relationship between a migrant and a smuggler terminates when the former has reached the agreed destination and paid the latter the agreed sum. On the other hand, the purpose of trafficking is obtaining control over a person for exploitation, including sexual exploitation, labor exploitation, or domestic servitude (2).† Victims of human trafficking may enter a country through legal channels, and in some cases, trafficking takes place wholly within national borders." 

PerspectiveAugust 10, 2026

The money laundering market: An economic analysis

Criminals launder their proceeds from crime, either themselves or by paying a professional, to disguise the link between the criminal, the crime, and the proceeds. This allows the criminal to spend the proceeds more freely and lowers the chance of ...

• Joras Ferwerda

"Since the goal of money laundering is to go unnoticed or to be seen as some other form of legitimate transaction, it is, by nature, difficult to provide credible estimates of how big the problem is. Moreover, the purchase of laundering services is generally a consensual crime: Both parties voluntarily enter into the transaction. Consensual crimes lack a direct victim to report the crime, which means the crime is revealed only when it is actively investigated.
There are a number of estimates of the volume of money laundering. These range in credibility; some lack empirical backup altogether [e.g., the widely quoted International Monetary Fund estimate of 2 to 5% of global GDP (3)]..." 

PerspectiveAugust 10, 2026

Casting light on the workings of illegal fishing markets

About 3.5 million fishing vessels ply the world’s oceans, providing livelihoods and food for millions of people. Sound management is key to fisheries’ sustainability, but illegal fishing, along with fishing overcapacity generally and environmental change, ...

• Philippe Le Billon,
• Zelda Ladefoged and
• U. Rashid Sumaila

 

PerspectiveAugust 10, 2026

Illegal markets for cigarettes and e-cigarettes

This paper discusses the long-standing illegal markets for cigarettes and the more recently emerged illegal markets for e-cigarettes. We identify three distinctive market fundamentals that help explain many features of the illegal markets. First, in ...

• Donald Kenkel and
• Grace Phillips

"In 2024, tobacco products generated almost $1 trillion in revenues, mainly from cigarette sales; e-cigarettes generated $26 billion dollars (1–3). While the share of the illegal markets varies by country, it is estimated that illegal markets account for about 10 percent of global cigarette consumption (4). Second, the illegal markets have arisen to evade high excise taxes that increase prices and regulations that restrict the availability of desirable features of legal products.  "

PerspectiveAugust 10, 2026

The illegal market for sex in the United States: Insights from economic research

The illegal market for sex in the United States generates significant economic activity yet remains understudied due to its illegality and clandestine nature. This paper synthesizes existing empirical evidence documenting aspects of market structure, ...

• Manisha Shah

"Although sex work is often perceived as predominantly occurring in marginalized urban areas or among underprivileged cultural groups, sex work is pervasive at all echelons of society. Media portrayals often emphasize street-based sex work, presenting it as the predominant form of prostitution; however, street-based sex work has been estimated to account for approximately 10 to 15% of total sex work participation (2). In the United States and in many other countries, the majority of the sex market has moved “indoors,” whether that be through massage parlors or brothels and/or online encounters." 

PerspectiveAugust 10, 2026

The policy construction of illegal markets: Exploring variation, success, failure, and unintended consequences

Illegal markets, broadly defined to include markets where only specific transactions are illegal, are the consequence of policy, either a prohibition or highly restrictive regulation. They are generated by a variety of concerns, some moral, some ...

• Letizia Paoli and
• Peter Reuter

"Drugs that are now prohibited were perfectly legal in most countries until the early 20th century. Famously, the British fought two “Opium Wars” with China (1839–1842 and 1856–1858) to open up that nation to opium exports from India (8). Cannabis, the most popular plant-based illegal drug, was cultivated—and also grew wildly—in at least four continents and until the 1920s “the large majority of countries did not have any controls at all” (9). However, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs virtually prohibited all production and distribution of many prominent psychoactive substances, including heroin, cocaine, and cannabis; it also prohibited possession. Since then, drug transactions have grown to form what is generally believed to be the largest illegal market globally. For the United States (US), an estimate for 2016, the latest available, was over $150 billion (10)." 

PerspectiveAugust 10, 2026

A descriptive analysis for the markets for counterfeit products

Product counterfeiting is a pervasive crime that involves the unauthorized use of a legitimate trademark, a violation of intellectual property rights. Counterfeiting is also one of many forms of global illicit trade, mirroring legitimate markets in ...

• Jay P. Kennedy

"US Customs and Border Protection reports (2) regarding intellectual property rights violations state that the most commonly seized counterfeit products at US ports of entry in 2024 were handbags/wallets (36% of all seizures), pharmaceuticals (27%), and apparel (7.4%). Other products seized included footwear, automotive parts, health and beauty products, and electronics like cell phones, computers, microprocessors, and circuit boards. While Customs seizure reports give an indication of the types of products identified and interdicted by law enforcement agencies, many more counterfeit products slip past customs agents and enter the market, including items like counterfeit aircraft parts, military equipment, weapons systems components, and even parts for nuclear reactors. "

##########

Some of these markets are also discussed in my recent book, 

Moral Economics: From Prostitution to Organ Sales, What Controversial Transactions Reveal About How Markets Work  

 

 

The Paradox of Protection: Overregulation Threatens Living Kidney Donation in Mexico,

 Protections intended to thwart organ trafficking may inadvertently also "protect" legitimate patients and donors from receiving life-saving medical care.

The Paradox of Protection: How Overregulation Threatens Living Kidney Donation in Mexico, by Francisco J. Reyna-Sepulveda and Javier Sanchez-Maldonado, Transplantation, Publish Ahead of Print, July 27, 2026. | DOI: 10.1097/TP.0000000000005860 

 

 

"Globally, unrelated and nondirected living kidney donations have become important mechanisms for expanding transplant access.1 Structured programs in the United States and Spain support unrelated donation through rigorous psychological evaluation, independent donor advocacy, and transparent oversight systems.3,4 For example, nondirected donors serve as critical initiators of kidney paired donation chains, substantially amplifying transplant opportunities beyond a single donor-recipient pair.3-5 However, a recent regulatory shift in Mexico threatens to effectively preclude these pathways in practice, leaving living kidney donors (including living liver donors) with genuine altruistic intent declined and vulnerable patients losing critical access to life-saving transplants.

"WHEN ALTRUISM REQUIRES PROOF
"On August 4, 2023, the National Transplant Center and the Federal Commission for Protection against Health Risks issued a High Health Directive (Alta Directiva Sanitaria), establishing mandatory standardized protocols for Mexican transplant centers.6 This directive emerged in response to well-documented regional concerns regarding organ trafficking, transplant tourism, regulatory gaps, and the “legal simulation” of donor-recipient relationships. These concerns are entirely legitimate and align with the principles articulated by the Declaration of Istanbul on Organ Trafficking and Transplant Tourism.7 

...

"Although the directive does not explicitly outlaw nondirected donation, its evidentiary requirements effectively preclude it at the committee level. As a result, viable donor candidates may be categorically declined for regulatory rather than medical reasons.  

...

"Although data isolating the exact proportion of donor evaluations declined solely for documentation rather than medical or psychosocial factors are currently unavailable, Mexican National Registry data highlight a concerning sign.9 During the 12 mo preceding the directive’s publication, 438 unrelated living donor kidney transplants were performed nationally, compared with 354 during the subsequent 12 mo—a 19% decline. " 

...

"This directive severely limits Mexico’s potential to establish domestic paired-exchange networks or participate in cross-border paired kidney exchanges. The Global Kidney Exchange model, for instance, incorporates pairs from middle-income countries into US-initiated chains to overcome financial and immunological barriers.10 This approach has been accompanied by ethical discussion in the transplant literature, particularly regarding concerns about potential inducements and unintended exploitation.10" 

...

"Ultimately, the critical question is not whether expanding living kidney donation should be permitted, but whether a transplant system can be considered ethically complete if a viable living kidney donor candidate is categorically declined for regulatory rather than medical reasons." 

Peter Coy on Moral Economics in The Free Press

 The Nobel Laureate Who’d Buy Your Kidney
What is bad about prostitution? Why is it wrong to eat horses? Al Roth’s latest book asks the most provocative moral questions. He gave The Free Press some of his answers.
By Peter Coy 

"I was a little surprised to find out that Roth has a wide streak of provocation in his personality. It comes across in his new book, Moral Economics: From Prostitution to Organ Sales, What Controversial Transactions Reveal about How Markets Work, published in May. In a mild, just-asking-questions tone, Roth digs into one prohibited or controversial activity after another: buying sex, eating horses, selling organs, assisting suicide, carrying a stranger’s baby. He asks why many of these activities are prohibited or restricted even though some people clearly want them. And he thinks about whether it’s possible to design markets for them in a way that preserves people’s freedom to transact while protecting those who don’t want to. 

...

"Roth entertains so many ideas that others strenuously resist that I asked if he calls himself a libertarian. No, he said. “People who call themselves libertarians often don’t like market regulation of any sort,” he said. “But I’m a market designer. I think that good regulations help markets work well.” Cigarettes and alcohol, for example. They can be sold, but not to children. That’s a reasonable balance. 

...

"If you want to design markets that enable beneficial exchanges while protecting the vulnerable, you may have to persuade people that a market in some repugnant good or service is tolerable. Roth seems to have taken on that task in Moral Economics. He never told me what to think. He just asked me what I think, and to think about what I think. It’s an economist’s kind of mischief—relentlessly, cheerfully inquisitive about the rules we’ve decided to live by but have never quite explained to ourselves.
Kidney transactions don’t seem so repugnant to me anymore. Would I sell a kidney to a stranger? Um, maybe, some day. Would I buy a kidney from a stranger if I really needed one? Hell, yeah."

Civil society, state and market by Bowles and Carlin in Annual Review of Economics

 Sam Bowles and Wendy Carlin propose that we should think of civil society as the third leg in regulating economic life, along with government and markets. (They use kidney exchange as an example to indicate what they mean.) 

The Governance Triangle: Economic interactions in civil society, the state, and the market, Bowles, Samuel; Carlin, Wendy; (2026), Annual Review of Economics. 

"Abstract: Interactions in civil society – in firms, families, neighborhoods, identity groups, and other face-to-face settings – have in common that relationships are personal and enduring, and as a result, identity and other-regarding preferences are important motivations (for better or worse). Here we add civil society to markets and states as a third form of governance of the economy, creating the governance triangle. We provide evidence that themes related to civil society have assumed substantially greater importance in economic research since the 1970s. We use a standard principal-agent model of employment in private firms to reveal three characteristics of interactions in civil society: the role of face-to-face interactions, social norms, and the private exercise of power. We show that market failures and other coordination problems can sometimes be more successfully addressed by civil society than by state or market governance. Civil society may have comparative institutional advantage where information available to state and market actors is limited, restricting the reach of complete contracts and enforceable government regulations, conditional on conflicts of interest being modest. When based on us-versus-them forms of identity, however, civil society governance may promote preferences antithetical to a liberal and democratic society." 

 

 

"To illustrate the meaning of points in the triangle, we have placed the kidney exchange model proposed by Alvin Roth and his collaborators (the red dot) in the governance triangle ((Roth et al 2006).) They designed a mechanism connecting those needing a kidney replacement to altruistic donors of kidneys. Such donors are most often an immediate family member of someone whose kidney is not a match for their loved-one needing the transplant. Roth’s algorithm enables long chains of unrelated matched donors and recipients, thereby widening access to transplants because they do not have to be conducted bilaterally (the donor giving to a particular match) and contemporaneously.

"As an illustration of the nexus of synergistic institutions in the triangle, we represent the kidney donor mechanism, the red point, by a weight of 0.3 on the state (which regulates the exchanges, including prohibiting sales), 0.2 on the market (which provides associated medical services), and 0.5 on civil society (for the centrality of altruistic and ethical motivations underlying the initial contribution of the kidney.)... By relating the characteristics of behaviour and the allocation mechanisms involved to the three pure types, other institutions and policies can be located inside the triangle."

########

Note that this representation in a triangle is in a barycentric coordinate system, which has only become a readily recognizable tool in various applications in economics in the last half century or so.  Wikipedia dates their introduction to 1827.

Deceased organ donation by Ashlagi and Roth in the Annual Review of Economics (with open questions)

 Here's a review paper concentrating primarily on transplantation of  organs (primarily kidneys) from deceased donors. It closes with a set of open research questions.

Organ Allocation and Transplantation  by Itai Ashlagi and Alvin E. Roth,  Annual Review of Economics, Volume 18, 2026, Vol. 18:613-645, August 2026, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-092425-123425     
 
ABSTRACT: There is a large shortage of solid organs for transplants. This survey reviews the allocation of organs (particularly kidneys), with an emphasis on how deceased donor organs are obtained and allocated in the United States but with pointers to related issues involving living donors and transplantation around the world. We review some of the key institutional details and theoretical and empirical studies and describe some open questions that we hope will continue to attract attention from researchers interested in the economic and operational aspects of organ allocation.

 
1. INTRODUCTION
 "Since at least the turn of the century, organ transplants have attracted considerable interest from economists. This is due both to their importance in modern medicine and to the fact that organ transplantation deals directly with some of the most basic questions of economics—namely, how to efficiently allocate scarce resources and how to make them less scarce. "

...

OPEN QUESTIONS AND RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
 
This section highlights research opportunities, some of which have been raised above.

1.  Can we design allocation rules free of justified envy that place hard-to-match organs quickly enough so that they remain transplantable? A large number of recovered organs that might be transplanted are discarded. How can we increase utilization of marginal-quality organs and get them accepted after fewer offers and less CIT? How can we do this in a transparent and equitable way? How can we use the information about organ quality that arrives during the offering process? 91 How can we use offer refusals in real time? How should we design allocation rules in the presence of social learning and potential information cascades (Zhang 2010, Doval et al. 2024)? How should the variability in centers’ willingness to accept marginal organs be accounted for?
2.  How to design priorities to balance efficiency and equity? How can priorities be designed to account for both longevity and urgency (Zhang et al. 2024, Lazenby et al. 2025)? How can priorities depend on patients’ treatments, taking into account that treatment decisions may in turn depend on priorities (Sweat 2023)? Countries use different priority rules, and there is a need to compare these to better understand trade-offs between these rules. The OPTN is seeking to implement continuous distribution allocation policies for hearts and kidneys, which will assign priority points smoothly across patient and match features. There are not yet studies that offer guidance to the resulting (in)efficiencies. 92
3.  How should organ quality be measured and reported? The KDPI is currently used for both acceptance decisions by surgeons and prioritization in the allocation system. As supply changes over time, percentiles correspond to different qualities. For example, a KDPI of 85% (which is the threshold for requiring patient consent to receive an offer) in 2018 corresponds to (i.e., has the same underlying nonnormalized KDRI risk measure as) a KDPI of 75% in 2024 due to the recovery of more organs and therefore the higher availability of organs of marginal quality. Would the use of the nonnormalized KDRI substantially change behavior and outcomes?
4.  How should surgeons’ and patients’ preferences be elicited? The OPTN allows transplant centers to express preferences via filters that screen organ offers. Despite this, many organs are still declined hundreds and even thousands of times (Agarwal et al. 2021, Guan et al. 2025). How can we better design these filters? Can we use AI to help recommend filters or to predict organ refusals in real time? More broadly, how should waitlist mechanisms be designed given incomplete patient and center preferences?
5.  How should transplant centers’ performance be measured? Should transplant centers be incentivized to accept marginal organs, for example, for patients facing many years of dialysis? How should we regulate transplant centers? Are new incentive schemes useful in increasing utilization? For example, how will the acceptance rate and pre-transplant mortality rate metrics impact centers’ behavior? The CMS has also launched the Increasing Organ Transplant Access model, 93 using a long-term field experiment that offers monetary incentives based on the number of transplants performed, graft survival, and percentage of accepted offers (Chan & Roth 2026.) How should we incorporate the huge role that transplant centers play in acceptance/rejection decisions when studying organ allocation mechanisms (Chan & Roth 2024, Ashlagi et al. 2025a)? There is a need for research on designing centers’ performance measures that include outcomes for patients on the waiting list.
6.  How should OPO performance be measured? OPOs vary in performance in terms of organ recovery and utilization, and incentive schemes remain controversial. How effective is the new tier system for monitoring OPOs based on donation and age-adjusted transplant rates? How should OPOs be incentivized to improve performance and transparency and to coordinate with transplant centers (see Chan & Roth 2024, Bae et al. 2026, Skowronski et al. 2026)?
7.  What should we incorporate in transplant centers’ preferences? Most theoretical models treat patients as the decision makers who accept or reject organ offers. In practice, however, transplant centers exercise substantial discretion over acceptance decisions, listing practices, and setting filters. How do equilibrium outcomes reflect centers’ preferences? There is a need for empirical and theoretical studies of how centers’ characteristics and incentives shape outcomes.
8.  Can we design simulation tools that account for equilibrium behavior? Simulations and historical data have been instrumental to the study and design of allocation policies. Existing simulations apply myopic acceptance models that are invariant to the allocation rules. There is a need for simple modern simulation tools that account for the incentives of patients and centers. 94 It would be interesting to create tools that generate not only better equilibrium predictions but also short-term equilibration effects. 95
9.  What kinds of experiments should the OPTN conduct? The OPTN conducts very few controlled experiments, despite facing ongoing allocation policy decisions. While simulation tools are useful to inform policy, field experiments offer another approach. Experiments can generate useful data to evaluate different approaches (e.g., for expediting placements). The size and heterogeneity of the United States present opportunities to test different approaches; but they also raise questions about whether different approaches would work differently in different regions, and about how to overcome the reluctance to conduct experiments.
10.  How can countries with low transplant rates be helped? Many countries have low living and/or deceased donation rates. Understanding the underlying barriers (organization structure, population preferences, etc.) would be fruitful in making progress toward increasing transplant rates (see, e.g., Okubo et al. 2026).
11.  What can be done to increase incentives for organ donation in ways that attract social support? What accounts for the widespread reluctance to increase organ donation by compensating donors? How can economists better explain the value of incentives in addressing scarcity and gather persuasive evidence to engage in a productive dialog with those who fear that this will increase rather than decrease black markets, or who feel there are fundamental religious or ethical objections to compensating organ donation? [For some thoughts on this, readers are referred to Roth (2026b)]. 

Regulation after a first occurrence : Cornell bans students from skinning bears in a dormitory kitchen

 It turns out that Cornell had no rule preventing students from skinning bears in a communal dormitory kitchen.  But now they do. (A lot of regulation works like that... keep an eye on AI...)

Students Skinned a Bear in a Dorm. Cornell Realized It Should Ban That.
After two Cornell University students skinned a black bear in a communal kitchen last year to make a meal, the school changed the rules.  By Miles G. Cohen

Annual Review of Economics - Volume 18, 2026

 Now published: Annual Review of Economics - Volume 18, 2026

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1146/economics.2026.18.issue-1

• 
  

• • • Dynamic Contracting

      Alessandro Pavan

      https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080525-114300

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  • • The Economics of Professional Decision-Making: Can Artificial Intelligence Reduce Decision Uncertainty?

      W. Bentley MacLeod

      https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-051624-071111

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  • • The Governance Triangle: Economic Interactions in Civil Society, the State, and the Market

      Samuel Bowles and Wendy Carlin

      https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-081424-080722

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  • • Evidence in Games and Mechanisms

      Elchanan Ben-Porath, Eddie Dekel and Barton L. Lipman

      https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-051624-060215

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  • • Natural Language Processing and Innovation Research

      Antonin Bergeaud, Adam Jaffe and Dimitris Papanikolaou

      https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-072225-113623

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  • • Masculinity Norms and Their Economic Implications

      Ieda Matavelli, Pauline Grosjean, Ralph De Haas and Victoria Baranov

      https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-051624-065932

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  • • The Neuroeconomics of Simple and Complex Choice

      Peter Bossaerts and Wolfram Schultz

      https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-051624-062344

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  • • Transfers of Technology and Management Practices: Evidence from the Twentieth Century

      Michela Giorcelli

      https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-051624-055215

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  • • Religion in Emerging and Developing Regions

      Sara Lowes, Benjamin Marx and Eduardo Montero

      https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-051624-065145

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  • • The Global Economic Impact of Climate Change: An Empirical Perspective

      Solomon Hsiang

      https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-102224-021145

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  • • Monetary Policy, Bank Fragility, and the Modern Financial Intermediation

      Gregor Matvos, Tomasz Piskorski and Amit Seru

      https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-051624-060715

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  • • Large Language Models: An Applied Econometric Framework

      Jens Ludwig, Sendhil Mullainathan and Ashesh Rambachan

      https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-120925-105620

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  • • International Migration and Economic Development

      Dean Yang

      https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-081525-021320

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  • • The Economic Impacts of Gender-Based Violence and Harassment

      Abi Adams and Emily Nix

      https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-051624-062754

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  • • Firm Size and Dynamics in Less Developed Economies

      Marcela Eslava

      https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-081525-072902

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  • • Learning in a Correlated World

      Arjada Bardhi and Steven Callander

      https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-051624-072515

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  • • Market Power in Artificial Intelligence

      Joshua S. Gans

      https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-051624-061832

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  • • Africa as a Success Story: Political Organization in Precolonial Africa

      Soeren J. Henn and James A. Robinson

      https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-051624-070224

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  • • Why Did Inflation Rise and Fall in 2021–2024? Channels and Evidence from Expectations

      Ricardo Reis

      https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-051624-072332

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  • • Uneven Modernization in the Muslim World

      Timur Kuran and Fasih Zulfiqar

      https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-051624-064953

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  • • What Makes New Work Different from More Work?

      David Autor, Caroline Chin, Anna Salomons and Bryan Seegmiller

      https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-092325-041649

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  • • The Economics of Religion: A Review

      Paul Seabright

      https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-051624-064410

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  • • Economic Growth Under Transformative AI

      Philip Trammell and Anton Korinek

      https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-051624-061002

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  • • Organ Allocation and Transplantation

      Itai Ashlagi and Alvin E. Roth

      https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-092425-123425

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  • • What Every PhD Student Should Know About Adam Smith

      Barry R. Weingast

      https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-051624-073128

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  • • Credit and Exports: Lessons From Micro-Level Data

      Banu Demir and Veronica Rappoport

      https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-051624-055456

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  • • The Macroeconomics of Market Power

      Jan De Loecker and Jan Eeckhout

      https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-100825-105527

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• Symposium on the Economics of Religion

• • • Religion in Emerging and Developing Regions

      Sara Lowes, Benjamin Marx and Eduardo Montero

      https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-051624-065145

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  • • Uneven Modernization in the Muslim World

      Timur Kuran and Fasih Zulfiqar

      https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-051624-064953

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  • • The Economics of Religion: A Review

      Paul Seabright

      https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-051624-064410

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